N. Sudarikov, 'The Main Directions of the Domestic and Foreign Policy of the KWP CC and DPRK Government and the Situation in Korea'

Secret

Copy Nº 2

SOVIET EMBASSY IN THE DPRK

18 November 1969

Nº 386

[CPSU CC stamp: 39334

2? November 1969 Korea

THE MAIN DIRECTIONS OF THE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY OF THE KWP CC AND DPRK GOVERNMENT AND THE SITUATION IN KOREA

(Political letter of the Embassy in connection with the arrival in the USSR of DPRK Minister of Foreign Affairs Pak Seong-cheol)

In connection with the upcoming official visit to the USSR of Pak Seong-cheol, KWP CC Politburo member, Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers, and DPRK Minister of Foreign Affairs the Embassy considers it advisable to illuminate some aspects of the domestic and foreign policy of the KWP and DPRK government, and also express views on a number of questions which might be touched upon by our side during the conversations in Moscow.

I. The Domestic Political Situation and the Economic Situation of the DPRK

All the domestic political and organizational work of the KWP is directed at the further elevation of the leading role of the Party in all spheres of the country’s life, raising the population in the spirit of devotion to the motherland, the Party, and first of all Kim Il Sung personally. Political work among the masses is invariably given first place.

[Translator’s note: there is a stamp at the end of the first page stating that “the material is informative and the CPSU CC Department has been familiarized with [it]. Katerinich.15D/6. 10 April 1970; [to the] archives. [[illegible signature]]”]

This work is characterized by great intensity, based on the study of the “ideas of the leader” and his instructions on the scene which are presented here as the creative development of Marxism-Leninism as applied to the specific conditions of Korea. At the same time the study of the classic works of Marxism-Leninism has actually been curtailed. No active preparation for a celebration of the 100^th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin has been organized, with the exception of individual mentions in speeches at meetings and rallies devoted to memorable dates in Soviet-Korean relations. A KWP CC decree on this question adopted in April was published in the press only in October of this year.

The increased glorification of Kim Il Sung, the name of whom is directly linked with the history of the national liberation movement of the Korean people, the liberation of Korea, and all the successes of the DPRK during the years of people’s power, remains as before a characteristic feature of the domestic political situation in the country. Kim Il Sung is exalted in propaganda not just to the rank of leader of the 40-million Korean people, but also as one of the outstanding leaders of the international Communist and worker’s movement, theoretician, and leader of the national liberation struggle of the peoples of the entire world. Each of his speeches and articles is viewed as a new word in the development of Marxist-Leninist theory, and as an exhaustive reply to questions which no one has been able to answer.

Political education work among the masses has a very sharply anti-American orientation. Not just servicemen, but the entire population is brought up in the spirit of readiness “to defeat” the American imperialists if they make an attack on the DPRK, [or] come to the aid of the South Korean people in the event of a mass uprising in the south against the US and the puppet Seoul regime.

One cannot fail to note the high effectiveness of the KWP political educational work with the masses. This is convincingly demonstrated by the great organization, discipline, fitness, and love of labor of the people, which is observed everywhere in cities and villages. In the DPRK cases of crime, disruptions of public order and labor discipline, and immoral phenomena are extremely rare. Leaders at any level enjoy unquestioned authority. Discipline and order in the country are ensured not only by educational work, but also by severe administrative measures against all those who exhibit even the slightest doubt of the correctness of the Party and the leader’s line.

[Translator’s note: the following paragraph was bracketed in the left margin with the note: “Cde. R. S. Zamoshchnikov”] From the observations of the Embassy, senior officials from top to the bottom are unreservedly devoted to Kim Il Sung and indisputably pursuing the Party policy in accordance with his instructions. All key posts in the Party and government are occupied by people who have worked for many years under the direct supervision of Kim Il Sung and are known here as his close associates back from the period of the anti-Japanese partisan struggle. During the last year a considerable replacement of senior officials has occurred in such important sectors of government and Party work as the army, the public security organs, intelligence, the KWP CC Bureau for South Korean questions, and others. In the opinion of the Embassy the changes which have occurred in the management of these sectors are connected with the unsuccessful actions of the North Korean armed groups and big failures of underground organizations in South Korea which have occurred in the past two years.

