Zhou Enlai met with Takeiri Yoshikatsu and he mentioned the international status of Taiwan while claiming that "the realization of relations between Japan and China is the desire of all citizens."
July 29, 1972
Record of the Third Meeting between Takeiri Yoshikatsu and Zhou Enlai
This document was made possible with support from MacArthur Foundation
７月２９日 １９：３０～２１：３０
竹入・周会談（第３回）
周： 昨日は，遅いところ，電話をありがとうございました。あのニュースは，竹入先生がいつていたように，自民党の右派より，蒋介石が，やつたのではないかと思ます。あの中には，国府という言葉が何回も出てきます。国府の説得が難しいということが書いてあります。廖さんの話では，東京新聞は，サンケイ新聞と何か関係があるようですね。私たちの方も，肖さんから知らせがあり，彼が言うことに依ると，田中首相，大平外相の考え方は変つていないということです。
竹入： それは安心をいたしました。
周： 先生は眞面目です。私たちの話し合では，いろいろ予想した方がよいということでした。
竹入： いつも，物事は最善とは限りません。
周： 物事に変化がありますから。
東京のニュースをキヤツチするのは早いです。新華社と共同通信と電送の関係をつくつてもよいと考えています。そうすると，向うのニユースが，すぐ入つてきます。先生がいわれるように，色んなニユースがありますから，・・・・
竹入： 日本のマスコミは，とくに記事のスクープをしたがりますから不正確な記事が出てきます。国民が迷惑します。
周： しかし，見方が鍛えられますね。錯覚も起しますが・・・・・
竹入： 感覚がマヒして無責任な風潮が起ります。
周： 世論を指導する点からいえば，やはりそういう面がありますね。この面からいえば，戦前から比べれば，自由になつてきました。
竹入： 自由が多すぎるようです。
周： 自由が多すぎると，その反面にいつてしまいますね。つまり，思想の起伏が激しくなつてきたのでしよう。
竹入： 同時に，人間本来の価値観が，把みにくくなつてきました。モラルが乱れてきました。これを，又，引きしめようとすると，反対が起ります。これからの日本の教育は大へん重大になつてきました。
周： 先生方は社会活動の視野が広いと思うのですが，よく把めるのでしよう。
竹入： それ程，適確ではありませんが，心配しています。青年が自己の使命感，義務感がうすくなつたように思います。一つはアメリカの占領政策の影響であり，一つは高度経済成長政策によるものです。自由のハキ違えもあるが，結局は日本を指導する政治の責任です。こういう点について，田中首相に期待するところは大です。田中首相は，本来，教育に熱心です。これをどう改革するか，期待しています。
周： 田中さんとしては，国際問題を解決してから国内に眼を向けるのでしよう。選挙の彼の公約からいつても，内政問題が沢山でていますね。これは，国民の期待でしよう。野党がそういう面で促進的役割りを果たせば，新しい要素が出てきます。そこまでには相当の努力が必要でしよう。
竹入： そうだと思います。余りうまくいきますと野党の役割りがなくなります。
周： 出藍の誉れといつて，後の者がそれをやるのでしよう。
竹入： 田中首相に期待するのは，刻苦勉励して，総理になつたことです。今太閤といわれています。国民の期待が強いです。
周： 田中さんは佐々木さんと同じ県の出身ですか。
竹入： 首相は新潟県で，佐々木さんは宮城県です。
周： 同じ東北です。ズウズウ弁が入つていますか。
竹入： 首相はズウズウ弁ではありません。
首相とこちらへ来る前に話しましたが，今，人気がよいことを自分は知つているが，自分は，この人気に慢心しないように，自戒しているといつていました。
周： 経済が今日まで発展し，国際的になりましたが，現在に満足してはいけないと思います。困難を突破しなくてはなりません。
先生が帰る迄に，私たちの話しを具体化したいと思います。
今回の第１回，第２回は意見の交換でした。いま，私たちの意見の要点をいいたいと思います。田中首相，大平首相は，考える上に役立つと思います。
私たちの考えでは，田中首相，大平外相が訪中する場合は，共同声明か，共同宣言を発表した方がよいと思います。
竹入： 同意です。
周： 思い付いたところは，こういう問題です。もし，田中，大平両氏が，これより沢山，また，もつと少くしてもよいと思う場合は意見の交換は可能です。
