Minutes of Conversation between the Romanian Delegation to Ho Chi Minh’s Funeral, Led by Ion Gheorge Maurer, and the Chinese Delegation, Led by Zhou Enlai, 11 September 1969

Minutes

Minutes of conversation between comrades Ion Gheorghe Maurer, RCP CC Permanent Presidium Executive Committee member, Socialist Republic of Romania Council of Ministers President and Paul Niculescu-Mizil, Permanent Presidium Executive Committee member, RCP CC secretary, [and] with Zhou Enlai, CCP CC Politburo Permanent Committee member, People’s Republic of China State Council Premier, Kang Sheng, CCP CC Politburo Permanent Committee member, National General Assembly Permanent Committee Vice President and Li Xiannian, CCP CC Politburo member, People’s Republic of China State Council Vice Premier.

The following individuals were [also] present at the conversation that took place on 11 September 1969 between 4:50 p.m. and 8:00 p.m.:

– from the Chinese side: Qiao Guanhua, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; Yu Zhan, MFA, Soviet Union and Eastern Europe Department, Director; Han Xu, MFA Protocol Department Acting Director; Ding Yuanhong and Deng Gaozhong, MFA translators.

– From the Romanian side: Stefan Peterfi Istvan, RCP CC Candidate Member, vice president of Council of State; Duma Aurel, the ambassador of the Socialist Republic of Romania in Beijing, Gheorghe Rosu, RCP CC, Foreign Relations Division Chief; Ion Dorobantu, First Secretary of the SRR [Socialist Republic of Romania] embassy in Beijing—Chinese translator.

Referring to his conversation with the president of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, A. Kosygin, which took place in Beijing on 11 September 1969, Premier Zhou Enlai related the following:

Kosygin briefly talked to me about the Vietnam issue. He stated that, in his opinion, Nixon wishes to leave South Vietnam, but that the US president is relying on the Saigon government. Kosygin continued by saying that he considers this support as unfit, but did not go into details and did not express his opinion regarding [possible] solutions for solving the Vietnamese predicament. It was clear from this that he tried to avoid a contentious discussion.

Kosygin tackled the situation of the Near East, showing that this is very complicated. He said that recently, Israel organized attacks against the UAR [United Arab Republic; Egypt] along the Suez Canal. I did not ask any questions on this subject and he didn’t make any assessments.

I told Kosygin that the disaster in the UAR in 1967 was the result of the Soviet attitude. He did not admit this and stated that the defeat occurred because the UAR was too weak. Kosygin also asserted that the US will not be able to obtain favorable results in the Middle East.

My conversations with Kosygin were centered on the main theme of Sino-Soviet relations.

During the conversation I tried everything in order to obtain the weakening of the tensions at the Sino-Soviet border. We agreed that the status quo will be maintained until the final resolution of these border issues, that clashes will be avoided and that troops from both sides will be withdrawn from the contact areas. This way we agreed on a ceasefire. This means that the Soviet military ships should not undertake any instigating acts against our ships, that their airplanes should not violate the Chinese airspace etc. Through this, Kosygin admitted that they organized the previous instigating acts.

We agreed that in the disputed territories, the economic activity in which the Chinese population has been involved for generations will no longer be disturbed. This, however, does not signify the establishment of a border. We decided to report to the Politburo of our parties the contents of the agreement that we reached and to later transform it into a document that we can sign.

Kosygin raised a number of issues as I also did. He tackled the issue of the amelioration of tensions in our state relations.

I told him that there are many divergences of principle in political and ideological matters, divergences that cannot be suddenly solved but that should not hinder the talks on relaxing tensions.

Kosygin agreed with this, but asked us to refrain from using insulting appellations when referring to the Soviet Union.

I reminded him of the way Lenin fought against revisionism during his time. I told Kosygin that there are many problems between us that would necessitate three month discussions not a three hour discussion.

Therefore, in regards to the border disputes, we agreed for now on certain temporary measures. Concerning the way in which the negotiations will take place and what problems will need to be solved, I told him that we will state our opinion in a more ample document taking in consideration that their declaration analyzed a period of 2000-3000 years. This document will be prepared by the MFA and will constitute the answer to their declaration.

Kosygin expressed his wish that China will respond as soon as possible to the Soviet declaration and that the document won’t contain offensive words.

Kosygin didn’t deny the concentration of Soviet troops along the Sino-Soviet border, including the People’s Republic of Mongolia, but asked not to discuss this matter.

Intervening, Comrade Kang Sheng pointed out that the Soviet Union has 69 divisions concentrated in those areas.

Carrying on, premier Zhou Enlai stated: “I asked Kosygin against whom these troops are concentrated and I told him just as I told you on September 7 what a Soviet attack against China would mean. I mentioned to him that this would mean the beginning of the war. And the 69 divisions can only fit in Central China.

In regards to the possibility of an atomic attack by China directed against the Soviet Union, I told him that everyone laughs when they hear about something like this. He did not defend himself but asked not to discuss this issue.

During the conversations, Kosygin approached the issue of Czechoslovakia. He stated that in this country there was a real danger of a coup and this determined the Soviet Union’s intervention.

