Letter to the Chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, Chairman of the Socialist International, Willy Brandt

To: 

The Chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, 

Chairman of the Socialist International

Willy Brandt

Dear Chairman Willy Brandt,

I have given your assessment of international developments, which your letter from February 19^th of this year contained, careful consideration. This assessment does not accord to a minor degree with ours. This concerns primarily the basic principle that there is no rational alternative to the policy of détente. 

I would like to underscore again that the Soviet Union is in no way interested in the continuation of tensions not only in the international arena in general but also in bilateral relations with the United States. We have not once proven this unmistakably (for example, I spoke about this in my election address on February 22^nd). There was also talk about this in the confidential messages that we recently exchanged with the leaders of the USA and other countries. 

President Carter declared with regards to you that he would like to return to the path of negotiations and continue the process of détente, including improving relations with the USSR as well. If only it had been true! Unfortunately, the actions of the American government prove otherwise. In addition, in their official statements, President Carter and people close to him express their acknowledgement of the politics of strength, of their intention to obtain military superiority over the Soviet Union, and to play a dominant role around the world. 

I believe, you would agree with me that one thing does not match the other here.

The arms race, which is not only being continued  but also drastically escalated by the USA, contradicts the interests of détente. Such a course undermines all the more the easing of tensions that was achieved in the last 70 years with such effort. It does not expand the opportunities for a continuation of constructive dialogue, rather it boxes them in. 

At the center of many discussions today is the so-called Afghanistan question. Sometimes, the West formulates such a position: tensions have increased because the USSR has introduced its troops into Afghanistan, accordingly, the way to reduce tensions runs through the withdrawal of the Soviet military contingent. That is however illogical. 

As is to be taken from your letter, we have a common position that the aggravation of tensions arose long before the “Afghanistan events” and have not in fact endured as a consequence of these. Those that limit all the problems related to the continuation of détente to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan are attempting to distract public opinion from the true root causes of the worsening of the situation with this. If one accepts only the pure Afghan aspect of the problem, prescriptions suggested here cannot also be evaluated as realistic. 

Our limited military contingent was sent to Afghanistan after repeated requests from the Afghan government for help in defending against external attacks on the freedom and independence of this non-aligned country that is friendly with us. I will not repeat what you already well know. I would however like to note that in the last weeks, the “undeclared war” that is being organized by the USA, China, and Pakistan against Afghanistan, has increased in magnitude. As the American press admits, they are banking on further subversive external action against the current Afghan government. In this, the USA is adopting fully open measures in this direction. 

I believe you would agree with me that this all has not helped defuse the situation around Afghanistan, that this is not bringing the timepoint at which we could withdraw our troops any closer, but rather pushes it further out. 

We have already declared repeatedly that the Soviet military contingents cannot be withdrawn from Afghanistan until the reasons that moved us to deploy them no longer apply. Most of all, every intervention into the internal affairs of Afghanistan must be prevented, military and other external actions against the people and government of Afghanistan must cease completely. The USA, as well as Afghanistan’s neighbors, must provide real and effective guarantees that interventions of this kind never begin again. Then, and of this I am certain, the Afghan government will also assess the situation differently. 

Subsequently, everything now depends on how soon real paths to a solution of the problem can be found to cease the external intervention into Afghan matters, which are directed against the government and people of Afghanistan, against the Afghan revolution. 

As you know, a number of suggestions and considerations (of an unofficial nature), which concern the situation in Afghanistan, are in circulation in the West. I would like to make you aware of two negative aspects of these suggestions and considerations. 

The first is that they all ignore the sovereignty of Afghanistan, completely bypass the fact that it has a legitimate government, which alone possesses the right to speak in the people’s name. 

The second negative aspect of the distributed suggestions is that they, in envisioning the withdrawal of the Soviet military contingent, do not mention at all the necessity of securing Afghanistan against interventions in its internal affairs. Meanwhile, that is the crux of the matter. 