In the meanwhile the Korean comrades have not determined the dates for the convening of the next, 5^th, Party congress. It probably is being scheduled for the end of 1970 or the beginning of 1971. Evidently, this is connected with some economic difficulties which are taking place in the country. As is well-known, the last KWP Congress occurred in September 1961, that is, more than eight years ago. During this time the Korean comrades have held a KWP conference (October 1966), which they consider equivalent to a Party congress.

In the economic field the efforts of the Party have been directed at mobilizing workers to fulfill the main tasks of the extended seven-year plan (1961-1970) in 1970. The solution of this problem is still attended by great difficulties. The implementation of the policy worked out by the KWP conference of “parallel economic and defense development” is associated with the diversion of considerable material, financial, and personnel resources for defense needs. The upkeep of the army and public security forces, which are enormous for the size of the country, and the consequences of the 1950-1953 Korean War still cause a serious shortage of manpower in all sectors of the economy. Great difficulties were created in the economy because of a severe drought in 1968-1969, which had a negative effect on the operation of hydroelectric power stations. This, in turn, led to many energy-intensive enterprises and even entire sectors of industry operating on a part-time basis for a long time. Transportation remains a bottleneck in the economy, although recently energetic measures were undertaken by supervisory bodies to expand the most heavily-trafficked rail lines leading to the Soviet-Korean border.

in order to solve the problem of a shortage of electrical power the Korean comrades are forcing the pace of construction of thermal electric power stations, including the Pukchang Thermal Electric Power Station (600,000 kwt), being built with the technical assistance of the Soviet Union. The first unit of this station with a capacity of 100,000 kwt was put in operation in November of this year, and a second unit with the same capacity will go into operation at the end of this year or the start of next year.

Weather conditions this year have also negatively influenced agricultural production. The Korean comrades are doing everything to furnish the rice fields with water, even damaging the operation of electric power stations; they have mobilized peasants to overcome difficulties, and have managed to achieve good results. Evidently, the grain harvest will at the average level of the past several years, although somewhat less than last year’s. The vegetable and fruit harvest received has been good. Animal husbandry remains, as before, the most underdeveloped sector of agriculture.

From all signs the seven year plan’s tasks for agriculture are far from being fulfilled on the whole, and this is having an effect on the material standard of the population, which as before remains low. There will be no lowering of prices for manufactured goods or an increase of manual and office workers’ wages this year. The strict principle of the rationed distribution of grain, more or less supplying this basic food product for the republic’s population, is being implemented due to their food resources available in the country.

At the present time the planning bodies of the DPRK are developing the next economic plan for five or six years. This plan is being prepared in two versions, in accordance with the situation and based on the policy of the parallel development of the economy and defense. One of these provides for the further strengthening of the defense capacity of the country in the event of a possible aggravation of the situation in Korea; the other is based on more favorable peacetime conditions for the development of the economy if there is a lessening of the tension on the Korean peninsula.

II. The Foreign Policy of the KWP CC and the DPRK Government

The main thrusts of the foreign policy of the Korean leadership are substantially different from the positions of the Soviet Union and the European socialist countries.

The Korean leaders are trying to replace the Leninist principles and fundamentals of the foreign policy of the socialist community and, most of all, the principles of proletarian internationalism and the peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems with the so-called “juche” line, more reflecting their nationalist ambitions than the independence and self-sufficiency of which they increasingly speak.

Based on this line the Korean leaders actually do not support our measures to relax international tension, including ending the war in Vietnam and settling the situation in the Near East. They do not agree with the policy of the Soviet government of developing relations with the US, Japan, and the FRG, and stay aloof from the problem of ensuring European security, and the idea of creating a system of collective security in Asia does not receive support from them. Therefore they shrink away from joint steps in the international arena with the USSR and other fraternal countries.