I replied that, in our opinion, the situation in Czechoslovakia was different from the situation in Hungary in 1956, when it was necessary to overthrow the Hungarian government. I told him that, undeniably, in some socialist countries there is the danger of a coup and I added that even the peaceful evolution towards capitalism, which is taking place in certain socialist countries, represents the possibility of instating capitalism without a coup. In this matter, the discussion was polemical. I could see from the discussions that the Soviets are in a very tense state. It can be affirmed that there are people in the Soviet Union who want war. Until now, no decision has been taken in this matter and this is why Kosygin was in a hurry to take action in the direction of easing up the tension.

It can be said that this act of Kosygin’s was only probing. We don’t know what they will do in the future so that is why we have to be vigilant.

Cde. Kang Sheng: As far as I know, Nixon stated that it is very hard for his kind of people to avoid mistakes. This represents an instigation.

Do you know [Konstantin F.] Katushev, what kind of man he is, what he occupies himself with?

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Katushev was with Kosygin. It seems like he is very young. He is approximately 41 years old. We haven’t seen him until now.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: As a matter of fact, he has become part of the leadership only recently.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Is he in the Politburo?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: No, he is secretary of the Central Committee.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: He is secretary of the Central Committee and works with the socialist countries. [Boris] Ponomarev works on relations with communist parties in communist countries. Katushev is an engineer.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: There might be no more noise at the border anymore.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: From a certain perspective, China and Romania are in a similar situation: they’re neighbors in the same way with the Soviet Union. There is a difference, though: you are very big and we are very small. However, what unites us is the respect for the principles of independence and self-determined development. If the USSR will ensure that these principles are respected in its relations with China, this will mean an alleviation of their respect for us too. This is a support for us.

Cde. Kang Sheng: India is a large country, but it is not unified; Romania is a small country, but it is unified. Which is the bigger country in this case?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Of course, we can look at the issue this way.

The fact that we looked at things [in a] very determined [way] during difficult times protected us from very, very difficult hardships. We said at that time: If someone will come in [our country], we will fight. We will see how it will turn out, but we will fight. And we are convinced that this firm attitude was very, very rational; it wasn’t an adventurous act, lacking reflection, but a rational act.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Is it possible, maybe, that the discussions and a weakening of tensions with us, even if just formal, could be used to put pressure on you?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: If the tensions between you will weaken, it will become harder to put pressure on us.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: So you are seeing things different then us!

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Yes!

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Do you see another justification that they could use against you?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: For us, the situation will become very tense, very serious if the tension with you would become greater, because at this time, the Soviets would say to us: you [must] choose between China and the USSR. As a matter of fact, they already told us. At this invitation, we answered as always: we do not choose. We have good relations with China that we are seeking to develop, just like the relations with the other socialist countries. We want to develop relations with the USSR also. This is why we tell them: you can’t pose the issue this way. We will not take a position against China. We believe that whoever takes a stance against China is making a mistake.

If the situation becomes very tense between you, then the problem would become more acute for us.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: Our party supports a relaxed evolution of relations with China, a point of view that we have always sustained.

There were also attempts to condemn China, but we opposed them. In Budapest, as part of the Warsaw Pact, so in a military alliance, an anti-Chinese resolution was proposed. Romania said: no! Ceausescu and Maurer opposed this and obstructed the adoption of such a resolution. After that, a resolution on the issue of European security was adopted, which is something completely different. We clearly expressed our point of view in relation to China during the discussions between Brezhnev and Ceausescu: we have to take the approach of weakening tensions; the policy of tensions and clashes at the border does not serve well Romania or the Soviet Union.

Later, the international conference of communist parties took place. The entire world knows that Romania firmly stood up against such a trend. I participated at the conference and found out with this occasion that a large number of parties were categorically against the resolution condemning China. And the Soviets are aware of this. Even some parties that attacked China in their speeches, did this as a result of great pressure; certain parties showed this in intimate circles and said that they do not agree with such an attitude, but that they are forced to do this. The Soviets, of course, have to take this into account. The Moscow Conference was not, however, successful in its fundamental tendency of condemning the Chinese Communist Party.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: This was the main unsuccessful objective.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Could it be possible that they are trying to use the same pretexts as in Czechoslovakia, in other words, to maintain that there is chaos and liberalization [in your country]?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: The political mood in our country is very good. I could say it hasn’t been better. Never in the way people are rallying around the leadership. There were moments of popular enthusiasm during the takeover of power, a period with a wide mass audience. This was followed by difficult periods that determined a cooling off, until people started understanding some things. Today, a granite-like unity has formed around the leadership and one of the causes of this unity is our orientation towards defending fair principles in relations between states—independence, sovereignty, equality of rights, and noninterference in internal affairs. It is not the only reason, but it is one of the main reasons for this unity.

Therefore, if at this moment, we would analyze the possibilities of provoking an internal act, we would have to ascertain the following: this has no base within the framework of the party; not in the general party, not in the leadership. We don’t have a right or a left, so it is impossible to provoke something.

There are problems that could be speculated, by looking to cause divergences between the co-inhabiting nationalities—Hungarians, Germans, but this is not something feasible. We have been very careful in judging the status of these nationalities and we can say that from this point of view, a stirring up of one of these nationalities is impossible. The remnants of chauvinistic nationalism that might have existed among the Romanian nationalities are of zero significance.

