Conversation between SPD chairman Willy Brandt and the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev on 30 June 1981 in Moscow

July 6, 1981

Dr. Thomas Mirow

Subject: Conversation between SPD Chairman Willy Brandt with the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev on June 30, 1981, in Moscow

The meeting lasted for approximately 2.75 hours. Additional participants on the Soviet side were Gromyko, Ponomarev, Blatov; on the German side, Wischnewski, Mirow. Apart from them, each a translator. Brezhnev opened with an approximately hour-long introduction that he read off at sight; Brandt responded likewise with approximately an hour. Then questions were discussed. 

Brezhnev called the international environment concerning. It is therefore today more important than in the 1970s to find a common language. Then, one treated each other as partners and as possible friends. Today there is no longer a spirit of good will. The Soviet Union is asking itself what has changed since 1970. First and foremost, the weapons at hand are more terrible. Therefore, striving for peace is more important, but in practice looks different. One is deeply concerned about the USA which is striving for military supremacy. The threat of war is increasing, the collected reserves of trust decreasing.  The responsibility for this rests not only with the USA but also with those who follow them on their course. One asks oneself how the Federal Government would likely react if the Soviet Union strove for a position of supremacy and conducted itself like the USA in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. One has numerous concrete examples for the change in American policy. An American diplomat from the MBFR delegation thus declared that the Vienna discussions were meaningless and the consensus that had already been achieved must again be reduced to a minimum. 

One does not want to drive a wedge between the USA and its allies in Europe, but the policy of détente is in the interest of all peoples. Therefore, Western Europe should exercise its influence. 

The NATO resolution could have particularly fateful effects. Helmut Schmidt played an active role in this. “Bonn has done exhaustive work.” The Americans wanted to change the power dynamics in Europe and around the world to their benefit. The new Soviet missiles did not reach the USA, in contrast, the new American missiles could hit the Soviet Union. Pershing II and Cruise Missiles are not a reaction to the SS 20 but rather a blow to the strategic capacities of the Soviet Union and thus a qualitative change.

The Soviet superiority which is constantly asserted does not exist. Of course, the SS 20 are better than the old missiles. But their assignment has remained the same: to counteract NATO’s nuclear weapons. The deployment of the SS 20 does not change the balance of power. There is in Europe, when one considers NATO’s FBS as well as the British and French systems, an approximate equilibrium in nuclear vehicles, namely approximately 1,000 systems on both sides. Apart from that, for every SS 20, an old missile is withdrawn. The SS 20 program does not change the fact that the West has a one and a half times superiority, when one counts warheads. 

The implementation of the NATO resolution would raise Western superiority to two times, and the USSR could not accept this. It would have to implement counter measures. Apart from that, the Federal Republic of Germany would be reduced to a missile launch pad for the USA and could not pursue its own security policy anymore. The Federal Republic’s campaigning for the NATO resolution is a step away from the line of the Moscow treaty. In this, the course that was steered by Willy Brandt and then by Helmut Schmidt is now as correct as ever. 

War can no longer be allowed to proceed from German soil. One has not forgotten the 20 million dead during the Second World War in the USSR, but one has a desire to live with Germany in peace. There has never been disloyal conduct vis-à-vis the Federal Republic, but now the USSR is portrayed as a threat. The events of the year 1941 will not be repeated, even if one has to tighten one’s belt.

This good German-Soviet cooperation appears to disturb someone. Therefore, the NATO resolution was made. One will fight this resolution, even if the German government runs into difficulties through this. One does not understand how the German Social Democrats would accept that the policy of détente is being undermined. One wants a consolidation of trust and an expansion of cooperation. But the good will of the Soviet Union is not sufficient. The Soviet Union wants negotiations regarding the limitation of and the reduction of nuclear weapons, including the FBS, the British and the French systems. One is ready for qualitative and quantitative moratorium for the duration of the negotiations. Indeed, the negotiations cannot be a camouflage for the introduction of new weapons. If Europe takes a clear position, the USA will not be able to do anything. Every corresponding initiative will be welcomed by the Soviet Union. 

Brezhnev then pointed to the various proposals that were contained in his party conference speech from February 23, 1981, as well as to his latest proposal with regards to a nuclear-weapon-free zone in northern Europe. They are also considering turning the Baltic Sea area into a nuclear-weapon-free zone if NATO would also comport itself accordingly. 

In all differences between the two sides, one proceeds from the idea that further agreements exist, and that peace is the highest value toward which one must orient oneself. Accordingly, there could arise many opportunities for common or parallel activities. He thus sees the upcoming meeting with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt: it should be a step forward and bring concrete advances in accordance with the Moscow treaty and the common declaration of 1978. There are still many reserves for cooperation, say in the natural gas pipeline business. Bilateral relations could develop well, if there were not the confounding external factors. 

Brezhnev expressed then the Soviet Union’s great concerns in light of the American China policy. They would take the appropriate steps, primarily when it comes to deliveries of weapons. 

Regarding the North-South problems, B. [Brezhnev] presented the known Soviet position again, but then added with regards to the summit in Cancun: “We do not exclude finding a form of involvement.”

Considering the difficult global situation, all reserves must be used in order to find good ways to solve the problems. Therefore, the call by the Supreme Soviet for peace. They hope that the German Bundestag will react to this. 

In his response, Willy Brandt made clear that he is filled with great concern. It must be asked how détente could be again placed on a solid basis. Not only are the bad relations between the world powers dangerous, but there is also the threat that politics will capitulate to weapons technology. A strong will for the policy of détente is needed. 

When one looks back to the beginning of the 1970s, one must determine that political détente and practical cooperation did not find their equivalent in military matters. Except for SALT I, there were no concrete successes here. Now the question must be asked what they can do to catch maldevelopments again.

