Report on Visits to the Mongolian People's Republic and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

SECRET

No. … Warsaw, 10-07-1977

[handwritten notation: Com[rade] Col. Kozłowski; T-40, a-a, 12-12-[19]77, signature illegible]

REPORT

of visits to the Mongolian People's Republic and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea^{x [}footnotein reference to the initial Ministry of National Defense information dispatched from the Pyongyang in a code message of Ministry of Foreign Affairs no. 3703/III of 09- 27- [19]77

I. The Mongolian People's Republic

On September 21–25 of this year, at the invitation of the Minister of Defense of General Batyn Dorj, I visited the Mongolian People's Republic with a delegation of the Polish People's Army.

The main points of the visit were the reception of the delegation by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the  Mongolian People's Party (MPP) Com[rade]  J. Tsedenbal, talks in the Ministry of Defense and a visit to one of the Mongolian mechanized brigades.

Com[rade] Tsedenbal positively assessed the current state of the Mongolian-Polish party and state relations /without further elaborating on this subject/. He asked for his respect and warm regards to the First Secretary of the Central Committee (KC) of the Polish United Workers’ Party. E. Gierek. He also passed greetings to the Chairman of the State Council Com[rade]  H. Jabłoński and Prime Minister, Com[rade] P. Jaroszewicz.

Describing the economic situation of Mongolia, J. Tsedenbal stressed the paramount importance for its development of assistance by the socialist countries, especially the USSR, as well as Poland - for which he warmly thanked. He then indicated the overall positive implementation of economic development plans, which were nevertheless largely dependent on the limited labor resources vis-à-vis the needs.

Certain difficulties are currently experienced in agriculture, following an extremely severe winter, which resulted in significant losses in the livestock population. The extent of the losses was limited by Soviet assistance, among other things, by Soviet army shipments of about 30 tons of feed to the most vulnerable areas. The rebuilding of the livestock population is regarded as a key public task for the next 2-3 years. This is illustrated, among other things, by the decision to adapt the period of school holidays to the rhythm of accumulated breeding work in which young people are required to participate.

J. Tsedenbal devoted most of his time to the issues of the Mongolian-Chinese relations, and discussed their history in the last few decades.  It is characterized by the Chinese superpower status, the tendency to want to annex Mongolia, also represented – after Kuomintang – by the leadership of CPC, the Mao Zedong’s group.

As early as 1936, Mao Zedong said that the annexation of Mongolia would be the primary task of Chinese Communists after gaining power. This demand was repeated in 1949 even before Beijing was seized. Stalin was supposed to have made the observation that "Mongolia is used to independence and would not accept absorption by China. This is also a matter of direct talks between the Chinese and Mongolian leaders." Although China did not formally enter into such talks, during the 1951 Tsedenbal’s visit in Beijing, Mao Zedong raised the issue in a veiled manner that but met with a rebuff, and did not return to it in further discussions. After the 20^th CPSU Congress, [the CCP] reiterated the demand of joining Mongolia to China, this time as a "liquidation of one of the consequences of the cult of personality." He also revealed such intentions in 1964, in a conversation with a delegation of Japanese socialists.

China's negative attitude toward Mongolia is illustrated in particular by the economic relations. In recent years, trade volume with China, traditionally important for Mongolia, dropped around 7 times. This was due, among other things, to the policy of price increases practiced by the PRC, which was not beneficial to the Mongolian People’s Republic, e.g. the doubled price of Chinese silk. Chinese workers employed in Mongolia were also used to incite the local population, and were inspired to [engage in] hostile demonstrations at Ulaanbaatar, etc.  When this met with the opposition of the Mongolian authorities, they were withdrawn by unilateral decision of the Chinese side. In the 1960s, the Mongolian side sought to re-hire  the Chinese. This never materialized, because the PRC demanded that Mongolia printed and disseminated  Chinese propaganda materials.

