April 6, 1995
German Federal Foreign Office, Memorandum, 'NPT Extension Conference: Positions of State Parties'
This document was made possible with support from Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY)
Reference: 242-371.16/41
Source: LR’n I Zeidler Bonn, 6 April 1995
HR: 4591
Memorandum
Subject: NPT Extension Conference
here: Positions of treaty parties
Attachments: 1. List of country positions (alphabetically)
2. List of country positions according to regions and state groups respectively
Evaluation of the country list updated at the last meeting of the “core group” on 2 March 1995 gave in general a more positive picture compared to February: while at the time close to 100 countries could be classified as being in favor or leaning towards indefinite and unconditional extension, now 113 countries fall into this category. 35 states (in February: 39) were now assessed by the “core group” as being more or less against indefinite and unconditional NPT extension. Assessment of the “core group” includes also a large number of uncertainties (recognizable in different question marks behind in respective assessments), so that statistic continues to give a reason for cautionary optimism related to the chances for reaching our goal.
The biggest changes occurred with regard to Africa; here the number of supporters (Y/LY) for indefinite extension increased from 12 to 23, with 10 countries remaining critical. (Group of Arab countries is here excluded). The positive image in Latin America has essentially remained with the same 22 supporters and 3 critics (February 21:4), although “hardliner” such as Mexico today is leaning more towards compromise solutions compared to previous weeks. A similar scenario applies to Asia (Malaysia, Sri Lanka!), where currently 6 supporters face 9 critics and 4 undecided. (Group of Pacific Countries is listed separately). Noteworthy is the uncertainty regarding the position of a number of OSCE countries despite OSCE explanation of December 1994.
Arranged according to state groups and regions respectively, the following picture emerges (according to the evaluation of the “core group”!):
(Remark: since February a number of countries joined the treaty, in addition, not all positions of the countries were known and some are still not, therefore, the numbers in the vertical rows are not necessarily corresponding)
NPT Position | Total | OSCE | Pacific | Asia | Latin America | Africa | Near-/ Middle East |
Y/LY | 113 (101) | 49 (50) | 12 (10) | 6 (7) | 22 (21) | 23 (12) | 1 |
N/LN | 35 (39) | 1 (0) |
| 9(10) | 3(4) | 1) (10) | 12(15) |
U | 19 (25) |
| 1 | 5(3) | 4(4) | 7(18) | 2(0) |
242-371.16/41 Situation, 6 April 1995
Subject: NPT Extension Conference
here: Positions of treaty parties (in alphabetical order)
Bold marked change of position since the last meeting of the Core Group
Y for indefinite and unlimited extension of the NPT
N against indefinite and unlimited extension of the NPT
LY “leaning yes” D1 – EU Demarche action ahead of the 3rd PrepCom
LN “leaning no” D2 – EU Demarche action ahead of the 4th PrepCom
U uncertain
/ position unknown or reactive to the Troika demarches
Country name | “core group” 2.3.1995 | Explanation | Assessment D2 | Campaign for the NPT | EU-Troika demarches |