The Korean comrades actively favor the development of bilateral relations both with socialist and capitalist countries, especially with the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Stressing the importance of the solidarity of the socialist camp, the DPRK leadership is taking steps, even displaying initiative, to develop and expand comprehensive relations with all the fraternal countries on a bilateral basis. When doing so, in relations with the European countries the DPRK strives first of all to develop trade and economic and military cooperation. At the same time it demonstratively places reliance on especially close relations with the DRV and Cuba which, as is stressed here, are being constructed on “revolutionary implacability in the fight against American imperialism”, and on a unity of views on the most important questions of the international Communist movement and the national liberation struggle.

Korean-Albanian relations are in a state of stagnation. The DPRK press does not report anything about Albanian life except in connection with national holidays. No reciprocal visits, exchanges of delegations or individual representatives are performed between the countries.

DPRK relations with China continue to remain cool. In recent years only reduced trade and economic and military cooperation have been maintained between the countries. Party ties and contacts at a high level are absent. The Korean comrades have painfully experienced the aggravation of relations between China and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and have constantly hoped for an improvement of Korean-Chinese relations. Therefore were almost no statements against the anti-Soviet attitudes and actions of Mao Zedong and his supporters, and they were silent even in those cases when direct attacks occurred against the leaders of the KWP and Kim Il Sung personally by the Chinese.

The Korean side undertook a number of steps in September and October of this year with the goal of normalizing and improving relations with China. Two meetings were held in Peking between Choe Yong-geon and Zhou Enlai: during the travel of the DPRK Party-government delegation to the funeral of Ho Chi Minh (11 September) and during the Korean delegation’s visit for the 20^th anniversary of the formation of the PRC (2 October). No substantive changes in Korean-Chinese relations are being observed after these meetings and the discussions which were held, although in the words of the Korean comrades they are hoping for significant shifts and positive changes and are striving for this. When explaining their steps concerning a normalization of relations with China, the Korean leaders try to draw a parallel with the line of the Soviet Union; they say, “we both have been trying to improve these relations”.

The Korean comrades are devoting special attention to the Afro-Asian countries, striving to develop political, economic, and cultural ties with them in every possible way. This year the DPRK established diplomatic and consular relations with six countries of Asia and Africa. High-level delegations often come to the DPRK from Afro-Asian countries. The Korean comrades give them fancy receptions, hold talks, and publish communiqués on the widest range of international problems, popularizing their special views. The DPRK embassies and the numerous delegations which go there with various missions do much work in the Afro-Asian countries. The Korean representatives in these countries propagandize their position with respect to ways to develop the liberated countries, the ideas of “reliance on their own resources”, “juche”, “self-sufficiency and independence”, “intransigence toward the great powers”, etc. A special place in this propaganda is devoted to Kim Il Sung as “the outstanding figure of the world Communist, worker’s, and national liberation movement”.

In the last two years the DPRK has undertaken energetic measures to develop relations with capitalist countries, regardless of the position these countries take with respect to South Korea. The Korean side is making overtures for these purposes in France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and several other European capitalist countries. This year the DPRK has expanded trade and economic ties with France, Britain, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Australia, the FRG, and Japan. The DPRK exports seafood, non-ferrous and precious metals, including gold, to these countries. By 1969 the DPRK trade turnover with capitalist countries reached 85-90 million rubles, that is, 15% of the country’s foreign trade turnover. Trade with capitalist countries allows the DPRK to create several hard-currency funds which are used to purchase the newest industrial equipment, and to finance foreign policy and propaganda events.

III. Soviet-Korean Relations

The KWP CC and DPRK government demonstrate a desire to develop and improve relations with the Soviet Union not only in word, but indeed.

