Polish Informational Note from the Interkit Meeting in Moscow, December 1967

Informational Note from the Interkit Meeting in Moscow: December 14 – 21, 1967

As the result of the party consultations between the CPSU, BCP, CPCz, SED, HSWP, and the PUWP, the international departments of these parties were instructed to prepare materials that contain the analysis of the development of the situation within the CCP and the PRC.

Each of the above mentioned international departments (except for the BCP) shared their prepared materials with the remaining departments.

According to the agreement from 14 to 21 December 1967, a confidential meeting took place in Moscow between the representatives of International Departments of the above mentioned parties as well as the Mongolian People's and Revolutionary Party. The meeting was devoted to the exchange of views and discussion on the China question.

As the result of this meeting, materials were drafted and worked out based on the studies sent by individual International Departments to be possibly used by the Central Committees of the seven parties as they see fit.

The participants of the meeting also adopted “a protocol note.”

[Note: attached here, MG]

[…]

The International Department CC PUWP

2 January 1968


Protocol Note

On the days between 14 and 21 December 1967, a confidential meeting took place in Moscow between the representatives of the International Departments of the Central Committees of the BCP, the CPCz, MPRP, SED, PUWP, HSWP, and CPSU which was devoted to the exchange of views and discussion on the China issue. As the result of the collective work, the participants of the meeting prepared a joint material, containing the analysis of the situation within the CCP and the PRC, the assessment of the so-called Maoism and the political course of Mao Zedong's group.

The participants of the meeting agreed that this material would be used by the Central Committees of their parties as they see fit.

The participants of the meeting exchanged their views on coordinating studies and research, as well as the propaganda and informational activity regarding the China issue, which will be conducted in individual socialist countries. The list of proposals regarding these issues is attached here.

Some of the delegations preliminarily made their remarks regarding the tactics on how to battle Mao Zedong's factional course.

The delegations expressed their wish to agree – after the consultations in the Central Committees of their parties – to hold no later than February 1968, a meeting of the representatives of the CC International Departments (at the level of heads or deputy heads of the departments) during which it would be necessary to exchange information regarding the attitude of the CCs of individual parties toward the concrete proposals that were put forth at the above mentioned meeting.

The delegations of the CC International Departments of fraternal parties emphasized the fruitful nature of the meeting, as well as a friendly and concrete atmosphere in which the meeting took place.

December 21, 1967

[Note: What follows are excerpts from a jointly worked out material entitled “About the Events in China,” MG]

“About the Events in China:” (An excerpt from the material worked out at the meeting of the International Departments of 7 parties in Moscow in 1967)

It should be stated in the beginning that as the result of the events in China connected with the “cultural revolution” the sheer existence of the CCP was threatened, the danger of the change in the nature of the state power took place, and as a consequence, there was also a real threat to China's socialist achievements.

These events are not exclusively China's domestic issue due to the following:

- Mao's group's policy is greatly damaging the cause of revolution and socialism and its activity on the international arena indeed favors the cause of imperialism;

- Mao's practical activity discredits the idea of socialism;

- Mao Zedong's policy conducts destructive activity in the communist movement;

- It causes commotion in the Third World;

- As a consequence, the course of Mao's group makes the struggle for peace, democracy and socialism very difficult, and makes it easy for the aggressive forces of imperialism to conduct their activities;

At the moment, it is still impossible to carry out the assessment of all issues. At the same time, however, many phenomena took on a sufficiently clear and complete form, a good deal of trustworthy facts were gathered, which enable us to assume a correct attitude toward the events in China, and to carry out their general assessments from the point of view of the Marxist-Leninist theory.

I. “On the issues of the current events in China”

1. It is impossible to understand the causes of the current events in China without taking into account the specificity of the development of the country and the Chinese revolution, as well as the conditions of the formation and development of the communist parties.

