Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 30 October 1962

Ciphergram No. 16028

Dispatched from Washington, D.C., on 10.30.1962 at 22:00 and received on 10.31.1962 at 4:50

Came to the Decoding Department on 10.31.1962 at 5:00

To: [Foreign Ministry Director Eugeniusz] MILNIKIEL,¹ URGENT, EYES ONLY

From: [Ambassador Edward] DROŻNIAK²

(From an important American interlocutor.)

[The interlocutor] thinks that the unpublished exchange of letters between Kennedy and [Soviet leader Nikita S.] Khrushchev contains a far-reaching obligation on the part of Kennedy to liquidate the American [military] base from Turkey.

The [US] administration is not going to exploit the withdrawal of the [Soviet] missiles from Cuba for maximum propaganda purposes as a victory achieved from the position of strength. Kennedy is getting ready to make a statement at a press conference on November 1, [in which he is going to] warn against adopting such an attitude, [and instead] he is going to draw attention to the fact that reaching an agreement in the area of disarmament is now more urgent than ever. K. postponed the press conference until Thursday in order to have more time to assess the process of disassembling [the missile bases] in Cuba. The local disarmament agency [i.e., the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; ACDA] has recently revived its activity, among other things, through making contacts with the delegations of different countries associated with the United Nations in order to find out in what areas they could come to an understanding as quickly as possible. [The issues that have been given] primary attention [are as follows]: the ban on nuclear tests; the ban on nuclear weapons’ proliferation; [issuing] a declaration or [signing] a treaty of non-aggression between NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and the Warsaw Pact; the elimination of some [military] bases; declaring both Africa and Latin America as non-nuclear zones. The [US] administration was happy to hear that [First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vasili Vasilyevich] Kuznetsov was appointed as the head of the delegation [to discuss the issue of] Cuba as a sign that the USSR is going to quickly resolve the Cuban Crisis.

He thinks that as long as there are no complications in implementing the agreement regarding Cuba, there is a real possibility for a summit meeting [to happen] relatively quickly and for a serious relaxation [of tensions] in the international situation. They [the Americans] fear complications on the part of [Fidel] Castro ([such as his] hindrance of the work of the UN Commission, among other things, by demanding the removal of [the US Naval Base in] Guantanamo), as well as [other issues such as] the moves by China [on the international arena, including] a further exacerbation of the conflict with India, egging Castro on to oppose the reached agreement, and presenting the USSR position as a serious concession to the United States. All of these could prevent the development of the [positive] events [described above].

Received by: […]³

By Dispatch to Moscow

[1] Eugeniusz Milnikiel (1905 -1969), former Polish ambassador to Great Britain (1953 -1956).

[2] Edward Drożniak (1902 – 1966), Poland’s ambassador to the United States (1961-1966).

[3] Comrade Gomulka, Comrade Cyrankiewicz, Comrade Gierek, Comrade Jedrychowski, Comrade Kliszko, Comrade Loga-Sowinski, Comrade Ochab, Comrade Rapacki, Comrade Spychalski, Comrade Zambrowski, Comrade Zawadzki, Comrade Jarosinski, Comrade Strzelecki, Comrade Czesak, Comrade Bodzilowski, Comrade Korczynski, Comrade Naszkowski, Comrade Wierna, Comrade Michalowski, Comrade Birecki, Comrade Katz-Suchy, Comrade Milnikiel.