November 4, 1962
Soviet Report on Conversation with US Congressional Staff
This document was made possible with support from Leon Levy Foundation
REPORT #5779/273 from 3l.X-62
from incoming (outgoing) ciphered telegram # 31615/835
from 31 October 1962 from Washington
Report received from a reliable source.
"Distribute the telegram to comrs. Kozlov, Suslov, Ponomarev, and .
Gromyko," --Semichastny.
During a confidential conversation with our source, the US Congressional staff members PARKS, MACCRACKEN, and BECKER informed him now there is a palpable mood of relief in the Congress, by contrast to yesterday [nakanune], when everyone felt inevitable approach of war. According to MACCRACKEN, she spoke with a Pentagon employee who expressed his disappointment that KENNEDY had chickened out [strusil]. In his opinion, pressure could have been brought on Cuba with the aim to succeed in removing CASTRO. In the Pentagon employee's words, plans to invade Cuba had been already drafted nine months ago. Then they were subjected to revisions in connection with the inflow of Soviet assistance to Cuba. No one knew what kind of political and military steps would be taken in time of crisis. White House decided on everything. In the opinion of the Pentagon employee, the question of [American] guarantees to Cuba is a particularly difficult one for the USA.
In the opinion of PARKS and BECKER, the USA would most likely agree to offer guarantees against military invasion. Latin American countries also would underwrite these guarantees. Perhaps they would announce it in the form of a joint declaration by Latin American countries. PARKS and BECKER believe that Guatemala, Nicaragua and Costa Rica will agree to this only reluctantly. The US might also promise not to provide ports and other government facilities to Cuban emigres. KENNEDY is allegedly ready to keep his word with respect to these guarantees, although the USA cannot guarantee that there will be no military training of emigres on US territory. Such a training could be supported by private funds and private facilities could be used for it. For example, there is talk that future preparations for an emigre invasion of Cuba could take the form of the so-called Legion of Volunteers from various Latin American countries. If the US agrees to extend broad guarantees to Cuba, including the renunciation of subversive activities, it will seek, on its part, analogous guarantees from CASTRO's side, specifically the one not to conduct subversive activities against the countries of Western hemisphere.
As for the question of normalizing economic relations between the US and Cuba, this can be discussed only after Cuba agrees to compensate American owners for their property confiscation in Cuba.
Americans do not intend to examine the question of the Guantanamo base during the negotiations in New York. They might agree to return this base to Cuba later, under certain circumstances and on the condition of compensation for the value of this base.
1 copy printed
from notebook 262
[signature redacted]
[Redacted text]
4 November 1962
Report on the relief in Washington after the height of the crisis had passed and the possibility of the US pledging not to invade Cuba, provide ports and other government facilities to Cuban emigres or training Cuban emigres on US territory. The report also highlighted the American reluctance on the normalization of economic relations and the Guantanamo base.
Author(s):
Associated Places
Associated Topics
Subjects Discussed
Document Information
Source
Rights
The History and Public Policy Program welcomes reuse of Digital Archive materials for research and educational purposes. Some documents may be subject to copyright, which is retained by the rights holders in accordance with US and international copyright laws. When possible, rights holders have been contacted for permission to reproduce their materials.
To enquire about this document's rights status or request permission for commercial use, please contact the History and Public Policy Program at HAPP@wilsoncenter.org.