１．戦争終結の問題
私たちとしては，こういう表現でいきたいと思いますが，どうでしようか。
「中華人民共和国と日本国との間の戦争状態は，この声明が公表される日に終了する。」
ここでいう，この日というのは，共同声明または，共同宣言が発表された日のことです。
竹入： これは共同声明の中に入れるのですね。
周： そうです。こういう表現でいくと，これが終了するのですから，みんな安心します。
２．国交の問題です。こういう表現でいきたいと思います・・・・・・どうでしようか。
「日本政府は，中華人民共和国政府が提出した中日国交回復の三原則を充分に理解し，中華人民共和国政府が中国を代表する唯一の合法政府であることを承認する。
これに基き両国政府は，外交関係を樹立し，大使を交換する」
竹入先生の見解ですと，田中首相に困難はありますか。
竹入： 私の見解ですが，困難はないだろうと思います。これは，田中首相の従来からのいい方ですから。
周： そのつぎは簡単です。
３．「双方は，中日両国の国交の樹立が，両国人民の長期にわたる願望にも合致し，世界各国人民の利益にも合致することを声明する。」
中国の場合は文法上「声明する」が先に出てきます。日本語に飜訳すると「声明する」が後になります。これは検討しましよう。
この一項は，中米共同声明から受け継いだものです。双方が共同にうたつた第１点です。
４．「双方は，主権と領土保全の相互尊重，相互不可侵，内政の相互不干渉，平等・互恵，平和共存の五原則に基いて，中日両国の関係を処理することに同意する。
中日両国間の紛争は五原則に基き，平和的な話し合いを通じて解決し，武力や武力による威嚇に訴えない。」
今の一句も中米共同声明の中で，キツシンジヤーが得意がつているところです。（中国の平和共存の５原則をアメリカが受け入れたという意味で） そこで書いたのですが，私たち両国が先に実行に移しましよう。
日本は，台湾，膨湖島を放棄しました。私たちは，日本の北方の４つの島を日本が回復することを支持します。これは，田中首相が五原則に基いて発表したことがありますね。
竹入： 世界の人達の中で，これに反対する人はいないでしよう。
周： 反対できません。
５．「双方は，中日両国のどちらの側もアジア太平洋地域で覇権を求めず，いづれの側も他のいかなる国，あるいは国家集団が，こうした覇権をうちたてようとすることに反対するということを声明する。」
これも，中米共同声明の第２点ですが，これは意味のあることだと思います。
これは，田中首相が，こういうことをいうのは，早すぎるというなら相談できます。中米両国が一致してとのことですから彼らも反対できないでしょう。日中両国の接近にアメリカは反対できないが，どこかの国に反対が出るのは，やむを得ません。
竹入： 私はこの点についての表現について，相談するとのことは，まことにありがたいと思います。しかし，これを受入れられるか，どうか，田中首相，大平外相に話します。
周： つまり，旗印を鮮明にするということです。私たちが協力して，他が覇権を求めるなら共同して，反対しようということです。
竹入： こういう風に表現しても，また，ゆるめても，ソ連は高圧を加えてくるのでしよう。
周： 彼らが，いくら高圧を加えても，私たちは，準備をしていますから手の出しようがないでしよう。１００万の軍隊を北方に派遣してあります。
竹入： 周総理の巾のあるご理解あるお申し出は，田中首相に伝えます。
周： 田中先生には無理はいいたくありません。それでは次にまいります。
６．「双方は，両国の外交関係が樹立された後，平和共存の五原則に基いて，平和友好条約を締結することに同意する。」
７． 「中日両国人民の友誼のため，中華人民共和国政府は，日本国に対する戦争賠償の請求権を放棄する。」
８．「中華人民共和国政府と日本国政府は両国間の経済と文化関係を一層発展させ，人的往来を拡大するため，平和友好条約が締結される前に必要と既存の取極に基づいて，通商，航海，航空，気象，郵便，漁業，科学技術などの協定をそれぞれ締結する。」
平和友好条約からですと，遅すぎます。アメリカと違つた点は，ここで，私たち両国の間には，こうしたものが，すでにあるのです。中日両国の漁業協定は，ソ連よりうまくいつています。電話は，よく聞こえますか。郵政大臣は三池さんで，福田派ですね。三池さんは，田中首相が訪中するには，人工衛星の電波中継が必要でないかと聞いたら，田中首相は，中国が用意するだろう。だから急ぐことはない。といいましたね。
私たちが，今のところ，思い付いているのは，今の８項目です。日本の方が，もつと思い付いたらそれも結構です。
竹入： 私が廖先生を通じて，周総理に申し上げたものは，入つております。したがつてこれ以上のものは，日本政府の方から出ないと思います。
ご好意と寛大にあふれたご理解をいただきましたことにお礼を申し上げます。