This year the trend toward an expansion of ties between the governmental institutions and public organizations of both countries, and toward an increase of personal contacts between Party and government figures has increased even more. A reciprocal exchange of delegations of various levels and types has been notably stepped up.

The official visit to Korea by Cde. N. V. Podgornyy, and also the visit to the DPRK by Cdes. V. N. Novikov, S. A. Skachkov, and N. A. Shchelokov made in 1969 played an important role in the further development and strengthening of Soviet-Korean relations. The Korean side in turn sent a military delegation to the USSR headed by KWP CC Politburo member and Minister of National Defense Choe Hyon, an agricultural delegation headed by Chairman of the Agriculture Committee Kim Man-geum, and a number of other delegations. In December a DPRK economic delegation headed by Deputy Premier Jeong Jun-taek will go to the Soviet Union.

Cde. Kim Il Sung accepted in principle an invitation from the CPSU CC to visit the Soviet Union on an official or unofficial visit at a convenient time for him.

Numerous transit trips through Moscow of Korean Party-government, parliamentary, economic, and other delegations have been used to expand personal contacts between leaders of the USSR and the DPRK.

Cooperation between our countries in the fields of culture, science, sports, and tourism has been considerably expanded this year. The appearances in the DPRK of the Berezka choreographic ensemble were large and quite effective cultural exchange events. The USSR and DPRK Academies of Sciences have concluded an agreement about collaboration, renewed an exchange of scientific researchers beginning this year, including in the social sciences field. Ties between trade unions, youth, and women’s organizations and also between the friendship societies of both countries have become more active.

A reciprocal exchange of information is maintained between the governments of the USSR and the DPRK through diplomatic channels and an exchange of opinions occurs on questions of mutual interest. Cde. Pak Seong-cheol went to Moscow in April of this year in connection with the aggravation of the situation in Korea as a consequence of KPA units’ destruction of an American reconnaissance aircraft and had a conversation with Cde. L. I. Brezhnev. In October the Korean ambassador informed Soviet representatives of new factors in DPRK relations with China.

The Korean comrades are consulting with us regarding the discussion of the “Korean question” at the 24^th UN GA session. As in previous years, a deputy minister of foreign affairs came to Moscow, and had meetings and conversations with senior USSR MFA comrades.

The Korean comrades react with gratitude to the work of the Soviet government at the UN, and to the aid and assistance from our side in establishing DPRK relations with the countries of Asia and Africa, and also with the capitalist countries of Europe.

The special views of the KWP leadership on many important problems of modern times, especially questions of war and peace, and the forms and methods of combatting American imperialism, continue to have an negative effect in the development of Soviet-Korean relations in the political and ideological spheres. The Korean comrades refrain from exchanging the experience of Party work, limiting themselves to the reciprocal sending of Party and government officials for rest and treatment. The desire to keep the people from “outside” ideological influence also finds expression in restrictive measures regarding the dissemination of the Soviet periodical press and literature in the DPRK.

Its attitude toward the International Conference of Communist and Worker’s Parties held in Moscow in June of this year was an important verification of the ideological and political conceptions of the KWP leadership. Whereas on the eve of the Conference the Korean comrades confidentially spoke in the spirit that convening the Conference was not a bad thing, their participation in its work, however, would  have unavoidably led to still greater complications and further strained relations with China, subsequently in an interview with one of the Arab newspapers published in the press Kim Il Sung hinted that the Conference did not produce the expected results and did not promote the solidarity of the international Communist movement.

The Korean comrades convened an international conference of journalists in Pyongyang through ICJ channels with the goal of raising the international prestige of the KWP and evidently as a counterbalance to the Moscow Conference which tried to make maximum use for propagandizing its own concepts of the anti-imperialist, particularly “anti-American”, struggle.

The Korean side displays great interest in expanding trade and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union.

