Record of Meeting of Fidel Castro and Military Chiefs

Important aspects contained in the information offered by the military chiefs, meeting on 24 October 1962, in the General Staff with Commander Fidel Castro.

Captain Pedro Luis (Information):

We believe that in case of aggression against us, the possibility of mobilization of United States forces would be between 5 and 6 divisions, and no more. They have 10 divisions, but it is not possible to deploy them all against us. These facts are interesting for making our operation plan, because we think that they might in the first step use 2 or 3 divisions that would be moved in 120 or 130 ships, a considerable amount of force that must be detected by us in time.

The American base at Key West [Florida] has been reinforced, and has acquired a quite interesting importance.

Our opinion, based on the concrete facts that we have, is that there is no evidence of any immediate aggression against us – based on the information we have – but rather that they will enact the blockade, and if a grave situation should arise because of this, they have the possibility of moving between 4 and 5 divisions and launching them against us, but could not do this in fewer than six days. However, using the airborne division, they could move their first troops here in five or six hours. But if they move the 82nd division, we would certainly know, [excised]^[1]

Captain Flavio Bravo (Operations):

A particularly interesting fact: according to the average mobilization, the permanent units were moved in 3 hours to their zones of concentration; the reduced divisions, from 8 to 9 hours; and the wartime divisions, from 12 to 13 hours, in less time than what was figured; and anti-landing divisions 2[unreadable] 2 hours.^[2]

I suggest that the operation plan be made taking the following into account: first, the possibilities of the enemy in each army zone; later, the movements of forces, and last, the mutual aid between forces.

Capt. Raúl Curbelo (Aviation):

According to the estimations made, we have fuel and fleet for making four daily missions for 20 days.

Of the 200 trucks promised for the transport of anti-aircraft (missiles) only 85 have been delivered to us. We are missing personnel for the 11 batteries for which we are coordinating with our comrade Rebellón to begin a training course tomorrow, if it is authorized.

Commander Fidel Castro:

The reserve anti-aircraft batteries in Havana must be in such conditions that they can be moved when it is necessary.

To lend mobility to the reserve batteries we need more trucks, and a further increase of 200 to the requested amount is needed.

Commander Fidel Castro:

Withdraw the trucks from batteries that are in San Antonio, Baracoa and Ciudad Libertad, because they are not needed there; do not remove them from Loma del Burro or from Príncipe, because those can be moved; and do not take them from the refineries either.

I would have the reserve batteries in three groups, for example, to facilitate their removal in case it is necessary, since it is more difficult if they are widely dispersed.

The 30mm anti-aircraft guns are very effective weapons against landings, and have an enormous value, as they serve to fight on the coast, against infantry, airplanes, and everything; they are the weapons that can demolish the highest number of tactical aircraft. They should be concentrated in three points, at least 24 batteries in three points; not disorderly, but carefully placed, not in assigned places but so that they can be moved toward any other place.

I would put at least 24 batteries outside Havana, but so that we could move them, transfer them to whatever place. I mean that the reserve guns should not be placed in a dispersed manner.

The Artillery requires many trucks; the situation with the rocket launchers is fine but we must figure out those trucks. We can use the three for the rocket launchers, one for each; for the Artillery Brigades, another three, and one for the Batallion of Tanks. Seven total.

Captain Flavio Bravo:

An idea that we have is that we must think through a reserve to cover the highways in case of immediate aggression, in order to move through them.

The most dire deficiency we have is in communications. Those that we should have are still coming by sea or leaving the Soviet Union. Our primary method of communications is telephones. With respect to communications, the air force in wartime will have great difficulties, and we want to draw attention to this. We have radio communications as well but there are many things yet to arrive that have not; they were expected between October and December, and this is a grave difficulty that comrade Chief of Communications knows well.

Commander Pedro Miret (Artillery):

All artillery groups that were ready to fight, occupying their zones of concentration within a time between one and one-and-a-half hours. The Brigades took a little longer, but the groups in general occupied their positions in this time.

All units were provided between 95 and 100% of both armaments and fleet. All units are provisioned with the modules that correspond to them.

With the fleet of Soviet rocket launchers, we have a problem with respect to transportation. We need some more trucks to move the munitions.

Commander Fidel Castro:

It is good that the weapons found in Ceiba del Agua have been moved. In SAU we are very poor in vehicles, because we have less than one full module. In 82mm mortars, we are a little short with 0.83 modules, however, there is a huge number of mortar projectiles.

