Report No. 3 of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of Poland in the Democratic Republic of Korea for the period of 1 May 1953 to 25 June 1953

Embassy 242/18/K/53

of the Polish Republic [added by hand]

in Korea

[letterhead with eagle] Min. St. Skrzeszewski

[added by hand]

242/136/53

28/VII [added by hand]

REPORT No. 3

of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of Poland

in the Democratic Republic of Korea

for the period of 1 May 1953 to 25 June 1953

Report No. 3

of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of Poland

in the Democratic Republic of Korea

for the period of 1 May 1953 to 25 June 1953

I. Polish-Korean relations.

[Ambassador Stanis?aw Kiryluk arrived from Beijing, met with top officials; Polish workers’ and people’s gifts distributed; Koreans happy about Polish invitation to 1,000 orphans, group being put together; President Bierut’s invitation to Korean delegation of officials of ministries, trade and economic specialists; cultural cooperation; embassy is well equipped with propaganda materials; Korean scientists invited to Polish scientific conferences; Korean press and radio frequently have news about Poland.]

II. The domestic situation in the DPRK.

1. 1^st of May, Day of International Solidarity of the Working Masses in the DRPK.

[Celebrations.]

2. DPRK industry.

[Competitiveness in enterprises to honor May Day; conferences to discuss and learn from accomplishments and improve industrial productivity and quality.]

3. DPRK’s agriculture

[Competitiveness yielding results, government awards top producers, spring sowing could have been more successful, farming hurt by flooding from dams bombed by Americans.]

4. Tendencies for prices of mass-consumption articles to drop in the DPRK.

[Significant price drops thanks to competitiveness in industry and agriculture and to aid from the Soviet bloc.]

5. Education.

[Conferences to critique school curricula; big focus on Russian-language instruction.]

6. Culture.

[Putting effort into creating culture centers in factories and villages; cultural performances; national festival of amateur ensembles.]

7. The struggle against espionage.

[Improving struggle against imperialist aggressors.]

III. South Korea.

The truce talks in Panmunjeom, which were crowned with the agreement reached on the issue of an exchange of the ill and wounded prisoners-of-war of the two fighting sides, as well as the recent signing of an agreement about a general exchange of prisoners-of-war, have brought on a panic within the Syngman Rhee clique’s regime. The Syngman Rhee-ites are assessing the situation soberly, that the reaching of a truce is a step toward solving the question of uniting the artificially split country, and thereby a further step toward the unavoidable downfall of the regime that the working masses of South Korea have come to despise. Because of this situation, Syngman Rhee recently declared a state of emergency, screaming that the country is in danger, which he defines as the possibility of reaching a truce. In a word, he launched a battle against the truce. It would be difficult to conclude that Syngman Rhee is acting alone. American imperialism, which is not keen to lose the possibility of enormous profits that the war in Korea is bringing it, is standing behind him. The American imperialism is acting cautiously, it does not want to oppose the truce itself, fearing that it might be completely unmasked before the opinion of the peace-loving people of the whole world that it is the actual aggressor, as well as further disagreements within the camp of the “allies” who have long lost their enthusiasm for this adventure, from which they gain no benefits other than acute losses. Proof of this are Syngman Rhee’s recent criminal endeavors, such as releasing the 26,000 prisoners-of-war who allegedly do not want to return to the DPRK, to which the American command of the so-called UN forces did not react at the right time, accepting this criminal activity with silence.

It would be a mistake to claim that there is unanimity within the Syngman Rhee clique regarding Syngman Rhee’s policies on the issue of the truce. In recent times, many politicians have realized that the continuation of the war against the DPRK must inevitably lead to utter defeat. They are opposing Syngman Rhee’s policy, which aims to prevent the signing of the truce, in the hope of saving what they can. Syngman Rhee is eliminating his opponents by any methods and means. To fight the opposition within the regime, Syngman Rhee has organized hit squads made up of fascist youths, which crush it. According to the South Korean press agency Hapdong reporting from Busan on 26.VI of this year, a band of thugs from the Syngman Rhee-ite hit squads attacked the chairman of the democratic party, former minister of internal affairs of the Syngman Rhee regime, Cho Byeong-ok, who had opposed Syngman Rhee’s attempts to torpedo the reaching of the truce, and beat him till he was unconscious. On 26.VI of this year, according to reports from the same agency, Cho Byeong-ok was arrested by Syngman Rhee. On the same day, a hit squad attacked the home of former minister of justice Kim Jun-yeon, who managed to escape. The enraged hit squad members wrecked his home.

