General-Colonel T. Shtykov to Cde. V.M. Molotov, Report about the Work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission to Implement the Moscow Decision of the Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs concerning Korea

to Cde. Lozovsky

[We] need to discuss [this]

[signature] V. Molotov

6 June

SECRET

to Cde V. M. MOLOTOV

I submit a report about the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission to Implement the Moscow Decision of the Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs Concerning Korea

ATTACHMENT:

1. The report on 27 sheets.

2. “Attachment Nº 1”, a list of questions for consultation with the parties and public organizations, on five sheets.

3. “Attachment Nº 2”, the procedure for consultation with the parties and public organizations, on six sheets.

4. “Attachment Nº 3”, a memo about the operation of the factories of North Korea, the output they have produced and the shipment of products to the USSR, on seven sheets.

HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION of the Joint Soviet-American Commission

General-Colonel – T. SHTYKOV

31 May 1946

Authenticated [illegible signature]

sent:

to Lozovsky (without the attachment [SIC])

Incoming Nº 4314-M

[handwritten:

Incoming 3266-L

716]

…

SECRET

Copy Nº ___

REPORT

ON THE WORK OF THE JOINT Soviet-American Commission to Implement the Moscow Decision of the Three Ministers Concerning Korea

I.

THE SITUATION IN KOREA IN CONNECTION WITH THE MOSCOW DECISION

The negotiations in the Joint Soviet-American Commission have shown that the Soviet representatives and American representatives regard the Moscow decision of the Three Ministers Concerning Korea completely differently. During the work of the Joint Commission [in the spring of 1946], the Soviet delegation thought and insisted that the Moscow decision be observed meticulously, for the Moscow decision guarantees the Korean people independence and development along a democratic path in a short time.

At the same time, the American delegation has tried to distort the substance of the Moscow decision and frustrate its observance. The American military command and the American delegation have encouraged the Korean reactionaries in every way to oppose the Moscow decision, pointing out ways and methods of how the Moscow decision can be evaded. This can be confirmed by a number of facts. First, on the day of the publication of the Moscow decision, the American radio broadcasted a report which said: “A decision was adopted at the suggestion of the Soviet Union at the Moscow Conference of the Three Ministers to establish a trusteeship over Korea for a period of five years”.

Such a report was no accident, inasmuch as the Americans knew that a desire for independence had been expressed among the Korean public circles. Therefore the report of the American radio about the establishment of a trusteeship over Korea caused a wave of protest against the Moscow decision in the South of Korea.

On 29 and 30 December 1945, protest rallies against the Moscow decision were organized in the city of SEOUL at the initiative of the leaders of right-wing organizations (Kim Gu and Syngman Rhee). The American military command not only did not take any steps to explain the Moscow decision and its defense against Korean reactionaries but, on the contrary, began to sympathize with the reactionaries. In addition, BYRNES, speaking on the radio on the question of the Moscow decision on 30 December 1945, made the following statement about Korea. BYRNES declared “that two military bodies will make up the Joint Soviet-American Commission to solve immediate economic and administrative problems”.

The Commission, acting jointly with the Provisional Democratic Government of Korea, can establish that one can do without a trusteeship. Our goal is to hasten the day when Korea will become an independent member of the family of nations! [Translator’s note: SIC. There is an end quotation mark at the end of the previous paragraph, but this paragraph reads like a continuation of the quotation, albeit without any indication of the end of the quotation].

Such a statement by the Secretary provided an opportunity for the American military command in South Korea and Korean reactionaries to oppose the Moscow decision. However, both the Korean reactionaries and the American military command laid all the “fault” for the establishment of a trusteeship on the Soviet Union. The Korean reactionaries unleashed a broad campaign against the Moscow decision and also against the conference of the representatives of the Soviet and American commands convened in accordance with paragraph 4 of the Moscow decision.

As the Seoul press reported a seven-day plan was developed of demonstrations and protest rallies against trusteeship.

At an unofficial meeting with General ARNOLD , he expressed bewilderment and surprise that the American command had allowed such actions, after which this seven-day plan was cancelled by the military administration.

We passed the TASS report published in the Soviet national press pointing out the factual aspect of how the question concerning Korea was discussed at the Moscow Conference of the Three Ministers to the Korean newspaper correspondents and it was published in all Seoul newspapers with the exception of two reactionary newspapers, “The Democratic Party” and “The Independence Party”.

But in the South of Korea, the left-wing organization did not manage to organize explanatory work around the TASS report inasmuch as the American military command had established strict censorship.

At the start of the work of the Commission, that is, at the moment it opened, there was an exchange of speeches by both delegations. General HODGE, opening the meeting of the Commission, did not say anything substantive about the goals and missions which the American delegation had set for itself.

At the same time in its speech, the Soviet delegation laid out the goals and missions which should be achieved by the Joint Commission and expressed its attitude toward the Moscow decision and the reactionary parties which have opposed this decision.

The Korean public reacted this way to both speeches:

“HODGE made a beautiful speech, but said nothing [about] what missions the American delegation was pursuing, while General SHTYKOV laid out the program for the work of the Commission to carry out the Moscow decision.

II.

THE WORK OF THE Commission

At the first meeting of the Joint Commission, the American delegation submitted two documents for consideration.

In the first document, the American delegation proposed taking the so-called democratic chamber which exists under the American command in South Korea as the basis of a Consultative Union, adding to it from the representatives of the democratic parties of North Korea.

