Memorandum of a Conversation between Walter Ulbricht, Chairman of the State Council of the GDR, and Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of the United Arab Republic, on 25 February 1965, 12:30-14:30

Stenographic Transcript of the Conversation between the Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic, Walter Ulbricht, and the President of the United Arab Republic, Gamal Abdel Nasser, on 25 February 1965 between 12:30 and 14:30 Hours

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From the German side participated:

Chairman of the State Council of the GDR, Walter Ulbricht
Deputy of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Lothar Bolz
The Envoy of the Government of the GDR to the UAR, Ambassador Dr. [Ernst] Scholz
The Head of the Department Arabic Countries in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Martin Bierbach
Comrade Paul Markowski as Interpreter
Comrade Nützel as substitute Interpreter
Comrade [female] Elfriede Gutschebauch as Notetaker

From the side of the UAR participated:

President Gamal Abdel Nasser
The 1st Vice President Abdel Hakim Amer
Prime Minister Ali Sabri
The Deputy of the Prime Minister, Dr. Nureddin Tarraf
The Deputy of the Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi
The Deputy of the Prime Minister, Dr. [Mohamed] Sedky [Sulayman]
The Minister for Foreign Trade and Planning, Dr. Ahmed Shukher

At the beginning of the meeting, President Nasser welcomed the Chairman of the State Council of the GDR, Walter Ulbricht, and wished him a pleasant stay in the UAR. He emphasized how the people of this country are very well aware who is supporting them in their difficult struggle and who has always been a good friend.

The Chairman of the State Council thanked with heartfelt words for the invitation by the President of the UAR. He called his visit to the UAR a great event for the people of the GDR and the entire German people. It especially serves the purpose of strengthening the friendship and the close cooperation between both states.

Gamal Abdel Nasser:

I again want to mention that this invitation was issued before the crisis with West Germany arose.^[1] The crisis is a result of this invitation. You will remember that we talked about this invitation, when Dr. [Heinrich[ Homann was here, and I expressed my approval of this invitation. Is there an agenda for the meeting?

Walter Ulbricht:

There is no agenda. - We are willing to talk about all questions. We are ready to listen to you.

Gamal Abdel Nasser:

I thank you very much.

Walter Ulbricht:

I think we are starting with the current problems. The assessment of the situation is contained in the already published material. We are viewing the invitation as a significant step contributing to serve the cause of peace. It has shown, and it now has become even more visible, that we are in full agreement on the question of the joint struggle for peace against the imperialist plans of aggression. Our republic and all peaceful forces in Germany are in favor of the full guaranteeing of the sovereignty of the UAR. Based on this aspect, we would welcome if our cooperation on international issues will become even closer. We are in favor of establishing nuclear-free zones and of international disarmament; and we are eager to first getting admitted as observer to the United Nations. Later we will ask for accession to the United Nations. There is no doubt that it would be useful if you, Mr. President, will support our position, and if we could have talks and consultations from time to time about these and similar questions pertaining to securing the peace.

You said the invitation has triggered the crisis in the relations with the Bonn Republic. But in Bonn there is not just this one crisis, there are a lot of contradictions coming together there. It began with the demand by the Bonn Government to have a right of say on nuclear weapons and to build a multi-lateral nuclear force. Against this, a protest movement has formed in most countries. Even the allies in NATO expressed their distance. In this context, the Bonn Government has announced its aggressive plan against the German Democratic Republic. As an experienced military man, you know, Mr. President, pretty well that military plans already discussed in public are not of very much value. We have taken the liberty to make the overall plan of the Bonn Government public.^[2] Since the Bonn Government was so careless to write everything down, this also had a counter-effect for them in West Germany.

The third issue is the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The Western powers themselves have rejected that at the Paris NATO meeting^[3]. And now in addition, the Bonn Government is supporting Israel with weapons of war. The double game by the Bonn Government became apparent.

