Vidaković reports to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry on the diplomatic efforts of many Cuban officials (Roa, Dorticos, etc.). Vidakovic is worried they might not be approaching the situation (the Cuban Missile Crisis) with the appropriate fervor, which might, he believes, lead to a hysterical over-reaction at some point.
October 27, 1962
Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry
This document was made possible with support from Leon Levy Foundation
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, FNRJ (FPRY)
Sending: Havana
Received: 28.X 62. at 07.00
No. 230
Taken into process: 28.X 62. at 10.20
Date: 27.X 1962
Completed: 28.X 62. at 10.45
Telegram
15
Very urgent
To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Koča. Yours 434844.
Visited [Cuban President Osvaldo] Dorticos at 1 P.M. Just today received U Thant’s message. The answer is being edited. It will be completed in an hour and I will be given it. Their intention is to address public opinion throughout that answer. According to what he stated I conclude that there is no necessary flexibility at all. They don’t have full texts either of the last message to Kennedy from Khrushchev or Kennedy’s answer, so they are still not completing the final version of the answer.
Your suggestions were passed. He states that a great deal of them will be in the above answer. Commitments will be taken during the negotiations, but not unilaterally. The condition is that they are taken by the USA too, as well as the stoppage of the blockade during them.
The idea of U Thant’s arrival to Cuba is very useful. Will be discussed immediately. Asked if it was U Thant’s suggestion. Answered that it was our opinion. Of course, they will have to invite him. Will be answered.
They are not able to allow inspection.
The idea of a special declaration of the Cuban Government can also be taken into account. They will consult immediately. I stated that it would miss the target if it lacks new flexible elements and proofs of their readiness to warm the situation; thus there must be understood what can maximally be done.
American planes continued overflights during the day. In the west part of the island there was fire at them, but without hitting the targets. He stated that there was information from Brazil that the possible attack could be in next 48 hours.
I have an impression that they are struggling between reality and Castro’s persistence. There are up against limits made up by Fidel’s speech. Today there is a certain deterioration in regard to our talks from yesterday. I couldn’t possibly find out more precisely how far they can go. I have an impression that D. was a protagonist of accepting our ideas. However, it seems that each issue is being discussed for too long. From the way and speed he has received me, in contrast to the other ambassadors except the Russian one, I can conclude that they care to be in constant touch with us.
In half an hour there will be a contact with D. A telegram will be sent immediately.
Vidaković
Vidaković describes the positions of both Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos, with whom he met, and U Thant, who sent him a message. Both men relay the difficulties in dealing with the Cuban situation, especially concerning the resolution to the UN on inspections in Cuba and the imminent danger of a possible American attack.
Author(s):
Associated People & Organizations
Associated Places
Associated Topics
Subjects Discussed
Related Documents
Document Information
Source
Original Archive
Rights
The History and Public Policy Program welcomes reuse of Digital Archive materials for research and educational purposes. Some documents may be subject to copyright, which is retained by the rights holders in accordance with US and international copyright laws. When possible, rights holders have been contacted for permission to reproduce their materials.
To enquire about this document's rights status or request permission for commercial use, please contact the History and Public Policy Program at HAPP@wilsoncenter.org.