Information about the Work of the 4th Department of the 2nd Directorate on the Preparation and Implementation of the Chekist Active Measures against the Intelligence Services of the FRG from Counterintelligence Positions in 1967.

Secret

Document No. 1

INFORMATION

about the work of the 4^th Department of the 2^nd Directorate on the preparation and

implementation of the Chekist active measures against the intelligence services of the

FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] from counterintelligence positions in 1967

The work on the preparation and implementation of the Chekist active measures against the intelligence service of the FRG from counterintelligence positions was conducted while taking into account the available materials on the aspirations [устремлений] of the adversary and on the basis of the tasks set by the Operation HORIZON [Горизонт]. In the course of our work, it was taken into consideration that the intelligence service of the FRG was making attempts to penetrate the Lithuanian SSR with their agents, using the travel of the FRG citizens to our republic, and was [also] making attempts to use the travel of our citizens to the FRG through different channels, the presence in our republic of a certain number of persons, who consider themselves German, who intended or had made earlier attempts to go to the FRG and obtain permanent residence there, and the large number of persons who have family or other ties in the FRG.

Consequently, the main aim of our counterintelligence measures was directed toward making possible the penetration into the agent network and the intelligence services of the adversary in order to obtain the information necessary to the counterintelligence service about the adversary’s designs, aspirations, forms and methods of subversive activities against the Lithuanian SSR.

These measures were taken along the following lines:

- The testing and establishing contact with our agents already present in the FRG with the aim of determining their capability, deciding the question of the feasibility of their active use and the creation of the conditions for it;

- The selection of agents having the capability to go to the FRG and obtain permanent residence there and the training for their use in the FRG for counterintelligence purposes;

- The selection and training of agents for danglin [подстава] to the intelligence services of the FRG for recruitment using the temporary travel of the Soviet citizens abroad and the travel of the FRG citizens to the Soviet Union;

- The identification of the persons in the FRG connected to the West German intelligence agencies, and also other persons deserving attention, who are of interest for recruitment. Their ‘study’ [изучение], ‘cultivation [разработка],’ and the creation of conditions for their recruitment.

The Work with the Agents Abroad

1. Agent RIMAS was placed as a permanent resident in the FRG in 1962 and assigned intelligence and counterintelligence tasks. After he settled as a resident in Hamburg [written by hand], got employment and obtained the citizenship of the FRG, we have taken steps in 1966 and 1967 to organize face-to-face meetings with him in order to ascertain his position and his capacity for more active use in the measures against the intelligence services of the FRG.

As a result, we have had two face-to-face meetings with RIMAS in 1967.

In these meetings, we have clarified the position of RIMAS, received some information about the persons suspected of the ties with the intelligence and counterintelligence services of the FRG and the U.S., about the activities of the Lithuanian émigré  organizations in the FRG, and also several leads on the persons to be studied for recruitment.

During these meetings, we have discussed the opportunities for more active use of RIMAS for counterintelligence purposes and he was given the task of collecting information about the Office of the BND in Hamburg [written by hand], [and] the identification and study of the persons connected to the Office. It was also envisaged to search for the opportunities to penetrate the agent network of the intelligence and counterintelligence services of the FRG and the U.S. in order to identify their agents and officers, [their] aspirations, plans, and concrete subversive activities against the USSR.

In September 1967, we received an encrypted message from RIMAS in which he reported the initial results of his work on our task to ‘study’ the places and the institutions which the Office of the BND in Hamburg [written by hand] uses as a cover for its operations.

2. Agent LEONAS was placed in the FRG [written by hand] in 1962 with the aim of his possible betrayal and the revelation of the tasks assigned to him by us to the adversary.

The intention behind this was to compromise the agents who had been placed in the FRG [written by hand] earlier [but] had confessed and betrayed us.

In 1966, after a long break, LEONAS renewed his correspondence with us and asked for the meeting.

On 25 December 1967, he arrived in Vilnius as a tourist, and we had two meetings with him. During the meetings, we learned the circumstances of his arrival in the FRG, the content of his repeated questionings by the intelligence representatives, his position at this time, and the opportunities for using him in our interests. We established that he did not follow through with our recommendations in connection to the task of confessing to the counterintelligence service and giving them the specially designed means of encryption for communication with us because he thought that by doing so, he would attract even more suspicion from the West German intelligence services, which could make his position more complicated. [His position was] already made difficult by the fact that he could not divorce his first wife, who, together with his older son, were getting him in trouble with the authorities. LEONAS said that during his time in the FRG, the representatives of the counterintelligence contacted him three times with the questions about what he knew about the military infrastructure in the USSR and whether he was recruited by the Soviet intelligence.