周： 例えば，この中で，どこかの一句，覇権の言い方がきつすぎるのなら，言い方を
変えていいと，入れなくてもいい。将来，平和友好条約に入れてもよいと思います。そうしないと，平和友好条約に書くものがなくなります。
竹入： 私たちが，いちばん心配していた台湾の領土の問題，日台条約の問題を大へんご配慮いただいて，まことにありがとうございます。
周： 双方の，黙約事項を作つたら，どうかと思います。
黙約事項は，宣言，声明の中に書きいれません。
これについて，同意が得られるか，どうか，相談してみて下さい。
黙約事項
今のところ３点ですが，田中首相，大平外相で，もつとつくりたいと言うかもしれません。
１ 「台湾は，中華人民共和国の領土であつて，台湾を解放することは，中国の内政問題である」
これは簡単な文章です。
２ 「共同声明が，発表された後，日本政府が，台湾から，その大使館，領事館を撤去し，また，効果的な措置を講じて，蒋介石集団の大使館，領事館を日本から撤去させる。」
竹入： 蒋介石集団という言い方には，抵抗があるかもしれません。昨年のわが党の共同声明には，蒋介石グループという言い方をしました。
周： あるいは，蒋介石の大使館，領事館といつてもよいですね。
竹入： 日本政府としては，台湾と国交をつづけて来た事実があります。前段に，台湾という言葉がありますから，ここも，台湾の大使館という風にしてもらえると結構ですが，その余地がありますか。いずれにしても，この点，田中首相，大平首相に考える余地を残してほしいと思います。
周： いいと思います。
３ 「戦後，台湾における日本の団体と個人の投資及び企業は，台湾が解放される際に，適当な配慮が払われるものである。」
竹入： 最大の感謝をします。お礼の申しようもありません。
周： 当然だと思います。私たちが挙げているのは３点ですが，田中首相の方で，他のものも入れたいというのでしたら，話し合つてよいと思います。この共同声明の文にしても日米安保，佐藤・ニクソン共同声明の「台湾条項」日台条約を入れず避けています。あなたが来られた以上成功させたい，そうして，国交が回復されれば過ぎたことになります。これは，政治的に言つているので，法律は当てになりません，第２次世界大戦の中に，いろいろな法律がありましたが，あなた方も，それでひどい目にあつているでしよう。岸の頭は頑迷で，新しい政治の赴くところが判らなくなつています。ヤルタ協定も３大巨頭がつくつたものですが，今はどうなつているでしよう。・・・・・
日中国交回復は，人民の願望に政治が結びついているのです。
竹入： これで，すべての懸案が満たされました。ありがとうございました。
周： お礼の問題ではなく，情勢を変えるために，努力しなくてはなりません。公明党の立場と田中首相の努力とが，矛盾しないようなりました。内政では，一致しない点があることは当然でしよう。竹入さんは，中国へお出でになつた時，何か気まづい心理状態があつたでしよう。それが必要なくなりました。
竹入： たいへん，ご配慮を頂き感謝いたします。周総理のご好意を田中首相，大平外相が反対する理由は何もないと確信をいたします。責任を以て正確に伝えます。
周： 感謝しております。これは，大事業ですから一人の人間や，一党のものではありません。人民の大事業です。これで，先生の今回来られたことに，叛かないようになりました。
具体的問題に若干答えたいと思います。
＜１＞竹入先生のご意見に賛成しますが，原則的に問題がなければ，田中首相が自ら来られる時に訂正した方がよいと思います。東京で論議すると秘密が洩れるかも知れません。
＜２＞ これも，竹入先生のご意見ですが，時期は９月の下旬がよいと思います。１週間位でしたら，下旬がよいと思います。国慶節も，５周年，１０周年なら別ですが，今，中日両国の問題は，大事なことですので，他の事は２次的なことになります。
田中首相の地方訪問にお供いたします。
９月下旬がまずければ，少し延ばすことも考えられないことはありません。その時期がいちばん望ましいと考えられますが，その時期でなくてはならないという意味ではありません。
＜３＞田中首相，大平外相の訪中が定まる時期の少し前に共同発表する文章を作りたいと思います。
（日本の田中首相と大平外相が，中国を訪問する。国務院周恩来総理が，これを歓迎し，招請する。）
訪中の時期については，９月の下旬というように大まかに書いた方がよいと思います。
田中首相が来られる以上できるだけ時間を割いて，お供をしたいと思います。
ニクソンより時間を多くしたいと思います。というのは，国交の樹立ですから。・・・・
竹入： 首相の訪中の時期の表明の方法は，どのようにしたらよいか。
周： ８月１６日に孫さんが帰国します。それまでにきまれば，孫さんに伝えてください。
それ以降ならば，肖さんに云つてください。竹入先生からでも結構ですし，大平外相からでも結構です。