According to the American draft, the left-wing parties of South Korea in the Democratic National Front are not invited to consult. In the opinion of the Americans, the Consultative Union should pursue all [its] work to work out a position on a Provisional Government and to draw up lists of members of the Provisional Government.

The Commission would be left to only approve these proposals and submit [them] for the approval of their governments.

The second document is about the creation of a staff for the future Provisional Government. The Americans proposed taking the Korean civilian personnel of the American military administration as the basis of this staff. This same document provided for the immediate, that is, within 30 days, consolidation of the entire economy of Korea, both its northern and southern parts. However, the economy of all of Korea should have been subordinated to the civilian staff of South Korea, actually the American military command.

The Soviet delegation submitted its own proposals.

The first proposal laid out the procedure for the work of the Joint Commission. The second proposal [laid out] the procedure and terms for consultation with parties and public organizations.

After a lengthy discussion, the American delegation agreed to accept our proposal about the procedure of the work of the Commission with small changes which did not have great importance.

As a result, the Joint Commission adopted the following decision.

“The Joint Commission has decided to break its work to fulfill the decision of the Moscow Conference of the Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs Concerning Korea into two stages.

The first stage is to determine the following implementation of paragraph 2 of the Moscow decision concerning Korea.

The second stage, the implementation of paragraph 3 of the Moscow decision.

In the first stage, to define the following program of the work (the agenda):

1. The terms and procedure for consultation with the democratic parties and public organizations.

2. A preliminary drawing up of a political platform and other appropriate measures for the future Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

3. The drawing up of recommendations for the structure and principles of organization of the Provisional Democratic Government and local bodies (a provisional statute).

4. The drawing up of recommendations for the personnel of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government.”

It was decided to create three Subcommissions in accordance with the work program adopted by the Commission.

1^st Subcommission – for the study and drawing up of terms and the procedure for consultation with democratic parties and public organizations.

2^nd Subcommission – for the drawing up of recommendations concerning the structure of the Provisional Democratic Government and local government bodies.

3^rd Subcommission – for the preliminary drawing up of a political platform and other appropriate measures for the future Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

After brief discussions, a list of questions for presentation to the parties and public organizations concerning consultation with them was drawn up in the second and third Subcommissions and approved by the Joint Commission (the text of the approved questionnaire is attached).

The main differences in the Commission arose about point 1 of the program of the work, “Concerning the terms and consultation procedure with the democratic parties and public organizations.”

The Soviet delegation submitted the following proposal concerning this point: “The Joint Commission should not consult with those parties and organizations which oppose the decision of the Moscow Conference of the Three Ministers Concerning Korea”.

Such a proposal by the Soviet delegation was motivated by the fact that the Joint Commission had been created to implement the Moscow decision. Accordingly, the Joint Commission should consult and listen to the opinions and suggestions of only those parties and organizations which agree with the Moscow decision and support it; it cannot be otherwise, for the substance of the work of the Commission is the implementation of the Moscow decision and nothing else.

In its work, the Commission should depend on and take into consideration the opinions and suggestions of those Korean parties and organizations which fully support that program of the revival of an independent Korean country which was put on record by the Moscow decision. Only on such a condition will our Commission be able to have guarantees that the Moscow decision with respect to Korea will be implemented and that the future of Korea as an independent country be guaranteed.

The American delegation began to object to the proposal of the Soviet delegation, declaring that this contradicted the American understanding of democracy, that such a condition (concerning the necessity of support for the Moscow decision) for parties and organizations with which the Commission should consult is not mentioned and not implied in the Moscow decision, that the American delegation views the use of this condition as an overstepping of the authority by the Commission, and that it does not see any need to demand the parties and organizations to support the Moscow decision on the condition that the parties with which the Commission will consult be actually democratic in their goals and methods and ready to cooperate with the Commission to support it in fulfilling its missions.

The American delegation thinks that a hostile attitude toward paragraph 3 of the Moscow decision, where it speak about a trusteeship, is a completely natural reaction of every Korean patriot and, subject to the faithful obedience on his part to the decisions of the Commission and a desire to put these decisions into effect, nothing more is required from him.

A lengthy discussion then developed.

The American delegation categorically refused to impose any conditions on the parties and public organizations which would make a demand of them to support the Moscow decision.

In one of the meetings, the head of the American delegation, General ARNOLD, declared that “inasmuch as our democratic principles are different, we cannot come to an agreement in the Joint Commission [underlined by hand]. And furthermore, I fear that the differences in the understandings about the systems of the political parties caused by the existence of a one-party system in the Soviet Union and a multi-party system in the US could lead to more fundamental differences.”

Further, concerning trade unions, ARNOLD declared: “here, what is more, our mutually differing notions of the role of different forms of public organizations such as trade unions will cause fundamental differences that are as difficult for resolution, if resolvable at all, as the problem of elimination facing us”.

And , “our mutually differing notions about democratic practice will give us completely different ideas about the type of governmental structure which we will propose. If you have any doubt on this question, I would advise you to compare the American Constitution with the Stalinist [one].”

In reply to this statement, the Soviet delegation told the American delegation that the differences of our political systems cannot serve as an obstacle to the implementation of the Moscow decision concerning Korea, for the Soviet delegation is not guided by its Constitution and does not desire to establish Soviet ways in Korea and that the American delegation ought not be guided by the American Constitution in the implementation of the Moscow decision. The task of the Joint Commission is to meticulously implement the Moscow decision.

The American delegation again began to insist on creating a Consultative Union of Koreans who, they say, know Korea better than the representatives of the American and Soviet commands and therefore allows them to prepare their own proposal themselves about the personnel composition of the government and drawing up a provisional statute of the government.