At the same time, particularly in recent years, China organized anti-Mongolian sabotage. Particularly pernicious was the spread of cattle disease (driving infected animals onto Mongolian territory), which resulted in approximately 120,000 goat deaths last year alone. Furthermore, contaminated seeds are allegedly smuggled, especially of the pod plants. There are instances of running intelligence and sabotage operatives [across the border]; hostile  anti-Soviet and anti-Mongolian propaganda is intensified in the Chinese mass media. 

A separate, particularly acute problem is the protection and security of the Mongolian-Chinese border about 4700 km long. Following the long-standing, numerous initiatives and efforts by the Mongolian side, it was jointly marked in 1962. At that time, the PRC, being in armed conflict with India, wanted to avoid the allegation that it questioned all its borders. At that time, the PRC, then involved in an armed conflict with India, wanted to avoid the allegation that it questioned all its borders. However, this "tactical gesture" did not change China's actual position. Moreover, further tightening of the hostile course of Chinese policy made it necessary to rebuild the Mongolian armed forces and then to deploy Soviet troops on its territory.

Some more specific information on the Chinese problem appeared during talks in the Ministry of Defense.^X [footnote: Generalized information on this subject is included in the final part of this report, taking into account, in particular, information obtained from the command of the Soviet Pacific Fleet in Vladivostok and the headquarters of the Far Eastern Military District in Khabarovsk] During their  stay in the desert-based Gobi Mongolian Mechanized Brigade, the delegation was informed of the deployment of a large Chinese force (three corps) on the other side of the border, only along the relevant section.

The defense doctrine of Mongolia is based mainly on assistance and close cooperation with the Soviet Army in a given situation. At the same time, attention is drawn to strengthening its military capabilities, which, in view of the limited human and material resources, is obviously small in comparison.

The Mongolian People's Army, according to our observations, generally shows a good moral and political, discipline and training level. The military personnel are (mostly) trained and retrained (in its entirety) in Soviet [military] academies. There functions a developed system of Soviet military advisors. The level of technical army support – average. The living conditions, the external appearance, the demeanor sometimes reveal elements of primitivism.

Our delegation was able to visit one of the Soviet Army's divisions on the territory of Mongolia, stationed in the suburb of Ulaanbaatar. This unit, as well as the entire Soviet army in Central Asia and the Far East, is kept in a state of sufficiently high combat readiness.

The overall level of socio-economic development of Mongolia is still low and the process of change and growth seems relatively weak. In addition to some historically shaped features and properties, this also results from a long-standing habit of relying primarily on foreign, mainly Soviet aid, but not actively enough on mobilizing its own forces and capabilities.

We visited currently modernized Wood Combine at Ulaanbaatar built with Polish help in the years 1967-1971 . Our specialists are renowned, respected and trusted there. It seems that there are still insufficiently utilized conditions for increasing imports of certain raw materials and products to compensate for our aid (e.g. adhesives, larch and cedar wood, etc.).

During our stay in Mongolia, our delegation met everywhere with evidence of sincere friendship and genuine sympathy toward Poland - our nation and our Party.

II. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Next, on 26-30 September , together with a delegation of the Polish People’s Army, I visited the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, at the invitation of the DPRK Minister of People’s Armed Forces, General, O Jin U.   

We were greeted everywhere with great hospitality and with a warm welcome. According to the program, I spoke officially with min.  O Jin U (and had some unofficial talks as well). The delegation visited two military colleges (the Military Academy and the Naval Academy) and four detachments (army, coastal artillery and air force). In the general part of the visit, we took note of the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum, the Palace of the Pioneers, the permanent industrial and agricultural exhibition and the metro line in Pyongyang, as well as two industrial plants: machinery and synthetic fibers in the city of Hamhung. There was also a special rally, with 6000  Pyongyang inhabitants and soldiers of the local garrison present.

