Letter by the General Secretary of the CC of the CPSU, Gorbachev, to the Chairman of the SPD, Brandt

Dear Mr. Brandt, 

I would like to steer your attention again to the question which was already discussed between us in exchanges of ideas at our meetings last year in Moscow and Bonn. With this I mean the problem of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe. 

I say it openly: the course of the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva over this problem has unleashed a serious and growing concern on our side. The American side’s position gives in no way evidence of the USA’s readiness to want to lead the matter to an agreement. Entirely the opposite. Mr. Brandt, you likely remember that when we spoke about the upcoming Soviet-American negotiations, you had expressed complete understanding for our position that not only Soviet intermediate-range missiles but also the advanced American weapons as well as the appropriate English and French weapons should be drawn into these negotiations. And in fact, it appeared that no other possibility would even come into question. Meanwhile, the Americans have not wanted to listen to anything else but their “null” option from the first day of negotiations until today, which one can only label as a mockery of healthy reasoning. 

Following this American variant, the Soviet Union should bring all their intermediate-range missiles effectively to zero, in other words scrap them, while on the NATO side, not a single missile, no aircraft carrier of atomic weapons was to be destroyed. But there are close to one thousand, more precisely 986 units, among which 160 ballistic missiles. Should we declare ourselves in agreement with this option, there would be a twofold numerical superiority in the means of conveyance for mid-range nuclear weapons and in the area of nuclear missiles, even a threefold superiority. In other words, the balance of power with regards to nuclear intermediate-range weapons would come off worse for the Soviet Union through this than by the realization of the famous NATO decision regarding “rearmament”. The thought involuntarily comes to mind that the Americans wanted to place us before a choice of “choosing the lesser of two evils” through such a “null” option. This is however a primitive means of negotiation which in no way gives evidence of the seriousness of the USA’s course of negotiations. 

In seeking to make their suggestions unacceptable from the outset, the Americans presume an absurdity: they insist that we should also scrap the intermediate-range missiles that are stationed in the East and have nothing at all to do with Europe. 

For you, the absurdity of such a question must doubtlessly be understandable. During your stopover in Moscow, you yourself viewed the withdrawal of Soviet missiles that were not essential for equilibrium to positions from which they could not reach Western Europe as desirable. 

No less absurd is the negotiating position of the USA with regards to our intermediate-range missiles in the European part of the USSR. 

It is known that even those Western European politicians, who, contrary to the facts, deny the existence of an approaching equilibrium in the area of intermediate-range weapons in Europe, are of the opinion that this equilibrium would be disturbed only by the deployment of the SS-20. 

That means that no one had the thought of “disequilibrium” with today’s far larger number of SS-4 and SS-5. Therefore, the question is asked how the destruction of all of our intermediate-range missiles, SS-4, SS-5, SS-20, is now desired - and that alongside the maintenance of NATO’s entire nuclear arsenal? Is there a whiff of logic? That obviously has nothing to do with logic. 

And to this, the Americans decided recently to bring a complicating factor into their negotiating position in Geneva. They are insisting on a limitation for Soviet missiles whose range is less than intermediate. To sum up, we have every reason to say that the acceptance of the American proposal would mean a one-sided disarmament of the Soviet Union, which none of us could demand, as you correctly noticed in our last conversation. According to your own words, that is an undisputed matter. All this leads to the conclusion of which I spoke at the latest meeting with your colleagues from the Socialist International: by all appearances, Washington would like to exploit the negotiations in Geneva to calm the publics of the Western European countries that are protesting against the USA’s dangerous military plans, and then, when the negotiations are deliberately led to a dead end, to attempt to justify the positioning of nearly 600 new American intermediate-range missiles, which is planned for 1983. 

And here, Mr. Brandt, I must say the following openly: we can only be surprised that most statesmen and politicians in Western Europe, including in the Federal Republic, either really do not understand Washington’s game or act as if they do not understand it. And some of them are blatantly playing into the Americans’ hands. 

I remember your words well, that the Soviet-American negotiations are vital for the Federal Republic and that the Federal Republic would contribute to a favorable process of these negotiations. Federal Chancellor Schmidt also said the same to me. I would be disingenuous if I did not concede that we do not feel a positive effect on the USA’s position by the Federal Republic. 

Far be it from me to butt into the internal matters of your party. But if the leadership of the SPD, as I was informed, is thinking of analyzing the state of the Soviet-American negotiations first at its party conference in fall 1983 and of first then wanting to define its position regarding the stationing of the new American missiles in the Federal Republic, then one could ask oneself, whether the leadership of the SPD does not want to be confronted with a completed matter and then even with the best will in the world not be able to reverse the course of events in a positive direction. Now it is not my intention to present to you again the Soviet position regarding the matters that are being handled in Geneva.  We have already sent these to you. We have also recently presented them publicly because the Americans published the proposals they submitted in Geneva and at the same time presented our position in a distorted manner. 

I would like to emphasize one thing: we are actually ready for entirely radical steps in the realm of limiting nuclear armaments in Europe. That can be a more than threefold reduction of the existing nuclear arsenal of intermediate-range missiles on both sides from 1000 to 300 units. That can be a complete liquidation of such an arsenal. That can be a complete liquidation of atomic weapons on Europe – of intermediate and tactical range as well. 

The only, and from our perspective, irrefutable condition for the realization of each of these variants is a strict observance of the principle of equality and of equal security of both sides. 

Since I know very well know how you are partial to the policies of détente and peace, I am certain that you, Mr. Brandt, will muster understanding for the motivations by which I am led, when I steer your attention to the state of affairs in the negotiations in Geneva. 

Respectfully, 

L. Brezhnev 

February 22, 1982