The Soviet delegation insisted on their own proposals.

Convinced that the American delegation was categorically refusing to give their agreement to removing the parties which had opposed the Moscow decision from participation in consultation and desiring to move the negotiations off the deadlock, the Soviet [delegation]… [Translator’s note: some words were apparently lost between pages]…compromised and, with the permission of Moscow, made a proposal containing a concession that the Commission could consult with all parties, including with parties which opposed the Moscow decision, on a condition that they adopt a decision of their governing body to support the Moscow decision of the Three Ministers Concerning Korea and publish it through the press.

We also warned the American delegation that the Soviet delegation would categorically object to these parties assigning as their representatives for consultation in the Commission people who had compromised themselves by statements against the Moscow decision, and would also not allow them to take part in the government being created.

After our proposals, the American delegation again began to object, arguing that no conditions needed to be imposed on parties and organizations in the form of demands for support of the Moscow decision.

A lengthy discussion sprung up, as a result of which a decision was nevertheless reached which provided for the parties or public organizations desiring to take part in consultation with the Commission signing statements of support for the Moscow decision.

The content of the decision is as follows:

“The Joint Commission will consult with Korean democratic parties and public organizations, which are actually democratic in their goals and methods, to sign the following statement:

“We…declare that we will support the goals of the Moscow decision concerning Korea as is presented in paragraph 1 of this decision, namely the restoration of Korea as an independent country, the creation of conditions for the development of the country on democratic foundations, and the fastest possible liquidation of the long Japanese occupation of Korea. We will further support the decision of the Joint Commission to implement paragraph 2 of the decision regarding the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government. , we will assist the Joint Commission in its development of proposals regarding the measures envisioned by paragraph 3 of the Moscow decision with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

Signature: representatives of the parties or organizations.”

After the adoption of this decision, the 1^st Subcommission began the development of the consultation procedure, the compilation of lists of the parties and public organizations, and the drawing up of a document regarding the procedure for consultation with democratic parties and public organizations.

Our draft proposals were taken as the basis during the drafting of the document about the consultation procedure with the parties and public organizations (the document is attached).

Big disputes erupted about point two of this decision.

The Soviet wording of point 2 is as follows:

“After the approval of the lists of Korean democratic parties and organizations, the Joint Commission notifies the national bodies of these parties and public organizations with an official letter that their parties or organizations are invited to consult, for which they are to select their representatives from among party or public organization members who have not compromised themselves with active opposition to the Moscow decision or to the Allies.

The parties and public organizations provide the representatives they have selected with the proper authority and officially notify the Commission of the selected representative or

representatives, reporting their first and last names, places and years of birth, and the positions that they occupy in the party or public organization.”

The American delegation objected to the following words in this point and demanded their exclusion: “from among members who have not compromised themselves with active opposition to the Moscow decision or to the Allies.”

The lengthy discussion which developed both in the Subcommission as well as in the meeting of the Joint Commission did not yield positive results.

The American delegation insisted that, inasmuch as we had agreed to allow parties which had opposed the Moscow decision to participate in consultation with the Commission on condition they sign a statement of support of the Moscow decision, no other condition ought to be imposed on the parties, and the Commission should allow any leader to consult with whoever the parties select, regardless of whether they have opposed the Moscow decision or not.

The American delegation submitted its own following draft of point 2 with the stipulation that it not be published in the press:

PROPOSAL OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION

3. May 1946

A. In connection with the document of the Joint Commission regarding the consultation procedure with the democratic parties and public organizations, and paragraph 2 in particular, we agree to the following:

B. If a representative chosen by a democratic party or public organization does not satisfy one of the delegations because of the dubious legitimacy of his right to speak for the party which he claims to represent, or because of its attitude toward the Moscow decision or toward one of the Allies (the US or USSR), the Joint Commission will decide on the possibility of asking the democratic party or public organization to appoint someone else for consultation with the Joint Commission.

C. This agreement is made at the request of the Soviet delegation, which says:

“If any democratic party or public organization appoints a representative who has compromised himself with active opposition to the Moscow decision of the Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs and one of the Allies (the US or USSR) the Soviet delegation declares that it will protest the Commission consulting with them.”

D. The American delegation declares that “in its opinion, any representative whose attitude toward the Moscow decision matches the attitude of his party or organization can be involved in consultation as indicated in the declaration on consultation published in Communiqué Nº 5.”

E. This agreement will not be published.

As is evident from this draft, the American delegation created an advantageous position for itself and had an opportunity to decline to take part in consultation for representatives of democratic parties and public organizations, at the same time demagogically declaring that, in its opinion, any representative can be involved in consultation regardless of whether he opposed the Moscow decision or not.

The Soviet delegation could not agree with this draft and insisted on the adoption of point 2 in its wording.

When drawing up the lists of parties and public organizations for consultation, the American delegation demanded that the list of parties and public organizations be drawn up in common, that is, the democratic parties and public organizations of South Korea and the democratic parties and public organizations of North Korea.

We sent Commission member General LEBEDEV, who was charged with drawing up a list of parties and public organizations of North Korea and getting the parties to sign statements of support for the Moscow decision, to Pyongyang.

On 25 April, the Soviet delegation delivered to the American delegation a list of parties and public organizations and their statements.