To improve the supply of vehicles, we urgently need the roads from Managua repaired. Additionally, some 400 workers need to be located there for loading and unloading of packages in storage facilities. And at the same time, we must ask infantry units of the Army of the West to send trucks without personnel, only a driver and helper. I believe it is very important to facilitate mobility from the storage facilities, with strong people accustomed to carrying much weight.

We must be careful placing personnel in the storage facilities for explosives.

Yesterday ten enemy aircraft entered our national territory and examined Mariel and Baracea, some 10 km to the east, in two groups of two and two groups of three. They dropped to some 100 m above the ground and, once back on the coast, ascended to 3,000 meters.

Commander Alto Santamaría (Tanks):

Specifically, I believe the most serious weakness that we have among tanks, is that of the independent companies [2 lines redacted and part of a third] because they are very small units and to not have real control over them makes it difficult to have security in general.

Commander Rolando Díaz Aztaraín (Marines):

Analyzing them quickly, regarding the combat preparation of the LT, we can say that they have made up to nine daily torpedo launches, but have not conducted any at night, since we are precisely in that stage of training. During the day, they can act completely, and at night also with reinforcement from the torpedo boats, but there has not been enough practice.

The frigates do not have personnel with very good experience in shooting artillery devices.

We consider one of the problems we have to be the lack of rapid coordination with our aviation and coastal forces to know the regions in which we can operate. It is highly necessary to establish this coordination.

The General Staff approved in the last few days some antiaircraft equipment for our bases, but they have not arrived yet. We have a concern about the base of Baneis; we need, at least, to have a battery in Baneis, one in Cienfuegos, another in Siguanea and also in Cabañas, primarily.

Commander Fidel Castro:

The one in Siguanea is not important; there you do not need anti-aircraft capabilities; for the others, yes. The two in Cabañas and the 30mm in Cienfuegos make three.

Captain Fausto Díaz (Communications):

For communications, the worst situation is that of Aviation. What they have are radio stations, fixed or mobile, but still taking them away from the fronts of battle. The worst in terms of this are Aviation and anti-landing battalions. Those battalions have some German stations that are not ideal for military uses, and they consume a great deal of current from the batteries.

I have a proposition regarding all this: there are two R-104 radio stations that the Headquarters of Artillery received. One can be given to the Independent Battalion of Tanks, which does not have communications, and one taken away from the Services Command Post to give to the Anti-Landing Battalion. These stations are very secure, and these comrades do not need them right now.

Captain Joaquín Ordoqui (Services)

We are coordinating the problem of distribution of medicine with Public Health, and besides, developing plans to present to the Chief of General Staff, to see if they will let us use second-year medical students and promote them to the level of Nurses, now that they have some experience and are presently on vacation.

[One paragraph redacted]

Castro: We should do as much as possible to resume fumigation, because lacking that can damage us more than the enemy. I believe we should see how soon fumigation flights can be reestablished.

I think there are some of our zones into which we should not let pass the Yankee planes that are violating our territory. I believe we should study some zones and put good anti-aircraft weapons so that when they fly there we will be able to shoot them and bring them down, primarily with 30mm anti-aircraft guns and when they pass, in obvious places and in low flights, bring them down. We would have two or three sites, not all that close to the coast, where they would be over land and not say that we had taken down the aircraft in waters under their jurisdiction, and place aircraft-hunters there.^[3] We have no political reason, of any type or any kind, that prevents us from shooting down a plane that flies above us at 300 feet. If it’s still over the sea, one, three miles…fine, but anything flying here, we bring down, making sure it falls in our territory.

However, we should not give a general order, for we cannot have them shoot down one of our planes. I would look for four or five places and place four or five batteries in these sites, and give only to these crews orders to shoot at that moment. Concentrate batteries of 30mm guns in four or five places, and when a plane passes over these, flying low, “fry it.” We must establish good coordination to avoid the possibility of one of our planes passing over these sites.

It is necessary to start to fire some shots, because the [Americans] have a mess stirred up. Planes that are flying within our territory, at 200 feet, we must take them down. If they begin with the “little mess” we will start to fire, but controlled shots, because now they will begin flying Piper (planes) over our defenses.

[1] Before releasing the documents, the Cuban authorities evidently carefully reviewed them, and censored some passages (or entire pages, in the case of the Rodriguez-Khrushchev memcon) which are indicated in the text.

[2] Translator’s note: In the original, there is a clear numeral 2, then a letter (possibly an E overstruck by another letter), then a clear letter n. This could be “2en,” or “2 in” 2 hours, or simply an error and thus a redundant 2 that doesn’t convey any additional information.

[3] Trans. note: This is one of Castro’s more innovative turns of phrase, as it does not seem to be common military slang in the present day.