Plan of Cooperation of the1st Main Directorate of the USSR KGB and the 1st Directorate of the CSSR FMVD in Work Against China for the period 1984-1988

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PLAN of cooperation of the1^st Main
Directorate of the USSR KGB and the
1^st Directorate of the CSSR FMVD in work
against China for the period 1984-1988

The foreign policy of the current Chinese leadership, in spite of some changes made in it, is as in the past mainly directed at achieving hegemonic goals. China continues to develop cooperation with the West on an anti-Soviet basis , often acting with them on parallel courses to the detriment of the interests of the countries of the socialist commonwealth. The formation in domestic politics of the concept “socialism on a Chinese model” is leading to the appearance of additional factors allowing Western countries to draw the PRC into the political and economic orbit of the capitalist world.

The considerable difficulties which the Chinese leadership is encountering in solving domestic and foreign policy problems has forced it to make corrections with respect to the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. However, China is proceeding only toward a limited restoration of some ties in fields to their advantage.

The policy of the Chinese leadership holds many dangers, including the possibility of military adventures. Considering this USSR KGB and CSSR FMVD foreign intelligence will closely follow China’s building up of strategic military potential, and oppose its attempts to strengthen relations with the West, first of all with the US, to the detriment of the interest of the socialist commonwealth.

in accordance with the Final Document of the (1982) Moscow Conference of the leaders of foreign intelligence security organs  of the countries of the socialist commonwealth USSR KGB and CSSR FMVD continue to improve and coordinate intelligence activity against China. During the period 1984-1988 they will concentrate their efforts on solving the following main problems.

I. In the field of information work

The intelligence agencies of the two countries will devote main attention to the acquisition of information, chiefly on the following questions:

- the plans and intentions of China with respect to the USSR, CSSR, and the other socialist countries. New factors and specific manifestations of a policy of a differentiated approach to the development of ties with individual socialist countries to the detriment of the interests of the other fraternal countries and the socialist commonwealth as a whole.

- PRC relations with the main imperialist countries - the US, the FRG, France, Britain, and Japan. Parallel actions and cooperation between the PRC and the US and other leading Western countries. The building up of the military potential and modernization of the PRC armed forces with the aid of imperialist countries.

- PRC policy with respect to the DRV, Laos, Cambodia, Afghanistan directed at the destabilization of the political and economic situation in these countries.

- The plans of the Chinese leadership in Southeast and South Asia including with respect to India and the member countries of ASEAN; activities to undermine the positions and influence of the countries of the socialist commonwealth in this region.

- The plans of the Chinese leadership in Southeast and South Asia, including with respect to India and the member countries of ASEAN;

- activities to undermine the positions and influence of the countries of the socialist commonwealth in this region.

- the designs and practical actions of Peking to weaken the positions of progressive countries in the Non-Aligned Movement, to undermine the unity of these countries, and to weaken the anti-imperialist direction of the Movement.

- the activity of the PRC leadership in the international Communist and workers’ movement. China’s practical steps to establish ties and cooperation with the “Eurocommunist Parties”. The tendencies and forms of China’s use of pro-Peking parties and groups in various countries in their interests.

- The domestic and economic situation in the PRC. The alignment of forces in the PRC leadership.

Continuing an exchange of information about the Chinese problem area the parties will undertake efforts to increase the amount of information acquired about China and its qualitative improvement, and will periodically specify the list of problems of the greatest interest.

II. In the field of active measures

The intelligence agencies of both countries will perform active measures in the following main areas:

- Countering and exposing the subversive activity of the Chinese leadership directed at eroding the unity and cohesion of the socialist commonwealth and the international Communist and workers’ movement.

- Exerting an influence on the Chinese leadership and the broad strata of the population favorable to the socialist commonwealth directed at tearing the PRC away from the West.

- Resistance to the PRC having closer relations to the US, Japan, and other imperialist countries in the political, economic, and military spheres, and a deepening of differences among them.

- Exposure of the hegemonic ambitions of Peking in Asia with respect to the developing countries and the Non-Aligned Movement.

- Promotion of the rift and the dissolution [razlozhenie] of pro-Peking groups in third countries.