Afghanistan | Y | Y: Speech at 49th UNGA (First Committee) |
| U | D2 |
Albania | Y | Different multilateral explanations (CSCE, NACC) as well as bilateral Dir for multilat.cooperation. Dervish Dumi in response to D2 | Y | Y | D2 |
Algeria | LN | LN: Assessment CANs |
|
|
|
Antigua and Barbuda | U |
|
| / | D1, D2/UK |
Country name | “core group” 2.3.1995 | Explanation | Assessment D2 | Campaign for the NPT | EU-Troika demarches |
Armenia | Y | Y: 49th UNGA, various public statements as well as FM Papazian in response to D2 | Y | Y | D1, D2 |
Argentina | Y | Y. confirmed by US FM at the occasion of visit Dg24 on 24/24.2.1995 |
|
|
|
Australia | Y |
|
| Y |
|
Austria | Y |
|
| Y |
|
Azerbaijan | LY* | LY: FM Hassanov has already in Dec 1994 explained to Troika that decision has not been made yet. *GB: Y | Y | Y | D1, D2 |
Bahamas | Y |
|
| Y |
|
Bahrain | LN | Position depends on the decision of Arab League | / | LN | D2 |
Bangladesh | Y | US Assessment (based on bilateral contacts): for undef.ext. |
| U |
|
Barbados | Y |
|
| U | D1, D2/UK |
Belarus | Y | CSCE, NACC | Y | Y | D1, D2 |
Belgium | Y |
|
| Y |
|
Belize | LY* |
|
| U | D1, D2/UK |
Benin | Y | Y:F (core group), per verbal note of 5.4. confirmed (DB 57 of 5.4.) | /(LN) | U | D2 |
Bhutan | U | U: UNGA 48 | / | U | D1, D2 |
Bolivia | LY | LY: confirmed by US FM at the occasion of visit Dg24 on 24/24.2.1995 | U/LY | LY | D1, D2 |
Botswana | U | U: in the face of response as UN SC member lately hesitant, pos "limited extension" to follow (DB 31 Gaboron 9.3.), N: SADC FM recommendation of 03.03.1995: definite extension (source: DB 46 Harare 6.2.1995) |
| U | D1, D2 |
Country name | “core group” 2.3.1995 | Explanation | Assessment D2 | Campaign for the NPT | EU-Troika demarches |
Brunei | N |
| / | / | D1, D2 |
Bulgaria | Y |
|
| Y |
|
Burkina Faso | Y |
| LY | U | D2 |
Burma | LN |
|
|
|
|
Burundi | U |
| / | U | D1, D2 |
Cambodia | Y | Y: per verbal note in response to D2 clearly explained for indefinite extension | Y | U | D1, D2 |
Cameroon | LY |
| LY | Y | D2 |
Canada | Y |
|
| Y |
|
Cape Verde |
| unknown |
| U | D2 |
Central African Rep. | Y | D1: Y | Y | U | D1, D2 |
Chad | U |
|
| U | D1, D2 |
China | U |
|
| U |
|
Colombia | LY? | Vote for NPT extension sets effective mechanisms for reduction of nuclear weapon arsenals and treaty-based arrangement for a ban on nuclear weapon testing | N | LN | D2 |
Congo | Y? | D1: Y |
| U | D1, D2 |
Cote d'Ivoire | Y |
| Y | U | D1, D2 |
Croatia | Y |
|
| Y |
|
Cyprus | Y |
|
| Y |
|
Czech Republic | Y |
|
| Y |
|
Country name | “core group” 2.3.1995 | Explanation | Assessment D2 | Campaign for the NPT | EU-Troika demarches |
Denmark | Y |
|
| Y |
|
Dominica | Y | D1: Y | Y | Y | D1, D2 |
Dominican Republic | Y | Y: Verbal note in response to Troika Demarche; LY: D1 as well as SPA-demarche | Y | / | D1, D2 |
Ecuador | LN | LN: 49.UNGA as well as SPA-Demarche; Y Assessment US FM at the occasion of visit Dg24 on 24/24.2.1995 |
| LN |
|
Egypt | N | Position towards Israel somewhat more flexible: Pres Mubarak to US FM Christopher on 9.3.1995; he did not demand from Israel immediate giving up of its NW, only discussions to join the NPT within three years of the extension (Source: DB239 Cairo 10.3.1995) |