When I am providing this assessment of the situation, I want to relate this to the domestic situation in West Germany. The Bonn Government has elections in fall.^[4] It is not comfortable for a Minister President^[5] to enter the election with such defeats. This is too much even for a strong Minister President. It is apparent that also in West Germany the forces are growing who are pushing for a peaceful orientation. The developments are therefore meeting pushback everywhere. This is why the West German Government is now maneuvering. They are also beginning to negotiate with us over economic issues. They are coming to the Leipzig Trade Fair. Over the Radio they are railing against us, but they are coming to Leipzig to negotiate with us. The [West German] government is protesting against that you, Mr. President, are receiving us here and that the Arab and African states are establishing relations with us. But the Bonn representatives in the economic missions are negotiating with us and not just over economic questions. There are also negotiations about other issues. It is obvious that this stands in complete contrast to the Hallstein Doctrine. We have told the Bonn Government that we are for disarmament in Germany in order to achieve a detente. It’s best for us to begin with expanding the economic relations between both German states and extending the relations to the political level.

Your initiative, Mr. President, had positive results because they have begun to think in Bonn. They are in a difficult situation. You have relations with two German states, of which each one is saying it does represent all of Germany. The Bonn Government is saying we speak for the German Reich in the borders of 1937. We are saying we speak for Germany as defined by the [1945] Potsdam Agreement. Politically we have an advantage because we have no Nazi and other burdens from the past; we have no Hitler generals - we have, as the saying goes, a clean vest.^[6] Given these circumstances, we do understand that it is very complicated for you to maintain relations with both German states. As a non-aligned state, you are eager to have normal relations with all states. We are having the position that everyone should have normal relations with both German states. The hope of the Bonn Government to succeed with swallowing he German Democratic Republic in situation of weakness is an illusion. The GDR has prepared all measures to guarantee its security.

Interjection by Dr. Bolz: Not only the GDR, but the entire socialist camp.

Now they are eager in West Germany to climb down from this policy, because this policy is bankrupt. The attempt to blackmail us with multi-lateral nuclear armaments has not succeeded. It is pointless to start even a small-scale nuclear war in Germany. I think that this insight swill become more and more dominant. You have to start from realities. All peoples and states can support us, by ways of international detente and disarmament.

As far as the reunification is concerned: we have to work this out in Germany by ourselves. The non-aligned states have said it correctly at their last conference in Cairo [5 to 10 October 1964]: Reunification is an internal matter of the divided countries. In each of these divided countries this is a complicated and protracted affair. We have the fullest understanding for the policy you are conducting as a non-aligned state. We are convinced that this policy is serving the UAR and the unification of the Arab countries. You have your special conditions, and we have ours. Nobody is expecting that I talk like President Nasser or vice versa, but we have joint interests on many issues, and we are eager to develop true and friendly relations. We are also rating the invitation especially highly, because the resistance against the Bonn Blackmail will also encourage the Arab countries to unmask West German policy. We are convinced it will also succeed in West Germany to reject the hegemonic demands of imperialism, as we cannot win friends in the world through arms build-up. This is nonsense. Twice a war was emanating from Germany. We can only win by disarmament and high scientific and technological achievements in other fields. There is no other way. This is the national problem in Germany. And it is a long struggle to fight this West German ideology. The extremists also have a tradition, and it is not easy and takes a long time until this tradition has been pushed back. Your invitation, Mr. President, has contributed towards sobering the people, so that they learn to respect the sovereignty of other states. This is our assessment of the current situation.

As far as the cooperation between our two states and governments is concerned: Recently and over the last years, economic cooperation has further developed. An agreement was prepared pertaining to future economic cooperation. We are very much interested in detailed information about the basic ideas of your 2nd Five-Year-Plan. We will discuss our plan until 1970, this will happen in July this year. We are interested in your concept of the plan perspectives until 1970, because this will make collaboration in this area easier. We have drafted the plans for the respective production areas until 1970. Now in spring, we are coordinating the collaboration with all socialist countries until 1970. Of course, cooperation between us and the UAR will be different from the one between ourselves and our neighbors, like e.g. with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. We are cooperating for quite some time already and the developmental conditions of yours are somewhat different from our neighboring states.

However, we are asking you to tell us your concept, so we can adapt to it. We do very well understand that you are working out the path you have chosen. Previously we held the opinion that the development of the entire socialist camp would proceed rather evenly, however, this is not the case. Everyone has to develop its plan in accordance with specifics in the individual countries. There are not the same conditions in Yugoslavia as in the GDR. Still, we are cooperating very well.

This is why it was already talked about in preparatory meetings that one should form a joint Economic Committee [GDR-Egypt]. Therefore I am asking for your opinion, Mr. President, whether you like this proposal, and on which level the Economic Committee should operate, Minister Level or Deputy Prime Minister Level.

