Note on Information Provided by Head of 1st Department of DPRK Foreign Ministry, Comrade Kim Jae-suk, about 1st Main Negotiation of Red Cross Committees from DPRK and South Korea on 12 September 1972

GDR Embassy to DPRK

Pyongyang, 15 September 1972

N o t e

On Information Provided by Head of 1^st Department of DPRK Foreign Ministry,

Comrade Kim Jae-suk [Kim Jae Suk], about 1^st Main Negotiation of Red Cross Committees

from DPRK and South Korea on 12 September 1972

This information was provided to ambassadors and acting ambassadors of several socialist countries (among others Poland, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Mongolia, Hungary, Cuba) simultaneously in territorial departments concerned [in the DRPK Foreign Ministry].

Main elements of the information were as follows:

• The 1^st Main Negotiation was a victory for the course of Comrade Kim Il Sung, and a result of the peace offensive by party and government.

• The peace offensive was started last year to create favorable conditions for the realization of South Korean revolution and the unification of the fatherland.

• In his historical speech of 6 August 1971, Kim Il Sung declared the DPRK’s willingness to negotiate with all political parties and associations of South Korea, including the Republican Party, in order to launch the peace offensive.

• The DPRK wanted to achieve by this peace offensive: to thwart the Nixon Doctrine which intends to have Asians fight Asians and, in our case, Koreans against Koreans; to counter efforts by the U.S. imperialists to modernize the South Korean puppet army, to further divide Korea and turn South Korea into a military base; to thwart the further penetration of South Korea by the Japanese imperialists; to prevent further negotiations between South Korea and the U.S., respectively between South Korea and Japan, that were to serve the purposes mentioned above. Another objective of the peace offensive is the elimination of fascist repression in South Korea.

• The South Korean puppet regime has attempted, using the pretext of alleged DPRK plans for a “march toward the South,” to increase the fascist repression against the South Korean people.

• The DPRK has no intentions whatsoever “to march toward the South.” This is supposed to be proven to the South Korean people. At the same time the South Korean government apparatus must be deprived of the pretext to suppress the people and the democratic forces. The growth of revolutionary forces in South Korea ought to be strengthened as soon as possible. In order to achieve this, the repressive measures and anti-communist hysteria by South Korea’s reactionary circles must be stopped.

• With its peace offensive, the DPRK wanted “to open the door between North and South” in order to influence the South Korean people in the spirit of the ideas of the DPRK and thus achieve democratization in South Korea.

• The South Korean puppet clique was forced

- to agree to the proposal of preliminary Red Cross negotiations

- to sign the joint declaration containing the three principles

- to agree to hold the 1^st Main Negotiation of both Red Cross Delegations in the   

 city of Pyongyang.

On DPRK Positions in Red Cross Negotiations, especially the 1^st Main Negotiation:

• The DPRK will do what it can to lead the Red Cross negotiations toward success.

• Through negotiations and the proposed exchange of people’s visits between the South and the North a base for the unification of the country ought to be created. It is intended to have meetings between representatives of parties and public associations in addition to the Red Cross delegates. In contrast, the South Korean side wants to limit the Red Cross talks only to the discussion of “humanitarian issues” in order to buy time.

• More than 80 percent of participants in South Korea’s Red Cross delegations are members of the intelligence service. They pursue tactics to cheat the world, to support U.S. imperialism’s policy of aggression, and to achieve a “victory over communism.” Therefore the preliminary negotiations were this tedious, and these intentions also influenced the main negotiation.

• The DPRK proposed to invite to the negotiations members of the respective advisory team which, in the North Korean case, is composed of representatives from various parties and mass organizations. After initial resistance, the South Korean side agreed to form advisory teams according to this composition. The South Koreans insisted neither to enter this agreement in the official documents nor make it public.

• Furthermore, the South Korean side attempted to turn the 1^st Main Negotiation into an expert meeting. On this question the DPRK position also prevailed. With a speech given by a member from the South Korean advisory team, the South Korean side itself created the opportunity that representatives from the advisory teams could give speeches during the negotiation.

• A number of receptions and sightseeing visits were arranged for the delegation members. This was reported all over the world, even in the press and broadcasts of South Korea. Thus the South Korean people were informed of the participation of the democratic forces from the North in the 1^st Main Negotiation.

• During the entire course of negotiations, the DPRK was eager to solve the entire problem according to the ideas of “Juche.”

• Meeting a request from the South Korean side, its delegates were given the opportunity to visit Kim Il Sung’s birthplace, the “cradle of the revolution.” They also visited the new residential quarter in Pyongyang and a primary school. To influence the South Koreans in an “anti-imperialist and national spirit,” the delegation was shown the “revolutionary opera” “Sea of Blood” and the movie “The Flower Girl.” They also watched a performance by the “Pyongyang Ensemble.”

On Successes Achieved Through the 1^st Main Negotiation:

• The superiority of the social system in the Northern part of the country, and the desire of its people for peaceful unification, was clearly proven to the South Korean people.

• The attempt by South Korean agencies to influence the DPRK people with phrases about “freedom” was thwarted.

• It worked to tie the Red Cross negotiations closely to questions concerning the unification of the fatherland. This is evident by the fact that South Korea’s opposition parties already demand from the Park Chung Hee clique the South Korean advisory team should include representatives from other parties and social organizations.

• The members of the South Korean delegation recognized the political-ideological unity within the Northern population. They rally monolithically around the party and Kim Il Sung as their “leader.”

• Some of them stated, General Kim Il Sung is such a great personality and unprecedented in Korean history.

• The course of the KWP and General Kim Il Sung was acknowledged as correct. One has emphasized that the planned economy of the DPRK is more successful than the “free economy” in the South.

• South Korean delegates could convince themselves [by seeing the North] of the lies spread about the DPRK in Southern coverage.

• The DPRK people displayed a high level of class conscience during the presence of the South Korean delegation. They welcomed the delegation without enthusiasm but friendly, and during encounters they performed very uniformly and consciously.

On further Prospects for Red Cross Negotiations:

• The Red Cross negotiations are a fierce battle between socialism and capitalism.

• The DPRK does not live under the illusion that these negotiations will run without problems. It is completely up to the South how long they will last. The DPRK is interested in their quick conclusion.

• The DPRK will continue its peace offensive. Future Red Cross negotiations will be held once in the DPRK and once in South Korea.

• The South Korean side will certainly do everything to delay negotiations. They fear the economic, political and military strength of the DPRK.

• The Three Principles, as it became clear during the Main Negotiation, are a proper foundation for a peaceful and independent unification of the country.

Comrade Kim [Jae-suk] used the opportunity to thank the governments of the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia for their support of the DPRK’s struggle. The DPRK has high expectations for further support on questions of the independent and peaceful unification of the country.

Note: This information was read out from a manuscript and must be considered as uniform DPRK official playbook language, as other conversations held on different levels demonstrate.

Helga Merten

3^rd Secretary of Embassy

CC:

1x Foreign Ministry

1x Central Committee, Department IV

1x ZID [Foreign Ministry]

1x Embassy