Comrade Le Duan’s Comments in a Politburo Meeting Held 24 March 1975, after our Victory at Ban Me Thuot (Notes taken by Comrade Vo Quang Ho)

Our victory is bigger than we expected. Ban Me Thuot marks a turning point and the beginning of a great general offensive to liberate South Vietnam. The current victory cannot be separated from the victories we have won over the past ten years. This is the culmination of so many previous victories. The general offensive has begun; the Central Highlands opened the door. We will follow up by attacking Danang. Finally, we will liberate Saigon.

The enemy was taken by surprise in four different ways: he believed that we simply wanted to passively implement the Paris Agreement; he believed that if we wanted to launch a large attack we would not be able to do so until 1976; he did not fully comprehend his own weaknesses; he did not fully comprehend our strength.

We have sufficient time to mass our forces as quickly as possible to advance into Saigon. The decisive blow will be against Saigon; we control the area around Saigon, and we have a sapper division there. We must mass sufficient main force strength on Saigon’s outer perimeter to destroy three puppet divisions. We will use three divisions to destroy one of their divisions.

The masses in Saigon are in an uproar, and if we are strong in the area around Saigon, the behavior of the masses will change. If we launch political and military proselyting attacks a portion of the puppet forces will disintegrate and surrender. If we are able to achieve the element of surprise, our strength will be doubled or even tripled. In the future the political struggle in Saigon will rise to the fore.

We must maintain a firm grasp on our three punches: main force, lowlands, and cities – the three must act as one to create combined strength.

If we are able to advance quickly, then we must advance, without worrying about whether we have time to consolidate and regroup. We have Party committees throughout the rural countryside. Our province committees and regional committees have wielded governmental power for more than 20 years. The masses already know the revolution. Our problems will be the cities, Hue, Danang, and Saigon. The important thing is Eastern Cochin China and Saigon – if Eastern Cochin China is lost, Saigon will rise up. Our army must quickly seize this tremendous opportunity; the enemy is now disintegrating, so we must seize this opportunity by massing our forces as quickly as possible. We must pay attention to the Mekong Delta in order to destroy the enemy’s stockpile of reserve supplies and resources. The best leap forward that the revolution can make is to launch attacks and uprisings. Just go ahead and make military attacks, because when we do so, uprisings will break out immediately. We must win the greatest victory, the most profitable victory possible. We must not destroy bridges or supply warehouses and logistics facilities.

The enemy has been defeated, so he is pulling back to regroup his forces and hold his ground in order to be able to bargain with us. We will act to make him weaker as he regroups, to begin to weaken him from this moment on by annihilating his troops and by surrounding and isolating them.

Saigon already has a political movement in place, the masses already belong to us, and the masses are prepared. Our urban commando and sapper forces are already in position. Saigon is not like a number of large cities in other countries. The problem for us is to mass a very powerful force, 12 divisions – if we have overwhelming force, the situation will change. In the lowlands we must continue to take strong action to expand our control, we must not ignore the need to open up the lowlands.