Record of a Conversation between Representatives of the USSR Committee of State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Concerning Questions of the Cooperation of the Covert Inspection of Mail Services

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Top Secret

Copy Nº 2

The text of this Record of the conversation is approved

Record of a conversation

between representatives of the Committee of State Security under the
USSR Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic concerning questions of the
cooperation of the covert inspection of mail services (PK)

After an exchange of opinions concerning questions of the operation of the PK services in elaboration of the Agreement between Committee for State Security under the USSR Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the CSSR in order to increase the work of the cooperation security organs to identify and monitor the communications channels of enemy intelligence organs with its agent network in the Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic the sides have found it necessary to mutually assist the counterintelligence apparatuses and PK services and have agreed on the following:

1. Mutual assistance in the work of the counterintelligence apparatuses and PK services will be carried out for the purposes of identifying:

a) suspicious one-way espionage correspondence without response from the Soviet Union to the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and from the CSSR to the USSR.

The organs of the KGB will take upon themselves the identification (without opening envelopes) of such correspondence from the CSSR (both outgoing and incoming) for oblasts of the greatest operational interest.

The security organs of the CSSR MVD will take upon themselves the identification of one-way correspondence from the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the FRG and West Berlin per specific inquires of the 2^nd Main Directorate of the KGB;

b) people simultaneously maintaining correspondence both with capitalist countries and with the CSSR. When this is done the KGB assumes identification of such correspondence.

c) correspondence going to the territory of other side from people (objects of development for espionage, and also people maintaining personal contacts with representatives or suspicious ties with private citizens of capitalist countries and conducting correspondence with the USSR and the CSSR) being monitored by this PK service at the instruction of operational subunits;

d) the departure of Soviet citizens from CSSR territory and Czechoslovak citizens from Soviet territory to capitalist countries, detected through external signs when monitoring correspondence;

d) correspondence sent from the Soviet Union to the CSSR or from the CSSR to the USSR by persons arriving in these countries from capitalist countries (diplomats, tourists, sailors, pilots, re-emigrants, repatriates, etc.) under the security organs’ monitoring, and also the correspondence of Czechoslovak citizens disguised by these departures;

f) enemy instructions about the tactics and methods of the use of postal channels, and also secret-writing carbon [paper], envelopes, papers, adhesive, and other means issued by the enemy to its agent network;

g) the accommodation addresses of enemy intelligence networks in capitalist countries (private individuals, individual enterprises and institutions, firms, etc.) which are used or can be used by an enemy intelligence network operating in the USSR or in the CSSR;

h) the handwriting of intelligence officers and authors of espionage letters in intelligence centers, and also the fonts of typewriters on which the letters are written, the instructions, and assignments to enemy agents and their cover document.

2. The sides are obligated:

a) in the event of the identification of correspondence indicated in subparagraphs a), b), c), d) and e) of point 1 to consider [them] as coming from its people, establish monitoring of their correspondence, and inform the other side about the facts found in a timely manner for a joint solution of the question of further measures;

b) to send the other side the materials and samples indicated in subparagraphs f), g), and h) of point 1 in a timely manner;

c) to carry out the measures indicated in points a) and b) of point 2 from already known facts, materials, and samples in the first half of 1965.

3. When informing the other side about the identification of the correspondence indicated in subparagraph a), b), c), d), or e) of point 1 the side providing the information gives:

a) the addresses of the recipient and sender;

b) type of correspondence (letter, wrapper, package);

c) a photocopy of a letter, the contents of a wrapper, [or of] a package;

d) the result of a laboratory analysis of the TS [Translator’s note: expansion unknown] of the correspondence;

f) available information about the recipient and sender.

4. In the event of necessity the sides will continue to direct requests to one another about the establishment of monitoring of the individuals on the territory of the other side.

The requests will indicate the procedure for informing [the other side] of the materials obtained and the proposed monitoring timeframes. The side interested in the monitoring should notify the other side in a timely manner about expiration of the need or an extension of the monitoring timeframe.

5.Each of the sides performs the identification of facts, materials, and samples listed in point 1, and also monitoring at the request of the other side provided for in point 4 with its accustomed methods of monitoring correspondence, exchanging work experience with the other side in case of necessity.

6. The representatives of the cooperating counterintelligence directorates and PK services will meet to consider the results of the joint work for the first year of cooperation through PK channels and, in case of necessity, develop appropriate measures to improve it. The time and place of the meeting are arranged in the course of work.

7. At the request of the KGB the CSSR MVD will send an operations official to the USSR for three months (who has a background in selecting suspicious letters) for the monitoring of correspondence coming from the USSR to the CSSR in Czech and Slovak with the goal of identifying espionage dispatches.

8. The text of this Record of a conversation will enter into force after approval by the leaders of the USSR and CSSR organs.

Prague