Cable from Le Duc Tho to COSVN Providing Ideas on the Possibility of Conducting Attacks and Uprisings to Liberate Local Areas

After reviewing COSVN Directive 02/75 providing COSVN’s assessment of the situation and its policy decision to conduct attacks and uprisings at the grass-roots level (village, district, and province), Comrade Le Duc Tho provided the following additional ideas for consideration:

COSVN’s policy decision that “villages will liberate themselves, will eliminate village-level military headquarters, and will besiege and destroy district military headquarters, district capitals, and province capitals, leading to the complete liberation of entire district and provinces” might not yet be appropriate for the current situation. In Comrade Tho’s opinion, the three-pronged attack [military, political, military proselyting] at the grassroots level is only capable of liberating enemy outposts at the hamlet and village level. Even if forces at the grassroots level are strong, they are only capable of liberating village-level military headquarters. As for district capitals, district military headquarters, and province capitals, if the effort involves only the three-pronged attacks of grassroots level forces, in the immediate and short-term future, at least, such attacks are not capable of taking such targets. Even later on, when local forces at the province level become stronger, the liberation of province capitals still can only be accomplished if main force units are available to make the primary effort. Only in the case of small provinces that have been greatly strengthened and in which enemy forces have largely collapsed will it be possible for local forces to liberate provinces and their capitals.

For that reason, when discussing the three-pronged attack at the grassroots level, only if our grassroots level forces continue to expand will there be a chance that they can meet the requirements of the new situation. If COSVN wants to launch an emulation movement for “villages to liberate villages, districts to liberate districts, and provinces to liberate provinces,” it will have to provide very specific and detailed guidance to each individual area, it will have to quickly build up forces that are strong in every respect, and it will have to provide powerful reinforcements for the grassroots levels, because at this time the enemy is seeking to pull back and regroup his forces.

With regards to building and consolidating liberated zones, in order to keep pace with the developing requirements COSVN will need to strengthen our forces on the front lines. If COSVN wishes to do this, it will need to reorganize its upper level structures, from COSVN down to the region, military region, and province levels, in order to streamline them. The excess cadres can then be formed into mobile operations teams to be sent down to the grassroots level to conduct operations there.

[Translator’s Note: This document can also be found in the first edition of Lich Su Bien Nien Xu Uy Nam Bo va Trung Uong Cuc Mien Nam (1954-1975) [Historical Chronicle of the Cochin China Party Committee and the Central Office for South Vietnam, 1954-1975] (Hanoi: Nha xuat ban Chinh tri quoc gia, 2002), 1063.]