This year has developed unsuccessfully in the field of foreign trade between the two countries inasmuch as the Korean side is performing its obligations unsatisfactorily by virtue of domestic reasons. The DPRK’s contract obligations for deliveries in 1969 constitute 182,200,000 rubles. The Korean side has shipped goods worth only 84,700,000 rubles (46.5%) of this amount, whereas the Soviet Union, with an annual volume of obligations of 161,800,000 rubles of deliveries, has delivered 101,600,000 rubles (68%) to the DPRK in nine months. As a result the DPRK’s clearing debt to the Soviet Union so far this year has reached 70 million rubles. In connection with such a situation Cde. Kim Il Sung recently turned to Cde. A. N. Kosygin with a letter requesting shifting this debt to a number of following years.

As of 1 July of this year the total volume of our obligations according to the agreement to give the DPRK technical assistance in the construction of industrial facilities was 281,100,000 rubles per clearing and 169,600,000 rubles on credit. Recently a new form of cooperation began to be introduced: the construction of enterprises with the technical assistance of the USSR with payment of the credit received with the output of these enterprises. The DPRK leadership highly appreciates the activity of the Soviet-Korean intergovernmental consultative commission for economic and scientific and technical questions, the fifth session of which will discuss the question of the prospects of cooperation between our countries between 1971 and 1975.

Soviet military aid is the main means of modernizing and increasing the combat capability of the DPRK armed forces. Since 1946 it has exceeded 1.8 billion rubles. According to agreements in effect the remainder of our obligations for 1969-1971 are 80,800,000 rubles, including deliveries of military equipment [worth] 55,800,000 rubles and technical assistance in the construction of military facilities [worth] 25 million rubles. While receiving such large and mainly free military aid from the Soviet Union at the same time the Korean leadership does not pass us confidential information about the condition of its armed forces.

It ought to be noted that the economic and military aid and assistance of the Soviet Union, which pays an exceptionally important role in the development of the economy and maintenance of the DPRK defense capability at a proper level, does not find a proper assessment in the public statements of the Korean leaders.

In spite of a number of negative aspects, Soviet-Korean relations are continuing to develop quite actively and in a favorable direction.

Over the long term a further gradual expansion of bilateral cooperation can be expected, primarily through economic, cultural, scientific, and technical channels. Cooperation in the political arena and inter-Party business ties are obviously developing more slowly and with great difficulties. shifts in this direction might be achieved as a result of expanding personal contacts between senior Party and government leaders of the USSR and DPRK and the achievement of greater trust and openness in relations with the Soviet union by the KWP leadership and Kim Il Sung personally.

At this stage a reciprocal exchange of individual representatives, groups, and delegations of the most diverse levels and specialties in the fields of culture, science, sports, and between public organizations, creative unions, etc. take on an important role in the improvement of the overall climate of Soviet-Korean relations. A further expansion of such an exchange, for which the Korean side is showing a readiness, would promote a final surmounting of the consequences of the 1962-1964 period of estrangement, and would help eliminate the misconceptions, suspicion, and prejudice regarding us sowed by the Korean propaganda of past years.

IV.The Situation on the Korean Peninsula and the Problem of the Reunification of the Country

Korea remains as before an explosive region of the world. Each of the opposing sides claims the absolute right to speak in the name of the entire Korean people. The DPRK leadership considers the most important national task to be the elimination of the puppet regime in the South and the conclusion of the revolution on a country-wide scale. The fight against Communism and the reunification of the country through the complete subordination of the North is the main thrust of the domestic and foreign policy of the South Korean authorities.

As is well-known, the 1950-1953 Korean War ended with the conclusion of an armistice agreement, [but] a peace treaty was not signed between the warring sides, and therefore both sides call the region along the demarcation line the front. About 1,500,000 well-trained troops from both sides equipped with modern combat equipment are concentrated here. The personnel and combat equipment of the armies of the North and South are approximately the same. A unique balance of forces has formed which restrains both sides from crossing into openly warlike actions. Trying to ensure its supremacy each side constantly increases the strength of [its] forces and modernizes [its] weapons. The equipping of the forces of both sides with new combat equipment is mainly done at the expense of their allies, the USSR and the US.