Connected to this question is the Scientific-Technological cooperation. The preparatory documents are talking about establishing a Scientific-Technological Council. We are in favor of this proposal. It has to be further elaborated how this Council is supposed to work, because the Scientific-Technological Council can only lead to positive results if the planning concepts are clear. Concerning this issue, we would ask that you develop your concepts, so we can organize our cooperation on this basis. This will contribute towards further close cooperation.

Regarding cultural cooperation, there also had been preparatory talks. We are very much interested to reach also an agreement on cultural cooperation. This will be beneficial to both sides. Therefore it looks in particular important to me that we undertake a mutual studying of the situation in various areas. I do not want to propose the method we have previously used with the socialist countries. In those countries, where the rule by the working class has existed for many years already, conditions for cooperation are somewhat different. The cooperation between our countries and the exchange of experiences has to really work in a way that we focus on the issues, which are of special interest to you. It does not make sense that you study our entire education system, but it would make sense for you sending a study group to learn about our vocational training. It is the same with other areas. According to your state of development and your interests, we ask that you propose yourself for which areas you want to send study delegations. We are ready to show you everything what you will want to know, and we will be preparing ourselves for this. We have a certain economic system of planning and guidance of the economy. One has to review which elements can be adapted by you in a similar way. There are certain aspects that might interest you, for instance the material incentives and also planning methods. It is not necessary for you to repeat the same bureaucratic mistakes we have made. We have now changed this quite radically. But how you structure your planning, this is your matter; this is something specific.

I have shown interest for a couple of economic problems of your country. You are practicing many things which we have done in a similar fashion: your attitudes towards small and medium industries, to private trade, to the problem how to set the prices under these conditions. We have not liquidated the small merchants, craftsmen, et cetera, like other socialist countries did. In our country they have transitioned into cooperatives. We are thinking the path you are following here regarding purchase and sale cooperatives is extremely important.

I want to state it explicitly: do not copy too much from us, since your conditions are different, and you have to take specific economic steps yourselves. I am saying this so that there are no misunderstandings when I am talking about cooperation. This cannot mean that we are giving you suggestions how you should do this or that in your country. This does not work. We want to study from you how the transition to socialism comes about under your conditions. We do not know that. The UAR is the vanguard of the Arab states, you can demonstrate to us how one can solve those problems. We want to study this in your country; and you will know that and give us advice how the development in the African countries is proceeding. This is difficult for us. We know how to fight against colonialism and neocolonialism, but the developing conditions of the newly liberated countries are very complicated. We are attaching value to your advice on these matters.

This is true cooperation. How to fight against West German imperialism: here we are specialists. Yet here for the Arab countries you are the specialists. I think we can develop a good cooperation in this regard. As I said, there are problems. You have to know for yourself what is relevant to you, and what you want to study from us.

Linked to the talks about the preparation of the second Five-Year-Plan is obviously also the question: what requests do you have where we can support you to train certain experts; what kind of engineers and professors do you wish to work here for some time? Or which experts, who already have a basic education, do you intend to send to the GDR as doctoral candidates? We are willing to fulfill your requests as far as it is in our power.

Regarding the other cultural cooperation in the areas of television, literature, and the health system: we are willing to develop the cooperation with you. Pertaining to television this is already ongoing. We agree that this is to be continued. In the area of culture as well there is a wide range for a cooperation.

These are the main problems we want to address.

With regard to state-to-state relations, we want to hear your opinion. It is our assessment that through the visit by Prime Minister [Otto] Grotewohl a de-facto recognition was made through the agreement on a Consulate General^[7]. However, this is not a de jure recognition , not a diplomatic recognition by the standards of international law. I want to ask you to state your opinion: what is possible?

Regarding cooperation with other Arab and African states we are attaching very high value to your opinion and to your advice. There are also certain economic interests which we have. For instance, we are interested to obtain oil from Arab countries, maybe from Iraq or from other countries. In any case, we need oil from the states which are close to you.

With Algeria this is not yet possible. But maybe we can find a way how we can import oil from an Arab country.

We are standing on a realistic base and think this is to mutual benefit.

This is all what I could say for an introduction.

Gamal Abdel Nasser:

I thank you very much for this introduction. 

