Instructions to the Soviet representatives being sent to several countries for conversations on the draft nuclear non-proliferation treaty

Attachment 3

Secret Copy Nº 1

Draft

INSTRUCTIONS

to the Soviet representatives being sent to several countries for conversations on the draft nuclear non-proliferation treaty

The Soviet representatives being sent to these countries ought to visit the head of state (of government) or the minister of foreign affairs and, referring to instructions of the Soviet government, pass on the oral declaration contained in Attachment 1:

 In addition to this, be guided by the following when holding conversations.

 For India

1. In connection with the fact that India has expressed a desire in the Committee of 18 to include in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty the obligations to take specific steps of disarmament it ought to be pointed out that we share the desire of India to put an end to nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear war once and for all, and to take steps to halt the production of nuclear weapons and eliminate nuclear arsenals. This desire fully corresponds to the position of the Soviet Union, which for many years has fought for the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has more than once declared and again declares that it is ready to immediately come to agreement about the elimination of all nuclear weapons in the world in order to completely free humanity from the threat of nuclear war.

 The fight to eliminate nuclear weapons is no longer in its first decade. And during these years, in spite of all the efforts of the peace-loving countries, including India, it has not been possible to achieve this goal. In addition, instead of the two nuclear powers which there were 20 years ago, now there are already five countries possessing nuclear weapons. In light of this experience it is obvious that if we try right now to tie the solution of the problem of non-proliferation together with the task of halting the production of nuclear weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles, then we will achieve neither a solution of either the problem of nuclear disarmament nor the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

A continuation of the unrestricted proliferation of nuclear weapons, the engagement in it of ever newer and newer countries, would threaten the security of all countries wherever they are, including the security of India, inasmuch as new countries from among India’s neighbors would obviously be drawn into the nuclear arms race. At the same time the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty would create great security for all countries and lay the basis for forward progress in the solution to the questions of disarmament, nuclear weapons first of all.

2. When presenting the question of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear countries it ought to be stressed that we understand the special concern of India in connection with this problem. Declare that last year a useful exchange of opinions took place between the Soviet Union and India in connection with the problem of guarantees of security for non-nuclear countries, in the course of this very exchange those provisions crystallized which have become the basis of the solution of this problem proposed right now in the Committee of 18 by the government of the Soviet Union in agreement with the governments of the US and Britain. Hand over for familiarization by the Indian government the text of the declaration of the USSR on the question of guarantees of security for non-nuclear countries which we intend to make when adopting a Security Council resolution for the familiarization of the Indian government.

For Japan

1. Stress in conversations that the wishes of the Japanese side have taken into account in the draft non-proliferation treaty, in particular concerning the question of holding periodic conferences of parties to the treaty. If the Japanese side touches on the question of extending international inspection to the territory of not only non-nuclear and nuclear countries, then point out that such a formulation of the question is pointless since the non-proliferation treaty does not limit* [inserted by hand: regulate the question of] the production of nuclear weapons by nuclear powers and sets as its goal not allowing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

*[handwritten] a change of Cde. Kosygin.

For Mexico

Mexico, the initiator and depositary country of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, has recently repeatedly turned to us with a request to sign additional Protocol II to this Treaty, which envisions an obligation of nuclear powers to respect the status of the Latin American nuclear-free zone being created. When this was done the Mexican side pointed out that the degree of support to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty by Mexico will depend on whether the Soviet Union and also the other nuclear powers which are parties to the non-proliferation treaty sign the additional Protocol II.

Making use of the corresponding provision of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America Mexico ratified it and put it into effect on 20 September 1967 with respect to Mexico, thereby turning its territory, airspace, and territorial waters set in accordance with international law into a zone completely free of nuclear weapons.

Consequently it ought to be declared that the Soviet government has highly appreciated the efforts of Mexico directed at protecting its country from the dangerous consequences which would ensure from the creation of their own or the placement of foreign weapons on their own territory.

Based on this and guided by our principled position in support of the creation of nuclear-free zones in various regions of the world in the interests of lessening the threat of nuclear war, the Soviet Union would be ready to respect the status of Mexico as a nuclear-free zone and to not promote the accomplishment in any form of acts which are a violation of the obligations which Mexico has assumed on the territory, airspace, and territorial waters of Mexico, and also not to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against Mexico. 

