Short Summary of the Talks with the GDR Party-Governmental Delegation on 9 June 1959

Secret. 4 July 1959.

Soviet officials taking part in the talks: N.S. Khrushchev [First Secretary, Presidium member, and head of delegation], A.I. Kirichenko [Presidium member and Central Committee Secretary], F.R. Kozlov [Presidium member and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers], A.I. Mikoian [Presidium member and First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers], V.V. Kuznetsov [First Deputy Foreign Minister], V.C. Semenov [Deputy Foreign Minister], M.G. Pervukhin [Ambassador to the GDR].

The following assisted in the talks: Deputy Head of the CPSU CC Dept. N.T. Vinogradov, [and] heads of departments at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, N.M. Lun'kov, and A.Ya. Popov.

Taking part in the talks from the German side: the GDR party-governmental delegation.

[The document does not list who was in the East German delegation. Minister President Grotewohl's files,^[1] the published communique,^[2] and the records of the summits indicate that the delegation included W. Ulbricht (First Secretary, Politburo member and head of the delegation), O. Grotewohl (Minister President and Politburo member), F. Ebert (Mayor of Berlin and Politburo member), B. Leuschner (Politburo member, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Chairman of the State Planning Commission), E. Correns (President of the National Council of the National Front), H. Loch (Deputy President of the Council of Ministers and Chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany), J. Koenig (Ambassador to the USSR), H. Homann (Vice President of the Volkskammer and Deputy Chairman of the National Democratic Party of Germany, A. Bach (Vice President of the Volkskammer and Chairman of the Christian Democratic Union, P. Scholz (Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Deputy Chairman of the Democratic Farmers' Party of Germany), and R. Korb (Stasi official, Head of Central Information Groups).]

Assisting in the talks was also GDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Collegium member A. Kunderman [who was also the head of the Foreign Ministry's Department on the Soviet Union].

Khrushchev: Let me welcome the GDR party-governmental delegation and give the first word to the guests.

Ulbricht: There is a series of issues which it is imperative for us to discuss.

I would like to start with the conference in Geneva. As is well known, the Soviet Union's proposal about a peace treaty at the Geneva conference was opposed by the Western powers' package of proposals. In sum, its core comes down to liquidating us not immediately, but step by step, in three stages.

Also in connection with the Geneva conference, the question is: what can our delegation do for the further development of initiatives[?] We would like to exchange views with you on this. We think that an important step for developing this initiative was Gromyko's proposal to create a commission of the representatives of the two German states. However, neither the West nor the Bonn government has responded to this proposal. Therefore, we should think about what we should undertake in this regard in the future.

Moreover, I would like to note that the proposals of the Western powers completely ignore the question of the prohibition of West German nuclear arms. Thus, our delegation in Geneva first of all raised the question of the prohibition of atomic arms and rocket installations in West Germany. This is the first issue which, in our view, must occupy the commission.

We also proposed to the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] to conclude a non-aggression pact, a treaty on the renunciation of the use of force between the two German states. Adenauer refused this proposal, but it met with support among the West German population (in particular from the FDP [Free Democratic Party] and SPD [Social Democratic Party]). Our proposal was understood by all and accepted, because it demands that both sides renounce something. We gave you the draft of this treaty and would like to know your view on this issue.

However, in any case, the question of a peace treaty remains at the center of attention. As regards us, proceeding from the above considerations, we emphasize especially one part—the prohibition of West German nuclear arms, [a position] which has the understanding of the FRG population.

The second issue about which we would like to exchange views is West Berlin. As is well known, the Americans are raising the question of preserving their rights in West Berlin. But we think that the issue of the preservation of occupation rights can't be raised now. We think that since 14 years have passed since the end of the war, it is time for a peace treaty.

The USSR proposed keeping a symbolic force in West Berlin. For our part, we are prepared to give a guarantee of access to West Berlin.

So where are the disagreements?