From the perspective of the large social categories—workers, peasants, and intellectuals, we can say the following: building socialism is not void of difficulties; there are difficult moments in one area or another. We have not had, though, any kind of widespread dissatisfaction among the workforce, no type of manifestations from unhappy unions—not among workers, or peasants or intellectuals. We have been very careful with these groups: being hard to come from the outside with their tanks to teach us, they could reorient themselves and try to organize something from within.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: The events that took place here in the summer of 1968 are interesting. We were among the first socialist states to find out, accidentally, from our correspondent who called us from Prague around 2 a.m., that Soviet troops had invaded Czechoslovakia. As a result, during the morning of August 21 we already held a meeting of the Presidium, the Executive Committee, and the Plenary of the Central Committee. The members in the leadership of the party went throughout the entire country: we discussed this with all social classes and found out that they are all supporting our position. We organized the workers’ guards. We gave weapons to workers, peasants, intellectuals; Romanians, Hungarians, Germans, all nationalities. The problem was that we were unable to cope with the organization of all the people who wished to join the guards. These weapons are held until today in the workplace.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: It is very light armament, infantry type.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: What is the approximate size of these armed squads?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Approximately 300,000. Besides these, there are the army units. There is close collaboration between the military units and the patriot guards. These are instructed by officers; instruction is done regularly, including shooting. The mobilization plans include: the troops of the armed forces, the militia, the Securitate, the armed guards, and the patriotic formations. We have now moved to the organization of schools for the personnel of the fight formations in the patriotic troops for preparing military leaders.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: This is an aspect.

Another aspect is that some have said that [Czechoslovak leader Joseph] Smrkovsky has ties with the West and that he has his people organized in Czechoslovakia. Do you think that there is a possibility to use the same pretexts in other countries?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Of course there is a possibility to use pretexts, but they’ve proved to be illogical and unrealistic. You know the story of the lamb and the wolf. Pretexts can always be invoked. But not even in the smallest trace of reality is such a pretext possible in Romania, under no circumstance and in relation to no one. Of course, you are familiar with the reproaches made to the Romanian Communist Party. They usually are: nationalistic orientation; then some maintain that the party is becoming intellectualized, which is rather unrealistic from a data perspective; there is a number of intellectuals in the party, but the categories of workers and peasants are predominant, approximately 70%. Thus, from this point of view they can find no real hope of making such an accusation plausible.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: The accusation of nationalism is based on the fact that we sustain the principles of defending national independence. We were even told in a discussion: why are you talking so often about defending national independence? What, is someone attacking you? And we replied: if there is no problem, the more we don’t see why we are being reproached for the fact that we emphasize these ideas!

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: From this perspective, it seems to us that there is no potential to justify suspicions of such nature.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: In connection with the possibility of embarking on the road to reinstate capitalism, the imperialists, too, wish that socialist countries in Eastern Europe will adapt to their demands and embark on the way to capitalism. If there is even a reduced number of such people—which can be said of Soviet Union also—could this matter be solved in those countries? How do you look at this problem?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: I will tell you what the situation is in our country and what the situation was in Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

The development of socialist industry poses the question of organization. It is normal, in any society that develops, that leadership issues start to come up. One of these issues is the organization, planning, and leadership of the national economy. In Czechoslovakia, a number of issues were raised in the Czechoslovak economy concerning the difficulties that existed at the end of Novotny’s period of leadership, which convinced many specialists and party members to think of different ways to solve them. One of the people who wrote a book and militated for a number of measures for the improvement of planning and management of the economy was [Czechoslovak economist] Ota Sik.