The Soviet Union could also give these commitments to other parties to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America which, like Mexico, actually turn their territory into a zone completely free of nuclear weapons.  

These commitments will have a perpetual nature, but the Soviet Union reserves for itself the right to reexamine them in the event that a particular country to which we give guarantees undertakes aggression or becomes a participant in such aggression. In taking upon itself a commitment to respect the status of countries which commit their territory to be nuclear-free zones the Soviet Union will of course proceed from the position that, having taken similar obligations upon themselves, other nuclear countries will also observe this status. 

It ought to be stressed that the commitments of the Soviet Union concerning the observance of the status of Mexico as a nuclear-free zone can be presented in the form of an official declaration of the Soviet government which will be sent to the government of Mexico. 

If the Mexican side nevertheless raises the question of the Soviet Union signing the additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America then say that we are studying this question. Stress at the same time that it would be incorrect to tie the question of nuclear powers signing Protocol II to the question of Latin American countries signing the nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty. 

Stress that in expressing readiness to respect the nuclear-free status of Mexico the Soviet Union complies with its wishes. In turn, the Soviet government expects that Mexico will speak in support of the nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty and will be among the first countries to sign it. 

For Brazil

1. One of the main comments of Brazil to the draft nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty is the demand that the treaty permit non-nuclear countries to create nuclear explosive devices and to independently conduct nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. 

[We] ought to proceed from the position that this Brazilian proposal is unacceptable inasmuch as devices for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes are no different from the devices used in nuclear bombs, and leaving such an ability with non-nuclear countries would actually lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is necessary to explain to the Brazilian side that the existing provisions in the draft treaty create conditions for the broad use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes by non-nuclear countries. Conducting peaceful nuclear explosions with the aid of appropriate international procedures will be available to all countries which are party to the treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and the cost of the explosive devices for them will be as low as possible, and will not include the expenses for their research and improvement.

2. Brazil is proposing that the nuclear powers commit themselves to send a substantial part of the resources which will be freed up as a result of the steps taken concerning nuclear disarmament through a special UN fund for the purposes of the economic development of developing countries. This proposal is also unacceptable to us inasmuch as it could be used to make inordinate demands on nuclear powers, including the Soviet Union. 

Nuclear powers are already taking on considerable commitments under the non-proliferation treaty in agreeing to make the technological byproducts from the development of nuclear explosive devices accessible to non-nuclear countries and to produce peaceful nuclear explosions at as low a cost as possible. 

It also ought to be pointed out that the problem of nuclear disarmament, and especially the question about the apportionment for economic aid of the part of the resources which will be freed up from such disarmament, goes beyond the bounds of the nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty. 

For Italy 

At a meeting of the Committee of 18 on 14 March of this year the Italian representative stressed the intention of Italy to seek the adoption of an Italian proposal to include in Article IV (concerning the peaceful use of atomic energy) a new point in the following wording: 

“No provision of this treaty ought to be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to the supply of raw and special fissile materials and also the equipment intended for the use of raw and special fissile materials for peaceful purposes”. 

This addendum proposed by Italy is not caused by a practical need inasmuch as in Article III of the draft treaty it provide for the possibility of non-nuclear parties to the treaty of obtaining these materials and the equipment under international monitoring. 

The Italian side might again direct attention, as it has done more than once in the past, to the so-called “Fanfani proposal” associated with the problem of the supply of fissile materials and first proposed on 1 August 1967 in the Committee of 18 Countries. The essence of this proposal is that, regardless of the non-proliferation treaty, to provide an obligation of nuclear powers in connection with it or even in its text to periodically hand over a certain agreed quantity of produced or fissile materials to the non-nuclear countries which signed the treaty. When doing so the non-nuclear countries would pay for these materials at a price lower in comparison with the market value; the sums paid by them would partly go to the nuclear producer countries, but might partly be directed to a UN fund to help developing countries. 

In the event that the Italian side touches on these questions then [you] can reply that they go beyond the bounds of the treaty, which is designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and should be considered separately. 

If the Italians propose limiting the effect of the non-proliferation treaty to 25 years, object to this, inasmuch as such a limitation would undermined the stability of the treaty.