The American delegation submitted only a list of parties and public organizations, referring to the fact that the compilation of the list of parties did not at all require their statements of support to the Moscow decision. However, in the list submitted by the American delegation for South Korea, only three left-wing parties and organizations of the 20 parties were included. Such very large organizations as the ?personnel union? [kadprofsoyuz], Peasant’s Union, the Democratic League, the youth league, and others were not represented, while six religious organizations were represented in the 20 parties and organizations.

The Soviet delegation, guided by the 17 April decision of the Joint Commission, demanded that the American delegation submit a list with statements of support of the Moscow decision by the parties and public organizations.

At the 25 April Commission meeting, a final deadline of 30 April was set to send in the statements.

On 27 April, left-wing parties in the Democratic National Front sent their statements of support for the Moscow decision to the Joint Commission.

At the same time, right-wing parties in the Democratic Chamber did not submit these statements by 30 April.

The reason for the delay for right-wing parties sending in statements was that after the publication of Communiqué Nº 5, which presented the decision of the Commission demanding the parties and public organizations sign statements of support of the Moscow decision, the right-wing parties opposed this decision and refused to give such statements to the Commission.

The Democratic Chamber held five meetings in which the question of whether to sign this statement was discussed. Only on 1 May 1946 was the following decision of the Democratic Chamber adopted:

“After a lengthy discussion of Communiqué Nº 5, we have come to the conclusion that signing statements means joint actions with the American-Soviet Joint Commission in the matter of creating a Provisional Government and that after the creation of a government, we can oppose trusteeship, so HODGE told us about this.

The Democratic Chamber permitted its political parties and public organizations to act together with the American-Soviet Joint Commission.

1 May 1946 The Democratic Chamber”

After the decision of the Democratic Chamber, the right-wing parties and public organizations handed in their statements on 1 and 2 May.

After the publication of Communiqué Nº 5, the right-wing parties continued to oppose both the Moscow decision and the 17 April 1946 decision of the Joint Commission. The American military command in the person of General HODGE , also distorted the substance of the Moscow decision in their statements, declaring that if the Koreans are against trusteeship, then there could not be one.

The 1 May decision of the Democratic Chamber directly indicated that the right-wing parties should take part in consultation to join the government and then again opposed the Moscow decision and trusteeship.

In connection with such a position of the American representatives and the Democratic Chamber at a meeting of the Joint Commission, the Soviet delegation stated that, inasmuch as the decision of the Democratic Chamber contradicted the decision adopted by the Joint Commission on 17 April and was actually directed against the Moscow decision, the Soviet delegation did not consider it possible for the Commission to consult with the parties and public organizations in the Democratic Chamber.

Then, at the 6 May meeting the American delegation made the following proposal:

“Halt the discussion of the question associated with the formation of a Provisional Government and move to the solution of the 2^nd question about the economic consolidation of Korea and the elimination of the “38^th Parallel,” declaring that if the Soviet delegation did not agree to discuss the question of the “38^th Parallel,” then we have no alternative other than to close the meeting.

We gave a detailed explanation to the American delegation and we insisted on top priority to the formation of a Provisional Korean Government and not the economic unification of Korea.

Then General ARNOLD made the following proposal:

“The preceding statement of the American delegation is clear. Since the Soviet delegation refuses to discuss the question of reunification in accordance with paragraph 2 of the Moscow decision concerning Korea, then before the question of consultation is clarified there is nothing left for the Commission to do except to close the meeting”.

We explained to the American delegation that there is no question of the economic consolidation of Korea in paragraph 2, but it talked of the formation of a Provisional Korean Government.

However, inasmuch as the American delegation did not desire to discuss the question of the formation of a government then therefore at the suggestion of the American delegation, the meeting of the Joint Commission was closed.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION

After the liberation of Korea from Japanese rule, political parties and public organizations began to be created both in the South and in the North of Korea. However, all the political parties strived to make their goals and tasks public and under a democratic flag. In the first days of their existence these parties did not have specific programs of goals and tasks.

The sharp division of the parties with a determination of their true face, their actual intentions, and political purposefulness occurred after the publication of the Moscow decision of the Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs concerning Korea.

The genuinely democratic parties and public organizations spoke in favor of the Moscow decision as a decision which guarantees Korea development along a democratic path and the acquisition of sovereignty.

In the South a whole series of parties, created mainly of Koreans who had collaborated with the Japanese, landowners, important merchants, and industrialists, and also parties and leaders who had emigrated, in particular, the “Party of the Independence of Korea”, who were political émigrés in China, who arrived from America, opposed the Moscow decision, declaring that the Moscow decision was adopted without consideration for the interests of the Korean nation, that the Koreans are able to create their own government themselves and immediately receive independence.

Thus, two camps had been formed by the start of the work of the Joint Commission to Implement the Moscow Decision in the South of Korea. The camp of the right-wing reactionary parties joined together in the Democratic Chamber under the American military command opposed the Moscow decision and the Soviet Union.

The following are the main parties and organizations in the Democratic Chamber: “The Central Political Council for Independence” headed by SYNGMAN RHEE, and the Korean Independence Party headed by KIM KOO. The Korean Democratic Party, headed by KIM SUNG SU, the Korean National Party, and a number of other parties and public organizations, totaling about 100.

The camp of the leftist parties in the Democratic Chamber joined into the Democratic National Front, which completely supports the Moscow decision. The main parties are: the Communist Party of South Korea, the People’s Party, the New People’s Party, the National Revolutionary Party, and also the women’s alliance, the Peasants Union, the Trade Union Alliance, the Democratic Union of Youth, and others – a total of 15 organizations.