He stipulated a method for the planning and management of the economy that placed more emphasis on market laws and represented the introduction of a system of broad liberalization of the economy. The Soviets accused the acceptance of this point of view by the Czechoslovak leadership as being a possibility of returning to capitalism. No ideas exactly like Sik’s, but ideas fairly close to his were introduced in the management and the planning of the Hungarian economy. In fact, these ideas were sustained and experimented with by the Soviet Union. Even now, they are discussing in the Soviet Union about the need to revisit the methods of planning and management of the economy. However, these do not have at all the character of a so-called liberalization that Sik’s system had and that Hungary’s current system has. Never, not even in one Soviet publication has there ever been a critical remark about the measures for improving the management and planning of the economy taken in our country. The measures that we’ve taken in order to create a property of an economic activity are of minimal importance from an economic standpoint and cannot become the object of criticism. For example, instead of giving employees of the establishment the possibility to sell ice cream or refreshment in the streets, we gave it to people who do it for a commission. But these cannot be considered as measures of reinstating capitalism.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: Our position, both theoretic and practical, was to criticize liberalism in the management of the economy. We did not openly criticize Lieberman’s concepts, or Ota Sik’s, or the Yugoslav ones. There was, however, a very clear indirect polemic in which we emphasized the role of the state and of the planned management of the national economy, while our measures of perfecting the management of the economy are based on perfecting the role of the state as the organizer. We reaffirmed this theoretical and practical position at our last congress. Therefore, they can’t criticize us here either.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Nor concerning the people’s earnings. Raising the standard of living has a general character.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: We took measures to eliminate great disparities in income.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: What is the difference between the highest and the lowest income?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Nine times.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: We have also worked on raising the social salary, eliminating the assistance unconnected to work, rent differences, taking measures against illicit earnings.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Is the situation in Hungary similar to the one in Czechoslovakia?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: I don’t think so. In Hungary, the opposition against the official government policy is rather pronounced. In Hungary, the opposition toward the participation at the intervention in Czechoslovakia is expressed rather openly. It can be seen in theater production and jokes.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: To what extent is Hungary’s economy relying on the Soviet Union?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Hungary has wide external economic ties with the Soviet Union, but it also develops these ties with the Western countries. It concluded a number of treaties with the Japanese, with the Federal Republic of Germany, with the United States. Hungary is not the only one doing this. Poland, the German Democratic Republic, the majority of socialist states have a volume of foreign trade that surpasses ours.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Does Poland rely more heavily on the Soviet economy?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: The economies of Poland and the German Democratic Republic rely to a great extent on the Soviet economy, especially when it comes to raw materials, but the Bulgarian economy relies on it overwhelmingly.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: This is interesting: the Hungarian troops that entered Czechoslovakia and were sent to the regions inhabited by a Hungarian population were very poorly received by the Hungarian population. This had a very bad resonance in Hungary. We shouldn’t forget the fact that Soviet troops have been in Hungary for 13 years. In 1956, as part of the Declaration of the Soviet government it was shown that the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary was dictated by the circumstances of the time and that they will be withdrawn. Thirteen years have passed since then and the troops are still there. So this also carries a certain weight in the mood of the Hungarian population.

Cde. Kang Sheng: It was communicated in the press that the countries which participate in the Warsaw Pact will use Bulgaria’s national day—September 9—to hold a conference. Do you know anything about this? This conference, even if it takes place without you, will discuss the attitude towards you.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: The international press wrote about such intentions in the past. These things are not impossible. They could happen. At this moment, however, such a meeting is not likely, at least from a logical perspective.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: In Czechoslovakia’s case, though, logic did not function at all (laughs).

Cde. Zhou Enlai: On September 7, when the discussion with you took place, you were saying that your Chief of the General Staff will go to Moscow for discussions. Has he gone to Moscow?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: He was supposed to leave for Moscow on Monday, and we left Saturday, so I don’t know what has been discussed.

Cde. Kang Sheng: Has [Marshal Andrei] Grechko, the Commander of the Warsaw [Pact] troops, come to see you?

Cde. Zhou Enlai: And Zaharov?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Grechko is not the Commander of the Warsaw [Pact] troops. He is the War Minister of the USSR; he wasn’t here last year or this year. But [Marshal Ivan] Yabukovski was here a couple times. He is the Commander of the Warsaw [Pact] troops. Zaharov was here also during his vacation and as part of the delegation sent to the 25th anniversary of Romania’s liberation. I had long discussions with Yabukovski regarding the organization of the statute of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact. These were heated discussions. On one side [was] the Soviet Union and the other countries, on the other side, Romania. The Soviet Union and the other countries had the intention of drawing a statute that would totally subordinate all the armies of the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact to the supreme commander, which was supposed to be a Soviet officer. It is true that it stipulated that he can be changed, but only a Soviet officer could be elected.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: So a supranational organization.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Clearly.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: This issue was brought up for the first time in Bucharest at the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) in 1966. Back then, the issue of the statute was a very relevant issue. A document was presented which strengthened the role of the commander and subordinated the national armies to him. We showed that we do not agree and all was delayed, following that the ministers of the armed forces would start a preliminary, preparatory work. In Sofia in 1968, they tried to reintroduce this statute. We opposed discussing it and it was decided that the ministers of the armed forces would work again.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: The discussions took place on several levels. The discussions of the Ministers of the Armed Forces were followed by discussions at a higher level and so forth. Until the very end, the statute was drawn taking in consideration the Romanian point of view. We declared that we will not sign such a statute, the way it was conceived. During these discussions, Yabukovski came to Romania several times. Ceausescu and I received him. We discussed, we bickered, and, at the very end a statute that did not include such dispositions was adopted. It anticipates that the national armies are under the command of the party and the government of that country, which establish a system of relations and collaboration during peacetime and also certain attributes of the supreme commander; he has to study and bring forth proposals to member countries concerning organization and armament, after which the countries will make the decisions.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: Any measure regarding the armed forces is taken only by the government or the organizations responsible in that country.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Procedures for wartime are also outlined: the countries will assemble and decide how the commander will exercise his function. There are also special texts, in the sense that no foreign military unit can enter the territory of another country without the permission of that country and based on certain preliminary procedures showing the way to station and withdraw these [troops].

Cde. Kang Sheng: Usually, the Soviet Union does not respect these. They could respect them in the case of Romania, but when it comes to the other countries, what do you think?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: I have doubts even when it comes to Romania!

Cde. Kang Sheng: Romania can use this statute to fight for its observance; but the other countries?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: We did not sign an act that they can use to come to our house whenever they want to.