The working masses of South Korea, who wish for a quick end to the war, are a much more serious opponent of Syngman Rhee’s policies on the issue of the truce. To counteract this movement, Syngman Rhee organized groups of agitators made up of the regime’s “prominent personalities.” With this in mind, on 14.VI of this year, the parliamentary session was closed for 5 days, and the deputies were sent out to “do their rounds.” The people reacted with deep hatred to the agitators’ attempts to convince them that the truce represents a “threat of communism,” that it threatens their fatherland and similar rubbish. This is supported by UP reports from Busan of 16[?smudged digit].IV of this year that the enraged audience at one such agitation meeting against the truce beat up the speaker, the Syngman Rhee regime’s Minister of Trade, Lee Jae-hyeon. The unfortunate speaker was place in a hospital. The Syngman Rhee regime also has numerous troubles with the so-called parliament. According to Seoul radio, the deputies raised a parliamentary question to the government, demanding an explanation why Syngman Rhee let out the prisoners-of-war, violating the agreement signed in Panmunjeom about exchanging prisoners. The Syngman Rhee-ite regime, fearing that greater troubles may come from this, refused to grant explanations to the parliament, rationalizing this with the country’s difficult situation.

What the regime calls a difficult situation are the South Korean people’s mass demonstrations, which are demanding an immediate signing of a truce. According to Japanese and western press agencies, in the period since the exchange of the ill and wounded prisoners-of-war, many-thousand-strong crowds of people demonstrate in favor of a truce nearly every day. The Syngman Rhee regime sends out the police and hit squads against the demonstrators. Despite the terror, the movement in favor of signing a truce is growing.

As can be seen from the above information, Syngman Rhee has serious difficulties, which augur nothing goodfor him. The ground is slipping out from under his feet, hence the expressions of his rage.

b) [sic] The Syngman Rhee regime is incapable of filling the American order for cannon fodder. Despite the many months of mobilization of young people for the army, its results are very feeble. The situation has not been improved by the diverse methods of conducting the mobilization, such as attempting to force those who are avoiding military service to join the army with a monetary reform, withholding of food rations, street round-ups and having the police escort resisters to the barracks. Barely 30% of those who are summoned appear before the recruitment committees. The rest go into hiding or injure themselves, thereby making themselves unable to serve in the military. In Seoul, about 9,476 people are hiding from joining the Syngman Rhee army. A large number of young people are avoiding the army by escaping abroad. According to reports of 13.V of this year from a Japanese agency, this year over 1,770 young Koreans escaped to Japan. The Yoshida government handed all the fugitives over to the Syngman Rhee-ites.

In this situation, the Syngman Rhee-ite regime has decided to employ extraordinary measures aimed at speeding up mobilization. These measures are the implementation of a broad action by the police and gendarmerie of street round-ups, during which the victims of these actions are taken to the barracks by force. Apart from this, the Syngman Rhee-ite regime applies punitive mobilization into the army. 50 harbor workers, who took part in a harbor workers’ strike in the port of Incheon on 21.VI.1952, were mobilized in this way. The Syngman Rhee-ite regime has serious worries whether this year it will manage, according to its patrons’ requests, to increase the number of its divisions. According to American plans, in 1953 the Syngman Rhee-ite army is to be made up of 20 divisions. So far, Syngman Rhee has managed to reach the number of 16 divisions.

Analyzing the above-mentioned facts, one can draw the conclusion that the Syngman Rhee-ite regime will have increasing difficulties in realizing the plans to increase the army. Contributing to this will be the phenomenon of hunger in the army, which is being heightened by the universal robbing of soldiers by the officers. According to statements by prisoners-of-war, theft and black market is a widespread phenomenon accompanying the Syngman Rhee-ite army.

Prisoner-of-war Kim Ja-yeon, priv[ate] of the 1^st battalion of the 36^th reg[iment] of the 5^th div[ision of the Syngman Rhee-ite army, said that the supplies officer of his regiment stole and sold the rice designated for feeding the soldiers for 3 mil[lion] won. Another prisoner, Ri Cheon-hui, priv[ate] of the 3^rd bat[talion] of the 21^st reg[iment] of the 8^th div[ision] talked about the fact that in his regiment 7 trucks were set aside to serve to transport the equipment and food stolen by the officers to be sold at the black market. The drive exists among the officers of the Syngman Rhee-ite army to get rich in the war by way of conducting trade with “whatever you can.” A statement from one of the prisoners from the 35^th reg[iment] of the Syngman Rhee-ite army is characteristic of this: the campaign commander in which the prisoner served tried to get capital to trade. Because of this, he said to the soldiers that if someone will give him 100,000 won he will grant him a 14-day leave. One of the soldiers gave him 70,000 won and asked for leave. This amount appeared too small to the officer but, after long bargaining, the soldier went on leave on the condition that after he came back he would supply the missing amount with interest for the delay, which amounted to an additional 60,000 won. This way, the soldier got a 14-day leave for 130,000 won, and the officer could engage in his trade activities.