In the fact that the Western powers don't want to carry out negotiations on guarantees with the GDR, although we already control them [i.e., guarantees of Western access to West Berlin] about 95%. Thus, the issue is the following: we must give a guarantee in the name of the GDR separately from four power agreements. Although in fact this will be an agreement of five powers. Gromyko is trying to achieve this at the conference [in Geneva]. But the West is not agreeing to it.

If an agreement of the four powers is reached at a summit on this question, we are prepared to publish a declaration on guarantees separately.

We also need to decide which tactics to follow on the issue of reunification. Our delegation in Geneva raised the question of whether we should publish in Geneva our declaration concerning a confederation. This question was discussed in the Politburo. But doubts arose among us about the utility of such a step at the current moment, since the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs is not especially suitable for this.

Maybe it would be better to do this at a summit conference?

At the conference in Geneva, Gromyko raised the question of having an all-German committee study the questions of the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty and the reunification of the country. If the Soviet comrades don't object, maybe we could discuss with the Soviet side how an all-German committee could study the peaceful resolution of the German question, and could give an instruction to our [Foreign] Minister [Lothar] Bolz to make corresponding proposals in Geneva and announce that we are also ready to discuss the question of reunification in this commission.

The next issue is a summit conference. If at a summit conference the positions move closer together and if some sort of agreement is reached, we would welcome all this, because we think that this would facilitate a return to a discussion of the issue of a peace treaty. However, the details of this can be dealt with later.

This, in short, is what I wanted to say.

Khrushchev: We have discussed all of these questions and believe that Geneva has given good results. It showed the unrealistic policy of [U.S. Secretary of State John Foster] Dulles which is aimed at the so-called "liberation" of Eastern Europe. This policy, which is directed at a blockade of Eastern Europe, the subversion of these countries from within, etc., is completely bankrupt. And it was clearly shown that efforts to subvert the countries of Eastern Europe from the socialist path of development completely failed.

Instead of this, they came to the conference in Geneva [and] agreed to the invitation of the GDR to the conference, which signifies de facto recognition of the GDR. Thus, the situation as a whole has turned out favorably for us. As regards the question of the unification of Germany, this problem is now used by the West only for propagandistic goals. The information which we have completely supports this. When our responsible comrades spoke about this question with representatives of the West, the latter directly said that the reunification of Germany is impossible.

De Gaulle, for example, said: "We are not for two Germanys, but really for three and even four." Eisenhower implied to Gromyko that the USA considers unification impossible at the present time, remarking that, in his view, it is a long process.

Macmillan and Adenauer also think this way. The latter is especially afraid of German unification and as long as he is alive—there won't be reunification.

We correctly announced in Geneva that we are for German reunification, but that this issue must be resolved by the Germans themselves, that is the main thing, that is the essence of our position.

Now we have prepared new proposals, which Gromyko will put forward today. These proposals don't change anything, but tactically it is advantageous for us to make them. The essence of these proposals is that we propose creating an all-German committee from the two German states on an equal basis (with a proportion of 1:1). This committee must be occupied with issues of bringing together the two German governments, developing contacts between them, and preparing a peace treaty. The four great powers have no responsibility for the activity of this committee and will not give them any instructions. The Germans themselves must resolve all issues connected with the activity of this committee.

Aside from this, we don't think it's worth it now to push the West to the wall, so that we will not give the impression that we are seeking the recognition of the GDR.

The Americans don't want to recognize the GDR. They can't do this for prestige reasons. That, and we would be offended. They didn't recognize us for 16 years [until 1933—ed.], and you want them to recognize you after 10 years. You need to wait at least 17 years. (p. 5) In any case, such a stating of the issue, such an intention from our side would hinder the relaxation of tensions.

You know that there is a demagogic system in the USA, there are 2 parties, but both are charlatans. They have said so much against the socialist camp, that they can't now recognize the GDR. And if [Christian] Herter [new U.S. Secretary of State] agreed to it, he would quickly be fired. So we have to reckon with such a situation. In such a situation, we must work out our tactics carefully. We need not Bolz but the Western representatives themselves to put forward proposals advantageous to us. We must make our proposals in such a way that they move them forward like their own, and we will support them. We don't need to rush, we must wait. We cannot show that we are in a hurry to get acceptance of our proposals in rough form.

