Lunch Meeting of Vice Minister and Ambassador Mansfield (Memo for the Vice Minister); Problem of the American Hostages in Lebanon (Dispatch of the Prime Minister’s Special Envoy)

Lunch Meeting of Vice Minister and Ambassador Mansfield (Memo for the Vice Minister)

Problem of the American Hostages in Lebanon (Dispatch of the Prime Minister’s Special Envoy)

August 17, 1985

First Middle East Division

Second Middle East Division

(Main Points of Remarks)

[Yoshihiro] Nakayama, former ambassador to France, serving as special envoy of the Prime Minister and carrying a letter from him, visited Tehran from the 6^th to the 9^th and Damascus from the 10^th to the 12^th.  The Special Envoy met with leaders of Iran and Syria, including Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani and President Assad, and requested that they exercise their influence for the release of the American hostages. (The contents of these meetings were conveyed on the 15^th by Ambassador Matsunaga to Presidential Assistant McFarlane.)

1.  Talks in Iran

(1) In line with the aforementioned request on the part of the Special Envoy, [TN: section blacked out] conveyed the Prime Minister’s confidential intention.

(2) The other side’s response was as follows.

(a)  Japan and Iran both reject international terrorism but differ in their definitions of terrorism. Iran does not see a great power’s large-scale illegal activities in a third country as terrorism. Nor does Iran criticize as terrorism the just activities of individuals or certain groups for the recovery of their rights. (Deputy Foreign Minister Ardebili)

(b) Iran denies any form of connection to the problem of the American hostages. Iran has only a limited influence in the third country. The resolution of the TWA Incident occurred in a particular international environment. Iran cannot exercise a decisive influence. Even if one wished this time for an outcome similar to that of the TWA Incident, there would be no guarantee that it could be realized. (Deputy Foreign Minister Ardebili)

(c) The United States promised Syria that, if the TWA Incident were resolved, they would then release the Shiite prisoners (300 persons) in Israel. So long as the United States does not keep this promise, Iran can say nothing to the Lebanese. (Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani)

(d) First of all, the problem of American hostages in Lebanon is one where the United States is simply making claims. It is unclear whether or not this problem exists. Even if this problem is real, in Lebanon there are many groups acting on their own; it is difficult to grasp the true state of this type of problem. (Foreign Minister Velayati）

2. In addition, we received from the Iranian side a letter from Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani, the main points of which are as follows:

(1) Efforts are necessary for the resolution of the terrorism problem. You may trust in Iran’s complete cooperation.

(2) We doubt whether the United States is truly seeking a resolution of this problem. The actions of the United States since the TWA Incident can be taken as provocations to terrorist activities. If the United States is truly seeking the release of the hostages, they should carry out their previous promise and realize the release of the Lebanese imprisoned in Israel.

3. Talks in Syria

(1) The response of the other side to the request from Special Envoy Nakayama is as follows.

(a) Syria told Minister Abe on his recent visit to Syria that, “Syria will do all that it can for the release of those now held in Lebanon.” There has been no change in this position. The Syrian authorities in Lebanon are gathering information on the whereabouts of the hostages and on who abducted them. However, due to the disorder in Lebanon at present, one cannot have much hope in the outcome of Syria’s efforts. (Foreign Minister Shara)

(b) The United States agreed to the release of the Lebanese Shiites held in Israel, and they should be criticized for not completely implementing this agreement. However, the release of the American hostages and the release of those Lebanese Shiite prisoners are different problems. (President Assad, Foreign Minister Shara)

(c) Syria has communicated to each group in Lebanon that taking civilian hostages not directly connected to the Israeli military’s invasion of Lebanon does not contribute to the resolution of the problem of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon. The major groups in Lebanon all clearly think this way. However, there exist in Lebanon many small groups, and those groups act on the basis of their own thinking. Relations between Syria and these groups are not hostile, but those relations are those of mutual understanding or friendship. They are not based on a solid foundation. Therefore, even speaking of Syria exercising influence, it will take time. In regard to the TWA Incident, Syria from the start had a grasp of the circumstances and so was able to bring it to a resolution. As for the seven Americans, it is unclear even where they are. It is an individual act, and we do not even know who did it. (President Assad)

(d) The US Government informed us that Israel would release the Lebanese prisoners this month. I would like to take action right after their release. I will contact you henceforth regarding both matters. (President Assad)

(2) In addition, Special Envoy Nakayama in his meeting with the Syrian side conveyed Prime Minister Nakasone’s desire to to strengthen further the relationship to date in the economic and cultural fields. Foreign Minister Shara, in the second meeting with the Special Envoy, hurriedly arranged at the direction of President Assad, frankly said that Syria would like to obtain more economic aid from Japan, which is without ulterior motives or prejudice. As a result, between Special Envoy Nakayama and Foreign minister Shara:

(a) The Syrian side promises the release of the hostages as quickly as possible.