Hunger and theft by officers are the reason for the phenomenon of desertion in Syngman Rhee’s army. The officers apply the method of collective responsibility vis-à-vis the troops and the non-commissioned officers of the units in which there are cases of desertion. Prisoner-of-war Choe of the 2^nd bat[talion], 10^th reg[iment] of the 8^th div[ision] told about a case of implementing collective responsibility in his company in connection with the desertion of 3 soldiers. The battalion commander, hearing about a desertion, beat up the company commander till he bled, and the latter in turn unloaded his fury against the soldiers, ordering them to strip and go out into the barrack square. The naked soldiers stood in the freezing temperatures for nearly an hour. The terror being applied in Syngman Rhee’s army is creating a bottomless rift between soldiers and officers. The anti-war mood increases daily among the soldiers of the Syngman Rhee-ite army, and nothing will crush it.

IV. Truce negotiations in Korea.

1. Exchange of ill and wounded prisoners-of-war.

After completing the repatriation of the ill and wounded of the so-called UN army side by the Korean-Chinese side on 26 April of this year, the American side, in accordance with the agreement, continued to repatriate our side’s ill and wounded prisoners-of-war.

On 3 May 1953 the American side announced that it had finished the repatriation of the Korean-Chinese side’s ill and wounded prisoners-of-war. The total number of men repatriated by the American side was 6,670 ill and wounded prisoners-of-war from our side, including 5,640 soldiers of the Korean People’s Army and 1,030 Chinese People’s Volunteers.

2. Truce negotiations in Panmunjeom.

The talks about a truce in Korea, which were started up again after a break of over half a year on the initiative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the People’s Republic of China with the goal of peacefully regulating the Korean conflict through negotiations, in this reporting period entered a phase of being very close to reaching a complete agreement.

The problem of repatriating the prisoners-of-war who had not been repatriated directly, who according to the data of the Supreme Command of the so-called UN army in Korea total 48,500, including 34,000 soldiers of the Korean People’s Army and 14,500 Chinese people’s volunteers, remained the main issue in the talks.

After the Chairman of the Korean-Chinese Delegation, Gen. Nam Il, presented our side’s new offer comprising 6 points about which there was a discussion in the previous report (see report No. 2 from the Embassy here, pp. 18-19) on 26.IV of this year, the Korean-Chinese side, rejecting Switzerland’s candidacy, proposed choosing one of the Asian countries as a neutral country. The Americans initially responded negatively to this proposal and insisted on Switzerland’s candidacy, and then Sweden’s, claiming that the candidacy of an Asian country is unsuitable. In response to these statements by the American side, Gen. Nam Il announced that there are many neutral countries in Asia to which the prisoners-of-war who will not be directly repatriated can be given, and he listed India, Burma, Indonesia and Pakistan as neutral countries with the goal of together settling on the candidacy of a neutral country. The American side, though, continued to express opposition in regard to transporting those prisoners-of-war who will not be directly repatriated to any neutral country and suggested placing these prisoners-of-war in the demilitarized zone in Korea under the care of a neutral country, initially proposing Pakistan as the candidate. Gen. Nam Il in his statement on 4.V of this year stressed that the two sides should first agree on the issue of transporting the prisoners-of-war who are not being directly repatriated to the territory of a neutral country, and then discuss the issue of the candidacy of that country.

Gen. Harrison’s statement was typical, when on 6.V of this year he came up with a proposal to free all prisoners-of-war who were not directly repatriated in South Korea; putting the matter this way would suit the Syngman Rhee-ites, who wish to fill the ranks of their army with these prisoners-of-war, and at the  same time it represents an attempt to slow down the discussions, and not their further progress on the way to reaching an agreement between the two fighting sides.