Regarding the future of the Geneva conference, we can already say now that it won't have any tangible results. We spoke about this earlier also, since the situation itself still doesn't have a basis for positive resolutions.

In addition, in my opinion, not one self-respecting prime minister will allow his minister of foreign affairs, due to prestige considerations, to sign an agreement on concrete issues. You don't think de Gaulle will allow his minister to sign an important decision? Neither Eisenhower nor Macmillan would allow this either.

Geneva—it's a test of strength, it's a sounding out of positions.

Therefore, our proposals must be put in such a form that they will be attractive to the population.

However, on the whole we must notice that the situation now has become so difficult that the Americans must find a way out. But prestige considerations strongly pin them down. The USA recognizes that the situation in West Berlin is abnormal, and that it is necessary to normalize it. They are talking, for example, about an agreement now on reducing the number of their troops in West Berlin from 10,000 to 7,500. But the issue of the number of troops in Berlin has no significance for the correlation of forces. We even spoke about this with Macmillan during his visit to Moscow. We told him: send 100,000 troops to West Berlin, but this will be worse only for you, and for us it will be easier, since in the event of an aggravation of the situation, these troops actually would find themselves surrounded, in a trap.

Currently the USA is also proposing to agree on the liquidation of espionage centers and radio stations, the cessation of propaganda, [and] the liquidation of subversive activities on the condition that we guarantee their rights in West Berlin.

We told them that we can't do that, since already more than 14 years have passed since the end of the war. However, we don't want to make an ultimatum, but we want to show that we are looking for real possibilities for the resolution of these problems.

They also proposed freezing the number of forces in West Berlin [and] agreeing that there won't be any rocket or atomic weapons there before German unification. And Gromyko is currently waiting for instructions from us on this issue.

Now the question of the peace treaty. Earlier we said that in the event of the Western powers' refusal to sign a peace treaty with the two German governments, we would sign a peace treaty with the GDR. But now it is necessary to create a safety-valve. Therefore we are proposing the creation of an all-German committee. Without us, but on our recommendation, the committee would deal with the issue of the preparation of a peace treaty and the reunification of the country. We are proposing a concrete period of activity for this committee—for example, 1-1 1/2 years, that is, until 1961. If the Germans don't come to an agreement among themselves in this period, we will be free from any obligations and we will look for the possibility of concluding a peace treaty with the two German governments or with one German government.

But during this period, that is, until 1961, they must reduce their forces in West Berlin, stop subversive activity [and] propaganda, [and] liquidate espionage centers. This is the main thing. We agree to the temporary preservation of the occupation regime until 1961.

Why are we doing this? It would be very attractive to all pacifists, since we will show them that we are acting without an ultimatum, but searching for a way for the resolution of these issues.

On the other hand, it is necessary to allow time so that the Western powers can move away from their old position.

The situation in this case is complicated in the following way: we are giving the Germans time to find a way out, but if they can't find it, then how can we help?

This is a very advantageous position. And what will we lose? Nothing. The resolution of the issue is only put off for a year or a year-and-a-half. And what will happen in this time? They will be weaker, and we will be stronger. Therefore, I think that we don't need to force the pace of events on this issue, since then the neutral states and many proponents of peace in the whole world won't understand us. We must not alienate our friends and neutral states.

The fact of the GDR's existence and development has already been recognized by Eisenhower and Macmillan, and public opinion understands and supports the GDR even more.

There is also a process of evolution among the German people. The progressive forces support the GDR and this process will be strengthened in the future. This is why Adenauer is enraged. And so, he doesn't want the liquidation of the "cold war."

The question is: will they accept our new proposals? One can say with 70% certainty that they won't.

So then it will be even more necessary to have a summit meeting.

Speaking as a whole, the essence of our differences of opinion on this question are that they want to drag out the occupation regime, and we want to limit it. Therefore, on the one hand, we will allegedly concede to them, but at the same limit their time, giving them the possibility to reform.