On the penultimate day of visit, the delegation met with the Secretary-General of the Korean Worker’s Party, DPRK President Com[rade] Kim Il Sung. The conversation lasted nearly 2 hours. Tow lengthy statements and a few comments by Com[rade] Kim Il Sung touched upon the following main points (statements and assessments):

The visit of the Polish People’s Army delegation to the DPRK contributes to the deepening of the unity of socialist armies, and an example of strengthening friendship on an internationalist basis.

The DPRK will never forget the material and moral assistance given by Poland during the war (1950-1953), followed by reconstruction efforts (including the construction of two production and repair facilities for rolling stock), as well as our support for them on the international arena. He asked for this assistance and support to pass warm thanks to the party and state authorities of the People’s Republic of Poland.

Expressing "great satisfaction with the very good" state and the successful development of Korean-Polish relations, he stressed (twice) that these relations are characterized by the absence of any discrepancies at both Party and government levels. "We belong to one socialist family," he said, thanking [us] for informing him of our Polish assessments, problems and actions.

On their part, they have set and are pursuing three main strategic goals:

- construction of socialism in the DPRK,

- support for democratic forces and aspirations in South Korea,

- solidarity toward the socialist countries and obtaining support from other countries (mainly from the "non-aligned") for the reunification of Korea.

The socio-economic development plans are generally successfully pursued. In particular (“just like the  Polish comrades”), they focus their efforts on improving the living conditions of society. There are difficulties, however, with a temporary nature and no major negative impact, e.g. in this year, the exceptionally low status of the mountain rivers and reservoirs caused a deficit of energy generated by hydro-power plants/.^X [footnote: Minister 0 Jin U informed us separately that, in spite of the above, this year’s "grain" harvest is expected to reach a record level of 8,500,000 tons].

In South Korea, the ruling regime is intensifying persecution and repressions. However, the "party underground organization" is working and growing, enhancing the conditions and possibilities for creating a "people's front" and thus the basis for a peaceful, democratic reunification of Korea is increasing. "They are always ready to support the forces of progress in the South."

The DPRK  lies "not in Europe, but in East Asia". Two powers in this zone, the USSR and the PRC, are of course both friendly countries (for the DPRK)  with which it borders,^x [footnote: About 1400 km of land border with the PRC and 30 km with the USSR]. In this context, however, "it is quite fortunate that Korea is situated on a peninsula". They are facing the enemy here - American imperialism and the Seoul regime.  They do not live in peace, but rather in a [state of] armistice. The enemy systematically repeats various provocations that are might actually result in a war (he reminded extensively at this point, as per the well-known North Korean interpretation, the most momentous incidents of the past nine years. Each time when the US starts a loud propaganda campaign, accuse the DPRK, blackmail, or threaten to strike. This in turn forces the DPRK to respond with firm determination and high defense readiness.

As a potential opponent, he also mentioned Japan, which "did not drop its plans to occupy Korea, and harbors aggressive intentions". The position of the Korean Worker’s Party and will always as be one of solidarity and integrity of the socialist countries, he emphasized several times during the discussion, asking for this assurance to be passed Com[rade] E. Gierek. They are aware of the strength of such unity, and they feel the need to manifest it, especially in view of the situation in their region.  "We are express our dissatisfaction at the fact that the socialist countries are not yet united in solidarity. We will never do anything that could inflame and exacerbate this state of affairs, but in the interest of improving it we will do everything that is effective, achievable and in our power."

As a positive example, he mentioned the close cooperation of Polish and Korean people’s armies in the past and "for the future". Thanking us for our support in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjon, he pointed out that the same position that is held by representatives of the People’s Republic of Poland (PRL), the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSRS), the PRC and the DPRK was a form of “manifestation of the integrity of the socialist countries”.

