Soviet Report on Cuban Proposal to Establish a Soviet Intelligence Center in Cuba

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CC CPSU

4 April1962

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After returning to Havana from the trip to the Soviet Union in March 1962 Cuban Minister of Internal Affairs, Ramiro VALDEZ MENENDEZ, in a conversation with the KGB representative touched a number of questions which he had brought up during his talks with the leadership of the Soviet intelligence, and on the content of which it had been reported earlier to the CCCPSU.

Ramiro VALDEZ said that Fidel CASTRO, to whom he reported on the results of his talks in Moscow, gave a positive evaluation of the results of the Cuban delegation's visit, in spite of the fact that Moscow did not adopt the line that he (VALDEZ) suggested to the leadership of the Soviet intelligence service regarding policies of Cuba and the Soviet Union in the countries of Latin America.

VALDEZ considers as the most important issue of the talks in Moscow the Cuban proposal to set up a Soviet intelligence center in Cuba. The intelligence center, stated VALDEZ, would be closer to the people of Latin America who, living in great poverty and being unpretentious and hardy people, could become excellent guerrillas. And in order to mobilize these people to struggle, in VALDEZ's opinion, it is necessary to establish a center of Soviet influence in Latin America.

VALDEZ considers the negative response of the leadership of the Soviet Union's intelligence to this proposal as a different approach to this question on the side of the USSR and China.

"While the Chinese," declared VALDEZ, "are trying to carry out a policy based on the notion that [on every continent there must be a center of Chinese influence, the Russians do not believe that it is necessary to establish such centers."] 1

VALDEZ also said that the declaration by the leadership of the Soviet intelligence service that the plan proposed by [the Cubans] is outside the frame of competence of the intelligence he considers as a polite rejection and believes that on this issue the leadership of the Soviet intelligence was not sincere with him.