Last year, we raised these issues [i.e., the 27 November 1958 ultimatum]. Now already almost a year has gone by, but in this time we have already turned around the core of public opinion. Therefore I would like to recall here a Russian saying, which says that if you have thrown the adversary to the ground, you don't need to then kneel on his chest. We don't need to show that we won. We should give the impression that both sides won. Let them yell about their victory, but we will say that it was also our victory.

In 1961 the GDR will start to surpass the FRG in standard of living. This will have very great political significance. This will be a bomb for them. Therefore, our position is to gain time.

Grotewohl: We could hardly reckon that they would agree with our proposals in Geneva. At the current time, the conference is in a decisive stage. It is possible that the Soviet proposals will be rejected. But this can't mean that there won't be a summit conference. Our goal is to win time. Any time which we win for negotiations, any negotiations is better than a "cold war." Precisely from this position, we must come to an appreciation of the world-wide historical scene, including the German question, which has subordinate significance.

Sometimes among us Germans, is seems that for us only Germany exists. But as a whole in international politics, the German question must take up only as much space as it merits.

We, as representatives of Germany, must have the possibility of freely appearing before the whole German people on issues which are of vital importance to them.

In reference to Comrade Khrushchev, the Soviet proposals don't have any limitations for us in this regard, therefore I support these proposals.

If it is possible to reach some sort of compromise, that is, if the Germans will be forced to carry out negotiations between them, then this already will be an enormous step forward, it will mean recognition of the GDR. If West Germany refuses this, then this too will be a big plus for us, it will give us the opportunity to activate our work in the West. But the strength of this influence on the West will depend on taking some sort of positive step. For example, the renunciation of arming the German government with atomic weapons. We think that we must achieve this. This will give a new impetus.

Other positive steps would be the liquidation of all subversive centers.

The situation for us is clear, and if the subversive centers aren't liquidated, then we ourselves will undertake measures for the guarantee of our security.

The main thing is that people in the whole world see that a step forward has been made in the safeguarding of peace. And this step could be the prohibition of atomic weapons in Germany. From the point of view of German policy [Deutschlandpolitik], these proposals are acceptable.

We must discuss together the situation in Geneva. And it would be desirable if the representatives of the National Front and other parties who are present here would express their point of view on these questions.

Khrushchev: Our proposals are not connected with an initiative of the German comrades. The proposals which have been made by the German comrades are very good. But I think that you shouldn't appeal directly to the West.

Ulbricht: (rejoinder) They still aren't used to us.

Khrushchev: We are ready to listen to the opinions of all comrades who want to speak here on the issues we have touched upon.

Bach: I am certain that the new proposals of the Soviet government will find a positive response among the German people, because they correspond not only to the wishes of the GDR but also to the interests of the peace-loving forces of the FRG. Those sections of the population of West Germany who have been afraid until now to enter into contact with representatives of the GDR will now be activated. We must bear in mind that if the proposal for the creation of an all-German committee is accepted, it will help to encourage those forces in West Germany which have shown indecisiveness until now. In my opinion, it is also important that the work of the committee will be for a limited time.

Among the population, there has been a growing view that the conference didn't deal much with the issue of German unification. Insofar as the entire package of the Western Powers skirted around the question of the unification of Germany, our new proposals in which the issue of unification is raised will allow us to take back the initiative.

Homann: I support what has been said here by the comrades. The question of ensuring security and peace is also the primary one for us. All other issues are derived from and subordinate to this question. Therefore I think that the proposals made here are correct. Negotiations in an all-German committee which must be carried out before 1961, will give us the opportunity to lay out broadly our position, to show that from our side the national question is decided on a path of peace and peaceful coexistence with other countries, and to show that the development of the GDR guarantees a happy future of Germany. We can also demonstrate that the policy carried out in the GDR under the leadership of the working class is really a national policy.