By this time in North Korea all parties and public organizations had advocated support for the Moscow decision. The following parties exist in North Korea: the Communist Party of North Korea, the Democratic Party, the New People’s Party, the Chondoist Party, the women’s alliance, the Union of Democratic Youth, the Peasants Union, and Trade Union Alliance, and a number of other public organizations, numbering up to 50 national [tsentral’nye] organizations.

After the start of the work of the Joint Commission all the leftist parties and organizations of South Korea, and also the parties and organizations of North Korea followed the work of the Joint Commission with great interest. Through their press they mobilized public opinion to support the work of the Joint Commission, explaining to the Korean masses that a Provisional Government would be created in Korea with the aid of the Allies on the basis of the Moscow decision which would reflect the interests of all the Korean people and that Korea could develop along a democratic path and gain independence only under strict adherence to the Moscow decision.

At this same time from day to day on the pages of their newspapers the right-wing reactionary parties in the South of Korea published protests against the Moscow decision, against the trusteeship, declaring that the Koreans themselves would be able to create their own government without the aid of the Allies in the Commission. Articles were specially published in the right-wing newspapers directed against the Soviet Union and against the Red Army located in North Korea.

Afterwards a decision of the Joint Commission was made that the Commission would consult only with those parties which signed a statement of support for the Moscow decision.

The right-wing parties in the Democratic Chamber opposed the decision of the Commission and refused to sign this statement.

The American military command in the person of General HODGE made a statement explaining the decision of the Joint Commission. HODGE declared that the signing of the statement published in communiqué Nº 5 did not at all mean that the parties and public organizations agreed with the trusteeship and that if they opposed the trusteeship then it was possibly that the four countries might decide not to establish a trusteeship in Korea.

Such an explanation by General HODGE encouraged the right-wing reactionary elements, which increased their statements against the Moscow decision, against the left-wing organizations, and against the Soviet Union.

The left-wing parties in the Democratic National Front and also the parties and public organizations of North Korea approved the decision of the Joint Commission of 17 April on the pages of their press, and immediately after the publication of communiqué Nº 5 signed the statement of support for the Moscow decision and handed it to the Joint Soviet-American Commission.

It also ought to be noted that during the time of the work of the Joint Commission the American military command in South Korea and the American delegation did work behind the scenes and even conducted intimidation. This can be confirmed by the following facts: in the Korean newspapers in SEOUL an American radio report was published that an independent government was being created in the South of Korea. The truth is, this report was refused by the American military command, but at the same time representatives of the American military command spread rumors through right-wingers that the government nevertheless was being created and that it is being created because the Joint Commission cannot come to agreement in view of the demands of the Soviet delegation to exclude from consultation a number of parties opposing the Moscow decision, and that representatives of left-wing parties would not be allowed in the government. At the same time General HODGE flew to MACARTHUR in TOKYO, which was widely advertised in the Seoul newspapers, which assessed HODGE’s trip with the purpose of coordinating the question with MACARTHUR of the creation of an independent government in South Korea.

Desiring, on the one hand, to influence the Soviet delegation and to force it to abandon its demands to present conditions to the parties during consultation and, on the other, the American delegation and the American military command strived to divide the left-wing organizations, break up the Democratic National Front, and neutralize the Communist Party.

Many greetings, messages, petitions, and resolutions were received by the Commission from rallies and meetings were received during the work of the Commission.  Such documents totaled 509, of which 257 were letters of thanks, 133 were resolutions, 64 were petitions, etc. These resolutions, greetings, and petitions were mainly from left-wing organizations and expressed gratitude to the allies for the liberation of Korea and also expressed the hope that a democratic government would be created in Korea and that Korea would be granted independence. The letters and resolutions of the left-wing parties demanded that reactionaries not be permitted in the government.

CONCLUSIONS

In our opinion, the real reason for such an attitude by the American delegation toward the Moscow decision and the cessation of negotiations is as follows:

I. During the Moscow Conference of the Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs in December of last year the Americans submitted their draft decision regarding Korea in which there was no mention of immediately granting Korea independence. On the contrary, the American plan provided for the establishment of a regime in Korea for up to 10 years which would not give the Korean rights to any government.

For 10 years Korea should have been controlled by an international administrative organ which is to perform its management through a so-called High Commissar.

The Soviet delegation submitted its proposal regarding Korea for the consideration of the Three Ministers, which was adopted. With the existence of the Soviet proposals in which the interests of the Korean people were in addition taken into account, and the Americans could not insist on their draft since it would have compromised then in the eyes of the Korean people.

Inasmuch as the Americans did not manage to push through their solution, after the end of the conference of the Three Ministers they changed their tactics and policy with respect to Korea and instead of a plan of establishing international control over Korea for a 10-year period, as they had proposed, they began to make a statement about the possibility of immediately granting Korea complete independence. Such a tactic by the Americans pursues two goals in Korea:

a) to try to discredit the Moscow decision concerning Korea which provides for the establishment of a trusteeship of four Powers over Korea and to provoke the Korean reactionaries against it under the flag of immediately granting Korea independence and against the establishment of a trusteeship over Korea.

b) supporting and inspiring the fight of the reactionary elements, the Americans are possibly counting on being able to achieve a reconsideration of § 3 of the Moscow decision, in particular the establishment of a trusteeship, as a result of which they will receive two advantages.

1/ The reactionaries who headed the fight against trusteeship are presented in the eyes of the Koreans as true patriots of Korea who fought and achieved a reconsideration of the Moscow decision with the support of the Americans. Such a circumstance would promote the growth of popularity of the reactionary leaders in the eyes of the Korean population.

