July 4, 1953
Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov to Soviet Ambassador in Beijing
This document was made possible with support from Leon Levy Foundation
Ciphered Telegram # 13464
Tenth Department of the MFA SSSR
Top Secret
Received; 19:20 on 4 July 1953
Sent: 21:20 on 4 July 1953.
To: Beijing, Soviet Ambassador
URGENT [vne ocheredi]
1211-1220. Pay a visit to Siu-Tsuan and tell him the following.
1. The Soviet government regards the measures planned by the government of the PRC as correct. The Soviet government is also in agreement with the draft answer to [U.S. General Mark] Clark from Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai.
2. The Soviet government believes that the entire course of armistice negotiations testifies to a resolute success of the tactics employed by the Sino-Korean side in these negotiations. The Sino-Korean side demonstrated to the whole world its striving for peace and readiness to conduct negotiations and find the ground for a compromise while protecting their state interests. American ruling circles became isolated in their policy that leaves the blame for the delay of the armistice negotiations and for the continuation of war in Korea in the eyes of the world public opinion at the door of the US.
3. As to Syngman Rhee and his recent provocative actions aimed at complicating the negotiations and at delaying the end of the war, we believe that it is not his independent policy. It is absolutely obvious that all the recent actions of the Syngman Rhee clique and the fuss around them were done in execution of certain tasks set by the US ruling circles which act to please the most aggressive segment of American monopolists. Due to the successful tactics of the Sino-Korean side all the obstacles to the conclusion of an armistice agreement have been removed. This put in a tight corner not only American foreign, but also domestic policy, since there is no more possibility to refer to aggravation of the international situation, to the Korean war, etc. Under the new circumstances the US ruling circles face serious political difficulties in sustaining the atmosphere of military hysteria, high military appropriations, etc. Therefore American ruling circles are taking advantage of Syngman Rhee and the noise around him in order to maintain in the US (and not only in the US) the unstable semi-military political atmosphere and to delay, in one way or another, the conclusion of an armistice. However, the thrust of public opinion in the US as well as in other countries has increased so much that the US ruling circles could hardly manage to put off ending the Korean war for long. This does not exclude that all kind of noise around Syngman Rhee continues and that, perhaps, there would be some new attempts to delay the conclusion of the armistice in Korea.
4. The Soviet government deems it necessary to return to the question about the trip of Kim Il Sung to Punmunjom to sign the armistice agreement. We cannot ignore the defiant conduct of the Syngman Rhee clique, for it may play some kind of dangerous tricks on Kim Il Sung. Therefore, Kim Il Sung should be advised against going to Punmunjom. Instead, he should order another responsible Korean comrade to sign the agreement on behalf of the KPDR. We hope that the Chinese friends will agree with this.
Telegraph the results,
MOLOTOV
Copies: 1 - cde. Malenkov
2 - cde. Molotov
3. cde. Khrushchev
4 - cde. Vyshinsky
5 - cde. Gromyko
6.- cde. Zorin
7. - 10th department
8 Copy.
Shown to cde. Podtserov, Fedorenko.
Molotov writes to the Soviet Ambassador in Beijing discussing the Korean War armistice.
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