Cde. Kang Sheng: Romania can therefore do something like this, but the other countries?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: The other countries agreed with the draft statute that we fought against and did not accept.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Can the other countries fight to keep the statute if pressure will be put on them?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: I think that until the very end it is impossible for people who believe in socialism not to rise against this unjust policy. When and how this will take place, I don’t know. In any case, there are signs. There is discontent in Hungary, in Poland, in the German Democratic Republic; there is discontent even in the Soviet Union. It is hard to say how widespread or strong these are, but there are signs of this discontent. I found out from certain reports that a few days ago in the Red Square there was a demonstration against the intervention in Czechoslovakia. It might have not been big, there might have not been ten thousand people, but the fact is that a number of people got together and demonstrated against the intervention in Czechoslovakia. This is a sign. Kang Sheng, you know the Soviet Union well and for a very long time; I know it too.

Cde. Kang Sheng: A number of writers from the magazines Youth and New World oppose the intervention in Czechoslovakia. On the other side, the magazine October is situated on the Pravda side.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: These phenomena don’t occur only among writers. I saw some reports about an entire series of other categories. There is a strong enough opposition towards an entire series of acts.

Cde. Kang Sheng: Recently, there was a meeting of literary figures during which they were asked to write about the fight against China in the Far East. The writers asked: “what should we write?” They were told to write about the tension and even war. One of them said: “If the Chinese are taken prisoners, how will their food be ensured?”

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: It is normal for these reactions to different things to exist. People [in the USSR] ask themselves: we don’t get along with China, we don’t get along with Czechoslovakia, the same with Albania, with Romania. Likewise with large communist parties.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: These issues were raised during certain party briefings.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: These issues will inevitably arise. Likewise, communist countries in capitalist states such as: the Spanish party, the Italian party, parties that fight in Latin America—Dominican, Mexican. People wonder: is this policy fair, if it leads to strained relations with an entire world, and first of all with the socialist countries?

Cde. Kang Sheng: In the Soviet Union there is a fairly large number of people who think about these problems. We have proof from Soviet passengers who pass, even from soldiers, who showed us these things.

It is true that Suslov was not that active during the June conference in Moscow?

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: These can be only impressions. You cannot know what hides behind them. I, too, have the impression that Suslov, both at the preparatory meeting and at the international conference played a much smaller role than at the first conference in Budapest. This is my personal opinion since I participated in Budapest and at the other meetings. I cannot figure out what significance this could have.

Cde. Kang Sheng: We had the same impression, too. We are not sure about the real meaning though.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Last time, when we discussed, you told us that Nixon also discussed with you the issue of European security. Has he showed you how he sees things in this matter? Does he see European security as a result of the agreement between the two military sides?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Nixon said that this is a problem in whose discussion the United States should also participate. Nixon showed that he believes that it is useful to organize European security and that adequate preparations need to be made in this sense. We raised this issue because it was more in our interest and wished to show him our point of view concerning the organization of European security.

The main point was that European security has to be organized not between military pacts, but between countries, and all countries should equally participate in this. In addition, during the discussion we emphasized the fact that we don’t believe it is fair for the organization of European security to be accomplished by two pacts: Warsaw and NATO—and even less to let the organization of European security be the result of discussions between the two great powers—the Soviet Union and the United States. We showed that this would mean the creation of an area of hegemony, which would not lead to a lasting solution to the problem. He showed interest and listened. Nothing was concretely discussed, though. Nixon said that the United States is willing to get in touch with all the states that want this. He is willing to speak with the other socialist countries the same way he is discussing with Romania. The only problem that he raised is that the United States has to participate in the organization of European security. This is indeed a problem that many European states have raised; almost all European states that are not socialist that we talked to raised this issue: [i.e.] Italy, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and Sweden.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Was the Soviet Union informed about your point of view?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Of course, the Soviet Union knows our point of view. Ceausescu informed the Soviet ambassador about the discussion with Nixon. But the Soviet Union knows our position even from before.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Is the Soviet Union unhappy with the fact that you are members of the Warsaw Pact but develop an independent foreign policy at the same time?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Within the framework of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union tends to organize all acts of foreign policy. There was the tendency to create within the Warsaw Pact a branch that would decide, with a majority vote, foreign policy affairs. The tendency to establish supranational bodies existed: in military affairs—in the organization of the United Commandment; in economic affairs—in the organization of Comecon as a supranational body, as well as in external political affairs. We opposed all these tendencies and said: the treaty that established the Warsaw Pact shows that the participant countries will consult on matters that they deem important and that they agree to consult on. Therefore, every country, as an expression of its sovereignty, has the right to practice the foreign policy that it wishes to practice, taking in account the engagements it made. I think that the Soviet Union is unhappy with the fact that we are leading an independent foreign policy. We had a different position from the Soviet Union on an entire series of issues. To answer your question, I don’t believe that the Soviet Union is pleased with us.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: There is some news showing that Nixon considers that he cannot monopolize European affairs through NATO and that he would wish to secure certain rights in Europe with the help of European security.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: I couldn’t answer. Many states, including members of NATO, embrace the idea of European security, in the sense that this has to be accomplished not through the understanding between two pacts, but through an understanding among all states. This point of view, being embraced by many European states, including members of NATO, could make Nixon believe that he has to take part in the organization of European security, especially since a number of countries asked for this. Stewart told us that if the Soviet Union would participate in the Pact on European security while the United States would not, a disproportion or influence gap would result. Denmark, Sweden, and Italy told us the same thing.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: The socialist countries’ members of the Warsaw pact discussed the topic of European security several times. There are two basic documents on this theme: the one from Bucharest from 1966 and the one from Budapest from 1969. There also was an idea to ensure European security between two pacts. Our categorical position was that we see in European security not the strengthening of the existing military treaties, but the organization of European issues with the participation of all European states, including the German Democratic Republic—an organization that would lead to the dissolution of NATO—and, in this case, as we jointly declared, we are prepared for the simultaneous dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. These documents have the signature of all states in the Warsaw Pact. This is how we interpret European security.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: And this is not a secret.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: This is a lengthy issue. Nixon said that so long as the issue of Vietnam is not solved, the issue of the Near East won’t be solved, nor the issue of European security, including the one of West Berlin.