On 7.V of this year, as a result of the fact that the American side continues stubbornly to hold onto its point of view regarding not sending the prisoners-of-war who remain unrepatriated directly to a neutral country, but to leave them in Korea, which represents a major obstacle to reaching further progress in the negotiations; the Korean-Chinese side, yet again giving an example of its good will on the issue of reaching a final agreement, made new proposals, made up of the following 8 points:

1. Within 2 months of reaching a truce, both sides should, without obstacles, repatriate all prisoners-of-war who are demanding to be repatriated, according to section 51, art[icle] 3 of the truce agreement;

2. In order to make it easier for the prisoners who are not being directly repatriated to return to their Fatherland, the two sides agree to create a repatriation committee made up in equal numbers by representatives of 5 neutral countries, namely, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland and Sweden, the four countries anticipated in section 37, art[icle] 2 of the truce agreement, and India, after this is agreed on between the two sides;

3. All the prisoners-of-war of both sides, with the exception of those who will be directly repatriated according to p[oint] 1 of this proposal, should be freed from military control and the custody of the side in whose hand they are presently in those places where they are at present and should be relayed to the repatriation committee made up of representatives of neutral countries anticipated in p[oint] 2 of this proposal, which will take them into its custody. The repatriation committee should have the ability to perform its legal functions and oversee the prisoners-of-war who are under its temporary jurisdiction. In order to guarantee the Committee’s effective performance of its functions, the neutral countries that make up the committee will deliver an equal number of armed forces each.

4. The repatriation committee – after taking into its custody those prisoners-of-war who will not be directly repatriated, should immediately take steps to, in the course of a set period of time of four months from the moment when the repatriation committee takes the prisoners-of-war into its custody – should strive to make sure that representatives of the countries to which these prisoners belong may freely go to the places where the prisoners of-war are staying, with the goal of giving an explanation and reducing the prisoners’ fear, informing them about everything that concerns their return to the fatherland, and especially about the fact that they have the full right to peaceful work in the Fatherland.

5. In the 4 months from the moment when the repatriation committee takes into its custody the prisoners-of-war and the countries to which these prisoners belong give the appropriate explanations to these prisoners, the repatriation committee should guarantee a quick return to the Fatherland of all those prisoners who will demand repatriation, while the side in whose hands the prisoners are staying should not create any obstacles to this repatriation. The administrative details of repatriating these prisoners-of-war should be regulated through consultation between the repatriation committee and the two sides.

6. If after the 4-month deadline provided for in pts. 4 and 5 of this proposal, there are any prisoners-of-war remaining in the custody of the repatriation committee, their cases should be examined through consultation at a political conference provided for in Section 60 Art. 4 of the truce agreement.

7. All expenses stemming from supporting the prisoners-of-war during the period that they are in the custody of the repatriation committee, including expenses relating to returning the prisoners to the Fatherland, will be covered by the countries to which the prisoners belong.

8. All the prisoners-of-war should be notified about the above proposals and the steps taken in connection to them.

In response to these proposals, the American side asked several questions about the details and, after a few days of fruitless talks, went back to its previous proposal of freeing the prisoners-of-war who belong to the category of the non-repatriated, directly “there,” i.e., in South Korea, thereby handing them over to the Syngman Rhee-ite and Chiang Kai-shekist thugs. The Department of State of the USA official made these proposals on 15 May 1953, in which apart form the proposal to free the prisoners “where they are,” it limits the activity of the repatriation committee, the carrying out of the explanation action among the prisoners etc.

The American side’s putting this matter in this way was another attempt to go back or even to break the truce talks and gave rise to outrage of the public opinion around the world. Against this background, the contradictions between England and the United States of N[orth] A[merica] appeared especially stark. As a result of the actions of the Americans [sic], acting under the mask of the UN on their behalf, outrage exploded among the “allies.”

The Korean-Chinese side decisively rejected the American counter-proposals, showing the impossibility of accepting them and the contradiction to what had been stated by the American side in April of this year.

After and eight-day interruption in the talks, which was set at the request of the American side, on 25.V of this year, at the request of the above side it was decided to conduct a closed session, and then again at the request of the American side the talks were delayed until 1 June 1953.

As a result of the talks conducted on 8 June, an agreement was signed on the issue of the general repatriation of the prisoners-of-war (1 copy of the agreement in English is attached to this report.) The signing of this agreement was assessed as the most serious step toward reaching an armistice agreement. The Korean comrades also expressed the view that the signing of an armistice agreement in Korea is very close.

