July 27, 1970
On the Visit of the UAR Party and Government Delegation led by President Nasser to the Soviet Union between 29 June and 17 July 1970
This document was made possible with support from The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
[GDR Ministry for Foreign Affairs]
24 July 1970
1. On the Visit of the UAR Party and Government Delegation led by President Nasser to the Soviet Union between 29 June and 17 July 1970
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(Source: Department AS [Arab States])
The Deputy Head of the Middle East Department in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Comrade Kornev, said the following about the negotiations:
The Soviet Union and the UAR [United Arab Republic; Egypt] are very satisfied with the development of bilateral relations. The USSR will further continue the cooperation with the UAR in the political, economic, and military area and continue to support the Arab cause also in the future.
Both sides are agreeing that the Middle East conflict can be resolved only by a political solution based on the U.N. Security Council Resolution from 22 November 1967. The main obstacle in this regard is the policy of the United States and Israel. Considered as means to implement a political solution are the increase of political pressure on Israel and the growth of fighting power, especially of the UAR Army. According to Soviet opinion, in case of an understanding the peace agreement should be guaranteed by the four major powers or the Security Council of the United Nations. Though not mentioned in the communique, the UAR does accept the known position of the government of the USSR regarding Israel, which is based on the existence of the State of Israel.
The UAR reaffirmed its agreement with the use of the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba by Israel.
The extremism pertaining to a solution of the conflict is ever more in decline. It does still exist only with the liberation organizations. [Yassar] Arafat as well would recognize the need for a political solution.
Both sides are supporting the struggle for the liberation of the territories occupied in 1967. However, the Soviet Union is of the opinion that guerrilla warfare is in this regard a dangerous and insufficient method. The liberation movement is raising the demand for the formation of a Palestinian state without any clear concept how this intention is supposed to implemented.
Concerning the demand for the creation of a Palestinian state, the emphasis on the Palestine Resolution of the United Nations in the [joint USSR-UAR] communique is important. It does either call for a return of the Palestinians to their traditional territories or for a compensation by Israel.
By the [GDR] Embassy in Cairo the following additional aspects were emphasized:
In the so far longest and most intensive negotiations between the USSR and the UAR, it apparently succeeded to deepen the cognitive process of the President regarding the global aspects of the Middle East Crisis. With such, an important contribution has been made towards the solidifying of the anti-imperialist alliance with the liberation movement and the strengthening of the progressive forces in the UAR. The noticeable rapprochement with the position of the Soviet Union is opening up stronger opportunities for integration in the peace strategy of the socialist states.
Furthermore, the communique is demonstrating mostly coincident positions. It is of a foreign-policy and programmatic character, which can result in domestic political consequences. In light of the increasing imperialist pressure and the activities by domestic rightist forces, the UAR leadership has solidified its commitment to Soviet policy and the cooperation with the Soviet Union.
Both sides emphasized the close linkage between the Middle East problem and other parts of the struggle against the imperialist policy of aggression. The emphasized joint position on European security in this context does represent a support for the struggle of the GDR to establish relations based on international law.
The previous reservation of the UAR regarding non-Arab problems was not repeated in the wording of the communique.
For the first time in such a type of document, an active approach of the UAR towards achieving a political solution of the Middle East conflict is expressed. This is progress in principle, since so far the UAR has left activities towards a political resolution mostly to the Soviet diplomacy.
Therefore it is to be expected that the UAR will noticeably increase its diplomatic activities in the interest of a political solution towards the Arab states, as well as pertaining to the influence on the September meeting of the Arab League, the African Summit, and the conference of the non-aligned states.
The UAR mass media devoted major attention to the visit. Especially emphasized was the following:
- The withdrawal of all occupation forces from all occupied Arab territories is the precondition for a peace settlement.
- The consequent support of the Arab states by the Soviet Union.
- The fundamentally different positions of the United States and the Soviet Union regarding the Middle East conflict.
The leading organs of the ASU [Arab Socialist Union, the only party in the UAR founded in 1962 by Nasser] and the UAR government have begun to evaluate the results of the visit in their meetings. The IV Congress of the ASU to begin on the 23rd of July might already become a litmus test concerning in what regards those results will already now have an impact on the political workings.
During the visit, the Soviet representative assured the UAR of continuing Soviet support. The UAR accepted Israel's right to exist. According to the GDR embassy in Cairo, Nasser's visit to the Soviet Union marks the beginning of increased UAR diplomatic activity in the region.
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