I think we are pursuing the same policy in the struggle for peace and against colonialism, and there are many areas where we can cooperate for peace. I think that the field of the non-aligned states is a very useful field for spreading and strengthening the ideas of peace in the entire world. This idea became successful after the Bandung Conference. There we had only 5 non-aligned countries. At the last conference in Cairo there were over 50 countries, in 1961 there had been 29.

Also, when we are looking at Africa, we can easily notice how the number of non-aligned states has increased. Therefore we believe that it is a good and useful idea to work for peace through non-alignment.

But these countries have difficulties. Each country has its own problems and they have to expand their relations with the developed countries. Many of the non-aligned countries are underdeveloped. Many had to suffer under colonialism. Many of these countries still have bases of the capitalists in their countries. The responsibility of the socialist camp tp alleviate the situation of these countries is large.

We are also confronted with the issue of neocolonialism.

You have talked about West Germany. I have to say that we were surprised last year about the West German attitude, because they had always come to us with the desire for cooperation. They continuously stated they do not want to interfere with our problems. West Germany is a rich country, a developed country, one of the most important developed countries in the world. Therefore they were in a position to interfere everywhere in Africa after they had expanded their cooperation and their economic penetration. Our example is typical in this regard. There are African countries in need for arms to build up their armies.

It is easy, quite easy, to receive the gift of arms. Of course, Tanzania as well would be willing to accept military aid. Israel had conducted this policy in Africa following the demand by the imperialist countries.

In 1960 I met for the first time the President of Mali, [Modibo] Keïta, and I asked him about his intention to import arms for his army from Israel. He said this is the only way for me to equip my army. I have asked for arms in France, but I was told to approach Israel.

Many countries are turning yo West Germany as a country with good intentions. So the roles are distributed. Some are supplying arms to this country, others are delivering to another one.

Recently we have noticed an increase of American influence.

I have elaborated here to direct your attention to the young, the non-aligned countries, and to remind you of the responsibility of the socialist camp. Because, if the socialist camp is not helping these countries to solve their problems, they have to give in to the pressure of the imperialist states.

Traditionally many [Western] countries were tied to these [African] countries and it is easier for the former to continue along these lines. It is not easy to launch a cooperation with a socialist country. Take us for an example. We have inherited the old regime. There was no contact whatsoever with socialist countries. But the United States and Great Britain had a strong influence here. After the liberation and the confiscation of the British assets in Egypt, we have begun to negotiate with the United States, Great Britain, and France over our needs for arms. Back then we did not think of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. At the beginning of our revolution we also had turned to the Soviet Union but it did reject arms deliveries.

We were influenced by Western propaganda. Such were our conditions and these are also the conditions for each new African country. One even hardly came close to entertain the idea to ask a socialist country for arms.

At a reception by the Prime Minister of Sudan I talked to the Soviet Ambassador and I asked him: Are you willing to deliver arms. There had been no decision by the Revolutionary Council, and I was convinced I would not get an answer. But even greater was my surprise, when after a few days I received the reply that the Soviet Union is agreeing to supply us with arms. I am providing these examples to explain to you in which situation the new independent states are in, especially in Africa. Therefore the socialist countries have to make great efforts to support the independent young countries, and this way we can strengthen the movements of non-alignment.

I want to provide another example. Congo-Brazzaville was a semi-independent country. There was a revolution there and nationalist forces were in the position to assume the governmental power. However, they faced big problems. The French were there, the technicians, and also the French Army was there. The Congolese Army just consisted of 1,000 men.

After the takeover of power [by the Congolese], France decided to drastically reduce aid. There were problems regarding paying for the wages and salaries. And there was no option to equip the army of 1,000 soldiers. The country of Congo-Brazzaville has a population of 1 million. But the leaders of the other African countries are looking to Brazzaville to see whether they will have success. If they will have success, the other countries can also begin with an independent policy. They [Congolese] came to us asking for a loan. We provided it to them. They have asked us to continue with construction works the French have abandoned. We declared our consent. They asked us for commercial credits. We gave them to them. They asked for arms. We stated our approval. In December of last year, the French left the country and withdrew all French technicians, the airport staff, and the personnel of the postal and telegraphic services. They [Congolese] asked us to the send the respective experts. [In the meantime] they had become subject to aggression by Congo-Leopoldville.