＜４＞東京から北京直行は可能です。
安全第一で試験飛行をやった方が良いと思います。，ナビゲーダー（航空士）と電信士を東京に派遣します。
ニクソンの場合，試験飛行をやりました。キツシンヂヤー自身が大統領の飛行機でやつて来ました。
竹入： 公表しましたか
周： 公表しなかったし憶測もしなかったでしよう。ＣＩＡがキャッチしたかも知れませんが判りませんでした。
キッシンヂャーがパキスタンから来たときも国際的にニュースはもれませんでした。北京の駐在記者もつかめませんでした。キッシンヂャーは最初に来たときは緊張しましたがその必要はありませんでした。田中首相に中国に来るときは緊張しなくても良いと伝えて下さい。
＜５＞田中首相，大平外相が，来られる場合，随行は何名でもかまいません。
電信装置，無線装置も持つてきてかまいません。
ニクソンの場合は，飛行機の中でやりました。
＜６＞首相，外相の訪中の場合は，日本の記者も訪中を希望するでしよう。首相に決めてもらい（人数）どの社にするかは，そちらで選んで下さい。こちらで招待します。新聞司の方でセンターをつくります。宇宙中継は，センターがありますから援助したいと思います。
安全を保証します。先生方は何かも来ているから判つているでしよう。
＜７＞帰つてから結果が判つたら，かいつまんで肖さんに言つて下さい。あまりくわしく伝えることはないと思います。例えば，
相談をする必要がある。
賛成するとか，（８項目，３項目）
お会してから相談するとか，で結構です。
｛＜１＞などは原文ではマル１など、以下同じ｝
大平さんに伝えて下さい。東京駐在の連絡事ム所は，外交機関ではなく，覚書貿易の弁事処です。外務省と正式に連絡を取りあうということはまづいと思います。孫，肖，許，江の４人は充分便りになりますし，信頼できます。
記者から聞かれて外相も，正式交渉を開始したいと云つていますが，正式にはやらないで下さい。やれば，記者からいろいろ聞かれます。竹入先生が肖さんと連絡をとるのもよろしいでしようし，内密で，大平さんが直接，肖さんと話しても結構です。孫さんは８月中旬に帰国します。田中首相が彼らと会見するなら私たちも，大へんうれしいと思います。大事な伝言があれば，孫１人に云つて下さい。
毛主席に先生のことを伝えました。毛主席も，先生に敬服しています。田中首相，大平外相によろしくお伝え下さい。
日中国交回復は大事業でありますが，一握りの人であつても，それを妨害する人がありますから，気をつけてください。蒋介石も特務班を日本に入れているでしよう。竹入先生のようなことがまたあるでしようから，充分気をつけて下さい。
（林彪問題についての周総理発言は別紙）
竹入： 何から何まで本当にありがとうございました。
周： 当然のことです。私たちの話は，これで殆んど終ることができました。
では，お元気で，
周： なお，３回にわたる会談の内容はすべて重要でありますので，田中首相，大平外相以外は，完全に秘密を守つて下さい。
私たちの方も当然秘密を守ります。
すべて竹入先生を信頼して申上しあげたことです。
竹入： 田中首相，大平外相に，このことを申し上げます。
ほんとうにありがとうございました。
周総理もお元気で，また，参ります。
以上
[1972]
July 29th 19:30~21:30
Takeiri [Yoshikatsu]-Zhou [Enlai] Dialogue (Third Round)
Zhou: Thank you for telephone call late last night. I believe that news was as you said. I believe Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] did it at the behest of the right-wing in the LDP. The word ‘Nationalist Government’ appeared numerous times. It said that it would be difficult to convince the Nationalist Government. According to Mr. Liao [Chengzhi], it seems that the Tokyo Shimbun has some sort of relationship with the Sankei Shimbun. We heard from Mr. Xiao that it seems that Prime Minister Tanaka [Kakuei] and Foreign Minister Ohira [Masayoshi] have not changed their mind.