Unfortunately, events that took place recently in South Korea interrupted the signing of an armistice, when on 18 June 1953, the provocative act of releasing ca. 26,000 prisoners-of-war, soldiers of the Korean People’s Army, was ordered by Syngman Rhee. These deeds of Syngman Rhee’s are undoubtedly not unknown to his American patrons. Many facts point to this, such as the American proposal to free the prisoners-of-war in South Korea, calls for this by USA political activists, as well as the clearly indifferent mentions of “the freeing” of the prisoners by the Syngman Rhee-ites coming from the side of the American commanders of the prisoner-of-war camps as well as the American mercenaries’ participation in this action. These deeds are the clear continuation of the American position regarding the repatriation of those prisoners-of-war who allegedly do not want to return to their native land.

According to the Rodong Sinmun newspaper, of 24.VI of this year, in the night of 20 June of this year, the Americans, together with the Syngman Rhee-ites, took part in herding the prisoners out of the camps by shooting from tank guns, while the camp was surrounded on 3 sides by tanks, while on the fourth side stood the trucks into which prisoners fleeing from the camp were loaded. These events took place in prisoner camp No. 4 which is located near the town of Daegu. Furthermore, the “freeing” of prisoners from camps Nos. 2 and 5 in Busan and No. 6 in [Donsan] was done in a similar way.

One can conclude on the basis of this that the Syngman Rhee-ite-American provocations intend to prevent the repatriation committee, which would no doubt uncover the fact that the prisoners-of-war were held in South Korea by force, from working.

The provocative release of ca. 26,000 prisoners-of-war by the Syngman Rhee clique met with sharp protest from our side, which was expressed in a letter from Marshal Kim Il Sung and the Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese People’s Volunteers Peng De Huai to Gen. Clark relayed by the Chairman of the Korean-Chinese Delegation, Gen. Nam Il, to the opposite side on 20 June of this year at an open session of the two delegations.

The Syngman Rhee side’s provocations met with condemnation and protests from world public opinion. This included the sending of a letter to Syngman Rhee by the President of the United Nations General Assembly Pirson [sic]. This letter was supported by the English government.

The events that took place in South Korea should be considered a very serious provocation aimed at breaking off the armistice negotiations. Nonetheless, the Korean comrades’ general opinion on the above issues is generally optimistic, the universal belief continues to predominate that the reaching of an armistice in Korea is close.

V. The PCK [Polski Czerwony Krzy?—Polish Red Cross] hospital in Korea.

1. On 3 May 1953, the leaders of the medical team that arrived in Korea on 24.IV of this year went to the location of our hospital. The Charge d’Affaires a.i. of the Embassy, Comr. Cerekwicki, went there together with the leaders.

Comr. Cerekwicki together with the leaders took a series of measures aimed at securing the transport with hospital equipment, its location after arriving at the location etc. Also discussed was the issue of bringing the people, for whom the Head of the Korean People’s Army Health Service, Gen. [Ton Hwa], promised to set aside 2 trucks and guides who know Russian.

During the inspection of the hospital, it was determined that the preparations for receiving our medical group are very advanced and that the Korean comrades have done everything to assure the group of convenient working conditions and settling in. It must be said that the preparations to receive our group, compared to the conditions that the hospitals of the other countries of people’s democracy have right now, and especially the Hungarian and Czech hospitals, who possess almost nothing after being moved to their new places and have to equip and build from the bottom up, are very good and with a large effort from the Korean side. (For the details regarding Comr. Cerekwicki’s visit at the location of our hospital and the wishes and conclusions, see note No. 2421/34/53/Tjn of 7.V.1953.)

2. In accordance with the preparations that have already been made, the transport bringing the equipment for our hospital was received at the Korean-Chinese border by Comr. Borun, the hospital’s steward, and then sent on by train to Huicheon, where the next unloading took place and further transport of the crates by car to the final destination. The whole transport reached Huicheon without damages. The unloading and car transportation took place at night.

After the transport reached its destination, the whole medical group worked sacrificially to set up and secure it further. Some of the crates containing the indispensable equipment and food were unpacked, and the remaining ones were stored at the destination under tents.

3. The first group of the PCK hospital’s personnel arrived in Andong [Dandong] on 12 May of this year and crossed the border on 13 of the same month. The second group arrived in Korea on 18.V.1953. Attache Comr. Saga?a was delegated to receive the hospital personnel on behalf of the Embassy at the border in [Andung].

Both groups were ceremoniously welcomed by representatives of the provincial and Sinuiju city authorities, the provincial Secretary and the town Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party, representatives of social organizations and the gathered population immediately after they crossed the Korean-Chinese border. The brief welcoming speeches were made by the heads of both medical groups. The first, as well as the second, group arrived safely.