Such are the problems those countries are facing. We do not have sufficient resources to help them. This is such an example where the aid of the socialist camp have to set in. I think they [Congolese] have asked for some tanks and aircraft. I am saying this to point out that we have to encourage the leaders of the free states. For example: Tanzania. They want to pursue an independent policy. They have supported the liberation movement in Africa. So one has to encourage and support them. Obviously they have their own problems. They have taken over the British administration. The same is true for Kenia. Also for Uganda. Uganda wants to have force because it is subject to an aggression by Tshombe. They asked us for some aircraft and other things, but it was difficult for us to meet these requests. We have forces in Iraq and in Yemen. It is not sufficient just to send two aircraft. You need the entire airport, the radar installations, et cetera.

But they see that Tshombe is supported by the Americans. Now they want to have support from other states. And if West Germany is coming in now and tells them it is willing to train pilots et cetera, then they obviously will accept this aid.

This is why our side has made the proposal to cooperate with you in other African states to build factories (soap factories, et cetera). I also think that out our policies are congruent on the issue of disarmament. We also have supported the idea of a nuclear-free zone.

As far as the problem of relations between the two Germanys is concerned: We are following this problem and we are in support of the idea of reunification. This was clearly stated at the most recent conference of the non-aligned states [in 1964]. However, we are of thew opinion that all this has to be achieved in a peaceful manner. Therefore we do not support a hostile West German plan against East Germany.

As far as our relations are concerned: we have always taken into consideration West Germany’s relations with Israel. It was our objective not to leave West Germany to Israel. In the last year, Israel has received from West Germany 3,700 million Dollars, this is more than one million Dollar every day. The United States do not want to deliver arms directly to Israel and have put pressure on West Germany to do this [instead]. For that reason we are monitoring this issue always with heightened attention and also concern. Therefore we also were very hesitant during the visit by Mr. Grotewohl [in 1959], but we agreed to the establishment of Consulates General.

We also have agreed to the invitation of the Chairman of the State Council of the GDR without running the risk to be at the mercy of Israel. This question is very important. We want to sow misunderstandings between Israel and West Germany. We want to bring West Germany to a situation where it stops to deliver arms to Israel. We do agree with you that the reunification is a question for the Germans themselves and that, in addition, it is a complicated question.

[Now] regarding the cooperation between our two countries. - And I also want to provide an introduction to this subject. -  

We have our plan for the next 5 years, from July 1965 to the year 1970. You can have our plan.

Our Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs are present. We do not have any objections against a joint committee. We only have to still discuss at what level. Such a committee does already exist with Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia at the level of Deputy Prime Minister. We can leave it to you to make the decision.

Interjection Walter Ulbricht: We will follow your decision.

Gamal Abdel Nasser:

If you do agree, then we can establish the committee at the Deputy Prime Minister level.

Also, we do not have any objections against the joint Scientific-Technological Council, and we have to achieve clarity about the objective of this council.

As far as cultural cooperation is concerned: We can sign a Cultural Agreement. Regarding the study groups, the Prime Minister can draft respective plans. And pertaining to training of experts and the delegation of professors: this has to be dealt with in this [Scientific-Technological] Council. We do agree on cooperation between television, radio, et cetera.

So much for questions of cooperation.

Concerning the transition to socialism. In my opinion, this is a very complicated question. I have tried to write a book about the transition from capitalism to socialism. I was not able to do this. I have read everything that Lenin and Stalin have written, with the objective to see clearly for myself with regard to this transition period.

I have also read Mao Zedong and have studied the Chinese experiment.

Interjection Walter Ulbricht: The experiment or the Great Leap?

Gamal Abdel Nasser:

From the beginnings to the present. Everybody has his conditions. In a certain situation, Lenin did say that he is willing to accept foreign capital. For some time there existed the Kulaks. In other countries there exists private property. There is no doctrine regarding the transition from capitalism to socialism, and we are seeing ourselves confronted with this task. And we are facing new problems. However, our society is not a socialist society, it is also not a capitalist society. So many problems are mixing and overlapping themselves here.

And it is easier to be either a capitalist or a socialist country. We are standing with one leg in capitalism and with the other one in socialism.

Interjection Walter Ulbricht: We have also tried this out ourselves.