| LN |
|
El Salvador | Y | D1: Y/SC Honduras' explanation on behalf the Group of Central American states. | Y | / | D1, D2 |
Equatorial Guinea | Y | US: Y (core group) |
| U | D1, D2/F |
Eritrea | / | joining soon |
|
|
|
Estonia | Y |
| Y | Y | D1, D2 |
Ethiopia | Y | 48, 49 UNGA. Y: Confirmed by US StDep to Dg24, 23.2.1995 Washington |
| Y |
|
Fiji | Y |
|
| Y | D2/F |
Finland | Y |
|
| Y |
|
France | Y |
|
| Y |
|
Gabon | Y |
| / | U | D2 |
Gambia | Y? |
|
| U | D1, D2/UK |
Georgia | Y | D1: Y |
| U | D1, D2 |
Country name | “core group” 2.3.1995 | Explanation | Assessment D2 | Campaign for the NPT | EU-Troika demarches |
Germany | Y |
|
| Y |
|
Ghana | LY | LY: US-StDep Graham to Dg24, 23.2.1995 in Washington |
| LN |
|
Greece | Y |
|
| Y |
|
Grenada | Y | Y: bilateral to US |
| U | D1, D2/UK |
Guatemala | Y | SC-explanation Honduras on behalf of Central American Countries, 18.1.1995: Y | Y | LY | D2 |
Guinea | / |
|
| U | D2/F |
Guinea-Bissau | LY |
|
| U | D1, D2/F |
Guyana | / |
| Y | U | D1, D2/UK |
Haiti | Y | Impression of its representative at the OPANAL conference in Cancun (Jan 1994) confirmed. Y:GB (core group) | A |
| D2/F |
Holy See | U |
|
| U |
|
Honduras | Y | SC Honduras explanation on behalf the Group of Central American states. 18.1.1995; LY: D1 | / | / | D1, D2 |
Hungary | Y |
|
| Y |
|
Iceland | Y |
| Y | Y |
|
Indonesia | N | LN: Discussions Dg24 16/17.3.1995 in Jakarta: as present chair of Non-aligned great influence but also fits the profile ("inflexibility against Western influence campaign"). Internal opinion divided. FM: No; national nuclear and research minister: Y (interest in civilian nuclear technology) (source DB 228 Jakarta 18.3.95) Topic for us on the agenda of the state visit of President Suharto in Bonn, beginning April |
| N |
|
Country name | “core group” 2.3.1995 | Explanation | Assessment D2 | Campaign for the NPT | EU-Troika demarches |
Iran | N | Dg24 in Tehran, 18.3.1995: Iran for indefinite extension against guarantees for treaty obligations, otherwise for a system of "rolling periods" (Source DB248 Tehran 19.3.1995) |
| N |
|
Iraq | N |
|
| LN |
|
Ireland | Y |
|
| Y |
|
Italy | Y |
|
| Y |
|
Jamaica | LY | U: confirmed by the US StDep following visit Dg24 on 23/24.2.1995; LN: SPA-demarche | U | U | D2 |
Japan | Y |
|
| Y |
|
Jordan | U |
|
| N |
|
Kazakhstan | Y? | D1 and D2: despite OSCE explanation Kazakhstan sympathizes with NAM arguments, Perm Rep FM hesitated towards Troika; expressed himself unconditionally for indef.extension | U | Y | D1, D2 |
Kenya | U |
|
| U |
|
Kiribati | Y? | Y: explanation Pac.Forum |
| Y | D1/UK |
Korea, North | N |
|
| N |
|
Korea, South | Y |
|
| Y |
|
Kuwait | LY | Position depends on the decision of Arab League | U | U | D1, D2 |
Kyrgyzstan | Y | Y: RUS (core group) |
| Y | D1, D2 |
Laos | N |
| N | N | D2 |
Latvia | Y | Y: per verbal note to Swedish FM confirmed |
| Y | D1 |
Lebanon | LN |
| N | U | D1, D2 |
Lesotho | LN |
| / | U | D2 |
Country name | “core group” 2.3.1995 | Explanation | Assessment D2 | Campaign for the NPT | EU-Troika demarches |
Liberia | / |
|
| U |
|
Libya | N | N: Gaddafi publicly in interview with "al Arab", Reuter 7.3.95; tied with Israel's NPT entry |
