Directive Sent to the Soviet Ambassador, Havana

Per Point 56, Prot. No. 79^[1]

Attachment 2

Havana

Soviet Ambassador

Visit Com. O. Dorticos or Com. R. Roa and advise that in connection with the resolution accepted at the UN General Assembly XXII session on the issue of the Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America, and the appeal of the Mexicans to us about the issue, we would like to inform our Cuban comrades of our future steps on this issue. We envision only an exchange of opinions with the Cuban comrades as a continuation of consultations which we had with Comrade R. Roa here in January 1967 when there were just only negotiations about the Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America.

As is known to our Cuban comrades, in January 1967 we did not give a final answer to the Preparatory Commission on the creation of a non-nuclear zone in Latin America, declaring only that in principal we supported the creation of non-nuclear zones in different regions of the world, while we would determine our relationship to a given zone more specifically after completing agreement of a corresponding treaty, and after the position of other nuclear weapons states had become known. At the XXII session of the UN General Assembly, the Soviet delegation criticized a number of provisions of the Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America, having shown their contradictions and inconsistency with the norms of international law, and, during voting on the resolution, refrained like the Cuban delegation.

Having studied the Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and Additional Protocol II, we have come to the conclusion that it would be disadvantageous for the Soviet Union to sign Additional Protocol II and thereby give a guarantee of respecting the status of a Latin American non-nuclear zone in the form as it is envisioned by this treaty.

Among the chief deficiencies of the Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America are the provisions permitting the production of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, as well as the transport (transit) of nuclear weapons by third countries through the territory of state-participants of the Treaty, as well as that a number of territories of Latin America, in particular Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Panama Canal Zone, are generally not included in the territory free of nuclear weapons. In connection with these provisions, the application of the given Treaty does not ensure turning Latin America into a truly non-nuclear zone.

Even more serious is the fact that the Treaty participants intend to arbitrarily expand its scope to vast areas of the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. This contradicts norms of international law and could be used in order to limit the ability of movement of vessels in these regions through which pass strategically important lines, to include those between the USSR and Cuba.

Determining our relationship to the Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America, we of course take into account the position of Cuba which cannot accept participation in a Latin-American non-nuclear zone in light of the denial of the United States of America of fair requirements for Cuba on conditions for creating such a zone. We relate with understanding to this position of our Cuban comrades, about which we have often publicly declared, to include at the Organization of United Nations.

In addition to this, a certain opinion has emerged here that it would be improper to bypass the striving of Latin American countries to achieve turning Latin America into a non-nuclear zone. This striving, as we consider it, might be actively used – primarily in order to limit the sphere of placement of American nuclear weapons in regions adjacent to Cuba.

The position of Mexico in this regard provides a decent basis for our corresponding steps: Mexico ratified the Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America on condition that its scope is expanded to the territory, airspace, and territorial waters of Mexico. The Mexicans have declared that they understand their obligations under the Treaty as absolute and forbidding in any form the placement of nuclear weapons on the territory of Mexico, to include a refusal on the production of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. In this way, Mexico becomes a non-nuclear zone.

Taking these conditions into account, we mean to move towards the wishes of Mexico and declare that we will respect its status as a non-nuclear zone.

If any other Latin American countries follow the example of Mexico then, of course, the issue will arise of safeguards for them. But, of course, in each instance this issue should be examined especially taking into account all obligations. In particular, the Soviet Union can not move towards applying safeguards to Brazil, as Brazil has declared that it intends to produce nuclear explosions. In any case, we mean to do this outside of a connection with the issue of Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America. Moreover, we consider that our declaration on respecting the non-nuclear status of Mexico or any other Latin-American country can only be conditional. We retain the right to reexamine our obligations in the case that if it or another state to whom we give safeguards perpetrates aggression or is revealed to be a participant in aggression. We have clearly and explicitly declared this to Mexico, and in the future we will warn other Latin American countries. Meanwhile, we are of the view that such a step from our side fully answers the security interests of the Republic of Cuba, since it is one just one more warning to the governments of these countries who, either with the USA or with their support, intend to embark on a path of aggression against Cuba or again some other country friendly to us.

Telegraph when carried out.

-zv

^[1] Translator’s Note: The following information is extracted from Protocol No. 79 of the CPSU CC Politburo meeting, finalized on 15 April 1968 and covering numerous resolutions made during 8 to 15 April 1968. A number of decisions were made during the meeting, including Point 56.