4. Currently, the whole medical group has begun normal work, but there are certain difficulties stemming mostly from the hospital’s insufficient equipment.

a) The hospital’s principal complaint is vehicular transportation. Apart from the Lublin cars [small trucks] which arrived brand new and are currently the only cars in good condition, the other cars, such as 2 Dodge ambulances and 2 Willy’s are completely old and are not appropriate for use in the Korean conditions. As the Embassy knows, one of the ambulances cannot be used and has been taken apart; one of the Willy’s all-terrain vehicles has met a similar fate. The remaining Dodge breaks down very often and cannot be used for any trip outside the hospital grounds. This state of the vehicles makes the work very difficult for the comrades in the hospital, because it must be taken into account that the hospital is spread to a few places, and the distance from the Center to ward III is over 7 km., which needs to be travelled twice a day because the employees return to their lodgings at the center for the night. Apart from this, the vehicles are indispensable for communications with the Embassy and for work trips to the KPA Head of the Health Service and so on. Because of this, new personnel terrain vehicles (jeeps or Willy’s) for the hospital should be sent immediately because in the current situation the Embassy, which has almost no cars, is not able to help the hospital.

b) The equipment which was sent for the hospital has many shortcomings, which is probably the result of oversight in the course of equipping the hospital. Of the flaws that the Embassy knows about so far, there is the compressor that arrived without rubber tubes and drills, which means that the compressor stands inactive when there is nothing to use for continuing to construct the shelter. The vehicles sent without spare parts and tires, which threatens with their immobilization in view of the very poor state of the Korean roads. There is also a shortage of autoclave to sterilize the operating room.

c) The hospital’s work is also made difficult by poor communications with the Embassy, which is related to the lack of vehicular transportation, which is the only means of communications here. The Embassy and the hospital are located ca. 200 km. apart, and there is no method whatsoever to make communications with the hospital possible. The Embassy initially tried to use the means of communications possessed by the Command of the KPA Health Service, but this turned out to be not very easy and often failed. Because of this, the Embassy currently takes advantage of opportunities such as travel by comrades form the Czechoslovak or Hungarian Missions to their hospitals, which are located near our hospital.

d) The lack of news from their families also has a negative effect on the hospital employees. This stems from the fact that the diplomatic courier who brings mail for the Embassy comes to Korea relatively infrequently, and thus this issue should be made more efficient. The Embassy believes that because the PCK hospital was revealed by our press, the letters from families may be sent directly to the PRL Embassy’s address in Korea, which will relay them to the hospital.

c) Comr. Braun, the PCK hospital’s warehouseman arrived in Korea together with the medical group. According to the information gained from the director of the hospital, Comr. Braun is a writer and a correspondent of our youth and literary press and during his stay in Korea, apart from his work as warehouseman he is to keep the hospital’s chronicle and prepare materials to write a book. In accordance with the telephone instructions given on 15.V of this year by Ambassador Kiryluk, regarding helping Braun gain the necessary contacts for his work as correspondent, the Embassy took care of all the formalities. During his time in Korea, Comr. Ambassador Kiryluk spoke about Braun’s work as a correspondent with V[ice]-Minister of Foreign Affairs  Ri Dong-geon [Ri Tong Gon] and with V[ice]-Minister of Culture and Propaganda Gi Seok-bok [Ki Sok Bok]. The Korean comrades promised Comr. Braun the most extensive assistance. In connection with the above, on 22.VI.1953, Comr. Braun left for Kaesong as a correspondent, which the hospital director greeted with disapproval, since he considers Braun to be a member of his collective performing the duties of the warehouseman.

The Embassy still does not know the factual view of Poland regarding Comr. Braun’s position and is asking for the quickest possible sending of instructions on this issue.

5) The Embassy to date has no data at all regarding the hospitals’ financial issues. So far, the hospital has been paid 230,000 won out of the amounts received by the Embassy here for its own needs. Because this state of affairs is not in accordance with the agreement on the mutual maintaining of the two diplomatic posts in Poland and Korea, the Embassy is asking for concrete instructions and guidelines regarding the issue of financing the hospital in Korean currency.

VI. The Embassy’s internal matters.

[New employee arrived to take care of financial matters; two promised employees have not arrived; the presence of Ambassador Kiryluk from Beijing has improved the work of the embassy; especially acute problems with vehicles and spare parts; the embassy is suffering from shortages of office materials.]

E. Cerekwicki

[signature]

Charge d’Affaires a.i.

of the PRL Embassy in the DPRK