June 28, 1979
Draft instructions to the Soviet Ambassador in Kabul with Appeal of the CC CPSU Politburo to the CC PDPA Politburo
in reference to point IX of Minutes Nº 156
Top Secret
Special Folder
KABUL
TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR
First. Urgently meet with Taraki and pass the following
Appeal of the CC CPSU Politburo to the CC PDPA Politburo to him:
“Dear comrades!
The CC CPSU Politburo sends its fraternal greetings to the CC PDPA Politburo and expresses feelings of comradely revolutionary solidarity with the heroic struggle of the PDPA in the defense of the gains of the 1978 April people’s revolution.
We note with great satisfaction that in the brief time which has passed since the Revolution was accomplished the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has begun to carry out political, socioeconomic, and cultural reforms in accord with the aspirations of the people of the country.
We well understand all the complexity of the conditions in which your work proceeds. From our own experience and the experience of revolutions in other countries we know that the enemies of the workers have never given up their positions without a battle.
Dear friends, at this difficult time for you we Soviet Communists, prompted by feelings of proletarian internationalism, consider it necessary to share some ideas with you in an open, comradely way.
1. We share your concern that the domestic situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan continues to remain complex and tense.
In the current situation it is our deep conviction that a union of all revolutionary and patriotic forces of the country is of very great importance. In our view, the first priority tasks are to ensure the support of the broad masses of the population with revolutionary measures by the PDPA and the DRA government and to achieve a neutralization and then elimination of the harmful influence of class enemies, the reactionary part of the Muslim clergy, and Afghan emigrants..
In turn, an improvement in the methods of political work will be required to transform these tasks into reality.
First, about the principle of collective leadership. The experience of our Party and also of other Parties of the socialist countries unambiguously speaks for the need to adhere to the principle of collective leadership. It creates an opportunity for a fuller consideration of all points of view which, without question, facilitates the success of the cause and permits mistakes and blunders to be avoided. Any important issue is decided only collectively among us, with the participation of all members of the Politburo. We counsel you to also act in this manner.
It is collective leadership in the Party and government at various levels – from top to bottom – that ensures the adoption of correct, well thought out decisions which objectively reflect the will and desires of the popular masses. For we Communists should always remember the words of Lenin that “In the popular masses we are all a drop in the sea and we can lead them only when we correctly express what the people think”.
The consistent implementation of the principle of collective leadership should of course be combined with the fulfillment of the Leninist requirement of personal responsibility. In other words, a broad free discussion in the process of formulating decisions and, at the same time, complete unity and the strictest discipline in carrying out the decisions reached.
2. Such a question as creating a orderly and effective system of local governments also requires serious attention.
The political structure of any government, and socialist countries are not an exception here, stipulates the creation of government bodies not only in the capital but also in the provinces. The issue of the organization of local government bodies within a multiethnic country such as Afghanistan is of especially great importance.
Local governmental bodies allow the central government to put their decisions into effect throughout the country more quickly. In doing so it is important that the officials heading the local bodies, as a rule, be of the same ethnic group or tribe as the majority of the population of the region. Such government bodies allow political influence to be exerted on the population more effectively and inspire the people’s confidence in the democratic institutions of the new political system.
It is also very important that the impression is not created among the population that people’s power shows itself only where there is a military unit.
3. It would be of primary importance, in our opinion, if the PDPA Politburo would continually carry out work to expand the social support of the new regime, actively enlist the people on its side, and not permit any alienation to arise between the people and the DRA government. In this regard we would like again to direct attention at the need to observe revolutionary legality and not permit unjustified mass repression. Such repression are only capable of undermining the authority of the new government among the population and impede the cause of defending the Revolution. In our view taking effective measures to ensure legality and put an end to administrative abuses would greatly facilitate a normalization of the situation in the country.
4. In conditions where the internal enemies of the Revolution, relying on external support, are stepping up their activity, the question of uniting all the healthy forces of the Afghan nation acquires especially great importance. United around the PDPA, Party members and those without party affiliation, workers and peasants, officers and soldiers, craftsmen and office workers, students and intellectuals, the national bourgeoisie and the patriotically-minded part of the clergy, and youth and women would constitute a force which would not fear the intrigues of enemies of the Revolution, domestic or foreign.
It seems that the matter of primary importance in these conditions should also be the resolution of the question of a broader acceptance into the PDPA of representatives of the workers, peasants, and other patriotically-minded strata of the Afghan population who are devoted by class [klassovo] to the cause of the Revolution.
5. We know that you are doing much work to strengthen the armed forces, including bringing divisions up to strength which are not now at full strength and are accordingly not complete combat-ready. Meanwhile there are weapons for these divisions in Afghanistan and more can be delivered when needed.
In this regard we would like to stress the exceptional importance of the task of strengthening the army, both as regards bringing existing divisions up to strength as quickly as possible as well as in terms of the subsequent creation of new units and formations. It would be correct to consider this one of the main tasks in the matter of ensuring the defense of the Revolution.
6. One more question, which in our view has a quite substantial importance in Afghan conditions. The enemies of the DRA tirelessly spread false reports that Muslims are supposedly being persecuted in Afghanistan and that “the canons of Islam are trampled on” there, etc. Both domestic and foreign Muslim reactionaries are playing on this. Their treachery and the dangerousness of their attempts to rouse the masses of believers against the PDPA government can in no way be underestimated. It seems to us that it would be useful to discuss this in a comprehensive manner in the Politburo and map out specific steps directed at countering this malicious propaganda, attracting an ever greater number of Muslim ulemas [scholars] on the side of the Revolution, and convincing the broad masses of Muslims that the socioeconomic reforms being carried out by the PDPA and people’s power, the need for which is advocated in Islam, not only do not affect and will not affect the religious beliefs of Muslims.
The Soviet leadership expresses the hope that our Afghan friends correctly understand our comradely appeal to them. It was dictated by a genuine desire, relying on our own experience, to give you every kind of assistance in the cause of strengthening people’s power, which was established in Afghanistan as a result of the April Revolution”.
Report by telegraph when this has been done.
Second. In your daily contacts with Afghan leaders it is necessary for you and the heads of all Soviet groups in Afghanistan, naturally, to consistently maintain the necessary tact and assiduously instill in them the thoughts which are described in the CC CPSU Politburo Appeal to the CC PDPA Politburo.
Members of the CC CPSU summarize the political instability in Afghanistan, pointing to collective leadership in government and to the military as stabilizing the political situation.
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