Taking into consideration the position of LEONAS, [and] the possibility of his visits to Lithuania to meet with the relatives of his wife, it was suggested to him that, if a recruitment offer was made to him, he should agree to cooperate with the representatives of the intelligence services and perform the potential tasks they might give him when visiting the USSR. LEONAS agreed with our suggestion.

The next meeting is scheduled to take place in the summer of 1968 in the USSR which he plans to visit with other members of his family to see relatives.

3. Agent SOSNYAK was placed in the FRG [written by hand] in 1959 through the repatriation channel. Soon after his arrival there and after obtaining the residency permit, SOSNYAK informed us via coded correspondence that the counterintelligence service made a contact with him. For unknown reasons, in contacting us, he did not use the encryption equipment given to him.

In 1967, SOSNYAK informed us via mail to the agreed-upon address that he intended to come to the USSR to see his relatives. However, for unknown reasons, this trip did not take place. In his letter to us at the end of December 1967, he expressed his hope that he would come to the USSR in the summer of 1968. When we meet with him, we will evaluate the potential of using him in our interests.  

4. Agent DAINA was placed in the FRG in 1965 [written by hand] through the repatriation channel. At this time, she lives in the city of Munich [written by hand] and works at the Radio Liberty [written by hand].

When sending her to the FRG, DAINA was not given the means or the equipment for contacting us. The expectation was that this would be worked out over time when needed after the face-to-face meeting with the agent and after learning about and checking her capacities.

It was expected to have a face-to-face meeting with her in 1967. However, due to the fact that, in her correspondence with relatives, there appeared certain elements which required further checking (several of her letters to her relatives in Lithuania did not arrive, she did not respond regularly to their letters), it was decided not to go forward with the meeting abroad. It is possible that she is being checked by American intelligence services.

5. In 1966, agent PATRAS left for the FRG [written by hand] through the channel of repatriation. Before he left, we have set up the mail address for him to contact us and worked out the coded communication in case the intelligence services of the adversary took an interest in him. It was recommended to him to get a job on the FRG merchant marine ships which visited the ports of the USSR.  

Soon after his departure, PATRAS informed us via coded correspondence that the intelligence services of the FRG made a contact with him.

At this time, he works in the city of Bremen [written by hand] on one of the ships of the FRG merchant marine fleet. As seen from his letters, he is taking measures to get a job on the ship which sails to the ports of the USSR. After his arrival in the USSR, we will have a meeting with him, evaluate his activities [in the FRG] in accordance with our interests, and work out the methods of covert communication.

6. Agents GELEZHUNAS and SVETLANA were placed by us in West Germany [written by hand]. In 1966, GELEZHUNAS sent a [proof-of-life] letter to the agreed-upon address. In 1967, no letters from him were received. In August [written by hand] 1967, we sent a letter to him to find out whether he intended to come to the USSR as a tourist. So far, we have received no answer.

Agent SVETLANA, together with her husband [written by hand] works in a place, which is of interest to Soviet intelligence. In 1967, she intended to visit the city of Vilnius as a tourist to meet with her relatives.

For unknown reasons, the visit did not take place.

The Training of Agents for Being Placed in the FRG as Permanent Residents

I. In 1967, agent ALFRED was sent to the FRG with a special assignment. Our work with him during the training period was based on the idea of his possible betrayal after arrival in the FRG and, consequently, on the potential of our starting an operative game [оперативная игра] with the adversary. Taking this into consideration, it was recommended to ALFRED that, if offered, he accepts to work for American intelligence.

After his arrival in the FRG, ALFRED has kept a regular correspondence with us via mail to the agreed-upon address. In his letters, he let us know about his situation and his plans about the residency and employment. The codes which would indicate that he established contact with American intelligence were not used. The face-to-face meeting with him is expected in one of the Socialist countries in 1968-1969.

The information received from other agents indicate that in the FRG [written by hand] ALFRED has contacts with the persons of interest to us, including those with ties to American intelligence.

2. In coordination with the city and regional branches of the KGB, the following agents were selected and are being trained to be placed in the FRG as permanent residents:

I. PAYURETIS, German by nationality, with high school education, his first cousin works in the police force of the city of Hamburg.

