Memorandum of Conversation between Bulgarian foreign Minister P. Mladenov and Polish ambassador Vl. Naperaj

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

C-54-00-26/7.X.81

M E M O

On October 6th this year the Minister of the Foreign Affairs, P. Mladenov received at his request Vl. Naperaj, Polish Ambassador to this country.

1. The Ambassador confirmed that the visit of Stanislaw Kania in our country would be held on October 15 as had been agreed so long as no extraordinary events occurred in Poland on that date. Stanislaw Kania's flight is to arrive in Sofia at 10:00 a.m. and to fly back to Warsaw between 8 and 9 p.m. Stanislaw Kania will be accompanied by 1-2 assistants only and it is possible that the talks will be held téte a téte. […]

2. [Information regarding the celebration of the 1300th Anniversary of the Establishment of the Bulgarian state on October 29]

3. The Ambassador expressed his view of the situation in Poland. He believed it had become more complicated. Their expectations that the second stage of the Solidarity Congress would change the line of aggressive behavior, adopted during the first stage, after the declaration by the Politburo of the Central Committee and the government of the P[olish] P[eople's] R[epublic], were not justified. The draft program and the resolutions voted, and especially that for referendum on the laws passed by the Sejm regarding self-government and the state enterprises, with the purpose to change them, strained the situation again, as did the negative reaction of the Congress to the decision of the government to increase the prices of cigarettes and tobacco products.

According to Naperaj confrontation is unavoidable. The issue "who gets the better of whom" is now being resolved. The extremists and the Western saboteurs are staging new provocations—prisons are broken open, strikes or preparations for strikes are declared, state orders are boycotted, anti-socialist and anti-Soviet literature, pamphlets and leaflets are distributed, the union of the PPR with the Soviet Union is under attack, they demonstrate openly their aspiration to take over power. Urgent actions are, therefore, required. The army, the militia and the Party activists have been put on the alert, ready for action. It is quite possible all this might bring about the introduction of martial law. If this point is reached, all public organizations with the exception of the PUWP, UAP and DP are to be banned, and about 20,000 people will be detained. Solidarity might respond with strikes but the situation is different now—Solidarity is no longer as popular as it used to be. A lot of people have realized what position the country has been driven to as a result of the strikes, and appeals to go on strike will not again evoke an unanimous response.

Naperaj underlined that the Party held the key for solving the crisis. He expressed his admiration of the enormous achievements of our country after the April Plenum of the BCP CC in 1956, resulting from the right policy of our Party. These achievements can be seen in industry, agriculture and in the markets. In their country [Poland], the errors in Party policy brought about the events in 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976. The present critical situation is due to their Party's loss of prestige due to its inability to draw the right conclusions from those events. The enemy now lays all fault at the communists' door. Therefore, the main task now is to strengthen the party and its reputation. Discussions were carried out with Communists, members of the Solidarity, and with members of Solidarity elected to the leading bodies of the PUWP in an attempt to persuade them to differ from the resolutions of the Gdansk Congress.

Naperaj underlined the difficult market situation. This year they produced 2.5 million tons grain more [than last year] but the state was able to buy only 50% of the quantity it had bought at the same time last year. The peasants, under the influence of Solidarity, refuse to sell meat, grains and other food products to the government, selling them instead on the black market for profit.

According to Naperaj, they are no longer in a position to make any more concessions. If the reactionary forces come to power, they will deal cruelly with the communists. In his speech delivered in Krakow, Bogdan Lis declared that all communists had to be hanged. Naperaj expected that Stanislaw Kania would tell Com. T. Zhivkov about the situation in their country in full.

Com. P. Mladenov said that we were very much concerned with the development of the events in PPR. Poland is heading for an extremely difficult time. The issue "who will win" is being contested, the fate of Poland is at stake. This requires urgent and resolute actions. Any further compromise will result in yielding power and the annihilation of the Communists. The counterrevolution will not miss the chance for savage reprisals. Lists of those who are to be physically destroyed have probably already been made up. It is known from experience that counterrevolution is very much the same everywhere. In Poland it is not any better than it was in Hungary in 1956. If steps for its suppression are not taken now, it might be too late later, especially when the newly recruited conscripts enter the army. A delay in delivering a blow [against the counterrevolution] will result in loss of power and the restoration of capitalism. It should be clear that if new elections were to be held, anti-socialist forces would take power.

Com. Mladenov drew attention to the fact that the West's speculations on a Soviet intervention in Poland were discontinued. The Soviet Union, however, cannot be indifferent towards the future developments in Poland, and Poland cannot go ahead without Soviet deliveries of petrol, gas, ores and other raw materials, [in short] without the comprehensive Soviet aid. That is why the Polish comrades must undertake the necessary steps for defeating the counter-revolution themselves, and the sooner it is done, the less bloodshed there will be. They should not fear strikes. If strikes are declared they will last a week or two, and then will be given up. This is not the worst that could be.

Comrade Mladenov told Naperaj that Com. Zhivkov will openly express our position on the events in PPR to Stanislaw Kania.

Georgi Georgiev, deputy-chief of the Second Department [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] was present on the meeting.

Sofia, 7 Oct[ober] 1981
signature: ( illegible )