Record of the Third Meeting between Prime Minister Tanaka and Premier Zhou Enlai

Top Secret Indefinite

Prime Minister Tanaka [Kakuei]-Premier Zhou Enlai

(1972 September 25th ~ 28th)

- Japan-China Diplomatic Normalization Negotiations Record -

Asia Bureau, China Section

[…]

In Attendance

Japan

Prime Minister Tanaka

Minister of Foreign Affairs Ohira [Masayoshi]

Chief Cabinet Secretary Nikaido [Susumu]

China Section Chief Hashimoto [Hiroshi]

China

Premier Zhou Enlai

Minister of Foreign Affairs Ji Pengei

Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Liao Chengzhi

Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Han Nianlong

(Note: The following record was typed in September 1988 from the original normalization negotiation records)

[…]

Third Summit Meeting (September 27th)

Premier Zhou: I want to discuss foreign affairs today.

Yesterday we agreed that both peoples of Japan and China reject intervention and that both our countries can deal with our own problems. The reason that such problems came to the fore during the Second World War was because there was a distinction between ideology and action.

Ideology develops regardless of a country’s national boundaries. Marxism did not develop in Germany, but in Russia and China. Because of the developments in communication, ideologies can be transmitted very quickly. No country can interfere with the transmission of ideology. China also prints everyday six million copies of the Cankao Xiaoxi [Reference News] that transmits foreign newspapers and periodicals. There is even criticism of China included in this. In this manner we are having Chinese citizens listen to many opinions and make their own decisions.

If not, they will take issue. Even the statements of [US President Richard] Nixon and [British Prime Minister Edward] Heath are printed. Discussion of ideology cannot be disrupted. Furthermore, only when we inform our citizens can we differentiate between good and evil.

Nixon identified [John Foster] Dulles’ mistake that socialism is monolithic. The United States realized around the end of the 1960s that China and the Soviets, and the rest of the socialist bloc, are not monolithic. The ten countries of the European Community are not monolithic either. The two systems of the world are not monolithic.

It is possible for peaceful coexistence to exist between two countries of differing systems. North and South Korea have begun talks. They have agreed to reject foreign intervention and agreed to hold talks. The Korean Peninsula is headed towards decreasing tensions. The Soviets have reacted negatively and asked how North and South could ever unify given their different systems. Regarding unification, the Soviets are in agreement with the North. However, the North has not been receiving aid from the Soviet for quite some time.

The Japan-North Korea relationship is a bilateral issue. If you allow me one moment to express our view regarding your relations with North Korea, we believe it would be beneficial for the Japanese government to use this current Japan-China summit meeting as an opportunity to improve relations with North Korea. We believe this will be useful to decrease tensions in the Far East.

Mr. Ohira has stated that he wants to include in the joint statement the aim of closing the books of history in order to look ahead to the future with a peace and friendship treaty signed between Japan and China. We agree to this. We want to proceed in the principles of mutual non-infringement, equality, and reciprocity.

PM Tanaka: Japan used to assume that China and the Soviets were a monolithic entity. We had assumed this based on the [1950] Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance and North Korea’s relations with both China and the Soviets. However, the fact that China and the Soviets are not monolithic is starting to be recognized by Japanese people as well.

Because the Japanese suffered at the hands of the Soviets at the end of the Second World War, Japanese people do not take what the Soviets say at face value. We support the unification of North and South Korea on their own accord. However, the Japanese public is anxious whether unification will come to be at the behest of the Soviet Union.

If it is as Premier Zhou has said that North Korea is not under the sway of the Soviets, then I believe that it would be beneficial for the peace of Asia if our nation improved relations with North Korea.

Premier Zhou: The origin of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance lies in the secret Yalta Pact. The Japan issue stems from the Yalta Pact, as well. The United States left the northeast and northwest of China to the Soviets. The Soviets signed a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with the Nationalist Government, but this was done in opposition to Japan. At the time Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] did not know about the Pact of Yalta. The government recognized the independence of Mongolia at this time. Furthermore, they leased land for the Soviet Union’s Sino-Korean railway and also allowed the Soviet advance into the Lü-Da [Lüshun-Dalian] region.

Once the Chinese Communist Party took power, Mao [Zedong] and Zhou travelled to Moscow and secured the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. At that time, Mao and Zhou expressed that China would like to include Mongolia within its household, but the Soviet Union opposed it. However, China got the Sino-Korean Railway [Changchun Railway] back and received a promise that the Lü-Da region would be returned within three years.

There was a portion in that Treaty that dealt with Japan. Although the Treaty is effective for thirty years, the first time that the Treaty produced results was during the first six years. However, when [Nikita] Khrushchev came to power we ignored this treaty.

