Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, FPRY

Sending: Havana

Received: 1.XI 62. at 10.00

No. 246

Taken into process: 1.XI 62. at 12.30

Date: 31.X 1962

Completed: 2.XI 62. at 13.40

Telegram

14

-DDD-

TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

This night had the discussion with [Gen. Albino] Da Silva, a special envoy of [Brazilian] President [João] Goulart.

He said that he came due to the permanent contact with Castro. The aim of that was to convince them to draw out real conclusions from the recent events. They were supposed to make concepts for their own policy on that basis. They had been acquainted earlier with standpoints of Brazil, but they either couldn’t or didn’t want to understand them. They should bond again somehow with LA [Latin America]. Internal regime is not an obstacle. Let them do what they want inside Cuba, but outside they must stick to the frameworks dictated by real circumstances which couldn’t be changed either by Cuba or Castro, nor would they be able to do so in future. The only way out of unpleasant crisis is the case of Yugoslavia.

Talks with Castro were open and fully sincere. Had talked about all sorts of things. C. didn’t conceal his outrage about Russians. Thus, he stubbornly refused any control [inspection] showing both sides that he must have been consulted as well. Holding his ground about the evacuation of Guantanamo base. Following his impression Da Silva concluded that F. would be very tough and persistent in his talk with U Thant. He tried to convince Castro that he couldn’t let U Thant to return without anything. This situation could deteriorate terribly and even be fatal for Cuba if everything deteriorated before the [US Congressional mid-term] elections i.e. before 5 November. He is not sure if F. fully understood that. He said that F. behaved like a hunted wild animal that was afraid of all sorts of things. Steps must be taken gradually and in stages because both internal and external situations are extremely complicated. He was of the opinion that Fidel was very honest to him and grateful that Brazil had taken such an initiative. Expressed optimism. Was of the opinion that he would succeed in main features. (This general is very naive.)

(See telegram co-ordinating no. 57)

Therefore, aspirations of Brazil are too ambitious for this moment. Cuba should be drawn into the circle of LA. Should be neutralized following the formula of Yugoslavia. Tactically, it should be based on negotiations Kennedy-Khrushchev excluding Fidel from them.

I suggest some hints: Cuba has oil supplies for 15-20 days; food supplies probably for a month; production brought to a halt; state of readiness must be prolonged due to internal political reasons. All this world fuss, even if it ends for the best, will cost Cuba in cutting down its living standards by another 10-20 percent. The only factor that could solve all these problems now as well as in the near future could be the USSR. Castro as well as all the others should bear in mind this fact and should bear it further, no matter what they said on TV and similarly. At this moment, this fact is unchangeable and obstinate.

Vidaković