Discussion Points from the Meeting with Zhou Enlai

Confidential

September 5, 1972
AP/dm

Discussion Points from the Meeting with Zhou Enlai

1. China – USA Relationship

Zhou speaks of America in a rather friendly manner or with a neutral tone; simply the memory of the handshake that Dulles refused at the Geneva Indochina Conference turns him bitter. 

He marks the beginning of the dialogue with the USA with the visit of Hammarskjold (January 5, 1955), at whose request he let the US pilots free (in June and August 1955). Between 1965 and 1970, there were discussions at the ambassadorial level, which culminated in the Nixon visit. 

The USA is criticized in so far as it is involved in the in Zhou’s words alternating “collision” and “competition” of “superpowers”.

He speaks of the USSR only in a derogatory manner, however. Zhou stresses that the “One China” theory is recognized in the Nixon-Zhou communiqué.  

2. Subcontinent – Bangladesh

There exists and has existed always a friendly relationship between China and the people of the East Bengal. (Zhou was significantly more conciliatory than for example Qiao at the 26^th General Assembly, who compared the situation to Manchuria). China recognizes that the fate of Bangladesh ultimately must be decided by its people. The foreign minister of Bangladesh knows of this Chinese attitude. Beyond that it is certainly not in the interest of Bangladesh to stress the relationship with China. If Bangladesh hence, in spite of this, puts up such absurd demands (admit75tance into the UN, recognition before the recovery of POWs), then only on these grounds: because India and the Soviet Union provoke it to. 

Zhou states that China will [word unclear] in so far as existing General Assembly and Security Council resolutions are not put into effect (the withdrawal of Indian troops and the recovery of POWS). 

Regarding Indian arguments (if no recognition, then no peace and therefore also no recovery of POWs), he refers to the case of Korea, where there was the release of POWs, although merely a ceasefire exists to this day. 

He also alludes to the Indo-Chinese conflict of 1962, during which China freely returned the Indian POWs after the end of hostilities (following the principle of enforcing territorial demands via political means). Zhou repeats that his veto is directed not against Bangladesh but against India and above all the Soviet Union. 

He hopes that the General Secretary will continue his efforts towards a general reconciliation on the subcontinent. He pointed out that Bhutto has already met the domestic preparations for the recognition of Bangladesh and the continuation of negotiations with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was only interrupted through his departure to Great Britain. 

3. Soviet Union

The fact that the Soviet Union has positioned 46 divisions on China’s northern border makes the border negotiations difficult; China does not however let itself be impressed. The Soviet proposal of a world disarmament conference is in its current form lacking in content and meaningless. (Zhou’s remark that China also supported the General Secretary with regards to the recent history of Austria also belongs to this thought. Tang explained to me afterwards that the fact that Austria was occupied by the Soviet Union was not decisive but still meaningful for Zhou and the Chinese; they expect greater sympathy in the assessment of Soviet policies by the General Secretary. [Beyond this, the consideration that Austria was divided also plays a role.])

Zhou is extremely critical  vis-à-vis the USSR. 

4. Financial Issues

Zhou thinks that China would have to provide probably 7% rather than 4% of the budget. Qiao qualified and explained that this at best could be realized at the end of the General Secretary’s term. 

Zhou inquired about the payment contribution of the Soviet Union. 

5. Indochina

After the withdrawal of US ground troops is practically completed, the Vietnam problem presents itself primarily as a political problem, namely the creation of a coalition government from: a) right-wing elements (Thieu); b) the center (the French); c) communist elements (provisional government). Zhou reminisced again about Dulles, who at the time impeded a referendum in which Ho Chi Minh had won against Bao Dai. Indochina would be an ideal territory for the policy of “non-alignment”. Zhou came to speak about De Gaulle and prized his Algeria policy in this context (withdrawal of 800,000 French from Algeria). 

6. Divided States 

Zhou advocates in general for the principle that these states should solve their problems before entry into the UN. He alludes primarily here to Korea and Vietnam, but also goes so far as to not exclude this principle for Germany (dig at the USSR). He alludes to the Schröder visit and his plan to declare the recognition of Beijing by the FRG as a matter above party lines. 

For the Korea question, he applies himself for the Algerian UN proposal. 

7. United Nations and China

a) Admission was expected first for 1972 and later. The General Assembly resolution was unexpected. 

b) The UN has arrived at a turning point that will decide whether it will share the fate of the League of Nations or not. Main problem: credibility, execution of resolutions (here one could latch on and say that just realistic resolutions should be accommodated in order to avoid this problem.)

8. Disarmament

Criticism of the SALT negotiations and the CCD serve the monopolization of atomic weapons by the superpowers. The SALT Agreement merely confined numerical proliferation, which opened the floodgates however to the refinement of weapons (sophistication or horizontal proliferation). Similar to NPT. Disarmament must be decided by all states and not negotiated in small committees. Chinese disarmament plans remain unchanged. He highlights the openness of Laird in a laudatory manner, who demanded great benefits in Congress after the SALT Agreement. 

9. Other

a) Zhou mentions that Sihanouk was recognized in Guyana as the lawful representative of Cambodia. 

b) Mentioned in connection with the Korean War Taiwan’s attempts to sway the Chinese prisoners of war to a return to Taiwan. Qiao Guanhua was the negotiator.