| U |
|
Liechtenstein | Y |
| Y | Y | D1, D2 |
Lithuania | Y |
|
| Y | D1 |
Luxembourg | Y |
|
| Y |
|
Malaysia | LN | LY: 48 UN GA, N: US StDept Graham to Dg24, 23.2.1995 in Washington; orients itself towards Indonesia |
| LY |
|
Madagascar | Y | US-analysis: LN |
| U |
|
Malawi | U | N: SADC FM recommendation 3.3.1995: definite extension (Source: DB46, Harare 6.2.95) | / | U | D2 |
Maldives | Y | Y: support promised in verbal note (in response to D2) | Y | Y | D2 |
Mali | LN |
| / | U | D2 |
Malta | Y |
|
| Y |
|
Marshall Islands | Y | US (Core Group) |
|
|
|
Martinique | Y? |
| Y | U | D2 |
Mauritius | N |
| N |
|
|
Country name | “core group” 2.3.1995 | Explanation | Assessment D2 | Campaign for the NPT | EU-Troika demarches |
Mexico | LN | U: is on one hand against indefinite extension, feels however as a member of UNSC under pressure to vote Y (Source: DB115 Mexico, 9.3.95) |
| U |
|
Moldova | Y |
| / | Y | D2 |
Monaco | Y |
|
|
|
|
Mongolia | Y |
|
| Y |
|
Morocco | LY |
|
| U |
|
Mozambique | U | D1: LY; N: SADC FM recommendation on 3.3.95: limited extension (Source: DB 46 Harare 6.2.95) | U/LY | LY | D1, D2 |
Namibia | Y? | N: SADC FM recommendation on 3.3.95: limited extension (Source: DB 46 Harare 6.2.95) |
| U |
|
Nauru | LY | Y: explanation Pac.Forum |
| Y | D1, D2 |
Nepal | LN | U: Nepal.FM towards EU-Troika on 20.3. (source: DB65 Kathmandu 21.3.1995) |
| U |
|
Netherlands | Y |
|
| Y |
|
New Zealand | Y |
|
| Y |
|
Nicaragua | Y | Y: FM Leal towards EU-Troika in December 1994; SC Honduras' explanation on behalf of the Group of Central American states on 18.1.95; final decision by President | Y | LN | D2 |
Niger | LY |
| Y | LY | D1, D2 |
Country name | “core group” 2.3.1995 | Explanation | Assessment D2 | Campaign for the NPT | EU-Troika demarches |
Nigeria | N | N: US StDept Graham to Dg24, 23.2.95 in Washington |
| N |
|
Norway | Y |
|
| Y |
|
Panama | Y | Y: Deputy FM towards EU Troika-Ambassadors (Source: DB 24 Panama 9.3.95); final decision by President | U/LY | U | D2 |
Palau | Y | joining soon |
|
|
|
Papua New Guinea | U | Y: explanation Pac.Forum; D1: demands improvement NPT | / | Y | D1, D2 |
Paraguay | LY | LN: SPA demarche | U | / | D1, D2 |
Peru | Y | clear support for indef. and uncond.extension at Opanal conference (28-30 March) |
| LY |
|
Philippines | Y | Japan FM expects steering towards Y (Source DB748 Tokio 15.3.95) |
| LY |
|
Poland | Y |
|
| Y | D1 |
Portugal | Y |
|
| Y |
|
Qatar | N | Position depends on the decision of Arab League | U | U | D1, D2 |
Romania | Y |
|
| Y | D1 |
Russia | Y |
|
| Y | D1 |
Rwanda | U/LY |
|
| U |
|
Saint Kitts and Nevis | Y |
| Y | Y | D2 |
Saint Lucia | Y? |
|
| U | D1, D2/F |
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines | LY |
|
| / | D1, D2/UK |
San Marino | Y |
|
| Y | D1, D2 |
Sao Tome | Y(?) | D1: Y |
| U | D1, D2/POR |
Saudi Arabia | U | U: Discussion with FM Faisal in Washington. Depends on Israel's behavior (Source DB148 Riyadh 7.3.1995) |
| Y |
|
Country name | “core group” 2.3.1995 | Explanation | Assessment D2 | Campaign for the NPT | EU-Troika demarches |
Senegal | Y? |
|
| U/LY |
|
Serbia | U |
|
| LY | D2/F |
Sierra Leone | Y | Y:GB (Core Group) |