The following factors contribute to this specificity:

a) half-colonial and half-feudal nature of the pre-revolutionary China, extreme economic, social, and cultural backwardness;

b) the weakness of the working class alongside the total advantage of the peasant masses and relatively a large number of the petty bourgeoisie;

c) the existence of objective conditions for the great-power chauvinist moods;

d) the communist party emerged in the conditions of the weakness of the working class and the fact that the class struggle was not yet developed; in the first phase, the national liberation struggle took precedence;

e) the majority of peasants and the petty bourgeoisie elements throughout the long existence of the CCP, the subjective over-appreciation of the role of the peasants and undermining the role of the working class;

f) the role of the liberation army in the development of the party.

Although the history of the CCP has been insufficiently studied in
detail, we can state that since the very beginning the two trends have been at odds with each other: the internationalist Marxist-Leninist and the nationalistic petty bourgeoisie;

Mao Zedong's line, that is, the nationalist bourgeoisie line, has been dominating since 1935.

The victory of the Chinese revolution is not testimony to Mao's correctness of views, that is, that one can transition to socialism not with a leading role of the working class but instead with the power of the peasants. The lack of the working class hegemony in China was supported compensated by the influence of the world socialism and the international proletariat.

Despite the complexity and the contradictory nature of its development, the CCP filled the role of a leader in the people's revolution. This is the result of the activity of the hundreds of thousands of Chinese communists.

2. At the time when the majority of the party and the working masses saw the cooperation with the socialist camp as the key to the socialist transition of the Chinese society, Mao and his supporters were guided, first and foremost, by nationalist tendencies. They counted on taking advantage of the gigantic progress connected with the development toward socialism in the alliance with the USSR for the implementation of their great-power chauvinism and hegemonic plans.

3. The VIII Congress has a special place in the history of the Communist Party of China. Its principal characteristic is that it took place under the slogan of strengthening and developing the healthy, Marxist-Leninist forces in the party rank and file.

During the first stage, after the victory of the people's revolution, the Chinese Communist Party (despite a series of mistakes and shortages) actually conducted a correct policy that was in accordance with the interest of the country following the path of socialism.

However, such a development, that is, the implementation of the VIII CCP Congress resolution were deeply at odds with the political concepts of Mao Zedong and seriously threatened with autocracy.

In 1958, the rambunctious policy of the “Three Red Banners” (“the new general line,” “the great leap forward,” “the people's communes”) which was supported by the overwhelming majority of the party cadres, which did not immediately realize the dire consequences of this policy. In the meantime, this policy meant a complete departure from the line adopted in 1953 and confirmed at the VIII Congress in 1956, and contradicted the Declaration adopted at the Moscow Conference in 1957 in which the fraternal parties jointly formed the basis for the correctness of building socialism.

This policy was a voluntary attempt to force the economic development tempo, and to skip a stage in the building of a developed socialist society.

The policy of the “[great] leap” and the economic difficulties caused a sudden sharp turn in the struggle within the CCP. Despite the fact that Mao's group was able to trample its opponents, the divergences still continued within the leadership regarding the methods of the tempo and development in the country. However, it was in complete agreement as to the aims, that is, to transform China into a great world power.

…Mao's group continued to eliminate party and state democracy, [began] the militarization of social life, strengthened the role of the army, and incited nationalist passions to further raise Mao's cult.

The rambunctious line of a great power aspiration, which had already led to such serious internal and external consequences, found itself in such odds with the PRC's social and state system and with the line of world socialism that its implementation became impossible without changing the nature of the Chinese Communist Party itself as the Marxist-Leninist party, without any principal political changes, and without breaking up with the communist movement and the socialist commonwealth.

The petty bourgeoisie nationalist wing in the CCP, which temporarily gained the advantage, began the so-called “cultural revolution” and ultimately chose the split in the international communist movement.

