Code Message No. 879 from Director General Wierna to Mazur (Prague)

36

January 23, code message of director general to the ambassador in Prague:

the Polish stance on the Czechoslovak ideas to modify the Rapacki Plan

Warsaw, Jan. 23, 1958

Top secret

^c'Flash'^c

Code message [No] ^c879  Jan. 24,  13.45 hrs^c

Praga – MAZUR (deliver in person)

1) In our claris No 10 we signaled an article from Rude Pravo regarding transformation of our nuclear-free zone initiative into a neutral belt from Scandinavia to the Adriatic ^his worrying and determinal^hcwe consider it detrimental.^c  Promotion of such ideas is an expression of misunderstanding of the line of attack by those circles in the West, which – in the light of the plan’s enormous popularity and as it was put on the negotiation list included in the latest Soviet proposals – started to try to torpedo the plan and altered their line of argument as well. At this stage, attacks, apart from military arguments, use mainly the claim that the Rapacki Plan essentially, is not restricted to the ^hnuclear-free zone^{h c}that is specified within it^c but aims to neutralize ^cthe entire^c Europe, thus threatening the very foundations of the Atlantic alliance. This issue evokes hesitation and apprehension in milieus that favor the plan. It is therefore a tactical mistake to promote ^cnow^c the idea of extension of the plan onto other countries. To promote it by a state and co-member of the zone confirms the opponents’ argument, which is detrimental to the chief and popular initiative. ^c(Cf. I sent you Gajewski’s report about Pineau^4[1]2) ^c_.

I report that in conversations with Patolichev during his visit in Warsaw, he maintained that territorial expansion of the plan’s scope is not advisable. Furthermore, Bulganin’s letters do not contain such proposals, either. The enunciation ^hon Gromyko’s statement^c about Italy in front of a delegation of Italian Defenders of Peace was probably a ^hresult of inconsistencies on the part of the Italians in their account of the conversation^{h c}in their interpretation was imprecise.^c During talks with us the Italians ^hunderstood^{h c}agreed^c that for tactical reasonsthe denuclearization of Italy should be taken up separately, without linking it with the Rapacki Plan.

2) We are aware that the chief of the Czechoslovak Military Mission in West Berlin was called to Prague for consultation about the nuclear-free zone. We hear that pressed by the GDR, Prague is planning an extensive propaganda campaign (appeals, trade unions, ^hparliaments,^h etc.)

^hWe believe that^hcWithout disclosing that you are aware of this plan^c, we should ^ctry to^c persuade the Czechoslovak comrades that setting mass propaganda [machine] in motion ^hby means of run-of-the-mill methods^h, in this particular case, completely misses the point. ^cA large part^cof Western opinion treats the matter seriously ^hand therefore we need more effective methods^{h c}that is chiefly why we had used diplomatic forms and avoided forms that the West calls propaganda.^c

^hIt is desirable to conduct the conversation not earlier than Saturday.^h

^fWierna ^f

AMSZ, ZD 6/77, w. 60, t. 83

⁴² See doc. no 18