Loch: Adenauer represents himself as a fighter for democracy and unification, but Adenauer's decision to withdraw his candidacy for president called forth a wave of protest and opened the eyes of many to the real state of affairs in the FRG.

Therefore, Khrushchev's proposals will have great significance. An all-German committee which will decide the fate of Germany, this is of course a step forward. The creation of this committee could activate the opposition forces in West Germany. The strengthening contacts between West German and GDR parties will gain new impetus.

In conclusion, I would like to express my certainty that we will return with good results to the GDR, which will allow us to strengthen our struggle for realizing the tasks which are before us.

Scholz: If we want peace, we can only agree with your proposals.

During Geneva we tried to explain things to the farmers and at every meeting, the question was asked: will there be war after Geneva[?] This testifies to the fact that people are thirsting for peace. However, some have lost heart, they don't see the real possibility to reach agreement. Therefore, the formation of the committee would be an important step in this direction which would inspire many. Thus I entirely agree with the proposals of the Soviet comrades.

Correns: There has already been a lot said here about Khrushchev's proposals. I think that these proposals will be well accepted in West Germany, since they are intelligent.

The propaganda in the FRG tries to present everything as if the USSR always says no. The new Soviet proposals cut the ground out from under this propaganda. This will give us great help in our all-German work and will give us the opportunity to start a conversation with the population of the FRG.

Khrushchev: If there aren't more people who want to speak, I would like to elaborate on one issue. The Western Powers are not accepting our proposals for a free city. But psychologically they are already prepared that a treaty with the GDR will be signed. Therefore, they are now especially worried about the situation in West Berlin. They are asking us, they are defining precisely, what the situation in Berlin will be. From their side, they have put forward the formulation that the GDR exercises control over the communications of the Western Powers with West Berlin "as agents of" the Soviet Union. We immediately answered them that this is unacceptable to us. But there is one question of theirs we must answer. They are saying: what will happen if the GDR one day takes the initiative and closes communications between West Berlin and the West?

And so on this issue there must be clear agreement. This has vital significance, even in relations between friends. We can imagine two forms of such guarantees:

1) The GDR together with the Western powers signs an agreement on guarantees. But the West probably won't agree to this. And we don't really need to achieve this.

2) The GDR guarantees it by a unilateral declaration.

However, in this case the Western powers want us to make the guarantee for your guarantee.

Ulbricht: Please. [i.e., okay]

Khrushchev: This would not be right. We can't do this. Therefore, we must sign an agreement with the Western powers which will be registered at the UN, in which it is foreseen that in the event that the GDR violates its obligations regarding guarantees, then the great powers together will seek measures to bring pressures to bear on the GDR.

In our view, this is the only possible path right now.

Do you have other proposals on this issue?

Ulbricht: Will this point of view be proposed at Geneva or at a summit?

Khrushchev: Yes, in Geneva. If we don't do this at the Geneva conference, a vacuum might be created at Geneva and there won't be any sense of a future at the conference.

We don't know whether Eisenhower will agree to this. But it is necessary for world opinion to know about these positive proposals by our side.

Ulbricht: The remarks by Comrade Khrushchev are very important. The time is really ripe for this. We must find a way out. But it is clear that we can't solve all issues in one stroke. Therefore I discussed the peace treaty very carefully, since it's clear that the signing of a peace treaty with the GDR would exacerbate the situation, for which we are not now prepared. Economically, we still cannot exert influence on the West; therefore, we must win time. This also concerns our policy with regard to the Social Democrats [SED] and the opposition circles of the West through which to isolate Adenauer. The signing of a peace treaty with the GDR would complicate the situation. In all regards, Khrushchev's proposals correspond to the real situation and our domestic political situation.

But we are interested that the issue of nuclear disarmament remain on the agenda. We must constantly discuss this, since only by this path can we isolate Adenauer. Therefore we will put special stress on all issues which are understood by the majority of the German people. Our opinions in this regard concur completely. All parties in the GDR support these proposals. Accordingly, we will give corresponding instructions to our delegation in Geneva.

