Discussion of the German Question at a Private Meeting in the Office of the CPSU CC General Secretary

26 January 1990

(Present were: Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, Shevardnadze, Kryuchkov, Akhromeyev, Chernyaev, Shakhnazarov, Yakovlev, Falin, and Fedorov)

Gorbachev. We are now with the GDR like with our own Azerbaijan: no one on whom to rely, but no one with whom to have confidential relations. But if it is also possible to come to agreement with someone this does not have conclusive consequences. Even Modrow is pushing away from the SED. It is not important that he is our sincere friend. There is no real strength in the GDR.

Accordingly, we can only influence the process through the FRG. And here we are [faced] with a choice: Kohl or the SDPG [the Social Democratic Party of Germany]. The Social Democrats, with all the soothing statements and vows of Brandt and his colleagues - have rushed to use the GDR in the election campaign.

Brandt is already the Chairman of the United SDPG. Prominent members of this party are ready to stand for the Volkskammer, to abandon membership in the Budestag, and return home, to East Germany, where a majority of them were born. They are striving to get around the CDS [Christian Democratic Union] on this.

We can play in this. It is necessary to invite Kohl and tell him: look what is being done, you can play this game, too, and you can lose. The Social Democrats have bigger chances in the GDR than you. We are not looking at the German question through your electoral eyes, we are looking in a European and world context. Your NATO allies also see it. And you know the difference between what they are saying publicly and what they are thinking.

Well then. Dear Helmut, we are also suggesting that you seriously stand up in German affairs for the European point of view, in deed, and not only in words.

What this means specifically: in the GDR are our troops, in the FRG are NATO troops. This is a real fact ensuing from the legal results of the war established by the victors. And this asserts the right of the four powers to participate in the German process. You, and especially Brandt, do not like it that among the victors is France ("an honorary victor", as you ironically call them). Good. but now it is another reality than in 1945, and let's meet with your, Kohl's, participation, not as a "4" but as a "5". And we'll decide on the Germans' rights and the rights of the rest.

Chernyaev. Mikhail Sergeyevich, in my opinion it is necessary to meet not as a "5", but as a "6", four from the victors and two from the German states.

Gorbachev. Let's discuss this. I continue. The main thing on which no one should count is that a united Germany will join NATO. The presence of our troops will not allow this. But we can remove them if the Americans also remove their own troops. But they still won't do this. And Kohl will still have to reckon with this, as well as the fact that it will require several years to eat up the GDR economically. So there. These years, are at both our and your disposal. Let's use them rationally. And we'll prepare for a 1990 All-European summit meeting.

An action at our initiative with a "5" or a "6" returns us to the role of active and fearless participants of a German settlement. This is an advantageous move.

Shevardnadze. Mikhail Sergeyevich, the main question for Kohl right now is about a "treaty community" which will lead to an FRG-GDR confederation. We don't need to be included in a discussion about reunification. This is not our business. Let the GDR come forward with an initiative. But hold a discussion about the troops only with the United States. I am against an "institution" in which there will be the four victors. This means that the NATO members [NATOvtsy] will be the masters of the situation.

Kryuchkov. The SED's days are numbered. This is neither a level nor a support for us. Modrow is a transitional figure, he is holding on for concessions, but soon there will be nothing to concede. It's worth paying attention to the GDR SDP.

Our people are afraid that Germany will become a threat again. It will never agree with the current borders. It is necessary to gradually begin to accustom our people to the reunification of Germany. Our troops in the GDR are a factor of the overall European process. It is necessary to actively support our friends, the former colleagues of the KGB and MVD in the GDR.

Yakovlev. It is necessary for Modrow to be installed in the SDP and head its eastern part. America needs our troops in the GDR more than we ourselves. It would be good if Modrow came out with a reunification platform, without preconceptions, based on the realities, and we could actively support it. We will win the sympathies of the German people with this. And when doing this it is necessary to refer to the fact that we advocated a united Germany beginning in 1946. But [what about] the conditions? Neutralization and demilitarization. There will be resistance from Britain, France, and the small European countries. We are putting the United States in a situation of hesitation. But we can sit on a hill and look down on the fight from above. As regards the attitude of our people, well right after the war Stalin himself favored the maintenance of German unity. In any event we simply cannot observe further.

Fedorov. This will suit the revenge-seeking forces. According to my information, in West Germany they don't want reunification right now. Modrow offered the idea of a referendum in the GDR, but after 6 May.

Ryzhkov. It is necessary to look at the process realistically. Not to stop it. Right now the whole matter is in tactics because we can't preserve the GDR. All the barriers have already been carried away. Economics is smashing it. All the state institutions have been dissolved. It is an unrealistic matter to preserve the GDR. A confederation, yes. But we should offer a condition for a confederation. It is incorrect to hand everything over to Kohl. If it's like that, then Germany will unleash a Third World War in 20-30 years.