(b) [TN: section blacked out]

Lunch Meeting of Vice Minister and Ambassador Mansfield (Memo for the Vice Minister)

Problem of the American Hostages in Lebanon (Dispatch of the Prime Minister’s Special Envoy)

August 17, 1985

First Middle East Division

Second Middle East Division

(Main Points of Remarks)

[Yoshihiro] Nakayama, former ambassador to France, serving as special envoy of the Prime Minister and carrying a letter from him, visited Tehran from the 6^th to the 9^th and Damascus from the 10^th to the 12^th.  The Special Envoy met with leaders of Iran and Syria, including Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani and President Assad, and requested that they exercise their influence for the release of the American hostages. (The contents of these meetings were conveyed on the 15^th by Ambassador Matsunaga to Presidential Assistant McFarlane.)

1.  Talks in Iran

(1) In line with the aforementioned request on the part of the Special Envoy, [TN: section blacked out] conveyed the Prime Minister’s confidential intention.

(2) The other side’s response was as follows.

(a)  Japan and Iran both reject international terrorism but differ in their definitions of terrorism. Iran does not see a great power’s large-scale illegal activities in a third country as terrorism. Nor does Iran criticize as terrorism the just activities of individuals or certain groups for the recovery of their rights. (Deputy Foreign Minister Ardebili)

(b) Iran denies any form of connection to the problem of the American hostages. Iran has only a limited influence in the third country. The resolution of the TWA Incident occurred in a particular international environment. Iran cannot exercise a decisive influence. Even if one wished this time for an outcome similar to that of the TWA Incident, there would be no guarantee that it could be realized. (Deputy Foreign Minister Ardebili)

(c) The United States promised Syria that, if the TWA Incident were resolved, they would then release the Shiite prisoners (300 persons) in Israel. So long as the United States does not keep this promise, Iran can say nothing to the Lebanese. (Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani)

(d) First of all, the problem of American hostages in Lebanon is one where the United States is simply making claims. It is unclear whether or not this problem exists. Even if this problem is real, in Lebanon there are many groups acting on their own; it is difficult to grasp the true state of this type of problem. (Foreign Minister Velayati）

2. In addition, we received from the Iranian side a letter from Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani, the main points of which are as follows:

(1) Efforts are necessary for the resolution of the terrorism problem. You may trust in Iran’s complete cooperation.

(2) We doubt whether the United States is truly seeking a resolution of this problem. The actions of the United States since the TWA Incident can be taken as provocations to terrorist activities. If the United States is truly seeking the release of the hostages, they should carry out their previous promise and realize the release of the Lebanese imprisoned in Israel.

3. Talks in Syria

(1) The response of the other side to the request from Special Envoy Nakayama is as follows.

(a) Syria told Minister Abe on his recent visit to Syria that, “Syria will do all that it can for the release of those now held in Lebanon.” There has been no change in this position. The Syrian authorities in Lebanon are gathering information on the whereabouts of the hostages and on who abducted them. However, due to the disorder in Lebanon at present, one cannot have much hope in the outcome of Syria’s efforts. (Foreign Minister Shara)

(b) The United States agreed to the release of the Lebanese Shiites held in Israel, and they should be criticized for not completely implementing this agreement. However, the release of the American hostages and the release of those Lebanese Shiite prisoners are different problems. (President Assad, Foreign Minister Shara)

(c) Syria has communicated to each group in Lebanon that taking civilian hostages not directly connected to the Israeli military’s invasion of Lebanon does not contribute to the resolution of the problem of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon. The major groups in Lebanon all clearly think this way. However, there exist in Lebanon many small groups, and those groups act on the basis of their own thinking. Relations between Syria and these groups are not hostile, but those relations are those of mutual understanding or friendship. They are not based on a solid foundation. Therefore, even speaking of Syria exercising influence, it will take time. In regard to the TWA Incident, Syria from the start had a grasp of the circumstances and so was able to bring it to a resolution. As for the seven Americans, it is unclear even where they are. It is an individual act, and we do not even know who did it. (President Assad)

(d) The US Government informed us that Israel would release the Lebanese prisoners this month. I would like to take action right after their release. I will contact you henceforth regarding both matters. (President Assad)

(2) In addition, Special Envoy Nakayama in his meeting with the Syrian side conveyed Prime Minister Nakasone’s desire to to strengthen further the relationship to date in the economic and cultural fields. Foreign Minister Shara, in the second meeting with the Special Envoy, hurriedly arranged at the direction of President Assad, frankly said that Syria would like to obtain more economic aid from Japan, which is without ulterior motives or prejudice. As a result, between Special Envoy Nakayama and Foreign minister Shara:

(a) The Syrian side promises the release of the hostages as quickly as possible.

(b) [TN: section blacked out]