Both Korean sides openly speak about the possibility of a military conflict breaking out, and make mutual accusations about provoking incidents and an intentional aggravation of the situation. The tension is increasing from incident to incident as a consequence of the infiltration of reconnaissance and sabotage groups. At such moments a threat is created of incidents of local significance growing into a larger conflict.

On the whole this year the situation on the Korean peninsula was considerably quieter compared to last year. Some tension appeared in April when DPRK aircraft shot down an American reconnaissance plane. Individual clashes with casualties have also taken place in the summer in the region of the demilitarized zone. They have come to nothing since the beginning of the year and so far no armed actions of the North Korean groups infiltrated into the South under the guise of partisans have resumed. It can be supposed that past failures in the South have resulted in some changes in the tactics of the North Korean leadership, which now prefers to infiltrate small specially-trained groups into South Korea to conduct underground work in individual strata of the South Korean population.

This year the KWP CC and DPRK government have taken steps to again mention their previous positive position on the question of the reunification of the country, stressing that they support a peaceful democratic way to solve this problem. While this is being done reliance is put on the need to first of all expel the American troops and overthrow the regime of Park Chung Hee in order, after power passes into the hands of progressive forces in South Korea, to enter into talks with them about specific ways to reunite the country, intending in particular holding free democratic elections throughout the entire country and forming a single democratic government of Korea.

Besides consultations with the USSR MFA and the ministries of foreign affairs of other fraternal countries the Korean comrades have invited a number of representatives of Asian and African countries to the UN to Pyongyang for familiarization with the activity of the DPRK and its position on the question of the reunification of the country by way of preparations for the 24^th UNGA session. In official documents the DPRK government has stressed somewhat more than previously that it has respected and respects the UN Charter and its goals.

The statements and practical steps of the Korean comrades show that right now they are sort of not intending to force the progress of events in South Korea and aggravate the situation on the demarcation line. With all the complexity of the situation on the peninsula a large action from one side or the other is hardly possible right now. [Translator’s note:  a mostly-illegible underlined comment was placed next to this sentence in the left margin]. The North and South are doing much work to strengthen the economy and defense, understanding that in many respects a solution of the problem depends not on themselves, but on their allies. The Korean comrades have been forced to take into consideration the policy of the CPSU CC and the Soviet government of lessening tension and solving conflicts through negotiations.

5. [SIC, not “V”]. Some Suggestions of the Embassy for the Visit of Cde. Pak Seong-cheol

The KWP leadership has attached quite great significance to the official visit of Pak Seong-cheol to the Soviet Union. This visit will undoubtedly promote the further strengthening of Soviet-Korean relations.

Pak Seong-cheol enjoys the complete trust of Kim Il Sung and is, after him, essentially the second person responsible for KWP CC and DPRK government foreign policy. In recent years his position has been constantly growing in the Party and country.

In the opinion of the Embassy, the following questions might be touched upon in conversations with Pak Seong-cheol:

1) Talk in detail about the political and economic situation in our country, the preparations for the 100th birthday of V. I. Lenin, about conducting economic reform and its positive results, and about other planned political and economic measures.

2) Familiarize [him] as much as possible about our foreign policy plans, noting the most important steps planned in this area. Inform [him] of the progress of preparations for a European conference which is planned to be held in Helsinki. Stress the importance of this conference, the successful holding of which is of interest to everyone who is striving for peace and security in Europe and in the entire world. Inquire about the attitude toward this problem of the Korean comrades, who demonstrated indifference to European matters until very recently.

3) Exchange opinions about the problem of the creation of a system of collective security in Asia, especially bearing in mind Pak Seong-cheol’s statement in a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador on 7 November that “they do not understand why this idea is being advanced by the Soviet Union right now and against whom it is directed”.