Has Brezhnev talked to you about the security system in Asia? He has not even raised this issue with us in today’s discussion. He talks [trambita] about it though. They are taking action in this direction, but there are not concrete ideas. They are following the creation of a pact of countries that are opposing China, but it is not easy.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: I also think it is not easy. This results from a report we received: it seems that during a conference, as part of the discussion between [US Secretary of State William] Rogers and [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei] Gromyko, the United States will declare that they do not support the idea of organizing Asian security and that they should not count on US support in the escalation of the conflict with China. I told you that Nixon talked to us very clearly about this matter and showed that the United States, during the discussions it had with countries in Asia through which it passed on its way to Romania—more exactly Indonesia, Thailand, the Phlipines and India—does not support this.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: The Rogers-Gromyko meeting is set to take place in September.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Has Rogers come to see you, have you met him?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: No.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Have you met Kissinger?

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Yes, he came with Nixon. He is a close friend of his. Kissinger gives the impression that he is a very well-informed person. He is a close collaborator of Nixon’s; he [Nixon] had very appreciative things to say about Kissinger. He always presented him as some kind of celebrity “the famous Harvard professor.” He is a history professor, a great specialist in matters of history, a great scholar. During the discussions I think he proved he has an analytical, penetrating character. He rarely intervened in the discussions.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: At the previous meeting you were saying, Comrade Mizil, that you wish to discuss certain issues on a party line. Comrade Kang Sheng is present, so we can discuss.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: I would like to say a few things. First of all, how do we interpret the meeting that took place in Moscow? You are aware that the initiative of the meeting dates a long way back. We had a point of view that we maintained until the end, more exactly that the conditions for a meeting of communist and workers’ parties are not met.

First of all, a large number of parties from socialist countries are missing, among them being some frontline parties in the fight against imperialism; parties from capitalist countries are missing; serious anti-imperialism movements from Africa and Asia—that have generally been weakly represented—are missing. The most important fact that led us to this conclusion is the existence of the tense situation in the international communist movement. In spite of all these, we decided to participate at the conference. The way events took place reinforced this initial opinion. By participating at the conference, we had the possibility to tell our opinions more broadly and to reaffirm our point of view concerning the necessity of certain relations between communist and workers’ parties, based on mutual respect, independence of parties, noninterference in the affairs of other parties, the right of every party to decide its internal issues, its political stance and its entire activity. The event in Czechoslovakia had the opportunity to reinforce this position. In Budapest, in 1968, we were the only party that expressed such a point of view. Later, a great number of parties expressed the point of view with clarity.

In regards to the meeting itself, it was seeking, first of all, to obtain a condemnation of the Chinese Communist Party. In spite of all these, the well known attacks took place during the meeting. We believe that one clear thing in this issue is that they did not manage to obtain a condemnation of the Chinese Communist Party. A resolution condemning the Chinese Communist Party was proposed by the party from East Pakistan—I am not even sure such a party exists; I did not see its representative at the Moscow meeting.

Cde. Kang Sheng: He is Indian.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: We intervened and demanded that this project not be discussed by any branch. Comrade Ceausescu demanded and had a discussion with Brezhnev on this subject. He asked clearly not to discuss this project, under any circumstance, not in the conference, nor in its committees.

We realized with this occasion that a large number of parties, even some of the ones that spoke against the Chinese Communist Party, did not agree with such a resolution. In the end, this project was not even discussed in the preliminary commissions. At the Secretariat meeting, the Soviet representative said that, since the issue is not on the agenda and we are too busy, we should not even bother with it.

The first conclusion that we reach is that the plan to condemn the Chinese Communist Party did not succeed.

Secondly, this conference was summoned with the goal of reestablishing a certain discipline among the communist parties, of reestablishing the supremacy of the CPSU in the communist movement. In our opinion, not even this objective was reached in the end. A large number of parties—14—either didn’t vote for the document, partially voted, or voted with reservations. If during the preliminary meetings the idea of subduing the minority in front of the majority frequently appeared, during the conference, almost no party invoked this principle. They realized they had no chance to win.

We consider the right of every party to participate or not participate at a conference, the right of every party to be sovereign in its decision, to sign or not to sign the documents, was recognized at the meeting.