[Translator’s note: “razlozhenie” can also be translated as “demoralization”]

- Discrediting of the PRC’s cooperation with reactionary regimes, particularly in Chile and the RSA.

Both intelligence services will inform one another about conducting individual active measures with respect to China. They will give mutual assistance in the development and in carrying out actions of influence with consideration for the specific situation.

III. In the field of agent operational activity

The parties will apply efforts to get the necessary sources and channels of influence in the PRC, third countries, and also on Soviet and CSSR territory in order to acquire reliable information about China and to effectively carry out active measures.

On Chinese territory

The residencies of the USSR KGB and CSSR FMVD will take steps to penetrate facilities of intelligence interest, study and develop local citizens, officials of the diplomatic corps, and also foreigners working on contracts in Chinese organizations and institutions.

The residencies in Peking will continue cooperation in accordance with existing agreements, including:

- an exchange of perishable [ne terpyashchaya otsrochka] political information on questions of an impending crisis situation;

- an exchange of information on the agent operational situation in the PRC, about facilities of mutual interest and their officials, and about the work of local special services and the residencies of enemy special services against Soviet and Czechoslovak citizens and institutions;

assistance in carrying out operational measures coordinated with headquarters [Tsentry], and also in organizing and using official events through cover establishments for operational purposes;

- aid in studying foreigners, direct approaches to whom by one of the intelligence agencies is impeded;

- the use of delegation leaving for China, specialists, and probationers from the CSSR and USSR to acquire information on questions of mutual interest.

On the territory of third countries

Both intelligence services will independently, but in case of necessity jointly, develop Chinese facilities and citizens. Take steps to acquire an agent network of local citizens who are promising for work with respect to China and for going to the PRC for a long period. Cooperation and coordination will be continued in work against China by the residencies of the USSR KGB and CSSR FMVD in New York, London, Bonn, Paris, Vienna, Tokyo, Delhi, Jakarta, Damascus, and Cairo.

These residencies of both intelligence services will directly exchange information about the following questions:

- concerning the situation in the country of residence and changes in the agent operational situation;

- about identification and characterizing information on Chinese citizens; about the activities of Chinese diplomats, intelligence officers, and other representatives;

- about local state institutions and public organizations, firms, and science centers having information about China and maintaining contacts with the PRC and its representatives in the country of residence;

- about pro-Peking groups in the country of residence;

- about the situation in local colonies of Chinese emigrants, including those from Taiwan and Hong Kong.

The residencies will exchange information about Chinese and foreigners of mutual interest and submit suggestions to their headquarters about the joint study and development of such people, devoting attention in the process to work on such categories of PRC citizens as specialists, students, probationers, and science workers.

The intelligence agencies of both countries will take steps to withdraw their agent networks from third countries to the PRC, and also to Taiwan and Hong Kong. In advisable cases they will jointly prepare and carry out measures to withdraw an agent network to the PRC.

The intelligence agencies are to step up efforts to obtain sources who have information about China, first of all in the US, other NATO countries, and Japan.

In individual countries, when necessary, the residencies will give [each other] mutual aid in processing and assessing materials in rare languages.

On Soviet and CSSR territory

The intelligence agencies of both countries in cooperation with the counterintelligence organs are to step up efforts to study and develop Chinese facilities and citizens in their own countries, and will give help and assistance to other USSR KGB and CSSR FMVD subunits in work concerning China.

Independently, and in advisable cases, jointly, meetings will take steps to use diplomatic, trade, cultural, tourism, and other channels to send their agent network to the PRC.

Organizational questions

The Parties have arranged to hold regular meetings of the chiefs of the corresponding subunits of the USSR KGB First Main Directorate and 1^st CSSR FMVD Directorates (no less than once in two years) to exchange work experience and discuss specific questions of cooperation. When necessary they can hold unscheduled consultations.

Both intelligence agencies will take steps to step up the work of their residencies in Peking, and augment them with experienced intelligence officers and specialists in China. Intelligence Sinologists will also be sent to countries where conditions exist for active work against China.

The USSR KGB First Main Directorate will continue the practice of helping Czechoslovak intelligence in training [stazhirovka] residents against China.

[handwritten:] “N 979/d”