On a different occasion, however, he distanced himself from the policy of the PRC. This was the opportunity offered by the what Deng Xiaoping told earlier in a discussion with Wörner, Chairman of the Bundestag Defense Commission, that tension between China and the USSR will continue for a number of generations and that war is inevitable. Kim Il Sung responded critically: The working class, the nations of the socialist countries know Marxism-Leninism, they do not depart from the slogans "workers of the world unite", and there is no tension between them. And, because nations cannot be replaced, the specific leadership will be replaced.

According to the nature of imperialism, weakness encourages him to "sting". Only our combat readiness can prevent the war. Strengthening the defense capabilities is therefore a joint responsibility of the socialist countries. That is why they support the policy of our Party as regards improving the defense capability of the PRL.

The socialist countries, regardless of the political differences between them, should intensively develop their mutual economic cooperation. At the same time, this will reduce their dependence on the capitalist market, and thus counter imperialism and at the same time ease the difficulties of growth. He added that he saw it fit to expand mutual trade between the DPRK and the PRL.

With a view to peaceful reunification of Korea, they attach great importance to undermining the negative impact of the American position on this matter and isolating the "Park Chung Hee clique" at the international level. In addition, they find it extremely important to obtain the widest possible support from non-aligned countries. They already began working on this. This does not mean relaxing their ties with the socialist countries: It is by acting in favor of a single anti-imperialist front that they are also reinforcing the socialist tendencies in Third World countries.

At the end of the talks Com[rade] Kim Il Sung once again expressed his conviction as to the overarching ideological and political community of the objectives and aspirations of our two nations and parties and requested that friendly greetings and best wishes be passed to Com[rade] E. Gierek, through him, to the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party.

Also interesting were the talks with min.  O Jin U.  Their importance is highlighted by the fact that he is also a member of the Political Committee and a Secretary of the Central Committee, as well as Chief of the General Staff of the KPA. These talks deepened the knowledge and, in a sense, the understanding of the position of the Korean comrades [as seen] against a more specific military and political background.

As for the Chinese question, he pointed out that, despite immediate neighborhood, in fact, know rather little of the internal situation in this country ("no one knows this well"). The more difficult it is to predict subsequent developments.

In view if the considerable length of the border^x [footnote: The border is not militarily-protected on the Korean side, as the Soviet comrades said.]  they want to have the best possible relationship with China. These were the worst during the Cultural Revolution. At that time, the Chinese were engaged  in literally ear-splitting anti-Korean propaganda ("people could not sleep either at night or during the day").

The Korean leadership decided not to respond at all.  As it was the case during Chinese [military] campaigns, they became exhausted and fell silent ("but we will not forget it, the day of reckoning will come").

They are not attacking now, and judging by appearances,  the "relations are better but not close". The DPRK does not want to interfere in Chinese domestic affairs. Nor will it allow any interference in its own affairs (in this context, he responded with agitation and disapproval when I mentioned that Mijal enjoyed Chinese support).

If they follow this kind of "principle”, they cannot make direct efforts to improve relations between the PRC and the USSR. ("In any case, the Chinese would say that we have been persuaded by Soviets. In turn, addressing the latter would meet us with the opposite allegation").

Minister O Jin U is convinced that, despite everything, "no one wants war, that means neither the USSR, but neither the PRC, which is also unable to invade, because it does not have the suitable modern weapons". To my question how to understand the non-differentiated treatment of both parties, when only one of them has territorial claims, he did not respond. He also preferred not to reveal his view on the sounding hypothesis that the Chinese side was not keen to see the US withdraw troops from South Korea.

Commenting on my statement about the attitude of the PRC leadership to Strauss and the various reactionary forces, he said that "China has the best relationship with your and our enemies". The Korean side, of course, does not like that feels bitter about it  which, however, it endures in silence.

O Jin U repeatedly and strongly stressed the need for peaceful, democratic reunification of Korea. They cannot agree and will not allow the division of the country to be recognized.  Therefore, they reject the concept of so-called cross-recognition (i.e.  the DPRK by the US and South Korea  - by the socialist countries), whose aim is to maintain and consolidate the existing situation.