They consider the possibility of the Soviet Union adopting symbolic measures, which are invoked to demonstrate that they in particular are not striving for any aggressive actions against Afghanistan’s neighbors. It is well known to you that we have not had such aspirations and do not have them. We have already stated that more than once, and everything that has been said in the West in this regard has no basis in fact. 

I believe that the most important European allies of the USA, and not least the Federal Republic of Germany, can contribute to a better knowledge of these circumstances in Washington, as well as to an understanding that our activity in Afghanistan is a purely defensive one and pursues a single goal: the protection of our friends and of the security of our southern border. 

We do not want at all to position Western Europe against the United States or to divide them from each other. We know to assess rather realistically the connections that your country and the other countries of Western Europe have to the United States. In this we are convinced that Western Europe, in particular the Federal Republic of Germany, could make a real contribution to the preservation of détente in the context of the existing alliances, one which corresponds to their vital interests. Unfortunately, the results of Chancellor Schmidt’s visit to the United States cannot do otherwise but disappoint in this sense. 

When it comes to your information regarding the activity of the Socialist International, I can only say: we have attentively paid attention to the results of the conference that took place in Vienna last month. We are impressed by the desires that were expressed there to deploy all available means for the support of the policy of détente. In my opinion, it would be useful to continue the dialogue that has begun with the Socialist International regarding questions of détente and disarmament and to find a fitting form for it. 

From our side, we can confirm that all of our proposals regarding ceasing the arms race, which we put forward earlier not only at the state level but also at the party level, remain in force, and that we are always ready to constructively debate them. More than that, we believe it is thorough the time to move from debates and discussions to the development of concrete measures which can be concretely realized in practice. 

It is necessary to continue the negotiations in Vienna intensively and to look for ways to reach an agreement. 

Our standpoint regarding the negotiations over intermediate range atomic missiles is known to you. The unwillingness of the American side to ratify the SALT-II treaty and in particular the NATO decisions regarding the stationing of American missiles in Western Europe that were made in 1979 certainly do not help solve this matter. However, we do not give up on the possibility of such negotiations, in case NATO renounces the decisions made at its December summit in Brussels, or at least cease officially their practical implementation. That could safeguard Europe from a new arms race spiral. 

I believe that the upcoming Madrid meeting of the representatives of the member states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Helsinki could make a useful contribution to improving the atmosphere in Europe. Naturally this will only be possible if the meeting participants come to Madrid with the intention of leading a constructive search for ways to defuse tensions, of restoring and developing the spirit of Helsinki, and not with the goal of continuing and sharpening the confrontation. 

We of course have the intention of proceeding constructively in Madrid. I hope that the approach of your country will be the same. 

I would like to draw your attention to the proposal of the socialist countries to convene a European conference regarding an easing of military tensions and disarmament and to Poland’s readiness to host this conference in Warsaw. Such a conference, next to the Madrid meeting, could provide an impulse for the solution of a range of important questions that are connected with the cessation of the arms race. 

Subsequently, if you would allow me, to take up the topic of the Moscow Olympics. We attribute great importance to their execution. And in this it is not a matter of the Soviet Union’s prestige. The success of the Moscow Olympics would present under the current conditions without a doubt an important factor for the easing of tensions, it would serve to secure peaceful and friendly contact between peoples. Attempts to bring about the failure of the greatest sport festival and in fact to undermine the entire Olympic movement represent one part of the campaign to destroy détente, peaceful cooperation between states, and friendship between peoples, which is being conducted by the government and all the right-wing forces in the USA. 

I would like to express the hope that judiciousness and reason will defeat political extremism and that détente, for whose realization we, along with you, Mr. Chairman, have invested so much power and energy, will have the upper hand over the “Cold War.”

At any rate, we in Moscow will do everything possible for this. 

I am ready to discuss all these problems with you personally. As I am aware of the delicate situation, I would be very grateful to you for a sign as to where and through which I could direct an official (or an unofficial?) invitation to you. 

Respectfully yours,

Signed. L. Brezhnev

March 11, 1980