Comrade Le Duan’s Comments After Listening to Comrade Vo Quang Ho’s Briefing on the Draft Plan (Notes Taken by Comrade Ho)

[Translator’s note: italics from the original text.]

Comrade Le Duan’s Comments After Listening to Comrade Vo Quang Ho’s Briefing on the Draft Plan

(Notes Taken by Comrade Ho)

10 September 1976

Liberate South Vietnam in two years, 1975-1976.

In Region 9, we need a number of battalions to make attacks behind enemy lines, because that will cause the situation to open up for us.

In 1975 we will attack on the scale of 1972 – what does that mean? We will stretch enemy forces and make big attacks against separate, individual locations. 1975 will be a very tough year for the U.S.: Elections in the United States; If Ford wants to win the election, he must resolve [settle] the problem of South Vietnam in 1975; We will liberate South Vietnam in 1975, before the U.S. elections. There are two key dates, 1975 and 1976: we must be able to do this militarily.

If Ford wants to move forward [to be reelected], in 1975 he must make the situations in South Vietnam and in Cambodia resemble the situation in Laos. We will create Scenario 1 in order to advance and take power immediately; we will not stop but instead will totally eliminate it [the old regime]. In 1975, if we choose Scenario 1 then we must eliminate the enemy’s apparatus of repression in the rural areas. In 1975 Ford must set up a tripartite coalition government in South Vietnam and a coalition government in Cambodia. Because his political position is shaky, our military position is very strong. If in Scenario 1 a tripartite coalition government is formed, we will immediately implement reunification [of North and South Vietnam].

1975 is very important. North Vietnam must focus on providing excellent training for a number of battalions and for replacement troops. We will send 10,000 troops to Region 8, 10,000 troops to Region 9, and make attacks that will open up the entire Mekong Delta.

In 1975 we will stretch the enemy thin throughout the entire [South Vietnamese] battlefield and make massed, large attacks in individual areas. Opening up the Central Highlands will be the primary effort. We will maintain the status quo in Eastern Cochin China, put pressure on Saigon again, and if an opportunity arises we will send in three or four more divisions to strike another blow. In our propaganda we should not make any public announcements about the population gains we have achieved or how many hamlets and how many people the enemy has lost so that we can maintain the present situation in which they [the enemy] conceal these things from one another.

Current Opportunities to Liberate South Vietnam.

-There will be two opportunities:

+In 1975 they will pull back, retreat for the elections in the United States. We will open up the rural lowlands, build roads linking North and South, stretch the enemy thin, and mass our forces to attack locations where enemy forces are weak. We must correctly decide how to stretch enemy forces thin. It is possible that Ford is preparing to push Thieu aside and form a tripartite coalition government. We will attack to open up the lowlands for our forces and eliminate all of the enemy’s outposts and bases there. If it is Scenario 1, we will combine mass uprisings and armed [military] attacks to demand true democracy. Prepare to launch a big offensive in 1976, just before Ford’s reelection campaign.

+In 1976 we will mount attacks on the scale of the 1972 offensive, attack individual cities, and strike right into the heart of Saigon. We will not miss our opportunity in 1976. In 1975 our main force units must grow stronger as they fight, and we cannot allow them to become weaker as we prepare for the big attack in 1976. Mass 3-4 divisions to annihilate one enemy division. Threaten all areas, then mass our forces to strike deep, right into the heart of Saigon. Le Loi and Quang Trung both attacked straight into Thang Long [Translator’s Comment: Le Loi and Quang Trung were Vietnamese emperors who drove Chinese armies out of Vietnam in the 15^th and 18^th centuries. Thang Long is the ancient name of Vietnam’s capital city, Hanoi. Le Duan is using these historical examples to support the argument for an attack into the South Vietnamese capital, Saigon]. Stretch the enemy thin everywhere and prepare to make a powerful, surprise attack directly into Saigon. Our preparations must be very active, very aggressive. We must attack the biggest, the most vital location. Make a surprise attack using heavy artillery and 7-8 divisions to attack into the city of Saigon. Isolate Tri-Thien and implement a good deception [diversionary] plan. Saigon is weak, not strong, and the masses all support us. In Cuba, Fidel Castro used 10,000 troops to strike directly into the capital and he successfully dispersed 200,000 enemy troops. We will take this daring action when the enemy starts to buckle, when he is unsteady. If we want to be able to seize this opportunity, we must create strength and power. We must employ the right measures, we must organize things properly, we must fight and make preparations at the same time, and we must attack in order to create additional strength. If our revolutionary movement advances in the rural countryside, it will also advance in the cities. We did not believe we would be able to defeat 500,000 American troops, but we dared to fight them, and that is why we won. If one knows what one is doing, then even small numbers can be successful, but if one does not know what one is doing, then even superior numbers can be defeated, like in Indonesia. The Chinese Revolution only won victory when it attacked – when instead of defending Yan’an [Yan’an was the headquarters of Mao Zedong’s forces in China during the 1930s, after the Long March], it attacked into the cities. We must build roads so that we can hold the initiative. Saigon is the primary target, it is the enemy’s big, main nerve center and headquarters. Region 5’s main objective will be to open up the lowlands to our forces.