Peaceful reunification will be achieved provided that the Park Chung Hee regime is deposed. At this stage, the US would not want war, and would even seek to partially alleviate the tensions created, previous or those emerging. At the same time, the Seoul regime favors war, and provided American troops are involved. So if Park remains in power, "war may be hanging by a thread".

Hardly anything survived of Carter's pre-election promises to withdraw the intervention army from Korea , as only the ground forces are to leave, which will take several years and will be compensated for by the strengthening of the air force. The weapons left by the withdrawing troops will be given to the South Korean army, whose modernization over the next five years will be advanced by further supplies of modern weaponry and equipment amounting to 7-8 billion dollars. This army (ca 1 mln regular troops and 3-4 mln of so-called territorial reserve) will therefore represent a significant and serious potential threat.

Taking into account the above, the development and strengthening of the DPRK defense potential will be carried out according to a program defined by the Korean Worker’s Party according to [the following] four points:

1/ The conversion of the entire Korean People's Army into a cadre army (each soldier, during the military service in peacetime, should be comprehensively trained to perform, in the event of war, functions [typical of] the higher ranks, for example, privates [to be trained as] team leaders, as team leader as platoon leaders, etc.).

At the same time, as has been pointed out, in the current political and military situation the army must be large (over 500,000  ), which is expensive, and which would absorb a large part of the male workforce.

2/ Modernization of the armed forces (introduction of modern weapons and equipment, ensuring proficiency and innovative use).

To this end, the Korean People's Army is currently looking for sources to purchase a range of current generations of weapons and equipment. Minister O Jin U expressed interest in the possibilities of their supply by Poland, including MI-2 helicopters, radio stations, certain types of warships, MIG-17 aircraft engines, etc. (the Korean side will send a group of specialists to Warsaw in the coming weeks for more detailed negotiations and, if appropriate, [to make] specific arrangements with the relevant foreign trade and industry departments).

He underlined the continued interest in the Soviet supply channel.  However, the [key] problem is the prices of the equipment and especially of spare parts, which recently increased by a several dozen percent. This difficulty is further aggravated by the burden of partly unpaid debt for the weapons already supplied (this does not apply, admittedly, to the war period, when the Soviet weapons were delivered free of charge). As a result, there were some hindrances. In this context, he mentioned with regret the fact that he was personally familiar with the arsenal of certain Arab countries, where so many modern, excellent Soviet weapons landed in the wrong hands.

He also stressed emotionally that the armed forces of the DPRK absolutely guarantee the suppliers of new equipment that the secrecy of its technological solutions will be preserved. 

3/ Combat training, the defense training of the entire nation (the size of the regular army has a ceiling, but war will require every citizen to take part in the fight - so everyone must be able to fight).  

4/Turning the entire country into a fortress (in the event of war, the DPRK will be a battlefield, and the entire territory will be the front. Given the fire power of a potential enemy for soldiers and equipment would require shelters and tunnels in nearby mountains).                            

As the delegation was informed, this task has already been carried out in principle. 

As part of the visit program, we studied these types of protective devices at various points in the country. They are gigantic, branching, several hundred meters [long], deep-cut streets and tunnels of a width and height of several meters, usually with two inlets, such as on both sides of the mountain, with side work and rest rooms, sited, well-lit, canalized and ventilated, equipped with an ingenious mechanism and skillfully masked gates and a series of indirect anti-atomic internal barriers.  In one of the many visited tunnels housed an entire tank battalion, in the second one there was an air force regiment, and in the third there was a coastal battery. The enormous amount of work that has been put into the construction is admirable and commands respect. Similar reflections come to mind after visiting the extensive, very deep, well-solved communication and the well-thought-out in terms of defense Pyongyang metro.