And in the future we will declare our support for a non-aggression pact between the two German states and for the liquidation of the occupation regime in West Berlin. But from the point of view of the development of the situation in Berlin, we also need to gain time, since Western propaganda is now maintaining that the dependence of West Berlin on the East would mean the lowering of the standard of living in it.

Khrushchev: I would like to quickly sum up the exchange of views on these issues. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the German friends for the fact that you correctly understand us and between us there is a complete unity of views that the German people support us.

This inspires certainty in us, this attests to us that our policy is right. If all the parties in the GDR approve of it, that means that world public opinion will correctly perceive it also. This understanding is a great victory of our peace-loving policy.

Ulbricht: I would like to speak some more about the situation in the GDR. The first months of fulfilling the plan of this year speak to the fact that we are quickly moving forward. We have been thoroughly occupied with certain branches [of the economy], especially chemical [industry and] construction, therefore we have achieved well-known successes. In construction, business has also gotten better now. Currently we are occupied with light industry and trade where we have well-known lags.

The main issue for us now is the increase of work productivity and the reconstruction of industry. In the chemical industry, the corresponding plan has already been worked out. For other branches, we are discussing [the plans]. It is also a new development that cooperation between the workers and intelligentsia is developing and growing. Brigades of socialist labor have been formed. There are about 10,000 of these brigades. The stimulus for this was an initiative of the Soviet comrades in creating brigades of communist labor. It is true that we have them at a lower level than you do, but it is occurring without any kind of propaganda or pressure from above. Thus we highly value this development.

In this connection, we have a request—to bureaucratize and broaden the cooperation and ties between large enterprises of our countries. Until now, too many functionaries [and] trade-union workers, but not direct representatives of industry have travelled [to us]. We should develop connections between exemplary industrial factory workers.

Until August, we are mainly working on a plan for developing agriculture for the period up to 1965. But we have tasks which we cannot resolve with our own forces by 1961. It is a question of acquiring some foodstuffs and consumer goods, such as wool, coffee, cocoa, and southern [tropical] fruits.

Khrushchev: We will give you oil instead of cocoa.

Ulbricht: Of course we can survive even without cocoa. But the question here is about comparing the standard of living in the GDR with West Germany and West Berlin. At the current time, the population still goes to West Berlin to buy some of these goods, which has, of course, negative political consequences.

We have a list of goods which we need, and we ask you to familiarize yourself with it and to see how you can help us. We are prepared to pay for everything you want in 1963. This is a proposal of the Politburo and planning commission. We aren't presenting these lists for negotiations. We would only like your specialists to look them over and tell us how they could help us. Concretely, the question is of a credit of 700 million rubles over 2 years, 1961-1962.

Khrushchev: Let [Bruno] Leuschner [Head of the GDR State Planning Committee and Politburo member] and Mikoian study this question.

Ulbricht: I would also like to inform you about the situation in agriculture. The development of our agricultural production is proceeding normally on the whole. At the current time, SKhPK's [Agricultural Production Cooperatives] occupy 49% of land space. We want to strengthen the weak SKhPK's now, and give agricultural technology to the strong cooperatives. We are not planning to speed up the tempo of the cooperativization of the farmers.

In the area of cattle-breeding, we have well-known difficulties. But we are studying these problems now so as to overcome the shortcomings we have here. On the whole, I would like to emphasize again that our agricultural situation is not bad.

We have another request. It has to do with broadening the scientific-technical cooperation between our countries. In several areas we have already achieved world standards. In other areas we are strongly lacking. Therefore we would request that you help us in the development of the chemical industry and in several other areas. I have in mind giving us help in the matter of mastering the technology of new machines. We will give you our best machines, the organization of technological processes for producing these machines, the blueprints for these machines, etc., and you will give us yours. In addition, we ask you to familiarize us with the models of those machines which you buy in America and other capitalist countries. For example, we now produce beautiful artificial fibers, but we are very backward in the production of weaving machines. Our research council worked out a concrete plan and proposal on this issue. And we already gave an order to stop the production of old machines. We are in a good position, for example, in heavy machine building and in the chemical industry where you exerted certain pressure on us.