The primary condition required for the liberation of South Vietnam is whether or not our main force units are strong enough to accomplish this. The Chinese Revolution used only military attacks, and there were no uprisings by the masses. Lenin, on the other hand, talked only about General Insurrection. In Vietnam, we say, “General Offensive-General Insurrection, in which the military has the decisive role.” In Vietnam the masses have a history of insurrection, most of them are on the side of the revolution, and they will never switch over to the enemy’s side. If we are strong, the enemy will not be able to rule the masses, to govern and control them. If we are not strong, then the enemy will be able to govern them. The masses are ready, so that requirement is fulfilled. In Saigon, as well as in Region 8 and Region 9, the masses are being repressed. If we break their shackles they will immediately rise up. We do not need to worry about international conditions or international requirements. If there are problems, the U.S. will withdraw; it will not jump in again as it did in 1965. The enemy’s government is weak and shaky. If we sent one or two divisions down into Region 8 and Region 9, the enemy will not be able to govern that area. The enemy has failed and his internal situation is in chaos. The primary condition is whether or not we are strong. The decisive blow will be a general [military] offensive; simultaneous general attacks and simultaneous uprisings, not a general insurrection. If the enemy is strong and we are weak, we will still attack. We will attack and seize control, not just attack to annihilate [destroy] enemy forces, because the masses have participated in the revolution for the past 20 years, the masses are ready to join us, and Saigon has risen up many times before. Now, if we crush the enemy’s forces, the masses will rise up immediately. During the 1968 Tet Offensive too few of our main force troops entered Saigon, so the masses were unable to rise up. We were still weak and we had not yet addressed the issue of sending our main force army into Saigon. In Hue large numbers of our main force troops entered the city, so the masses there were able to rise up. Our main force troops, who defeated the Americans and forced 500,000 American troops to withdraw, are now better trained, more powerfully equipped, and are massed in larger numbers. In the area around Saigon our local forces are solid, and our sapper and spearhead forces are very powerful and have been organized into a single organizational structure. We will stretch the enemy thin throughout South Vietnam and we will defeat the enemy in the lowlands, which will make the enemy’s hold on the cities shaky. The U.S. will not intervene again. Our side [our allies] will maintain the present level of assistance. The masses are used to mounting uprisings, they know what to do, and 60-70% of the masses are on our side. The time we spend on preparations is the most important thing. When we enter the city, the enemy will not be able to surround us. We will completely annihilate individual enemy divisions and attack into Saigon, and the other areas will be left like a snake that has lost its head. We will not wait for the masses to rise up; instead, we will attack into Saigon, and then the masses will rise up. We have 300,000 troops and the enemy has 600,000 troops. The enemy outnumbers us 2 to 1, but the enemy’s forces are dispersed. We have a “fist” of 100,000 massed troops to strike our blows. When the Chinese Revolution advanced to the south, the Nationalist Chinese Army outnumbered the Chinese Communist Army 5 to 1. The International Revolution has never had conditions as favorable as those that we have. The revolution is the greatest advantage that we possess.

We must prepare. If the masses in Saigon rise up in 1975, we will send our forces in quickly. We must be prepared for 1975, we must be prepared for 1976, and we must have reserve forces. Cadre from the battalion level up must be prepared. When the U.S. entered the war, we dared to open up the Tri Thien front. Now we are in a powerful position. The U.S. has left, and our main force divisions remain in South Vietnam.

We give the highest priority to the question of the general offensive-general insurrection and the issue of our main force troops, because the general offensive is the main thing, because the military side will be the primary factor. A general offensive conducted in one phase and made up of three or four campaigns. The general offensive is not a single blow, but it will be a phase, a period of time. 1975 will be the initial phase of the general offensive. The general offensive may take two years. In 1968 our primary purposes in attacking the cities were to liberate the countryside and to defeat America’s will. But the American troops remained there, and the puppet army was still there. This time, the American army has withdrawn and gone home, so if we crush the puppet army the puppet government will disintegrate. Clear the countryside, annihilate the enemy’s regular units, destroy individual enemy divisions, attack the cities, three fists intimately linked together, supporting one another, … This time our general offensive-general insurrection will be longer and more complex. We will annihilate a few enemy divisions and attack the city. Even if there is an insurrection in Saigon, we will still have to annihilate the enemy’s divisions in Eastern Cochin China. Can three or four of our divisions annihilate one puppet division? If we cannot accomplish this militarily in Eastern Cochin China, then we may first launch a big attack in the Central Highlands. After being hit with two blows, in the Central Highlands and in Eastern Cochin China, the enemy will disintegrate. We will dare to attack en masse and with reserves. Our preparations for the general offensive-general insurrection must be good: build roads, make preparations in the Central Highlands, make preparations in Saigon and Eastern Cochin China.