The contribution of the Federal Republic can only be limited, but they gladly want to do what is possible. This is also the opinion of the Chancellor, whose genuine greetings he conveys. In this it is an advantage if one does not contest the good will of the other side, as sometimes has happened in the context of Poland. One has exercised the greatest discipline here and find it correct that this be recognized. It is a vital interest of the Federal Republic that relations between the world powers improve. The USA is not a monolithic block, its policies can be influenced. The USSR’s skepticism is known to us, but the Chancellor has brought a firm commitment from Washington that there should be negotiations regarding euro strategic weapons, a pledge which NATO strengthened again in Rome. 

It has been said that Helmut Schmidt has done painstaking work. In reality, he argued painstakingly. During the discussions in 1978 in Bonn, he connected the corresponding passage regarding the approximate equilibrium explicitly to intermediate-range weapons as well. This was also discussed in 1980 in Moscow. It is understandable that the USSR would feel itself threatened by the new intermediate-range weapons. But we also feel endangered by the SS 20. The mutual threats must be reduced through speedy negotiations. In this, he understands the Soviet position that the FBS should be drawn in and accepts the consideration of the French and British capabilities. 

W.B. continued that he does not want to go into the SPD presidium’s response letter to the Central Committee of the CPSU in detail (which, as became obvious, was not known by Brezhnev), but rather only refer to some main arguments: no efforts for superiority, for speedy negotiations without preconditions, our considerations regarding thoughts of a moratorium, a clear response to the question of which weapons systems should be drawn in. A great difficulty is that both sides are obviously proceeding from entirely different numbers. Therefore, everything depends on mustering the political will to find a solution. The German Social Democrats have internalized what the governing parties in France have held onto regarding this topic. 

It would be best for the Federal Republic if the Null Option were realized. This requires that the Soviet Union make its position clearer, also more distinctly say what will become of the SS 4 and the SS 5 and what the number and deployment of the SS 20 will be. It is hardly reassuring that for us in Europe that the SS 20 do not reach the USA. The SS 20 likely mean a qualitative change for us. Perhaps it could help if one first concentrates on the most dangerous systems, so the missiles. The Null solution assumes otherwise that the negotiations do not last too long. 

In the context of the Moscow Treaty, he wants to hold onto that it remains our conviction that no war may begin from German soil. June 22, 1981 is also an important day of remembrance for us. Many people on our side are afraid of a new war. The growing peace movement in the Federal Republic is apart from that not a movement for the Soviet Union and its policies. They direct their demands to all participants. Their goal – as also that of the SPD – is equal security for both sides at the lowest possible level. In this context, he also wants to ask whether the USSR is ready to pull the missiles that do not serve as parity to our systems behind a line from which they could not reach us. 

Apart from that we hope that Madrid comes to a good conclusion, that a clarification of the term trust building measures reaches as far as possible and that a conference regarding disarmament in Europe becomes possible. 

W.B. then reported from the reconstitution of the disarmament commission of the Socialist International under the leadership of Kalevi Sorsa and suggested that a joint German-Soviet conference be organized in fall or winter by the Ebert Foundation. (Brezhnev declared that he was in agreement with this.) To the proposal that Brezhnev made in his party conference speech that the consequences of a nuclear war be researched, W.B. suggested that the UN General Secretary be tasked with convening a corresponding working group.  

Regarding Brezhnev’s planned visit to Bonn, he wanted to say that this was viewed by the Chancellor not only as an important element for bilateral relations but also for the negotiation process. Bilateral relations have not developed badly, and we are also interested in further expanding economic cooperation. It should also be considered that the bilateral relationship should continue to be handled with care since it will not be of less importance for the future than it has been in the past. (B. agreed to this explicitly.)

W.B. then outlined briefly the – reserved – China policy of the Federal Republic. Apart from that he is also interested in speaking about Afghanistan during his stopover in Moscow, which has caused plenty of difficulties. With regard to the North-South topic, it is less the past that interests him than the future, and here there are common interesting questions, e.g., hunger in the world, energy problems, debt questions, the future development of international organizations or also the correlation between arms races and world hunger. 

Brezhnev underscored subsequently again the mutual interest of both sides in negotiations. The Federal Republic could make an essential contribution. He wants to ask openly why the USA could implement everything. The Europeans must now articulate their interests so that there can be a reversal in favor of arts control. 

Regarding Poland he explained that the events there are of two natures. For one, the political leadership committed serious economic mistakes, which led to the dissatisfaction of the masses. That is now changing. For the other, however, these mistakes are being exploited by anti-communist forces which want to eliminate socialism in Poland, for example the extremist forces in “solidarity.” They are supported with concrete aid from the West in this. The Poles have to solve their problems themselves. The USSR will however provide every conceivable aid and will stand by Poland in an emergency. 

B. asked W.B. then about the new French president, with whom he is nevertheless well acquainted. 

Willy Brandt underscored from his side again the readiness to continue and expand bilateral relations. Regarding Poland, he cannot accept the accusation of intervention in so far as it concerns issues for which he is responsible. He already heard similar accusations from Ambassador Semyonov a few months ago and subsequently asked for concrete evidence. These were not given to him. They also do not exist. Once again, he would like to refer to the agreement of the two French governing parties: the Poles must lead the process of economic renewal to a conclusion themselves. This is also our opinion. 

Regarding François Mitterrand, he would like to say that he is convinced that the Soviet Union will find a serious partner in him, one who wants peace and détente in Europe. 

Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski reinforced in conclusion the meaning of the Brezhnev visit to Bonn. The German interest in this goes far beyond party lines. It is desirable that a specific date be set as soon as possible. This would be a sign for positive developments in Europe. 

Brezhnev expressed his thanks and stated his readiness to come to Bonn in November.