| U | D2 |
Singapore | U |
|
| U |
|
Slovakia | Y |
|
| Y | D1 |
Slovenia | Y |
|
| Y |
|
Solomon Islands | Y | Y:GB (Core Group) |
| Y | D2/UK |
Somalia | U |
|
| U |
|
South Africa | LN | "friends of the NPT": strives for extension with certain limitations; N: SADC FM recommendation of 03.03.1995: definite extension (source: DB 46 Harare 6.2.1995) |
| U |
|
Spain | Y |
|
| Y |
|
Sri Lanka | U | Neutral and impartial with a view of the Conference Presidency (Amb Dhanapala). Result visit Dg24 to Sri Lanka 15.3.95 (Source: DB106 Colombo 15.3.95) |
| LN | D2 |
Sudan | N |
| LN | LN | D2 |
Suriname | U | U: NL (core group) |
| U | D2/F |
Swaziland | LY |
|
| U | D1, D2/UK |
Sweden | Y |
|
| Y |
|
Switzerland | Y? | N: Trokia demarche on 16.3.1995. Switzerland is for limited extension to test commitments of the nuclear weapons states from time to time; and to have a mechanism to do so (source: DB 139 Bern 21.3.95) |
| Y |
|
Syria | N |
|
| LN |
|
Country name | “core group” 2.3.1995 | Explanation | Assessment D2 | Campaign for the NPT | EU-Troika demarches |
Tanzania | LN | N: SADC FM recommendation of 03.03.1995: definite extension (source: DB 46 Harare 6.2.1995) |
| LN | D2 |
Thailand | LN | Japan FM expects steering towards Y possible (Source DB748 Tokio 15.3.95) |
| N |
|
Togo | LY | Y: US StDept Graham to Dg24, 23.2.95 in Washington | U | U | D2 |
Tonga | U/LY | Y: Explanation Pac.Forum |
| Y | D1, D2/UK |
Trinidad and Tobago | U | U: confirmed by the US StDep following visit Dg24 on 23/24.2.1995 | Y | U | D2 |
Tunisia | N | LY: 47 (!) UNGA, LN: will not vote against Arab League position | / | LY | D2 |
Turkey | Y |
|
| Y |
|
Turkmenistan | LY | Y: OSCE explanation, Troika-counterpart showed himself poorly informed | / | Y | D2 |
Tuvalu | LY | Y: Explanation Pac.Forum |
| Y | D1 |
Uganda | N |
|
| U |
|
Ukraine | LN | But: in interview with Japanese newspapers demanded President Kuchma shortly revision of NPT for extension decision. Dep FM Tarasink has this position in discussion with Dep NATO DG on 2.3.95 not repeated | Y | Y | D2 |
United Kingdom | Y |
|
| Y |
|
United States of America | Y |
|
| Y |
|
Uruguay | U | N: confirmed by the US StDep following visit Dg24 on 23/24.2.1995; decision to be taken by the President |
| U |
|
Uzbekistan | LY |
| Y | Y | D1, D2 |
Venezuela | N | N: confirmed by the US StDep following visit Dg24 on 23/24.2.1995; decision to be taken by the President |
| N |
|
Vietnam | LN |
|
| U |
|
Country name | “core group” 2.3.1995 | Explanation | Assessment D2 | Campaign for the NPT | EU-Troika demarches |
Western Sahara | Y (?) | Y: Explanation Pac.Forum | / | Y | D2 |
Yemen | LN | Yemeni FM to EU Troika: Y only if one of other members of Arab Leage will vote with Yemen (Source: DB 79 Saana 21.3.95) | N | N | D2 |
Zaire | LN |
| / | LY | D1, D2 |
Zambia | LN | N: SADC FM recommendation of 03.03.1995: definite extension (source: DB 46 Harare 6.2.1995) | N | N | D2 |
Zimbabwe | N | Leading role in SADC-FM recommendation (3.3.95) for limited extension, confirmed by Demarch on 8.3. in Z.FM. |
| N |
|
German Foreign Ministry index listing all of the NPT countries and their positions on extending the treaty.
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