This would make the Americans’ task of pushing these leaders into the Provisional Democratic government easier.

2/ This fact would facilitate the United States ensuring it would win sympathy in Korean circles as a country supporting the Koreans in their struggle for being immediately granting Korea independence and, on the contrary, the Soviet Union would be depicted as a power opposing Korea  being immediately granted independence and insisting on establishing a trusteeship over Korea.

3/ The Americans and the reactionaries, having achieved a reconsideration of the Moscow decision, would put all the left-wing Korean democratic parties and public organizations which have taken and take positions of complete and unconditional support for the Moscow decision in a difficult position, fully understanding and seeing in it a guarantee that Korea would be ensured development along a democratic path and the establishment of independence.

The left-wing organizations correctly understand that only with strict adherence to the Moscow decision would Korean be afforded the opportunity to develop along a democratic path and a seizure of power in Korea by reactionaries would not be permitted.

II. As a result of the persistent and consistent demands of the Soviet delegation for strict adherence to the Moscow decision and consultation only with those parties and public organizations which support this decision, a situation developed for the American delegation in which they were not able to push through right-wing reactionary elements into the government.

III. At both the first January conference of representatives of the Soviet and the American commands as well as during the work of the Joint Commission the American command did not manage to unite the economy of Korea and subordinate it to the civil apparatus (the American military administration located in SEOUL); they thereby were not able to seize the economy of Korea and introduce its own capital into it.

IV. The American Delegation objected to the proposals of the Soviet delegation to impose conditions on the parties and public organizations concerning support of the Moscow decision only because it prevented it from creating a government in which a majority of representatives of right-wing parties would be assured; accordingly, their plan to seize the economy of Korea to  introduce its own capital into it with the aid of the government they had created was frustrated.

The adoption of the proposals of the Soviet delegation to present the parties with conditions to support the Moscow decision created favorable conditions for the leftist parties and organizations of South Korea and the democratic parties and public organizations of North Korea; they would be secured a majority in the government, which also meant the frustration of the American plan to seize the Korean economy and establish a reactionary regime in Korea.

V. The American military command is striving to use the interruption in the work of the Commission to break up the leftist organizations in the Democratic National Front, the Communist Party first of all, and to thereby create favorable conditions for the activity of the right-wing organizations in the South of Korea.

We are of the opinion that the behavior of the American Delegation in the Joint Commission and its persistent defense of the reactionaries in Korea are in accordance with that policy which the American government is also pursuing in other countries at the present time. Korea is an advantageous strategic point for the American military clique, but for American capitalists it is an advantageous bridge where their capital can be invested in unlimited quantity.

Taking the above into account, we think that we could not and cannot deviate from the positions we took during the negotiations in the Joint Commission, for we are insisting on the strict adherence to the Moscow decision on Korea. Any deviation or concession of ours would lead a strengthening of the right-wing reactionaries and their infiltration into the  Provisional Government. A government composed of reactionaries would a   rubber stamp in the hands of the Americans, especially considering the fact that the capital of Korea, SEOUL, is in the zone of occupation of the American troops. Such a government created of reactionaries would only harm our interests in Korea and strengthen the position of the Americans in Korea.

SUGGESTIONS

Considering the situation which has developed in Korea in connection with the interruption of the work of the Joint Commission it would be advisable to submit the following suggestions for your consideration.

1. On the question of the resumption of the work of the Commission do not display the initiative since to display initiative on this question means to make some concession to the Americans, to turn to them with a compromise proposal. The initiative in the suspension of the negotiations belongs to the Americans, let them get out of the situation which has been created, and we will listen to what they propose.

2. At the beginning of the work of the Commission on the question of the conditions for consultation with the parties and organizations and their representatives the Soviet delegation in the Commission is to hold to its previous position, that is, to insist that the Commission should consult only with those democratic parties and organizations which support the Moscow decision completely and without any reservation, and that the parties or organizations should not select representatives for consultation with the Soviet [SIC] Commission who have compromised themselves by actively opposing the Moscow decision and against an ally (or one of the allies).

3. In order to make it difficult in some measure for the Americans to repress the left-wing organizations of South Korea we consider it necessary to begin in the press (here in the USSR, in North Korea, and in the foreign press, mainly in the American press) a systematic coverage of all the more or less significant cases of repression, terror, and other kinds of persecution of left-wing organizations in South Korea both by the American authorities as well as by the reactionaries.

4. Expose the nature of the reactionary policy of the Americans in South Korea in the press and on the radio, comparing it to the progressive democratic reforms being carried out by the People’s Committee of North Korea (agrarian reform, etc.)

5. Concentrate our attention in North Korea through political, economic, and cultural channels. For these purposes:

a) examine the question of Japanese industry in North Korea. We consider it advisable to transfer this industry to the ownership of the Korean people (the state). The transfer is to be done through the People’s Committee of North Korea.

b) to help the Provisional  People’s Committee of North Korea on the question of the fastest possible startup of industry put 250-300 Soviet engineers at its disposal for a period of two or three years who can be used for supervisory work at enterprises and trusts.

c) Organize on a contractual basis the supply of the industry of North Korea with the fuel, coking coal, and the various raw material needed to start up the enterprises. Instead of this obtain industrial production (black copper ore, graphite, zinc, tungsten and molybdenum concentrate, etc.) in Korea.

d) In order to help the starving population of the northern provinces of Korea  put up to 100,000 [tons] of food (grains: wheat, cloves, panicum, etc.) at the disposition of the Provisional People’s Committee of North Korea from the reserves available to the command of the 25^th Army in Korea, from the reserves in the storehouses in the city of Dal’niy, and from importing part from the Soviet Union.

e) Allocate a certain quantity of goods to supply the population of North Korea (trucks, textiles, sugar, kerosene, lubricants, gasoline, etc.)

f) Set up a powerful broadcast radio station in Pyongyang.

g) Grant Korean youth the opportunity to enter our secondary and higher educational establishments.

h) in order to strengthen the People’s Committees as forms of democratic self-government hold elections on 15 August, the anniversary of the liberation of Korea, to local government bodies, district and provincial people’s committees. Hold the elections on the basis of direct and secret voting.

HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION

IN THE JOINT COMMISSION

[signature]  /Shtykov/

General-Colonel

31-5-46

four copies/MB

sm/?ab?

[handwritten:

1) Transfer the Consulate  to PYONGYANG

2) [left blank]]

Attachment Nº 1

LIST OF QUESTIONS

for consultation with Korean democratic parties and public organizations on the question of working out recommendations concerning the structure and principles of organization of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and local government bodies (the Provisional Regulation).

A request to present your point of view regarding the structure and principles of organization of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and local government bodies  (the Provisional Regulation) and to hand [it] over to the Joint Commission (date). It is desirable that your reply present your point of view on the following questions in detail in order that the replies be used when drawing up the Provisional Regulation.

1. The rights of the people (A Declaration of Rights, for example: freedom of speech, press, universal suffrage, religion, assembly, inviolability of person, sexual equality, etc.)

2. The general form or nature of the Provisional Government which should be formed.

3. The government body or bodies of the Central Government to implement the executive and legislative functions:

a) whether it is necessary to grant the Provisional Government the right to issue laws until the creation of a legislative body on the basis of holding general elections;

b) the composition and structure of the body or bodies to perform such functions (for example: the organization, the names and functions of the ministries; the name of the chief executive or body to perform the main executive functions; the organization, name, and functions of some body to perform legislative functions);

c) the powers and responsibilities of the different ministers and officials;

d) the election or appointment and replacement of ministers and the other main officials, the body or bodies to exercise executive or legislative functions (for example: the term of service, the continuity in service, the release from a post);

e) the procedure for performing legislative and executive functions;

4. Local government bodies, their formation, structure, authority, and responsibilities:

a/ the method of creating local government bodies (whether the local government bodies of provinces, districts, regions, rural districts, and villages are to be elected or appointed. If elected, then on what principles should the elections be held? If appointed, then by whom?)

b/ the organization and structure of the local government bodies of provinces, districts, cities, rural districts, and villages, including the names, responsibilities, and rights of the local government bodies;

c/ the sphere of activity, rights, and responsibilities of local government bodies (provinces, districts, cities, rural districts, and villages).

5. Judicial bodies:

a/ the organization of judicial bodies (for example: the quantity, nature, and type of courts, the creation of any other judicial organizations);

b/ the rights and responsibilities of the courts and other judicial organizations;

c/ the selection and replacement of judicial personnel (for example: are the members [of courts] elected or appointed, term of service, removal).

6. The procedure for a change or addition to the Provisional Regulation.

Questions not mentioned above which you consider necessary to include in the Provisional Regulation might be put in your reply.

The list of questions for consultation with the Korean  democratic  parties and public organizations on  the question  of  the political platform of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government  worked out by Subcommission  Nº 2 was approved by the Heads of both delegations in the wording proposed by the Joint Subcommission,

LIST OF QUESTIONS

for consultation with Korean democratic parties and organizations on the question of the political platform of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

A. POLITICAL MEASURES OF THE PROVISIONAL KOREAN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

1.The rights of citizens. What rights and responsibilities of Korean citizens, men and women, should be proclaimed in the political platform of    the Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

2. The elimination of Japanese influence. What measures should be undertaken to eliminate the harmful consequences of the prolonged Japanese rule in Korea and the pro-Japanese elements.

3. How should an excessive concentration of economic and political power in private hands be averted and how should the activity of reactionary, anti-democratic elements, and elements trying to undermine the Provisional Korean Democratic Government be prevented.

4. Law and rights.

a/ What policy needs to be followed in the creation of a Korean code of law;

b/ How should the conduct of judicial matters and legal procedure be organized in the Korean language;

c/ How should the democratization of judicial bodies be conducted.

5. What should be the policy with respect to minorities and foreign citizens.

B. THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE PROVISIONAL KOREAN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

1. What measures should there be with respect to the development of agriculture, industry, and transportation to improve production and increase the Korean people’s standard of living.

2. Agriculture:

a/ What should be the policy with respect to landlord agriculture and the land lease system which existed under the Japanese;

b/ What policy should be followed with respect to agriculture:

1/  private ownership of land with no limitation on the right of a peasant’s ownership of land;

2/ private ownership of land with a state limitation on the right of peasants to sell or mortgage land in case the land is received from the Government;

3/ nationalization of land with [its] transfer to peasants for permanent and free use,

4/ what other methods can be proposed of solving the problem of agriculture.

c/ What should be the special policy with respect to land which previously belonged to the Japanese;

d/ If land which belonged to Korean landowners should be transferred to renters, should the landowners receive compensation for the land;

e/ Should the land being transferred to renters be sold to them or transferred free of charge;

g/ What should be policy be with respect to irrigation structure and their use.