Gamal Abdel Nasser:

We are also going through a process where there are also mistakes you have to correct. For instance, I think it would be completely crazy if we wanted to nationalize land and property. We have limited land ownership to 40 acres. Now we are attempting to implement a collective cultivation of land while maintaining private ownership. In addition, we want to introduce mechanization.

Where we have done this already, we were able to increase production by 30 percent, with cotton by 20 percent, and with rice and wheat by 30 percent. Next year we want to expand the method of cooperative work in the Nile Valley. We are a bit afraid about the concept of a state farm.

Interjection Walter Ulbricht: Us too!

Gamal Abdel Nasser:

With cooperative cultivation, everyone remains the owner of his land, cares for his land, and nothing gets stolen. But how does this look like if you have a state farm? Who will then take care of it? If someone does not get fertilizer, they come to my office. Then everyone can send a telegram to me that he does not get fertilizer.

Those were the many problems of transition. It is very easy to nationalize a business. It is also easy to appoint a head of a company.

But how is the new production to look like? It has to be exportable. This is why we have competition between the companies.

Trade is even more complicated because we have to work with the old merchants. The progressive forces are not specialists for trade. This is why we have very many problems in this context, especially as far as distribution is concerned. We have organized the foreign trade and have problems there as well. It is our policy not to allow an increase of prices, but there had been some leftist opinions that you need to have the monopoly and not give the goods to other businesses. I have criticized this in the parliament. We have said, 25 percent are for the cooperative sector, 75 percent for the private sector. This has helped to resolve the problem.

Another problem of the transition is the increase in consumption. Grain, sugar, meat - everywhere consumption is increasing.

In addition, we are subjected to very big propaganda in this area. Everyone is writing that we have many problems because we are building up socialism. We have to provide the local market with what it needs, and this is affecting our exports. So, there are very, very many problems associated with transition. Everyone has to have work, we have to eliminate unemployment. Then we have to provide anyone with the minimum living standard. In 1952 there were 4.5 million workers. Now there are more than 7 million, and all of them want to consume something and need consumer goods.

We have heard how you are solving some of these problems. We had big discussions with President Tito. They had the same problems like us.   

Regarding the question of our cooperation related to other Arab countries and also pertaining to oil. - We want to talk about this in our next meeting. We will prepare for this accordingly. I do not know whether we have a surplus of oil, maybe next year.

Walter Ulbricht:

I thank you very much for your interesting remarks. You have answered some of the problems we know from our own experience. I am also willing to give you answers to some problems. For instance, what you are saying about agriculture is absolutely correct. We are applying the same methods. First mutual support, then cooperation; means of production staying with the peasants. Then you gradually give them technology. Then the peasants are learning, and the principle has to be the peasants must feel responsible for their own cooperation. You must not mandate this from above. When the peasants are beginning to work cooperatively, and the state is supporting them in material terms, then they develop so much talent that there will be progress.

As far as the state farms are concerned: We have faced the same question. We have only a minimum of state farms. We have some for seed cultivation and for cattle breeding. Only seven percent of the land are state farms. Some socialist countries were of the opinion with state farms you are progressing faster, but the peasants are not learning quicker in state farms than in the LPG [Landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaft, or Agricultural Production Cooperative]. We have checked this out. It does not go faster. You have to convince both, the peasants and the laborers in the state farms. In our country the peasants have learned faster than some farm laborers. However, there are some complicated economic questions involved, questions of prices, et cetera. There are also similarly complicated issues in the industry. This is not written down anywhere. We can discuss about it. We do know what we are not supposed to do. We have included the big farmers up to 99 hectares in the LPG. We were warned the big farmers will command. [However,] the majority of these farmers are working excellently. The old pattern, which was initially used in other socialist countries, we have not applied. We had to do this differently. Why? For economic motives, but also for the reason that we have to show an example to West Germany. If we would have expropriated the peasants with 90 hectares, we would have alienated the West German peasants. Now the former big farmers are doing propaganda for the GDR vis-a-vis the West German peasants.

We are willing to tell you how we have progressed and what we have gotten wrong. We are very pleased with your statements.

It is agreed that the two Prime Ministers will meet to prepare the next meeting on Saturday late afternoon.

With the handover of the accompanying letter for the district community clinic to fight tuberculosis to President Nasser, the first negotiation round was ended.