Takeiri: I am glad to hear that.
Zhou: You are serious. We can expect much to come from our conversation.
Takeiri: We cannot always count on things to have the best outcome, however.
Zhou: Things do change after all.
Tokyo is very quick to catch the news. I think it would be good for Xinhua and Kyodo to link transmissions. This way the other’s news will arrive immediately. As you said, there are various news everyday…
Takeiri: Japanese media always wants to scoop the news, so inaccurate articles come out. It is a bother for the citizens.
Zhou: However, it trains your perception. Although, it could cause misapprehension…..
Takeiri: It will numb the senses and create a tendency for irresponsibility.
Zhou: With regard to its role in guiding the public opinion, I suppose it could have that sort of affect. However, compared to before the war, the press has become more free.
Takeiri: It seems that there is too much freedom.
Zhou: I suppose that if there is too much freedom, it goes too far. It must mean that the fluctuations in opinions are getting more severe.
Takeiri: At the same time people are losing the sense of value essential to humans. Morals are being disheveled. If we attempt to straighten things out, there will be pushback. Education will be extremely important for Japan.
Zhou: I believe that you have a wide perspective and grasp of social movements.
Takeiri: My grasp is not very precise, but I am worried about the situation. I believe young people’s sense of duty and responsibility is thinning. I believe one reason for it is the effects of America’s occupation policy. Another reason for this is the policy of high economic growth. There is certainly the aspect of self-delusion, but ultimately this is the responsibility of the politics that leads Japan. With regard to this concern, I believe we can place a lot of hope in Prime Minister Tanaka. Prime Minister Tanaka has been enthusiastic proponent of education. I am hopeful to see how he will reform education.
Zhou: I believe that Mr. Tanaka will deal with international issues, and then look to domestic issues. Judging by his election promises, there seems to be a lot of domestic issues. I am sure that the citizens expect something in this regard. I believe if the opposition party played a supportive role with regard to domestic issues, this could present a new factor. This would require considerable amount of effort.
Takeiri: I think so. If things go too well there would be no need for the opposition party.
Zhou: They will call it ‘surpassing the master,’ and someone who from behind will do it.
Takeiri: Prime Minister Tanaka worked diligently to become Prime Minister. He is currently called the Imataiko [Translator’s note—this was a name used for Toyotomi Hideyoshi, who rose to become the preeminent Japanese warlord in the late 16th century despite his peasant background. Likewise, Tanaka rose to Prime Minister despite never going to college]. The citizens’ expectations are high.
Zhou: Is Mr. Tanaka from the same prefecture as Mr. Sasaki.
Takeiri: The Prime Minister is from Niigata prefecture and Mr. Sasaki is from Miyagi prefecture.
Zhou: They are both from the Northeast. Do they have the ‘zu-zu’ dialect.
Takeiri: The Prime Minister does not have the ‘zu-zu’ dialect.
I spoke with the Prime Minister before I arrived, and he knows that he is popular. However, he said that he will be self-admonishing so that his popularity does not make him conceited.
Zhou: The economy has developed and become international, however, we cannot be satisfied with the current state. We have to break through the difficulties.
By the time you leave, I want the topics we discussed to take shape.
The first and second rounds of dialogue have been exchanges of opinions. I want to review the main points of our opinions. Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira will be extremely effective.