When we go into the Politburo meeting, we will only discuss the mission for 1975.

Preparing forces is the most important issue:

-Our in-place forces must be strong enough.

-Preparation of main force units in South Vietnam: 13 massed divisions, with the primary sector (Saigon and Eastern Cochin China) having a total of 7-8 divisions and 120,000-130,000 troops. 3-4 divisions in the other sector[s]. Carry out strategic annihilation [annihilation at a strategically significant level].

-North Vietnamese main force units will conduct massed attacks with three corps, they will mount several such attacks.

-Reserve troops to serve as replacements.

-Prepare logistics supplies and roads.

-Utilize ammunition properly: artillery will fire at close range to economize on ammunition expenditure, and because it is more accurate that way.

The following troop recruitment levels are approved: 1975 – 130,000; 1976 – 180,000. Ensure sufficient troops to provide 13 divisions in South Vietnam, 14 divisions in North Vietnam.

Our attack in South Vietnam will not adversely affect our continued advance [toward socialism] in North Vietnam. Once we win in South Vietnam, the capitalists will be willing to take the risk of investing in North Vietnam.

Our troops in North Vietnam will participate in economic construction and they will build irrigation projects, roads, and houses. Each year they will train for six months and carry out labor duties for six months.

North Vietnam must pay attention to our northern border, and especially the Lang Son-Cao Bang area. Pay attention to the roads leading down from the north. Build two defense lines, one along the border and one in the piedmont area. Also pay attention to our coastline.

Direction for 1975: There are two directions: The enemy will be forced into Scenario 1, establish a tripartite coalition government, or there will be uprisings in the cities. No matter what scenario takes place, no matter what happens we must gain more complete control in Regions 8 and 9 and increase our pressure around Saigon, and then there will be a possibility that that a [revolutionary] movement may arise in 1975. If a movement arises in the cities, we must work as hard as possible to open up and expand areas under our control in the lowlands, and we must send 5^th Division to penetrate down deep into the lowlands of the Delta. Region 8 should organize 2-3 regiments to attack and shatter the enemy, but they do not need to then hold and defend those areas. They should leave local force battalions behind to hold those areas while the regiments are massed to form a division to send up to put pressure on Saigon. Immediately send a division down to B2. If an opportunity arises, send several divisions down into Eastern Cochin China after the attack in the Central Highlands. In 1975 we may be able to use 5-6 divisions to pressure Saigon. Depending on the conditions at that time, we will then decide whether attacking the enemy’s regular units will be our primary effort or whether attacking Saigon will be our main effort.

-Tri Thien: Additional, secondary attacks.

-The main effort will be in the Central Highlands and Region 5 to cut South Vietnam in two and threaten Saigon. After the Central Highlands finishes its attacks it will be stronger, and it will be ready to move down into Region 7.

-Attack and gain control of Region 8 and Region 9.

The situation will then change in a fundamental way.

1976 will be another great leap forward. We will crush them before the elections in the United States. We have the conditions necessary to be able to accomplish this, but we must concentrate more, try harder, make things more certain for 1975-1976, and our road networks must be improved. In late 1974 we must advance, we must not allow ourselves to fall back, because the enemy is in political chaos and disorder.

Assessment of the United States: Even if there is a 10% chance that the U.S. will attack North Vietnam, we will still attack in South Vietnam. If the situation continues to be protracted in South Vietnam, we will grow weaker. Only if South Vietnam is liberated will North Vietnam be able to build itself up. The best thing for us is to liberate South Vietnam in 1975-1976, if things become stretched out longer, it will not be good for us.

We call it General Offensive-General Insurrectionbecause in war:

The military blow is still the decisive blow. The army will strike the fundamental, the most important blow. In 1975-1976 we will strive to get our allies to provide us an additional 200,000 – 300,000 rounds of artillery ammunition. In 1959-1960 we started with insurrections and then followed them up with military attacks, but after the fighting has already begun, after the situation has turned into revolutionary warfare, then we can easily launch a general offensive-general insurrection. The masses belong to us, but military pressure is necessary in order for the masses to be able to rise up. In Hue the masses rose up in 1968, and in Danang the masses once rose up for 72 days [Translator’s Note: Referring to the 1966 uprisings led by the Buddhists and South Vietnamese General Nguyen Chanh Thi]. In Region 9 there were uprisings in 1973-1974. Saigon has had several uprisings already. If they set up a tripartite coalition government, that will be an opportunity for us to rise up, with our military forces and political forces acting in parallel, to seize the countryside and not miss the opportunity to launch uprisings in the cities.