Correspondence Delivered to G. M. Korniyenko by D. E. Boster

Secret Copy Nº 30

Translation from English

Delivered to G. M. Korniyenko

by D. E. Boster, US Embassy Counsellor,

on 22 November 1966

I just finished studying the report about your conversation with our chargé last Friday. I was of course glad that the discussion of an agreement on non-proliferation continues in a promising and businesslike spirit. I very much hope that the differences of a semantic nature will not lead to this opportunity of achieving agreement on non-proliferation, which touch on the practical problems facing both of us, not being used.

During our conversations in New York and Washington early this autumn we achieved agreement about three quite simple provisions which could lie at the basis of an agreement, namely: 1) that we will not transfer a nuclear weapon directly or indirectly to any country not possessing a nuclear weapon; 2) that we will not help any country not possessing a nuclear weapon to become a nuclear power in any fashion, and 3) that we will never transfer to anyone whatsoever the right to bring our nuclear weapons into operation. This area of agreement covers the practical part of this problem. The fact that you view it as an area of disagreement, that is, the concept of transferring to a group of countries which does not involve an indirect transfer to countries comprising this group is not an actual difference. In response to the questions raised by your side in New York we pointed out that according to the proposed American wording no multinational measure would be permitted which would imply a transfer of a nuclear weapon by a country having a nuclear weapon or the abandonment of control by a country having a nuclear weapon over control over its own nuclear weapon.

I noted your comments about our concept of the prohibition on abandonment of control over a nuclear weapon. Speaking completely frankly, I think that you underestimated the importance of the precision which this obligation formulated. Our language was calculated on being the clearest and firmest statement of the third point discussed during our dinner meetings earlier this autumn, namely that none of us will ever give another the right to bring their own nuclear weapons into operation. If this language were adopted, no American weapon could ever be brought into operation as long as the US itself did not make the decision that this be done. We would be bound by the obligation to preserve control over our nuclear weapons as long as the treaty remained in force. If we concentrate our attention on this approach to this problem and not on political consultations between countries, then it seems to me that we have a good chance of achieving a mutually acceptable solution.

I hope that we will be able to continue the discussion in New York on the basis of Articles 1 and 2 of the American draft which was passed by our representatives to yours, for these Articles reflect the substantive agreement which, it seemed to me, we reached in the course of our meetings this autumn. At the same time our representatives in New York could continue the useful work which they are engaged in, trying to come to agreement about the other articles of the treaty. It seems to me, that as a result of the exchange of drafts between the two sides, we have come closer on the question of these articles than ever before.

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