In 1955, the Soviet Union proposed that a joint Sino-Soviet fleet be created to cooperatively defend the Lü-Da region. Mao Zedong responded that if the Soviets would come from the sea, we would go up into the mountains for a guerilla war.

In June 1959, Khrushchev unilaterally violated an agreement made between China and the Soviet with regard to nuclear power. Even during the Sino-Indian border dispute that was started by Indian incursions, the Soviets backed India.

Khrushchev’s talks with [Dwight] Eisenhower did not go as it liked, so they directed their resentments at China.

The Soviet Union cut-off material aid to China and brought home 1,300 of their technical experts [in July 1960].

The Soviets provided a negative learning opportunity. Since then we have inevitably taken a path of rehabilitation through our own efforts. In July 1963, both parties met in Moscow, but this was that last party-to-party meeting. On July 19, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ruptured talks with our Party. The following day, on the 20th, the trilateral Partial Test Ban Treaty was concluded [between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union]. Khrushchev was an unreliable person. That is why we placed great expectations in [Leonid] Brezhnev. However, the policies of Brezhnev did not differ from Khrushchev’s and talks with the Soviet Union did not proceed well.

Mao Zedong had told [Alexei] Kosygin that China and the Soviets are both calling each other dogmatists and revisionists. This would mean both China and the Soviet Union are not socialist. Kosygin asked how long he intended to contest the issue. Mao answered that he would dispute the issue for 10,000 years. Kosygin replied that that it is too long. Mao finally retorted that for Kosygin’s sake he would take off 1,000 years and settle to contest the issue for 9,000 years.

However, Mao believed that, separate from the party-to-party relationship, the bilateral relation could be improved. We concluded a three-year long-term trade agreement, but the Soviets broke it off in a year.

In 1969, during the 20th anniversary of the People’s Republic’s founding, Kosygin came to Beijing on the way back from Ho Chi Minh’s funeral. He met and spoke with Zhou for three hours. Because there were border disputes between China and the Soviet Union, I expressed that we wished to raise the national border issue.

There was an unequal treaty concluded between Czarist Russia and China. Lenin called attention to this following the Russian Revolution. In reality, when the national boundaries were delineated by the treaty, no actual surveys were conducted. The line was simply drawn using a pencil.

China proposed the following three points concerning the Sino-Soviet border:

1. Maintain the status quo;

2. Renunciation of the use of war;

3. Modifications to disputed areas.

Kosygin agreed to the proposals and talks began on October 20, 1969, but even after three years we still do not have even a provisional agreement.

China has demarcated boundaries with many bordering countries. The only boundaries that are not demarcated are with the Soviet Union and India.

Therefore, it is as if the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance did not exist at all. We asked the Soviet Union if they even had memory of the treaty. They answered that they did. The Soviet Union opposes China with a million troops deployed between Kazakhstan and Mongolia. In Mongolia alone they have six divisions positioned towards China. Can the Soviets still be called a nation allied to China? It is as if the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance does not exist. We have dealt with the Soviets repeatedly, but we have learned our lesson.

With regard to Taiwan, the Nationalist Government is only scaring Japan.

PM Tanaka: Although the Soviets had concluded a non-aggression pact with Japan, when the tides of war turned against Japan, they kicked open the gallows’ trapdoor. We cannot trust the Soviet Union.

Premier Zhou: We understand that it would be difficult for Japan to talk to the Soviet Union. We believe it is difficult to take back those four islands [the Northern Territories or the Southern Kurils].

PM Tanaka: The issue with fishing is difficult as well.

Premier Zhou: Although we have not had formal relations between Japan and China, we have been able to make progress on the fisheries issue in the East Sea and Yellow Sea and Japan-China relations in this regard have gone smoothly.

This is a change of subject, however; in light of history, the Chinese side is worried about Japanese militarism. From henceforth, I want for there to be much mutual exchange between Japan and China, and to see the actual state of affairs in Japan.

PM Tanaka: Militarism will never be revived. The militarists are an extreme minority. Since the war the lower house has held eleven elections, seven local combined elections, and there have been nine upper house elections. It is impossible to change the state through revolution. Furthermore, it is impossible to change the constitution without a two-thirds vote in the Diet.

The Japanese people are keenly aware of the losses that territorial expansion brings.

Currently, the Japanese only produce two children. At this rate, the Japanese people will disappear in 300 years. There is no reason to fear Japan.

Premier Zhou: The person responsible with the administration is important.

PM Tanaka: (After explaining the Plan to Remodel the Japanese Islands) There is no money to spend towards the revival of militarism.

