Minutes of the Conversation between Premier Zhou Enlai and Premier Kim Il Sung

Foreign Ministry Top Secret Document

Minutes of the Conversation between Premier Zhou Enlai and Premier Kim Il Sung

[Not Reviewed by Premier Zhou]

Background of the publication of the [North] Korea—Indonesia Joint Statement

Premier Kim Il Sung [henceforth referred to as Kim]. When we were talking to Sukarno, we mainly raised two points on the content of the joint statement: One was on the Vietnam issue, and the other was the issue of the “Korea–Japan Talks.” On the Vietnam issue, we proposed to support the four points set forth by Premier Pham Van Dong. Sukarno expressed his approval. As for the Korea issue, as Sukarno had discussed it when he visited [North] Korea, we only raised the issue of opposing the “Korea–Japan Talks” this time round. Sukarno agreed to include this in the statement. Sukarno proposed to include the issue of the Asian-African Conference into the statement. We agreed to do so.

Both sides established a drafting committee for the joint statement after reaching the above agreement. Vice Premier Kim Gwang-hyeop and Foreign Minister Pak Seong-cheol represented the Koreans. Second Deputy Vice Premier Leimena and First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Suwito represented the Indonesians.

On the 13th, both sides submitted their respective drafts but Indonesia’s draft was rather toned-down and ambivalent about the Vietnam issue. It proposed to have peace talks, advocated the idea of having a consultative conference among the Asian countries along the lines of the Geneva Conference and opposed the idea of having a few big powers to resolve the Vietnam issue. There was not a single word about the issue of North Vietnam. As for the issue of opposing the “Korea–Japan Talks”, not a word was mentioned for fear of offending Japan. In lieu of such a draft, we changed our strategy, i.e. we compromised on the issue of the “Korea–Japan Talks” and asked them to sharpen their rhetoric on the Vietnam issue. In the end, they omitted the paragraphs on opposing the idea of having a few big powers to resolve the Vietnam issue and convening the conference of Asian countries. Both sides spent a whole day discussing this.

It seems that Sukarno says well-meaning things, but there are problems with the people below him.

On Issuing a Document in Support of Vietnam

Kim: I asked Sukarno for his views about ratifying the document, I asked Sukarno for his opinion. Sukarno said that some delegations [and only raised the example of Japan] had asked if there would be a document issued or talks held for the commemorative event this time round. If there were, then they would not attend. He replied by asking them to come and talk a look, which means that no document would be issued. Thus, Sukarno was not disposed to giving me a definitive opinion. I met the Vietnamese comrades and they were prepared to submit a draft document. It seems that a lot of work will have to be done if a document is going to be issued. Otherwise there would be difficulties.

Premier Zhou Enlai [henceforth referred to as Zhou]: It’s not feasible to have a document that involves all the delegations. We should strive to have a document that involves more than a dozen countries and with a tone that is not lower than that of the [North] Korea—Indonesia Joint Statement.

Kim: It can be done with more than a dozen countries. Sukarno and Sihanouk will have no problem with this. Today I spoke to Sihanouk about the four points set forth by Premier Pham Van Dong. He expressed his agreement

Sihanouk’s Visit to [North] Korea

Kim: I met Sihanouk today. He said he was planning to visit [North] Korea from October 12 to 15 this year [he will be visiting Vietnam on October 2 and going to Beijing after that] and the Soviet Union thereafter.

Sihanouk is not bad. Even though it was the first time we met, I could see that he was very resolutely anti-imperialist. He said that the negotiations with the United States did not amount to much and that they just had to be driven away, and told me to rest my mind.

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