Protocol 58 provides insight into what was occupying the mind of Khrushchev at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The theme of the meeting was centered around the Sino-Indian conflict, questions surrounding the McMahon line, and the future of Tibet. With the focus on China and India, it is reasonable to assume that the crisis caught Khrushchev by surprise.
October 14, 1962
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 59
This document was made possible with support from Leon Levy Foundation
33. [On the Indian-Chinese conflict]
The proposals are being readied by Cde. N. S. Khrushchev
1. Delay the shipment to India of MiG-21 aircraft.
2. On instructions to the Soviet ambassador in India, Cde. [Ivan] Benediktov. Say to [Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal] Nehru: “We are disappointed.”
Are they thinking about how this conflict will end?
By whom was the McMahon Line created?
By whom was it recognized? When was it introduced?
But the circumstances have changed.
The PRC’s proposals for troop withdrawals spanning 20 km are reasonable.
India’s demands for troop withdrawals spanning an additional 20 km are humiliating for the PRC.
We are in favor of eliminating the conflict, it will not bring any benefit.
India is hardly going to gain anything from the conflict.
[ . . . . ]
Protocol 59 further details the focus of the Soviet Union just before the Cuban Missile Crisis. Khrushchev was so confident that his plan with Cuba would go unhindered that he spent his efforts on resolving the Sino-Indian border conflict, thinking the matter with missiles was done.
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