But we can only surpass West Germany by carrying out a quick reconstruction of industry. Without this we cannot resolve our main economic task. Besides, our intelligentsia compares not only our standard of living with the level of West Germany, but also the level of production. Therefore, it would have great significance also for the resolution of the question about the intelligentsia.

In sum, the issue is to strengthen [our] exchange and cooperation.

Your delegation which was in the GDR already gave us significant help in this regard. We hope that this cooperation will strengthen even more in the future.

We also think that it is time to broaden the cooperation between our countries in the area of schools, including in the preparation of textbooks.

Until recently, this matter was going badly here. But it has improved in the past year. It is true that we have some different forms and methods of work, but the principles are the same. The same basic problems face you and face us. We are now preparing new school laws which will be implemented shortly. The main direction in which we are going is the introduction of polytechnical education in the schools.

But we are particularly behind in the development of new textbooks and in this regard we need more significant help.

Khrushchev: We agree with you. And we will give you help where we can. But these issues are difficult. Therefore let's wrestle [with them] together. The question of schools, of course, is easier than the question of reconstructing industry. And what you need, what you find good for you [from us], take it. If something isn't suitable for you, don't take it. Here we must have a free exchange of views.

It's harder with machines. And the issue here isn't with secrecy, but with the fact that we have very many machines, and we ourselves often don't know whether we make them worse or better than other countries.

In this connection I would like to say that I really liked your [trade] fair. It gives an idea of a level of achievement of world technology. It even served as a stimulus for the CPSU CC plenum which will meet this month.

On the whole we want to say—let your engineers look at what is suitable for you, and what is suitable, take. We buy a lot of machines abroad. You can also get the blueprints of these machines, and your engineers can assist in their assembling.

Thank you for the information on the situation in your country.

Ulbricht: We need to agree on working out the text of the communique. From our side, comrades Leuschner, Kundermann and Korb could participate in its preparation.

Khrushchev: From our side, comrades [V.V.] Kuznetsov [First Deputy Foreign Minister], [Mikhail] Pervukhin [Soviet Ambassador to the GDR], [and] [Vladimir] Semenov [Deputy Foreign Minister] will participate.

Grotewohl: I have one concern. Ulbricht already expressed our ideas, our points of view on economic issues. We agreed that Leuschner will discuss this with comrade Patolichev. But we already ran into this problem in the past. If comrades approach this question from the point of view of foreign trade, then the whole matter will be reduced "to a pencil." But in our conditions economic problems turn into political ones.

If we obtain the creation of an all-German committee, but then we have to retreat, our position will be deplorable. Therefore, I really ask you to take this situation into account. We need credits for 1961 and 1962, and I would ask that the Soviet comrades approach this issue from the perspective of what I have said.

Khrushchev: We will look at all of this. We must reckon with our real capabilities.

I would like to remind you that we began the competition with capitalism naked and with bare feet. The people believed us not only due to the promises of sausage and beer, but also due to the teachings of Marx and Lenin.

The Americans are placing great hopes now in the organization of their exhibit in Moscow. They are reckoning that the Soviet people, looking at their [the American] achievements, will turn away from their [Soviet] government. But the Americans don't understand our people. We want to turn the exhibit against the Americans. We will tell our people: look, this is what the richest country of capitalism has achieved in one hundred years. Socialism will give us the opportunity to achieve this significantly faster.

Therefore, we won't raise the issue of socialism or coffee. Socialism—first, but coffee must be delivered, today maybe not the whole cup, but tomorrow the whole cup.

We aren't tradesmen, we are friends. Therefore, we approach all issues politically. But before giving an answer, we must consider, we must look at our capabilities [to help you economically].

Notes taken by: comrades Beletskii, Kotomkin, Myal'dizin


Notes:
[1] Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR – Bundesarchiv, ZPA, NL 90/472. [back]
[2] Pravda, 20 June 1959, p. 1. [back]