II. “The nature of ‘the cultural revolution'”

2. The tasks, which Mao's group aspired to carry out by inspiring the “cultural revolution:”

- first, to stifle the oppositionist tendencies, to strengthen its absolute dictatorship in order to carry out its political line without any obstacles in the future;

- secondly, to erase the correct definition of Marxism-Leninism from the[Chinese] nation's consciousness, to raise a young generation in the fanatic spirit which would devote itself to “Mao's ideas” and to ensure that this great power [policy] line continued;

The opposition forces are deeply varied and they encompass both real Marxists and those opposing the methods used by Mao Zedong's group in “the cultural revolution”, but who at the same time still agree with the great power and hegemonic aspirations.

Given these conditions, Mao Zedong and his group had to resort to yet another political maneuver. They began a campaign on behalf of the so-called “great revolutionary unity” of the army, the Red Guards, and a portion of the old party cadres.

“The Cultural Revolution”, which was thought out as a conspiracy, led China to a serious political crisis in the course of which the fate of the current social system and the direction for the development of the entire country is still being played out.

4. The “cultural revolution” aspires to form China's political system. Despite the fact that Mao Zedong and his group dealt a great blow to the party, they were still not able to get rid of it altogether. There are healthy elements within the party rank and file; they can bring China back to the correct path of socialism under more conducive circumstances. Given the situation when the CCP leadership was in fact broken up, the party is temporarily unable to carry out the leadership function in society.

Mao's group is planning to convene the party congress after it carefully selects its candidates. The implementation of these plans would mean a new situation both within the internal political life in China itself, but also within the world communist movement.

In the course of the “cultural revolution,” they are in fact aiming to eliminate the political line of building a people's democracy in the PRC and are replacing it with military and bureaucratic dictatorship.

5. “The cultural revolution” had a disastrous influence on the national economy and the situation of the working people. The Leninist principle promoting the material interest was considered as “a blade directed in the back of the proletarian revolution.”

Mao's group does not have any constructive program of economic development. The opposition does not have such a program either, [as the opposition] limits itself at the present stage to the criticism of the policy of “three red banners.”

6. The “cultural revolution,” which condemned the Chinese society to a long-term hiatus in the spiritual life, is diametrically contradictory with the tasks of the progress toward socialism, which is unattainable if all of the achievements of national and world cultures are not adopted. It is a psychological brainwashing of the nation in the spirit of chauvinism and militarism, in the spirit of preparations for a war.

7. The youth movement inspired by Mao Zedong meant to create the illusion of the bottom-up support, an illusion of the massive revolutionary pronouncement. The only organized force of the “cultural revolution” on the scale of the entire nation is the army. The “cultural revolution” is being carried out by the forces of a narrow stratum of the Chinese society and constitutes a form of violence over the people.

8. The “cultural revolution” lacks the wide social support. There are differences among Mao's supporters and within the group itself which is in charge of the “cultural revolution” affairs. This does not mean, however, that Mao's group is condemned to a swift and total defeat. It can, with the aid of methods of terror and demagogy, stifle the opposition and for some time to impose an anti-people's policy in China.

III. “About Mao Zedong's political course on the international arena:

9. The nearly ten-year period of shaping and implementing Mao Zedong's course on the international arena revealed its total anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist nature, its harmful effects to the interests of the international revolutionary movement and the human progress, as well as the national interests of the Chinese people.

10. Mao Zedong's position on European security and the struggle against the West German imperialism reflects its nationalist goals which are rid of principles. While masking its own policy of pseudo-revolutionary slogans, the Maoists in reality are coming out against the line agreed upon by the fraternal parties in the struggle against the West German imperialism. Their position actually corresponds in essence with the position of the governing circles of the FRG on issues such as the anti-Sovietism, aspirations to obtain nuclear weapons, and intensifying tensions in Europe, and the declarations regarding the revisions of state borders.

Mao Zedong's group's foreign policy constitutes a logical consequence of the conception of the overall great-power chauvinism, it is a departure from all of the basic principles of the socialist foreign policy, the revision of the line of foreign policy defined at the VIII CCP Congress in 1956. This policy is directed against the causes of the peace and revolution and it helps imperialism.