In order to create the conditions favorable to the placement of PAYURETIS in the FRG, his mother’s trip to visit the relatives in the FRG was organized. Depending on the results of that trip, we will decide on the measures to be taken regarding the placement of PAYURETIS.

2. DELFINAS, German by nationality, ship radio operator by profession, his relatives live in the city of Hamburg.

3. VITYANIS, German by nationality, with high school education. In 1967, his father left for the FRG to obtain permanent residency. VITYANIS keeps up the correspondence with him in order to prepare the conditions for joining him there.

4. KALNYALIS, Lithuanian, his wife is German and intends to leave for the FRG where her relatives live and is trying to persuade him [to do so]. In order to create the conditions for the move of KALNYALIS to the FRG, the trip to the FRG to visit his wife’s relatives was organized for KALNYALIS in 1967.

5. TIGRAS, born in 1938, German, with high school education, accountant by profession. His brother and sister live in the FRG. His brother works as a radio operator at the airport in Frankfurt-on-the-Main, and the husband of his sister is involved in the activities of the Lithuanian emigration.  

During 1967, we have worked with the agents noted above on their education, preparation, and training in the habits necessary to perform our tasks abroad.

3. In coordination with the city and regional branches of the KGB, we have worked on the selection of the candidates for recruitment among the persons of German nationality, who have ties in the FRG, or have other capabilities which could be used in counterintelligence measures.

With this goal in mind, for the purposes of the ‘study’ for recruitment, the Kaunas City Branch of the KGB [selected] 9 persons, the Klaipeda City Branch of the KGB 7 persons, the Shiauliai City Branch of the KGB 1 person, the Shakai Regional Branch of the KGB 5 persons, other city and regional branches 4 persons.

The Training of Agents to Dangle Them for the Adversary’s Recruitment

During 1967, the measures were taken to train agents with the perspective of dangling them for recruitment by the adversary and to create the necessary conditions for that.

With that goal in mind, we sent our agents on short-term trips to the FRG. We also took measures to acquaint the adversary with the favorable information about our agents through the third persons and through the channel of the agents’ correspondence with their contacts in the FRG.

In that respect, we have done the following:

I) In 1967, using the existing capabilities, agent [name missing] was twice sent to the FRG.

The tasks of [name missing] were selected in the context of his already established contacts in West Germany, among whom there were persons suspected of the involvement with the special services of the FRG. In particular, his already established relations with the object of ‘cultivation’ BALLERINA who lives in the FRG and has insistently invited [name missing] to the FRG.

During the second trip of [name missing] to the FRG (in November), the increased interest and care toward him were first shown by BALLERINA and later by the well-known figures of the Lithuanian nationalist emigration in the FRG, Bernatonis, Demenaitis and others who, according to our information, have ties with American intelligence.

In the course of interaction with [name missing], they ‘studied’ the agent and also tried to use the opportunity to get information about the situation in Lithuania from him. These conversations were accompanied with the attempts to sway [name missing] in the spirit of nationalism and to find out the agent’s reaction to the possibility of remaining abroad.

As a result of these conversations, [name missing] was asked to think about how he could be useful to the émigrés in their contacts with Lithuania. This was to be discussed further at their next meeting in February 1968 during his expected visit to the FRG for the upcoming competition [конкурс].

2) Using the travel to the FRG of agent [name missing], we have continued the ‘study’ of the citizen of the FRG LENNARTS [written by hand], who is suspected of ties with intelligence services. LENNARTS has shown an increased interest in the agent and in meeting him abroad. It is possible that this interest can be explained by the ability of the agent to travel abroad regularly as a member of the sports delegations, which is known to LENNARTS.

Taking into consideration the information provided by [name missing], we worked out the approach to dangle [name missing] for recruitment by FRG intelligence.

During the meeting with the agent in 1967, LENNARTS insisted that they meet at a discrete location with the participation of the third person who came to the place of the competition under the cover of an athlete. The meeting did not take place and its real purpose remains unclear. The measures regarding the dangling of [name missing] are planned to continue in 1968.

3) Agent LISA traveled to the city of Darmstadt where she met with her relatives and the persons from the Lithuanian émigré circles.

While she was in the FRG, LISA conveyed to the persons she met the information favorable to us regarding her husband – our agent VITAS, whom we plan to dangle to West German intelligence and who, thanks to his position, may be of interest to it.

As a result of LISA’s trip to the FRG, we collected some information about the status of our citizens in the FRG, the content of the interviews of the persons coming from the Lithuanian SSR to the FRG to obtain permanent residence status, [and] the methods of negative influence by the nationalist elements on our citizens.