The third thing that we consider important is that during the conference, a number of parties largely expressed their opinions openly concerning the relations between socialist countries, between communist parties. These were: the Romanians, the Spaniards, the Dominicans, the Swiss, the one from Reunion and others. These points of view were published in the press—and this thing is extremely important—including, partially, the Soviet press.

We interpret as positive the fact that the main document contains the principles of relations between socialist countries, between communist and workers’ parties. Regarding this, we had a large number of propositions that were included. Of course, this document contains some things that we don’t agree with. But the fact that these principles are written in a joint document has a certain political significance; if they will be respected or not, this is a different matter.

Finally, we consider extremely important the principle of the development of relations between the parties that participated and even parties that did not participate at the meeting. This hints at new possibilities of development among communist parties. In what we are concerned, we give great attention to this principle. Both parties that were at the meeting and parties that were not at the meeting participated at the congress of our party.

We don’t have any illusions and realize that the affirmation of the new principles in the communist movement will be the result of a long process. As part of this process we wish to have an active role, to develop relations with all parties, and especially, with parties that have new points of view concerning principles in relations between socialist countries and communist parties.

I wish to emphasize that we made contact with a large number of communist parties both during the preliminary conference and during the conference. We became familiar with new positions, new points of view in a series of parties regarding relations with the Chinese Communist Party. An entire series of parties share the opinion that the respective parties feel the need to revisit their previous positions on the Chinese Communist Party and their relations with it. A series of parties told us openly that they would want the Chinese comrades to know their opinion and their wish of having contacts and develop relations with the Chinese Communist Party. During this [meeting], we transmitted to you these wishes. Among these are, first of all, the Spanish party, Santiago Carillo came to see us a couple times and discussed with Comrade Ceausescu; he raised this issue. The Italian Communist Party, with which we have good relations and in whose press we can observe a process of reevaluating their position towards the Chinese Communist Party. Likewise, the Mexican Communist Party raised this issue, the Workers’ Party in Switzerland—I was in Switzerland a couple months ago and the comrades raised the issue of a possibility of contact with the Chinese Communist Party [while] the Communist Party from Reunion, whose secretary general we met in Hanoi, [raised the issue] the day before yesterday. Likewise, the Communist (Marxist) Party of India, which sent a delegate to our congress, mentioned that it wishes to have contact with the Chinese Communist Party. Also, the parties from Northern European countries, the Australian Communist Party and others.

We believe that it is our duty to inform you about this new element that has appeared in the communist movement, and that, in a series of parties, the process of fighting for the organization of their relations based on certain new principles is also associated with the wish of normalizing relations with the Chinese Communist Party. We also reached the conclusion that we laid out for you, that the Chinese Communist Party can bring, by respecting its relations with other countries, an important contribution to this process of respecting, within the framework of the communist movement, of equality of rights, noninterference in other [countries’] affairs, mutual respect and independence of every party.

Here is, in brief, what we wished to tell you.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: Indeed, there are tendencies in the communist movement towards the independent development of parties instead of joint actions. The communist movement is developing in this direction. There was an Informative Office that functioned in your country. Between 1957-1960 we made efforts to bring a contribution to the development of the movement through the convocation of meetings and the adoption of declarations. It proved, however, that the declarations did not play any role for the communist parties. It was exactly these declarations that some parties did not accept. Since then, every party develops independently; there are problems that some see in one way, others in another way; there are divergences from a theoretical standpoint. These are a result of the fact that imperialism is headed for a fall, while socialism [is headed] for a victory. There are common and distinct elements between us. Even the common elements have to be looked at creatively, taking in consideration the concrete conditions in every country, not in a dogmatic manner. From this perspective, the role of the Warsaw Pact is of enclosure, of restricting the development of the participant countries. The Warsaw Pact functions in the same way as NATO, CENTO [the Central Treaty Organization].

All these point out that the world is transitioning through a period of discord. The communist parties are proceeding through a trying period. It will be proved which parties are capable of leading the revolution.

The international meetings cannot solve the problems. We understood your intentions of opposing China’s condemnation at the meeting, creating an organization, promoting the principle of noninterference. Only these parties that maintain the principles of independence can lead the revolution. The parties that follow others cannot do this—how the parties from Pakistan or Bagdad are just like many others. Presently, parties have to follow a policy of bilateral relations. Otherwise, it would mean letting the revisionist Soviet party work its magic wand.

We told you that we are not interested in this meeting. We have different points of view in this matter. Think that there are countries where there are more parties; actually, this is the way it was in Russia with the Bolshevik party. This is an inevitable problem in the development of the international communist movement, which has to go through this trial of the practice and that will show which grouping in that country is capable of leading the revolution. Even though we opposed the conference, Comrade Mao Zedong showed, several times, that we do not intend to call another conference. This is a matter of principle.

