File Note of Consul General Andrzej Szewiński in Sydney to Department III Dep. Director B. Lewandowski

165

June 6, file note of consul general in Sydney regarding conversations

in Australian DoFA regarding the Rapacki Plan and relations with Poland

Sydney, June 6, 1958

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Department III

Dep. Director B. Lewandowski

On June 2, 1958 I visited the new director of the Europe, Africa and Middle East Division Mr A.R. Cutler, and the head of the Protocol Branch and of the Consular Division, J.M. McMillan.

Before the visit I met with Cutler at a party to celebrate the Czech national holiday, when he expressed interest in the Rapacki Plan and said that he wishes to see me after his vacation. Cutler, who was previous chief of protocol, took over the Division – as he said himself – for a short period of time and expected to be sent to an independent mission. After the preliminary pleasantries, he went on to define his attitude to the Rapacki Plan.

After acquainting themselves with the contents of the Plan, reports from London and Paris, and after analyzing it in his division and the UN division, they concluded that the plan is a valuable and original autonomous Polish initiative, undoubtedly aimed at reducing tension and creating a basis for discussion. They believe that in the current political and military situation the Plan is unacceptable, because its implementation would immediately give military preponderance to the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries, which have greater strength and number in conventional forces in Europe than the Atlantic Treaty. Even if we assume that the USSR has no aggressive plans in Europe, then the acceptance of the plan in the event of any flare-up, for whatever reason, would upset the existing balance. Nevertheless, they do not subscribe to the opinion of certain governments that the Plan is useless as it consolidates the division of Germany. They suppose that Poland will try to initiate further discussion on the Plan, and therefore they will keenly follow the developments, from the point of view of a country that is not directly involved in European affairs.

I expressed satisfaction with his Ministry’s serious attitude to the Plan and its correct assessment as an autonomous initiative. To treat the Plan as a solution of military balance (military agencies usually interpret this as their own military preponderance) means to fail to understand its political sense. The Plan should be treated nor as an overall solution of the European problem, but as an introductory stop, aimed at halting the constant process of deteriorating the situation. Rejection of the plan, in expectation of overall solutions that comprises disarmament, withdrawal of troops, nuclear issues, and finally German reunification, in practice leads to a series of fait accompli,such as arming the FRG with Matadors,^9[1] and later, certainly, with nuclear warheads. The situation is far from frozen – on the contrary, each day worsens the condition for a general solution. On the other hand, adoption of the Plan or merely starting a discussion on its basis, immediately creates a series of facts – not military but political. If the parties were to adopt as basis of discussion airborne and on-the-ground control by an international agency, with the Plan considering its different variants, would it [would it not?] bear on the military planning, in the sense of delay or even halting the fait accompli. What would bring an incomparably impact on the atmosphere of mutual contacts. It is clear from the reactions of some governments, including Labor, as well as German and French social democrats that understanding for these aspects of the Plan could be found on a less official plane.

We have not turned to Australia for an opinion about the Plan; my personal opinion is that Australia could not publicly reveal a position different than that of the US or Great Britain. As not directly involved in European matters and engaged chiefly in the East, recently Australia has not taken part in the discussion on European matters which might be a loss for the peace cause. As it is in intimate ally and on traditional terms with the US and all the Commonwealth countries, it could play a major role on the international arena.

I suppose that Australia’s situation ^his conducive to^h allows it to express its own opinion in the frequent contacts with US and English statesmen, perhaps even influence the formation of their views.

Cutler took up the topic. Poland, with its deeply rooted traditions of independence is, in this respect, similar to Australia, as it is a member of a specific bloc, it has its own initiative. Australia often expresses a different view in discussions with [other] Commonwealth countries, but does not make it public. Indeed, their Ministry, which was actually established during the war, is small and inadequately prepared to cover the entirety of international affairs, but primarily dealt with Asia. The program of setting up new missions in Commonwealth countries (Ghana), in Laos and Cambodia, the interest in the events in Indonesia, the role of SEATO and the Colombo Plan,^1[2]0 etc. prevented any deeper involvement in European affairs, in East European affairs in particular, and again they will require active interest on our part. The matters that they are currently interested in include the Rapacki Plan. They would monitor everything that the missions would send them, and they ask me to deliver materials to them. The views that he heard from me were interesting and new to him. He believes that personal contact is extremely desirable, and would want me to visit him for such informative conversations when I am in Canberra.