It is our thinking that we should release a joint statement or joint declaration when Prime Minister Tanaka and Prime Minister Ohira visits China.
Takeiri: I agree.
Zhou: The points I can think of are the following. If Mr. Tanaka and Mr. Ohira wish to add or lessen the points, we are open for discussion.
1. Regarding the conclusion of the war:
We want to phrase it in the following manner. What do you think?
“The state of war between the People’s Republic of China and Japan is concluded on the day that this statement is announced”
Here, ‘this day’ is to mean the day on which the joint statement or joint declaration is announced.
Takeiri: This will be included in the joint statement?
Zhou: Yes. If we used such an expression, this would be concluded, and everyone would feel at ease.
2. Regarding the issue of diplomatic relations, we want to use the following wording…What do you think?
“The Japanese Government, in acknowledgement of the Three Principles for the Reestablishment of Sino-Japanese relations as submitted by the Government of the People’s Republic of China, recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government that represents China. On this basis, both countries will establish diplomatic relations and exchange ambassadors.”
Mr. Takeiri, in your opinion would this be problematic of Prime Minister Tanaka?
Takeiri: This is my opinion, but I do not think that this would be a problem. After all, this is the way that Prime Minister Tanaka has been phrasing the issue.
Zhou: The following portion should be easy.
3. “Both countries declare that the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Japan is in line with the long-term wishes of the two countries’ peoples, and that it will also benefit the peoples of every nation.”
In Chinese grammar, ‘To Declare” comes at the beginning. However, when translated into Japanese “To Declare” comes at the end. Let us consider this topic.
This is part is taken from the China-US Joint Statement. It is the first point made by both parties.
4. “Both countries agree to handle relations between China and Japan on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual respect for sovereignty and the preservation of territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in internal matters; and equality and reciprocity. In accordance with the Five Principles, disputes between China and Japan will be resolved peacefully and without the use of force or the threat of force.”
The previous passage was also used in the China-US Joint Statement, and is something [Henry] Kissinger was proud of. (This is to mean America recognized China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.) We first wrote it with the Americans, but let us put it into practice first.
Japan has abandoned Taiwan and Penghu Island. We will support Japan in retrieving the Four Northern Islands [the Northern Territories or the Southern Kurils]. Prime Minister Tanaka has spoken about this on the basis of the Five Principles.
Takeiri: I do not believe that there are people in this world that would be opposed.
Zhou: One would be unable to oppose it.
6. “Both countries declare that neither China nor Japan seeks hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and that we are opposed to any other country or group of countries that seeks attain hegemony in such a way.”
This is the second point made in the China-US Joint Statement. I think this point is very meaningful.
If Prime Minister Tanaka believes that it is too early to raise such a thing, we can dicuss the matter. This is something that China and the US both agree on, so I imagine that the US cannot be opposed. America cannot oppose closer relations between Japan and China, but, inevitably, there will be some country that comes out in opposition.
Takeiri: I am very thankful that you offered to discuss the wording of this point. However, I will speak with Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira about accepting this wording.
Zhou: I mean to clarify our standpoints. It means that if another country seeks hegemony, we will jointly cooperate to oppose them.
Takeiri: Even if we keep the wording as is, or weaken the wording, the Soviet Union will apply pressure.
Zhou: No matter how much pressure they may apply, we are prepared so that they have no way of interfering. We have deployed one million troops in the north.
Takeiri: I will convey to Prime Minister Tanaka of Premier Zhou’s understanding.
7. Both countries agree to conclude a peace and friendship treaty, based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, after the establishment of diplomatic relations between our countries.”
8. “For the sake of friendship between the peoples of China and Japan, the Government of the People’s Republic of China abandons its right to seek war reparations from the Nation of Japan.”
9. “Prior to the conclusion of a peace and friendship treaty, the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of Japan will conclude, as necessity dictates, such agreements in the fields of commerce, navigation, aviation, weather, post, fishing, and science and technology in order to develop economic and cultural relations, and to expand the exchange of people.”
It is too late to begin with a peace and friendship treaty. The difference with the US with regard to this point is that such a relationship of peace and friendship already exists between our countries. The fishing agreement between China and Japan is functioning better than the agreement with the Soviet Union. Can you hear the telephone conversations well? Mr. Miike is the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, and he is part of the Fukuda faction, is he not? Mr. Miike said that a satellite relay would be necessary if Prime Minister Tanaka is to visit. Prime Minister Tanaka responded that China will prepare something and that there is no need to rush. Is this what he said?
