Protocol 71 gives details to the immediate fallout of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Soviet perspective. Thanks to Castro’s so-called Armageddon letter and his five points, by December 1962 (date of this protocol), Khrushchev was calling the Cubans “unreliable allies.”
November 16, 1962
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 66
This document was made possible with support from Leon Levy Foundation
Present: Brezhnev, Voronov, Kirilenko, Kozlov, Kosygin, Kuusinen, Polyansky, Suslov, Khrushchev, Grishin, Demichev, Ponomarev, Shelepin.
On the message from US President R. Kennedy[1] about further steps concerning Cuba.
Khrushchev, Gromyko,
Brezhnev, Kosygin, Kozlov,
Ponomarev, Suslov[2]
About Castro’s position — unreasonable and screechy
Let this be a lesson for us.
We are coming to the crunch point: Either they will cooperate or we will let our people go.
Cde [Anastas] Mikoyan’s letter requesting a conversation with Castro.
Respond that we agreed to the withdrawal of the Il-28s (orally).[3]
[1] Translator’s Note: Malin mistakenly includes the “R.” here. The confusion may have arisen because on 12 November (four days earlier) Robert Kennedy, speaking on behalf of his brother, had orally conveyed to Dobrynin the president’s willingness to allow up to 30 days for the removal of the Il-28 bombers from Cuba and to lift the naval quarantine against Cuba even before the UN gave confirmation of the dismantling of the Soviet missiles. The CPSU Presidium had already dealt with this offer on 14 November, but the issue kept coming up as the two sides sought a mutually acceptable arrangement.
[2] Translator’s Note: The listing of speakers mistakenly mentions Ponomarev and Groymko twice each. The extra occurrences of their names have been omitted here.
[3] Translator’s Note: See the description of Mikoyan’s visit to discuss this issue and others in “Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol No. 71.”
Protocol 66 is the first Malin note dated after the Cuban Missile Crisis, on 11 November. The tone of the protocol indicates that Castro is not pleased with Khrushchev's handling of the crisis, and there is a growing sense of distance between Cuba and the Soviet Union.
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RGANI, F. 3, Op. 16, D. 947, L 49. Translated and edited by Mark Kramer, with assistance from Timothy Naftali.
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2012-08-28
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