German Bundestag, 13th Legislative Period, Proposal for 'Indefinite and Unconditional Extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty'

German Bundestag
13. Legislative Period
Printed matter 13/398
08.02.95
Proposal
from representatives Klaus Francke (Hamburg), Peter Kurt Würzbach, Dr. Freidbert Pflüger, and the CDU/CSU faction, Karsten D. Voigt (Frankfurt), Uta Zapf, Gernot Erler, and the SPD faction, as well as Ulrich Irmer, Dr. Olaf Feldmann, Roland Kohn, Dr. Eng. Karl-Hans Laermann, and the FDP faction.

Indefinite and unconditional extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
The Bundestag is resolved:

With the end of the East-West conflict, opportunities and chances for international cooperation have . This is also true for international cooperation in the area of arms control. The conflict around North Korea’s atomic program has recently once against made clear the great significance attached to international efforts at disarmament and arms control.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1979, established a system of international proliferation control and remains unchanged as a cornerstone of the current arms control system. Now, 25 years after the NPT entered into force, in accordance with Article X para. 2, a majority of the treaty parties must make a decision about an indefinite or time-limited extension of the treaty.

Prior to the Extension Conference called for this purpose from April 17-May 12, 1995, the German Bundestag has formulated its call for the Federal Government to continue to work on an indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT. At the same time, all opportunities should be seized to further develop the NPT’s non-proliferation regime without changes and to further strengthen verification capabilities. In this context, the German Bundestag welcomes the entry of Ukraine as well as of Belarus and Kazakhstan as non-nuclear weapon states into the NPT and urges all states not yet signatories to urgently adopt the NPT.

The German Bundestag remembers its calls in June 1993 for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (Printed matter 12/5116), and it calls the Federal Government in particular to:

1. Continue to actively work in the Geneva Talks toward an agreement on a verifiable and comprehensive test ban treaty, also in order to improve the prospects for an agreement, as broad as possible, on indefinite extension. At the same time, the Federal Government should appeal to the governments of nuclear weapon states to further extend the voluntary atomic test moratoria. In particular it should explicitly call for the People’s Republic of China to carry out no further atomic tests as it did after the Chinese tests of October 1993 and June 1994;

2. Push for an intensification of efforts for nuclear disarmament. It is necessary to swiftly press for implementation of START I in order to emphatically underscore the willingness to nuclear disarmament. An early ratification of START II is desirable in order to ensure a swift continuation of the nuclear disarmament process;

3. Promote the establishment of a nuclear weapon registry at the United Nations, in order to build trust among non-nuclear weapon states in nuclear disarmament by nuclear weapon states through the registration of existing stockpiles, and to reinforce nuclear weapon states in their own non-proliferation policy. Such trust could be additionally strengthened by international control of disarmament measures;

4. Move the five nuclear weapon states of the Security Council to strengthen their security guarantees toward the states that fulfill their obligations not to obtain or to proliferate nuclear weapons;

5. Sustainably support the efforts of the Geneva disarmament conference for talks about a treaty banning production of weapons-grade fissile material for weapons purposes (so-called Cut-off);

6. Encourage the further development of a sanctions mechanism for violations of the NPT. Such a mechanism would build on the declaration by the Security Council of January 31, 1992, which determined that states attempting to obtain or produce nuclear weapons in violation of international law must have sanctions levied against them. The sanctions in these cases must be commensurate with the threat to world peace.

7. Push all NPT treaty parties, in addition to extending the treaty, to adopt voluntary obligations and limitations under the framework of the safeguard regime;

8. Work toward strengthening the IAEA. The right of the IAEA to special inspections even for undeclared facilities must be strengthened and expanded. States shall be subject to an obligation to inform the IAEA when building nuclear facilities—military as well as civilian. The IAEA’s access must be institutionalized and expanded. The IAEA must be endowed with according personnel and finances accordingly;

9. Work toward a reduction of the threshold for control-related, significant quantities of nuclear material, since after new technological developments substantially smaller quantities are sufficient to produce an atomic bomb. At the same time, it is desirable that nuclear material made available by disarmament of nuclear weapon states as well as plutonium and highly enriched uranium previously not inventoried will be subject to international control even in states outside the NPT. The efforts to create an international control system according to the German 10 Point Initiative for Non-Proliferation Policy of December 15, 1993 are to be pursued with determination. International controls on such weapons-capable materials would immediately contribute to a decrease in the dangers of nuclear smuggling.

Bonn, February 7, 1995
Klaus Francke (Hamburg)
Peter Kurt Würzbach
Dr. Friedbert Pflüger
Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble, Michael Glos, and faction

Karsten D. Voigt (Frankfurt)
Uta Zapf
Gernot Erler
Rudolf Scharping and faction

Ulrich Irmer
Dr. Olaf Feldmann
Roland Kohn
Dr. Eng. Karl-Hans Laermann
Dr. Hermann Otto Solms and faction