We are currently considering the previous eight points. Please let us know if anything else comes to mind form the Japan side.
Takeiri: The points I conveyed to Premier Zhou through Mr. Liao [Chengzhi] are included. Therefore, I do not believe that there will be anything else from the Japanese Government.
I give my thanks for your kind and lenient understanding.
Zhou: We do not need to include a statement saying that the wording may be changed; for instance, the wording of the section on hegemony is thought to be too strong. I think it would be fine to include it in the peace and friendship treaty. If we do not do so, we will not have anything to include in the peace and friendship treaty.
Takeiri: Thank you very much for your consideration regarding the issue of the Japan-Taiwan Treaty, we were very worried about the Taiwan territory issue.
Zhou: I wonder if we should make a list of our mutual tacit agreements.
We will not include these tacit agreements in the statement or declaration.
Please consult to see if we can agree to do so.
List of Tacit Agreements
At this point we have three [tacit agreements], but Prime Minister Tanaka and Prime Minister Ohira may say that they want to add more.
1. “Taiwan is the territory of the People’s Republic of China and the liberation of Taiwan is a Chinese domestic matter.”
This is an easy sentence.
2. “After the announcement of the joint declaration, Japan will remove its embassy and consulates from Taiwan, and will effectively remove from Japan the Jiang Jieshi group’s embassy and consulates.”
Takeiri: There may be resistance to the wording, “Jiang Jieshi group.” Last year my party used the term “Jiang Jieshi group.” (Translator’s note: Takeiri suggested using the borrowed English term rather than the Sinic term.
Zhou: Or we could say Jiang Jieshi’s embassy and consulates.
Takeiri: For the Japanese Government, there is the reality that Japan and Taiwan had diplomatic relations for some time. We have previously used the word Taiwan, so would it be possible to say, “the Taiwanese Embassy.” In either case, I hope that you allow for Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira the latitude to consider the wording.
Zhou: I think that is fine.
3. “After the liberation of Taiwan the assets and firms of Japanese organizations and individuals that existed after the Second World War will be dealt with appropriate consideration.”
Takeiri: I give you my greatest thanks. There are not enough thanks that I could give.
Zhou: I think this is a matter of course. These are the three points from our side. However, if Prime Minister Tanaka has anything on his side that he would like to add, I believe it would be fine to discuss the matter. The wording of the joint statement avoids the Japan-US Security Alliance, the “Taiwan Clause” of the Sato-Nixon Joint Statement, and the Japan-Taiwan Treaty. Now that you have come to China, I want for our discussions to be a success, for diplomatic relations to be reestablished, and for all this to be in the past. This is a matter of politics and laws will have no bearing. There were many laws during the Second World War, and you suffered under them did you not? Kishi is thickheaded and he does not know that a new state of politics is coming. The Yalta Agreement was made by the Big Three [The Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom], but what has come of the Agreement now?.....
The reestablishment of Japan-China relations ties politics with the will of the people.
Takeiri: This takes care of all the pending concerns. Thank you very much.
Zhou: This is not a matter of thankfulness, but rather a matter of taking the effort to change the situation. The Komeito’s [Komei Party] standpoint and Prime Minister Tanaka’s efforts are no longer contradictory. Certainly there are domestic issues, which the two do not agree on. When Mr. Takeiri came to China, were you not troubled with some thoughts? I believe those worries are unnecessary now.
Takeiri: Thank you so much for your consideration. I am convinced that Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira have no reason to oppose your courtesy. I will take personal responsibility to convey the message.
Zhou: Thank you very much. This is a great achievement, and so is not the accomplishment of one person or one party. This is the people’s achievement.
I would like touch on some specific issues.
(1) I concur with Mr. Takeiri, however, if there are no fundamental problems, I believe that it would be better to make corrections with Prime Minister Tanaka comes here personally. If discussions are held in Tokyo, I am afraid that word will be leaked out.
(2) This is also Mr. Takeiri’s opinion, but we believe that the end of September would be best. If it is for a week, I believe the end of the month would be good. It would be a different case if it were the 5th or 10th anniversary of the National Day, but China-Japan relations are important, so the National Day is of secondary importance.