Cde. Kang Sheng: Between us there is the common point of view that the conditions for the convocation of the meeting were not met. But there are differences in the way we look at this conference. We showed that we are not interested. In fact, we didn’t even publish anything regarding this conference. Our answer is actually included in the article published in March of 1965. We saw your good intentions of opposing the resolution condemning China. We consider that it doesn’t matter if China is not condemned in the document, since after the conference an anti-Chinese campaign was unleashed. The declarations from 1957 and 1960 did not play a role. In this matter, our points of view differ. I am not even personally interested in this conference, even though in the past I participated at many conferences. I believe that it would have been better if at the conference a resolution condemning China would have been adopted. Of course, you wouldn’t have signed. But if the Soviets want the gallows, it is better to give it to them, instead of reaching a situation where the condemned is neither dead nor alive. We do not want to deny the good intentions of the Romanian comrades, in the sense that they opposed China’s condemnation at the conference.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: The Albanians had a different position and published a series of articles. If they want to criticize, they can criticize, we cannot reproach this to them. They did not participate. Yugoslavia did not participate either. We do not reproach to you the fact that you participated. If we would have published a serious critique, we would have raised the importance of the conference with this, and the Soviets would have been happy if we would have cursed at them.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: We want you to know that we think the same on many topics that you presented to us. Regarding the document adopted at the conference, you shouldn’t think that we give it too much importance. We didn’t even publish the document in the form of a brochure. We filed it, we are keeping it, but if anyone will reproach us anything because of our relations with a party or another, then we can invoke this document at any time.

Even though the conference did not take place in appropriate conditions and even though it could not solve the numerous problems that our movement is dealing with, it was nonetheless an opportunity to clearly expose the points of view regarding the organization of relations in the communist movement based on the right of every party to decide on its own its policy. And this new development is valuable. An entire series of parties declared that they oppose the politics of coordination. It is true that there are numerous parties that do not oppose being coordinated, but a large number of parties, including some serious parties, said that they oppose this policy. And we believe that this is also valuable. Therefore, it is not the document that gives the conference its value, but the fact that the position of an important number of parties developed here.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu expressed clearly, at the end of the conference, our reservations concerning the document. We believe that the idea of developing bilateral relations is fair and we widely practice this method. We want to continue to develop relations with numerous communist and workers’ parties, to discuss the new problems, what we have in common, what makes us distinct, our differences in opinion. This action has a very important value for our country. It gives us the opportunity to express our solidarity and to feel, in turn, the solidarity of other communist parties. In addition, it gives us the opportunity of affirming our party’s point of view concerning the necessity of organizing relations of solidarity in our movement based on the principles that you have also mentioned.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: To sum up this discussion: the document adopted at the meeting is a model of lack of logic and of triviality. What is affirmed on the first page is contradicted on the second. From this point of view, the document has no value. At the same time, it can cause problems, since everyone can find something arguable within it. And since the most valid interpretation is that of the strongest, the document poses some risks.

We believe, however, that we did the right thing by going to the conference. The conference was dealing with two main issues: reestablishing the conductor’s baton [bagheta] and China’s condemnation. We were interested in both issues. Whether China considers that its condemnation has a value or not, that is your problem. If nobody that was opposing this would have been present at the meeting the baton would have been established. We said: we are going to fight this, especially since we believe that many parties had an oscillating attitude. We adopted positions different that the Soviet Union concerning the baton and concerning China. And we succeeded. This does not mean much for China. For us, however, it is something big: we legalized the right of having a point of view—which can be good or bad. If it is bad, it is fought with ideas, through discussions, not with clubs. This is what we won in Moscow. If you won or lost something, you will analyze this. This was, however, our rationale when we went to the meeting.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: In the international communist movement at the moment there is the tendency of independent self development of parties. There will again come a time when there will be solidarity. There can’t be a revolutionary party that has no influence in its country.

Cde. Kang Sheng: Let’s not be naïve in relation to the fact that the document includes the principles of relations among parties. You said that the most valid interpretation is that of the strongest, so I don’t know if the Soviets will respect them.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: I am really afraid that it is true.

Cde. Zhou Enlai: You are right when you emphasize the fact that more and more parties do not listen to the baton anymore. You rose against the baton and fought against it from the inside, at the meeting. We fought against it from the outside. Let’s fight so that all parties can develop independently!

A last problem before finishing up, since we have more discussions tonight with the Korean comrades, who are leaving tomorrow.

We will soon have the 20th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China. We don’t have the initiative of inviting guests from abroad, being preoccupied with the great cultural revolution, which continues. Additionally, we don’t want to incur high financial expenses. If our friend countries wish to participate, then they can send delegations. For example, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam asked to send a delegation.

If you wish to send a delegation or to delegate your ambassador—we delegated our ambassador to you—then you can proceed as you see fit. In other words, we will salute the delegation or the ambassador. I believe you understand well what I am telling you?! We ask you to inform Comrade Ceausescu, the Romanian Communist Party CC Permanent Presidium about this matter and to decide as you see fit.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer: We understood well the meaning of what you have told us and we will explain the meaning of the decision we will adopt. In any case, I am convinced that the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party knows the extent to which the Romanian Communist Party values its friendship with the CCP. We told you: for us, the support of the Chinese people, of the Chinese Communist Party, of the Chinese state in the promotion of our policy of independence, national sovereignty is extremely valuable. If there would be only this reason and we would show to what extent our people and our party are standing by the Chinese people and party at the 20th anniversary of the proclamation of the republic. Of course, I will report this matter to our leadership and we will be careful to show in detail and in a clear manner why we will adopt a decision or another, being convinced that you will understand well he reasons why we will adopt that decision. There cannot be any misunderstanding.

09/17/1969