Then Cutler ask me questions about our relations with the USSR. I underlined the far-reaching and fruitful cooperation, citing as an example the recent twin citizenship agreement, and the beneficial economic cooperation and the recent troops reduction.

Cutler asked whether I think that is a signal of USSR’s interest in economic improvement and whether the atmosphere is more quiet or more tense. I replied that the desire to raise the standard of living, improve supplies of basic commodities, etc. is so common and strong that only the fear of the growing threat from the West still hinders far-reaching unilateral disarmament on our part. And thus we reduce armament and conventional forces. There is absolutely no reason to suppose that the Soviet initiative regarding the top-level meeting or our Plan only aim at a tactical and propagandistic success.

The recent meeting in Moscow primarily concerned issues of economic cooperation was also aimed at finding means to raise the standard of living.^1[3]1 Each new step of the West that testifies to a policy from a position of strength, such as arming the FRG with missiles, is construed here as a direct attack on our standard of living. No slogans of  ‘liberating’ us can erase that effect.

Cutler said that if it were the case, one should be optimistic about the future. He repeated once again that he counts on similar conversations in the future.

Cutler is an economist by training, 42 years old. In 1941 in Syria, he was awarded the highest military decoration, Victoria Cross. He was High Commissioner in Ceylon (1952–55), and envoy to Egypt (1955–57).

2. [sic] In conversation with the acting chief of protocol and director of the consular dept. McMillan, I briefly outlined the development of our Consulate, underlining our trade and services role for Poles in Australia. During 1943–44, McMillan was an official in their diplomatic mission in Moscow, delegated to care of Poles from the breach of relations between the London government and the USSR to the moment of recognizing the PCNL [Polish Committee of National Liberation] and is still interested in Polish affairs. I showed him the bulletin published by the FRG embassy in Canberra, whose title page features a map of Germany with 1937 borders.

McMillan replied that Australia is not a signatory of the Potsdam agreement and takes no position on the issue of borders. Australia will not be bound by any document other than a peace treaty. He acknowledged my comment and will forward it to his superiors, but cannot officially speak about the correctness [of our stance], but as he knows the Poles and understands very well how negative an impression such a map makes on us.

McMillan informed me that their deputy trade commissioner in Sweden will have an official passport. In his opinion, such a trade commissioner should have a tariff privilege and personal immunity. Consuls in Australia, if at the same time they are not diplomats accredited at Canberra, have multiple official visas, if need be. Naturally, they have a personal immunity, tariff [privilege], etc., as diplomats. I expressed the view that their trade commissioner in Poland would have, within the framework of legal regulations, the same prerogatives as our trade ^aconsul in Poland^a, of course only during [their] official stay.

Speaking of the consulate work, I mentioned to McMillan the warming conversations with Poles planning to visit Poland that are conducted in certain offices of the Immigration Department, and I told him of slips of paper handed out to those people with a warning printed on the slips that no responsibility is taken for those people. I said that many have visited and returned, and there is no reason for such conversations. Some Australian citizens complain about the delay caused by the procedure to extend the passport onto Poland as each passport contains the clause that it is not valid in our countries.

McMillan expressed the view that as the number of trips increases, it will become necessary to revise the procedure.

McMillan also provided me with certain information regarding inheritance, bigamy, etc. Their MoFA does not  deal with such matters, as everything is done by the state authorities.

My assessment: I consider the conversation with Cutler beneficial and one that opens up a field for further contacts regarding the Plan, and I believe it advisable to supply him with information about the course of the discussion on the plan and to comment on it in person.

Perhaps it would be advisable to take up the topic with on the Australian representatives, best at the UN, at an appropriately high (ministerial) level

PRP Consul General in Sydney

^fAndrzej Szewiński^f

          PRP Consul General

AMSZ, z. 9, w. 51, t. 671

⁹ See doc. No 92.

¹⁰ An international organization that grouped Asian and Pacific countries, initiated at conference in Colombo, Ceylon in January 1950. Recently, commonly believed that the organization was established to strengthen the economic development of its members.

¹¹ See note 52 to doc. no 160.