I will accompany Prime Minister Tanaka’s visit to the provinces.
If the end of September is not good, it would not be impossible to hold off for a little longer. That time period would be best, but it is not to say that it is the only acceptable time.
(3) I hope that the text of the joint announcement can be prepared before Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira’s visit is confirmed.
(Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira of Japan will visit China. Premier Zhou of the State Council is delighted to make this invitation.)
Regarding the timing of the visit, I believe it is best to be general and say, “the end of September.”
As long as Prime Minister Tanaka is coming, I hope to take as much time possible to accompany him.
I hope to spend more time with him than I did with [US President Richard] Nixon. After all, we are establishing diplomatic relations….
Takeiri: How shall I convey the timing of the Prime Minister’s visit?
Zhou: Sun will return to China on August 16th. Please convey the date to him by then.
If it is after that, please convey the date to Mr. Xiao. You can let him know, or it could be through Foreign Minister Ohira.
(4) A direct flight from Tokyo to Beijing is possible.
To put safety above all else, I think we should have a practice flight. I will send a navigator and a telegraph operator to Tokyo.
We had a practice flight for Nixon, as well. Kissinger came on the president’s plane.
Takeiri: Did you publicize this?
Zhou: They did not publicize it or think to do so. The CIA might have caught wind of it, however.
When Kissinger came from Pakistan, the news was not leaked internationally. The press in Beijing also did not catch wind of the visit. Kissinger seemed nervous when he first came, but there was no need. Please tell Prime Minister Tanaka that he has no reason to be nervous when he comes to China.
(5) If Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira come to China, how many people will also attend?
We do not mind if telegraph equipment and radio equipment are also brought.
When Nixon came to China, such tasks were completed in his plane.
(6) If Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira come to China, I believe Japanese journalists would also want to visit China. Please have the Prime Minister choose and how many journalists from which companies will come. We will provide the invitations. We will make a press center with the news department. Our center has a satellite relay, so we would like to assist you in this regard.
We would like to guarantee safety. You have come to China many times so I am sure you already know this.
(7) When you return home and the decision has been made, please give a summary to Mr. Xiao. I do not think there is a need to go too much into detail. For instance,
We need to discuss something.
Or, that we agree. (Entry 8, Entry 3)
Or it would also be suitable to tell him that you will consult with him in person.
Please convey this to Mr. Ohira. The communications office in Tokyo is not a diplomatic facility. It is a law office for trade protocols. There will not be direct communications between this office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Sun, Xiao, Xu, and Jiang should be sufficiently reliable and trustworthy.
I saw that the Foreign Minister replied to a journalist’s question saying that he would like to proceed with formal negotiations. However, please do not start anything on an official capacity. If he does, there will be a lot of questions from the press. You discretely contacting Xiao should be sufficient. It will also be fine if Mr. Ohira directly talks with Xiao, as well. Sun will return to China in mid August. If Prime Minister Tanaka is to meet with them, as well, we would be greatly delighted. If there is urgent information to convey, please do so only through Sun.
We have told Chairman Mao [Zedong] about you. The Chairman has expressed his admiration for you. Please give my regards to Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira.
The reestablishment of Japan-China relations is immensely important, but as long as there are those who grasp this, there will be those who will act as obstacles. Please careful of this. I am sure that Jiang Jieshi has sent in special operation teams into Japan. There is the possibility of further physical attacks, so please do be very careful.
(Statements of Premier Zhou’s on Lin Biao)
Takeiri: Thank you so much for your thorough thoughtfulness.
Zhou: It is a matter of course. I believe we have concluded the topics of our discussion. Please go in good health.
Zhou: Lastly, the three rounds of talks that we have had are of great importance, so, aside from Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira, please keep the discussions completely confidential.
Of course, we will also keep it confidential.
I make this request with complete trust in you.
Takeiri: I will convey this to Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira.
Thank you so much for your time.
I also hope for your health. I will come again.
During a conversation with Takeiri, Zhou Enlai reviewed the main points of their opinions from the first and second rounds of dialogue.
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2001-298, Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs. Also available at the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Obtained by Yutaka Kanda and translated by Ryo C. Kato.
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2013-11-15
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