4) The Korean leaders and Kim Il Sung personally are following everything that concerns China and our relations with this country with special interest. How they take shape depends mainly on the position of the KWP. We have informed them about A. N. Kosygin’s conversation with Zhou Enlai. Now they are interested in the details of the talks in Peking. It would be advisable to provide information not only about our overall position with respect to China and the state of Soviet-Chinese relations, but also insofar as possible about the current discussions in Peking. Show interest about DPRK relations with China, the prospects for their development, and the steps in this direction by the Korean side.

5) Exchange opinions about the situation in Vietnam, the prospects for the development of events in this region, and the possibility of a settlement of the Vietnam problem by political means. Talk about our aid to the Vietnamese people, the recent visits to the USSR by DRV Party-government delegations and the Republic of South Vietnam.

6) Talk about our policy with respect to Japan, the state of Soviet-Japanese relations, and the prospects for their development. Present our views on the policy of the Sato government, especially his policy with respect to Asian countries. Show interest in the state of and prospects for the development of DPRK relations with Japan.

7) Opinions could be exchanged in the area of Soviet-Korean relations on the following specific questions:

- the expansion of a mutual exchange of written and oral information between the CC’s of our Parties and the governments of both countries on questions of domestic and foreign policy;

- the accomplishment of official visits by Cde. Kim Il Sung and Cde. Choe Yong-geon, taking into consideration that he has given agreement to Cde. N. V. Podgornyy in May of this year and confirmed this in a conversation with Cde. N. A. Shchelokov in November of this year;

- the visit to the DPRK by USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Cde. A. A. Gromyko;

- the development of Party and political ties and contacts, the exchange of Party worker delegations, USSR MFA delegations, etc.

8) It would also be advisable to work on, favorably decide, and inform Pak Seong-cheol of our opinion about the following measures to strengthen bilateral relations:

- sending a USSR Supreme Soviet delegation to the DPRK in 1970. It is desirable that this delegation be headed by a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium who is a CPSU CC Secretary, and that it be composed of prominent Party and government officials. Thus the delegation would have a Party nature in its composition; [Translator’s note: the above paragraph was highlighted in the left margin].

- Cdes. A. A. Grechko (M. S. Zakharov), V. V. Matskevich, and other invited Soviet leaders [should] make visits.

9) It seems advisable to exchange opinions about the state and prospects for the development of Soviet-Korean economic and defense cooperation. Evidently, it would be advisable to give a favorable reply to Cde. Kim Il Sung’s letter to Cde. A. N. Kosygin requesting that the DPRK government be offered a trade credit of 70,000,000 rubles.

It is also necessary to take into consideration that the Korean side might raise the question through Pak Seong-cheol of additional military aid to the DPRK inasmuch as deliveries of weapons and equipment according to previous agreements will be completed in the next year or two.

10) in the area of foreign policy [we] could express our favorable attitude toward the position of the DPRK on the question of the peaceful reunification of the country on democratic principles. Note that the press and official representatives of the USSR constantly emphasize attention to this question, supporting the Korean comrades.  

Talk in more detail about the development of the discussion of the “Korean question” at the current UN session, the work done by the USSR MFA, the Soviet embassies in foreign countries, and the Soviet Mission to the UN in drawing UN member countries to the side of the DPRK during the discussion at the 24th UNGA session about Korea.

11) In view of the fact that restrictions have been established for officials of the Embassy and other Soviet institutions in the DPRK in maintaining contacts with the population and officials, and also in moving around the country (contacts and trips outside Pyongyang are possible only with the permission of the MFA Protocol Department), we consider it advisable to discuss the question of observing the principle of reciprocity in the establishment of a regime for officials of Soviet institutions in the DPRK.

Attachment: Secret, on two sheets; unclassified, on 11 sheets..

SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN THE DPRK [signature]

(N Sudarikov)

5-gp

1 – to Cde. A. A. Gromyko

2 – to Cde. K. V. Rusakov

3 – to Cde. V. I. Likhachev

4 – to Cde. I. I. Il’ichev

5 – to file

18 November 1969 Nº 755