Directives for the Soviet Delegation at Soviet-American Technical Negotiations on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Explosions

Per Point XII, Prot. No. 86^[1]

Top Secret

Attachment 2

Directives

for the Soviet Delegation at Soviet-American technical negotiations on the peaceful use of nuclear explosions.

1. Express agreement with the program of negotiations proposed by the American side.

Propose to the American side to consider the data in the negotiations as confidential and material which is not subject to publication.

2. In discussing issues in the first section of the program, confirm the utility of using nuclear explosions as excavational, underground engineering and scientific-research operations.

As regards the issue of creating clean charges, as proposed by the American side for discussion, having heard out the American side, limit this by the answer that work in this direction is also underway in the Soviet Union.

Depending on the procedure which will be accepted at the negotiations, do an overview of possible directions of peaceful uses of nuclear explosions for creating channels, reservoirs, underground storage, on stripping operations and underground crushing, pointing out that design development is underway in the Soviet Union on the use of nuclear explosions, in particular for the creation of the Kama-Pechora channel, reservoirs in arid regions, the extraction of apatite on the Kola peninsula; the review can be illustrated by data from these projects.

3. In discussing the second section of the program “Excavation operations,” along with the presentations by the American side, make the following presentations:

a. the status of methods to calculate the action of large-scale underground chemical and nuclear explosions;

b. radioactive contamination of the natural environment from underground nuclear explosions and methods to forecast it.

Use our data on the experimental nuclear explosion in Shaft 1003 in the presentations.

In the process of discussions on the section on excavation operations, put to the American side the question of: “What are the criteria of permissible radioactive contamination of the atmosphere and earth surface.”

Encourage the American side so they are the first to provide their opinion on the norms of acceptable emission of radioactivity outside the boundaries of the country on whose territory explosions are produced.

If the American side should express an opinion on such norms, then the Soviet side will put forth its opinion:

a. on the concentration of the mix of radioactive products, emitted beyond the boundaries of a country, that it should not exceed 5% of the maximum permissible concentrations for a population for short-lived passage of a cloud, calculated on the basis of recommendations of the International Commission for Radiological Protection (MKRZ);

b. on the dose of radioactive fallout from explosions conducted over the course of a year per a calculation for a 30-year period, that it should not exceed 2% of the dose due to natural radioactivity, while the quantity of strontium-90 in the fallout should be less than that quantity for which the quantity of strontium-90 is reduced from global fallout on the earth’s surface due to natural fallout over the course of a year.

For the given norms, should there be a need, provide a presentation on “Possible criteria and norms of radioactive output beyond the boundaries of a country where nuclear explosions are produced.”

Discussion on these norms should be limited by the exchange of opinions.

4. In discussing sections III (underground engineering operations) and IV (scientific-research work), listen to the presentations by the American side, and from our side do presentation at a working level on the experiment in the salt deposit (in Kazakhstan).

In the section “scientific-research work” you may discuss the significance of geophysical experiments.

^[1]Translator’s Note: The following information is extracted from Protocol No. 86 of the CPSU CC Politburo meeting, finalized on 20 June 1968 and covering numerous resolutions made during 14 to 20 June 1968. A number of decisions were made during the meeting, including Point XII, made on 20 June 1968.