LISA provided the personal characteristics of the people who are active in the Lithuanian émigré circles [and] who may be of interest to us.

4) Agent ERNA visited the city of Hamburg to visit her relatives. ERNA provided the information about the persons from the circle of her relatives, suspected of ties with FRG and U.S. intelligence, and also about the content of the interviews of the persons coming from Lithuania to live permanently in the FRG.

In accordance with our assignment, ERNA made it clear among her relatives and their circle that she had the ability to meet with West German sailors in the town of Klaipeda.

5) Agent MIKOLAS traveled to the GDR where he met with his mother who came from the FRG for that purpose. From the statement of MIKOLAS about his conversations with his mother, it is evident that certain persons from the Red Cross of the FRG, who are in contact with his mother, expressed suspicious interest in his possible travel to the FRG. MIKOLAS was asked by the Red Cross to establish the identity of a woman, living in the region of Klaipeda, via the photograph given to him.

In 1968, we plan to send MIKOLAS to the FRG on a private visit.

6) Agent [name missing] traveled to the FRG where he met with his relatives. According to our assignment, he studied the possibility and usefulness of obtaining the permanent residency status in such a way that West German intelligence services express an interest in him.

7) At the end of December 1967, agent [name redacted] left for the FRG. He was given the assignment to take measures and find out via official channels how he could obtain monetary compensation for his service in the German military, received by other persons who settled in the FRG. This was done in order to clarify the form and character of the possible interest by FRG intelligence services in the persons from the same category living in the Lithuanian SSR.

8) During 1967, we have taken measures to make the adversary aware, generally through the channel of correspondence with the contacts in the FRG, of the information about our agents favorable to us, which to a certain extent could be of interest to FRG intelligence. In this respect, the activities were conducted with the following agents selected for this purpose: BALTIYA, [name redacted], RITAS, BUDRIS, YAGELAITE, [name redacted], BERZHYALIS, GINTARAS, LABUNSKAS.

The ‘Cultivation’ of Foreign Citizens

1. The object of operative selection MARTA, the citizen of the FRG, is suspected of ties with FRG intelligence services. In 1967, we worked through agent TSAREV to convince her to visit Lithuania. In that same year, she briefly visited the city of Tallinn from the territory of Finland, which she concealed from agent TSAREV. It is possible that her trip was a way to test TSAREV, expose the interest of our service in her trips to the USSR, and was aimed at TSAREV’s “accidental” appearance in Tallinn while she was there. In her correspondence with TSAREV, she still expresses her intention to visit Lithuania, [and] tries to find out whether he is able to meet with her in Sweden. The ‘cultivation’ is focused on proving her espionage activities in practice and capturing her with the evidence [поимка с поличними].

2. We are ‘studying’ the object of operative selection ZEMLYANIN, the citizen of FRG, living in the city of Hamburg [written by hand]. ZEMLYANIN intended to come to Lithuania in 1967 to visit his relatives living here, but he postponed his visit until 1968.

In 1967, we received the information from our agent abroad RIMAS which confirm our suspicions about the possible ties of ZEMLYANIN with the intelligence services of the adversary. RIMAS was tasked with the further ‘cultivation’ of ZEMLYANIN.

3. Another case of operative selection, STRAUS, the citizen of FRG, living in the city of Munich [written by hand], is being ‘cultivated.’ STRAUS participates in the activities of Lithuanian émigrés in the city of Munich [written by hand], in particular in the regional leadership of the PLB [Pasaulio lietuvių bendruomenė or the Lithuanian World Community], [and] communicates with persons with ties to American intelligence. His relatives live in the Lithuanian SSR, and he intends to visit them. He expresses his intention to come back to Lithuania as a permanent resident.

We are ‘studying’ STRAUS with the aim of recruitment.

4. In the city of Munich [written by hand], there  was spotted Webermeier [written by hand, but not a codename], who left Lithuania in 1959 through the repatriation process. Webermeier [written by hand] graduated from the Translation Institute in the FRG and is occasionally used as a Russian language translator during the visits of Soviet delegations to the city of Munich [written by hand]. She intends to visit Lithuania in 1968.

In order to find the way to approach Webermeier [written by hand], we are ‘studying’ her contacts in the city of Vilnius for the purpose of recruiting them as agents.

The Chief of 4^th Department of the 2^nd Directorate of the KGB of the Council of Ministers of the Lithuanian SSR

Colonel Ginko [signed]

“8” January 1968

No. 2/4-49