11. The socialist countries, which are struggling against imperialism, are also forced to fend off the attacks from Mao Zedong's group.

12. The diversionary activity of the group in charge in China and its agents stops the development of the communist movement, and thwarts the work of the fruitful activity of the international democratic organizations.

13. Mao's concept and his policy toward the national-liberation can only weaken the position of the movement in its struggle against imperialism and colonialism.

14. The subsequent unmasking of Mao's group's foreign policy line in the area of ideology, the vigilance toward its maneuvers, as well as providing collective fending off of its provocations directed against the cause of peace and revolution, are important conditions today for a future world development of the revolutionary process, and the internationalist duty of the Marxist-Leninist party.

IV. “About the essence of Maoism”

15. Maoism is a collection of views which run deep against the Marxist-Leninist theory and which are being masked with the “leftist” ultra-revolutionary phrases.

16. Maoism is not any systematic, or a new theory of revolution, but a petty bourgeoisie, chauvinistic platform which is being used for political struggle.

17. Mao Zedong's group deemed the basic principles of scientific socialism as “revisionism,” “economism,” and “bourgeoisie liberalism.” The Maoists call “counterrevolutionaries” all those who are struggling for welfare of the working masses and accuse them for the attempts to restore capitalism.

Maoism is an anti-Marxist trend subjugated entirely to the egoistic aims of Mao Zedong's group. This is a tool of deification of his persona, cementing his absolute authority [power], and justification of his hegemonic aspirations.

V. Some conclusions

18. China's experience shows that tendencies caused by superstitions of the petty bourgeoisie can take on a deviationist form, if they decisive struggle for a pure proletarian ideology does not take place.

19. China's experience shows that the departure from the principles of proletarian internationalism, as well as the rejection of all forms of cooperation with the socialist commonwealth and the world workers' movement, causes great damage to the nationalist interests and undoubtedly leads to the deformation of the people's system.

20. The failures of Maoism inside the country and on the international arena once more clearly proved that it is impossible to achieve goals that have been designed voluntarily, that it is impossible to skip the necessary historical stages in the process of building socialism, that one cannot replace the technology with slogans, that the subjective factor is not all powering not only in the area of material production, but also in the spheres of social relations.

21. Mao's actions and those of his group prove that the cult of personality and the departure from the principles of intra-party democracy undermine the leading role of the party and can threaten its own existence.

22. Countering Maoism and further expansion of Marxism-Leninism – these are important and international tasks of the world communist movement.

The China problem is connected to the real problems of the so-called Third World and with the complexities of its paths toward the social progress. Because Maoism feeds on these real problems, the fight with Maoism taken on a form of a creative development of the revolutionary and scientific theory, among other things, the drafting of the optimal models of the economic and political development of poorly developed nations during their road to socialism.

***

While following the principles of proletarian internationalism, the Marxist-Leninist parties aspire for the friendship and international solidarity with the Chinese Communist Party, as well as with the Chinese People's Republic.

While decisively fending off the anti-Leninist line of Mao Zedong's group and taking the necessary steps toward thwarting the provocations on its side, fraternal parties of socialist countries are in favor of normalizing state relations with the PRC, developing economic and other forms of cooperation based on principles of equality and mutual non-interference in internal affairs on behalf of conducting joint operations to defend the heroic Vietnam in the struggle with imperialism.

The struggle against Mao Zedong's group is a struggle to restore friendship and cooperation with the CP of China based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the return of Chinese communists to the position of scientific socialism. This constitutes a real and internationalist assistance to those elements in China which maintain their loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and counter Maoism.

The events in China continue to develop. Subsequent changes are taking place in the political balance of power, and various maneuvers and changes are not excluded. This is why we need to constantly investigate the ongoing processes and to react in an opportune time to any change in the situation.