Premier Zhou: How would Japan cope with nuclear war? The Soviets advocate a ban on nuclear war and a ban on the use of nuclear arms, but this is clearly a fraud that needs to be revealed. There is the possibility that non-nuclear states may be tricked by such Soviet swindles. The prospect of the Soviet proposal at the 27th United Nations General Assembly [1972] is dangerous, so we want to reveal their proposal for the fraud that it is. If countries believe the Soviets, they will render themselves defenseless. They are holding the ultimate weapons while telling others not to. The Soviets know that both the US and China will oppose the proposal that they are planning to make at the United Nations. They are still planning on making the proposal in order to advertise that the US and China are in alignment.

We have already told the Soviets to swear that they would never deploy nuclear arms in a first strike against non-nuclear states. If they believe that nuclear arms are unnecessary, they should abandon all nuclear arms and place them under international observers’ supervision.

The Soviets have spoken about banning nuclear weapons, but have never mentioned the disposal of nuclear arms. This is a fraud. If we lose our sense of skepticism towards the Soviets, we will be taken advantage of by the Soviets.

PM Tanaka: With Japan’s industrial power and level of scientific and technology expertise, it is possible to manufacture nuclear arms, but we will not. Furthermore, we will never maintain nuclear arms.

Premier Zhou: The Japan-US Security Treaty has unequal aspects.  However, they know that they cannot immediately dispose of this. This is because if Japan is not under the US nuclear umbrella, then Japan would lose its right to voice their opinion.

PM Tanaka: You say the United States is aggressive, but the United States has protected the democratic nation against the monolith of communism. I do not believe that the United States has aspirations for territorial expansion or plans for aggression. Therefore, the improvement of relations with the United States is not only useful for Asia, but is also useful for world peace.

Premier Zhou: Expansionism and aggressiveness were behind the actions of the United States during the Second World War. However, now the United States has fattened other countries and is suffering because of it.

PM Tanaka: The United States believes that China has no plans for aggression against third countries. The United States will not intervene in other countries’ own issues. I believe that the United States has no aggressive intentions. However, if they acted aggressively, the country will not last. This is my frank assessment of the United States. After concluding Japan-China diplomatic normalization, I hope that you will deepen your understanding of Japan-US relations.

Premier Zhou: The issue that China and the United States find the most difficult to agree on is Vietnam. The issue of North and South Vietnam is fundamentally different from the issue on the 38th Parallel [in Korea].

The United States is responsible for its policies in Vietnam and Indochina. The Laos issue is the doing of the CIA. I have told [Henry] Kissinger the same thing. The United States is maintaining a decrepit shack, the Vietnam War has cost more in blood and treasure than the Korean War. On the other hand, China has an obligation to Vietnam.

The greatest problem during the Nixon visit is the Vietnam War.

The Jiang Jieshi issue will be eventually solved. Now, Indochina is the issue.

Dulles’ policy tried to pry Taiwan away from the continent and place Taiwan under the United States’ protection. However, Jiang did not listen to the United States. Jiang is an individualistic person. The United States attempted to force the Nationalist Government to withdrawal its forces from Jinmen [Kinmen or Quemoy] and Mazu [Matsu]. This is because Jinmen and Mazu are not in the defensive scope of the United States. Jiang Jieshi was enraged. Seeing this we bombarded Jinmen and Mazu. With this, Jiang gained the pretext to defend Jinmen and Mazu. We decided on bombarding the islands only on odd days of the month.

Kissinger said that “we do not challenge the fact that all Chinese maintain that there’s only one China.” This is Kissinger’s masterpiece.

Regarding the European affairs, they are embracing the illusion of peace. However, this is simply because they are being tricked by the Soviet Union.

PM Tanaka: What are your thoughts on the Senkaku [Diaoyu] Islands? There are many people who ask about this issue.

Premier Zhou: I do not want to discuss the Senkakus at this time. It is not right to discuss this matter now. Because there is oil, it is a problem. If there was no oil, neither Taiwan nor the US would be an issue.

Following normalization of diplomatic relations, after how many months will we exchange diplomatic missions?

FM Ohira: We will use all means necessary, but we cannot include a specific number of months within the joint declaration. It is because it would not be good if we missed that deadline by even one day. We want for you to trust us, based on the two of us coming to visit China, that we will exchange embassies as soon as possible.

Premier Zhou: “As soon as possible” is sufficient. I will trust you both.

PM Tanaka: Mutual trust is important. Therefore we hope that you do not believe that Japanese militarism will be revived or that an aggressive policy will be revived.

Premier Zhou: I am more sensible than Japan’s Socialist Party. The Socialist Party noisily insists on demilitarization, but I told them that it is only a matter of course that Japan has defense capabilities.

PM Tanaka: We thank you for this.

Premier Zhou: We are thinking about the Indochina issue first and the Taiwan issue second. The liberation of Taiwan is a domestic issue, and therefore it can be left for a later time.

[…]