The Korean People's Army makes a very good impression. The entire older and largely the middle segment of the officer corps has considerable combat experience, including a group of pilots even from the Vietnam war. A young, well-chosen and extremely well-trained (all of the candidates for officers must go through an basic military service before the best are directed to senior officers' schools).

The appearance of the soldiers – good. A clean appearance, a springy soldier’s look, exemplified by gesture and a rhythmical drill. The soldiers’ demeanor – tactful and friendly. The moral and political condition – undoubtedly high, exemplary discipline, with a touch of fanaticism. A good level of training, combat fitness, stamina, including a highly thought-out, ingenious and hard-working base, and the diligence and endurance in training.

Having learned these qualities, he becomes in some sense an understandable metaphor used in the patriotic and combat call by Kim Il Sung: "One soldier of the Korean People's Army should be able to fight a hundred enemies." This is a kind of compensation for the mediocre armament level of the armed forces.

All evaluations and observations regarding life in the DPRK should take into account that:

- Firstly, this country lives with the obsession of the demarcation line, in a state of armistice, a kind of “semi-war”, with an overwhelming desire to reunite;

- Secondly, reconstruction from total destruction began only twenty years ago;

- Thirdly, it is a community that overcomes the centuries-old backwardness, with specific traditions and an Asian mentality, including some traces of a long Japanese occupation.

If all of this is seriously taken into account, one could understand, assess and appreciate the country better.

First of all, what is particularly striking is the organization, hard work and social activity, the order, order and a generally high discipline.

We have seen that the education and training system in the DPRK is a key factor in shaping these features social that are beneficial to the state. Children and young people receive extremely comprehensive financial, organizational and educational help form the state. The universal availability of nurseries, kindergartens, and the 10-grade secondary education (plus a pre-year for 6-year-olds). An extremely wide, consistent and materially secure polytechnic system, embedded organically in school curricula and worker apprenticeships, as well as in out-of-school activities (such as a the very "utilitarian" network equipped with and dynamically run "[youth] palaces" and youth clubs). Education of children and young people in a spirit of high and specifically uniform discipline, a sense of duty /specific social duties/, profound respect for the elderly. A large scale and a good level of amateur cultural activity. Everything in the spirit of strongly emphasized love of the Nation, the Homeland, and the Leader.

The DPRK is a rather difficult economic partner. At the same time, it is a country of great prospects, with a high development potential, considerable amount of raw materials, with ambitious industrial development and high agriculture, with its own technological and development achievements, such as machine tools, heavy trucks, and finally extremely interesting production of synthetic fiber (calcium and anthracite based).

Therefore it seems that, despite the doubled volume of Polish-Korean trade in the last five years, it is worthwhile and should be developed even more quickly. Kim Il Sung’s position, among other things, expressed to our delegation, should play a very helpful role in these efforts. In particular, the exchange profile could be enriched, which currently consists in exports of our coking coal and imports of magnesite.

In the light of the observations made during the visit, however over a limited time, a general assessment of the situation and phenomena in the DPRK could be arranged on two planes: positive and generally negative.

The first is the fully-fledged socialist economic and social structure in cities and in rural areas. The class situation, the internal value of society and the spartan approach to life are clear. A wide, well-organized system of education and self-training for all citizens. On these grounds, a high production level, an impressive pace of construction, and the mass character of social action.                                 

The positive aspects include: the alignment of the general foreign policy directions of the DPRK with those of the socialist countries (including those in Europe, the Middle East and South  America and Africa, in particular Angola and Ethiopia). The propaganda and emotionally staunch anti-imperialism, with the main focus on the USA, and then on Japan, are also a positive factor for us.

Whereas on the negative plane we have the monstrous publiccult of the leader, from monuments to lapel badges with his likeness; from commemorating [him] [in the form of] "chapels", plaques, or even inscriptions wherever he was present, to referring to his words or name, with consummate reverence on every official occasion. Furthermore, there are publications, posters, placards, stage decorations, songs, etc.