Gorbachev. Both we and Eastern Europe have a process, it is an objective process. And it is already very overheated. Where this process has affected the stronger links: the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Romania, there it pulled harder. The lesson to us is: keep up, don't lag behind, keep reality before [our] eyes all the time.

Even with that very great criticism which they hear, the people will not infringe upon perestroika. Rather, they will not accept  [priemlet - SIC] opponents of perestroika. Our society is the most rotten through of all those like it. And nothing will save it. We began to reform it ourselves. And it's necessary to hang in there, to go forward, and not to lose the initiative. Trampling [would be] disastrous.

There was Brest Peace Nº 1, then we were in the situation of Brest Peace Nº 2. If we don't cope, we are threatened…that they will chop off half the country again. It is very important to understand this. The public is very ideologized, and therefore the real processes are passing us by. But there is no way the Party can be revived.

Of course, the GDR must be singled out. This is a special case. It's not Romania. Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary interest us. They are sick, but they cannot go far away. Poland is a special case. And the GDR is a special case entirely. A strong private sector has remained in Poland. Agriculture is essentially private. But Poland is neither economically, politically, nor historically dependent upon us. It is not necessary to be frightened of Mazowiecki (then the PNR Prime Minister) and his claims, for we have not given the Poles anything in vain. And we have ended up in debt to them. Meanwhile our relations with the Polish people have not improved in the course of perestroika.

The most difficult point remains, the GDR. For it can leave: there is both the FRG and the European community to which it was long attached. There is still a morale factor for us, the reaction of the Soviet people. I would count on possibly winning more time. The main thing right now is to draw out the process, regardless of the end goal (reunification). It is necessary for the Germans, Europe, and the USSR to become accustomed to this goal.

The strategy is this. All of West Germany is, well, interested in not losing ties with us. It needs us, and we need it. But not absolutely. Do we really not need France and Britain? To think so would be a big mistake. The Germans need us. This in turn forces us to reckon with such a dependence. Business circles don't want parasites. There are 58 million [people] in the FRG and 16 million in the GDR. France doesn't want reunification. Britain is afraid of ending up in the background. We should take all these factors into consideration.

So, the main points of the strategy [are]:

1) the relations with the great powers on this problem;
2) the Vienna process (talks about conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe);
3) we and the SED;
4) we and the FRG;
5) we and the GDR.

Do not reject the position of the victors. Offer the idea of "4 + 2". But first come to agreement with France. Maybe I am to go to Paris?

Channel the German question into the Vienna process. But stay the course on the problem of troops in Europe so it doesn't appear that we are simply withdrawing on the 50^th anniversary year of Victory. Closely tie the presence of the troops in Germany with the Vienna process.

And tell Kohl, do not meddle. We can come to agreement with everyone about this part. The potential of special relations is preserved with the FRG: both with it and with the GDR. This needs to be insisted upon. There are mutual interests, and there is a basis for mutual understanding.

We and the SED: there is euphoria there right now with regard to the SED. But they have forgotten that here there are a lot of problems, both European and German. Don't give up on the SED. There are still two million members there. Let 700,000 be left now. It would be irrational to totally write them off. Some kind of left-wing force will crystallize out. We'll listen to Gysi. The other socialist countries. It's necessary to work with him [Translator's note: s nim - SIC; s nimi - "with them" would be expected]. They are allies all the same. If we throw them away, they'll be picked up [podberut].

The suggestion of a "treaty community" with features of a confederation meets the idea of playing for time.

We will restrain those who are in a great hurry.

What are the next steps?

1. Receive Modrow in Moscow on 2 February, and then Gysi. We have moral obligations here.

2. Receive Kohl after Baker and right after Modrow. And then inform Modrow about the conversation with Kohl.

3. Draw up ideas for a discussion with Kohl on the basis of the conversations with Baker and with Modrow.

4. Inform Thatcher right after the meeting with Modrow.

5. Write a letter to Mitterrand. The question is, when to change ambassadors?

Shevardnadze. This is the central issue.

Gorbachev. Assignments:

- propaganda support of the processes in Eastern Europe (Yakovlev, Falin, and Fedorov)
- Gorbachev interview about the reunification of Germany after the meetings with Modrow and Kohl;
- do not exclude my brief visit - one day in London and one day in Paris;
- Akhromeyev is to prepare for a withdrawal of troops from Germany. Explain to Kohl and Modrow the "economic exposure" of the GDR.

Falin, Shakhnazarov, Fedorov, Akhromeyev, and Chernyaev also spoke in the course of a detailed discussion.

A record was made right after the meeting, a transcript of which (even minutes) were not kept. The record is incomplete. However, the authenticity of what is in the record which was made is guaranteed by the person who made it.

Record[ed by]A. S. Chernyaev