However, from this grossly cult image emerges a second figure of the leader - a vigorous activist, who is often in the filed - throughout the country, in all places, in all kinds of diverse facilities. He takes part in conferences, conducts lots of direct conversations, personally chairs various meetings, including rural circles, etc.  These activities are well-researched, organized, prepared in propaganda terms, and well implemented. In total, the assessment of this personage, this cult, is a highly complex problem.                                 

The negative, insular nationalist tone was expressed the form of the "juche" doctrine in the 1960s. This is a canon of action elevated to the highest level, based solely on one’s own resources. According to the officially [publicized]  statements, this is intended to overcome the historically inherited inaction, lack of ambition and initiative. The propaganda aspect of "juche" is widely visible. The historical and contemporary internationalist, allied aid is never mentioned. There are no signs of the forthcoming 60th anniversary of the October Revolution, the role of Lenin, and the liberation of Korea from the Japanese occupation. A similar approach exists to Chinese aid during the war of 1950-1953. However, in talks behind closed doors, probably depending on the partner, the issue of assistance and cooperation is generally recognized and underlined. As we know, the “juche” doctrine has recently been taken up by some Third World countries more or less officially. The DPRK inspires those decisions and is [their] spiritual father. This can cause other undesirable problems.                                 

The Korean attitude toward the situation created between the PRC and the USSR and other socialist countries is also very unclear and mystifying. Although we understand the complexity of this problem, it seems to reveal a certain degree of insincerity and ambiguity.                                 

Some specific features and social and moral predispositions can also be viewed as negative. These include secrecy, the tendency to fanaticism, the susceptibility of masses to manipulation by the ruling elements.         

All in all, however, it is a nation, a state and an army with genuine achievements and considerable prospects. The attitude toward Poland is friendly, with good memories of everything that connects us.

It appears that it is fully appropriate to extend contacts and cooperation with the DPRK, particularly in the political and economic spheres, and also in education, culture and youth [exchange].  

As already mentioned, during the visit to the People's Republic of Mongolia and the meetings in Vladivostok and Khabarovsk, we obtained a number of new information on the Chinese military threat. Below its synthesis:

xxx

The PRC is switching to an offensive doctrine. The Eleventh KPCh Congress changed nothing in this respect. The degree of militarization of the national economy is increasing. Military expenditure accounts for 40-45% of the state budget. The armaments industry is expanding. Its production capacity is increasing in terms of quantity, product range and technological level. Among other things, the annual production of T-59 tanks increased significantly (Chinese modernization of the Soviet T-54) and of T-60 (Chinese modernization of Soviet PT-76). The production of F-9 combat aircraft was launched (class similar to that the Soviet-made MiG-21). China has a third largest submarine fleet in the world. The first nuclear-powered submarine has recently been launched and preparations are being made for the construction of a ballistic missile-equipped submarine. After mastering missile production (2 km range) just a few years ago and relatively recently those with 6 km [range], they will now begin testing an 8-km range missile. The first two missile types (over 100 are now operational and on launchers) have been appropriately deployed in approximately 10 bases. The PRC currently has around 300 nuclear warheads. Nuclear weapons are being tested, and the frequency of test explosions is increasing (several years ago, about 1 explosion a year, currently about 4 a year). They have an army of several million. The army began reorganization of mechanized and armor divisions in order to build a structure similar to the Soviet model. The main forces are concentrated in regions bordering the USSR^x (footnote:^X as we have been informed, along the several thousand kilometers of the state border with the PRC in the Far East M[ilitary] D[istrict], there have been no incidents for a long time. The Joint committee is working out the problems of shipping on the Amur and Ussuri rivers. After several years of impasse in the last few months, one could observe certain positive developments in their approach to some practical problems.) and, respectively, with Mongolia. Currently, the air force base system is also undergoing relocation. Extensive engineering work is being carried out. All this underlines the severity of the problem and at the same time the scale of the effort that the USSR must make.