3. The organization of industry.

a/ What should be the policy with respect to industrial production and distribution;

b/ What form of property (public, private, or cooperative) should be adopted for each of the following sectors:

major industry (for example, steel and chemical)

medium-scale industry (for example, textile and footwear);

small-scale industry (for example; furniture and agricultural tools);

Banks:

wholesale trade

retail trade;

mineral resources;

forestry;

rail transport;

transportation companies;

insurance;

the fishing industry;

public use enterprises (for example, power stations, pipelines, communications)

the handicraft industry.

4. Labor, wages, and social insurance.

a/ What should be the policy with respect to the minimum wage, maximum hours, and working conditions;

b/  What should be the policy with respect to the labor of children and women;

c/  What should be the policy with respect to workers’ organizations;

d/  What should be the policy with respect to social insurance;

e/  What should be the policy with respect to increasing labor productivity.

5. Trade and prices.

a/ Ought a ration-card system be introduced for basic necessities. If yes, how should this program be accomplished;

b/ What should be the policy with respect to the procurement of the basic food items;

c/ What program of price stabilization and price control ought to be adopted if such a program is needed at all;

d/ What measures of combatting speculation and the concealment  of goods ought to be pursued;

e/  What should be the policy with respect to foreign trade.

6. Finance.

a/ What should be policy be with respect to:

1/ income tax,

2/ property tax,

3/ turnover tax,

4/ export and import taxes,

5/ receipts from state monopolies,

6/ inheritance tax,

7/ other kinds of taxes.

b/ What measures need to be conducted to a unified and healthy monetary system throughout all of Korea;

c/ What should be policy be with respect to balancing the budget;

d/ What measures should be undertaken to combat excessive interest (usury).

C. THE POLICY OF THE PROVISIONAL KOREAN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN THE AREA OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE

1/ What system of education needs to be introduced in Korea in the following fields:

a/ the elimination of adult illiteracy,

b/ compulsory primary education,

c/ secondary school,

d/ higher educational institutions.

2/ Training of personnel. What should be the program for training Korean specialists and skilled workers so they can support the economy and the government apparatus.

3/ National culture. What measures should be undertaken to accelerate the development of national culture and the arts, and also science.

4/ Health. How should public health be organized.

Authenticated:

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION

COLONEL [signature] ZYUBCHENKO

Attachment Nº 2

CONCERNING THE PROCEDURE FOR CONSULTATION WITH THE DEMOCRATIC PARTIES AND PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS OF SOUTH KOREA

1. Guided by the decision of the Joint Soviet-American Commission regarding the conditions for consultation with Korean democratic parties and public organizations, Subcommission § 1 compiled an overall list of approximately 30 of the main Korean democratic parties and public organizations representing various political orientations both in the North as well as in the South of Korea, taking into consideration the numerical strength and, as far as possible, the influence of these parties and organizations, and submitted it to the Joint Commission in Seoul for approval.

For inclusion in the overall list they presented to the Commission: the American delegation – a list of democratic parties and public organizations performing their activity in the South of Korea, and the Soviet delegation, a list of democratic  parties and public organizations performing their activity in the North of Korea.

3. The Korean democratic parties and public organizations of both North as well as South Korea not on a list indicated in point 1, and which fulfill

the conditions of consultation published by the Commission, will also be afforded the opportunity to present their views to the Joint Commission on the questions listed in point 4.

These parties and organizations should send their views to the Joint Commission in Seoul or Pyongyang when the Commission is there. A written declaration should be attached to the letter presenting the views signed by the leadership of the party or organization in accordance with the conditions for consultation published by the Commission, and also brief information about their program and total number of members.

4. After verification of the authority of the representatives of the democratic parties and public organizations of South Korea by the Commission the Commission convenes a joint session to which these representatives of parties and public organizations of South Korea are invited. The head of the Soviet delegation chairs the session in Seoul and the head of the American delegation chairs the analogous session in Pyongyang. At such a conference [SIC – soveshchanie] the head of that delegation in whose zone the conference is held gives the report worked out by the Commission in the name of the Commission. Subsequently, the agenda of such joint sessions of the Commission with the representatives of the parties and public organizations is approved by the Commission.

At the first joint session in Seoul the Commission reveals the list of  parties and public organizations of South Korea and their representatives with whom the Commission will consult, and reads out the present agreement about the consultation procedure worked out by Subcommission Nº 1. Then the Commission suggests that the Korean democratic parties and public organizations present their views by the designated time through their representatives:

a) concerning the political platform and other proper measures for the future Provisional Korean Democratic Government;

b) concerning the structure and principles of the organization of the future Provisional Korean Democratic Government and local government bodies (the Provisional Regulation);

5. After this the Joint Commission goes to Pyongyang, where all those measures which were listed in point 4 are held with the Korean democratic parties and public organizations of North Korea.

6. Having received the offer of the Joint Commission the Korean democratic parties and public organizations of both North as well as South Korea discuss this offer in their national bodies and with the representatives of their local organizations and pursue appropriate work among the population (rallies, meetings, etc.)

7. The views and suggestions worked out by each democratic parties and public organization of both North and South Korea are submitted in writing to the Joint Commission over the signature of their representatives.

8. The Joint Commission sends the views and suggestions received from the democratic parties and public organizations of both North and South Korea for study and working out coordinated proposals to Subcommissions Nº 2 and 3, which create the necessary number of subcommittees for this purpose. Advisers, experts, and technical personnel are appointed by the Heads of the corresponding delegations for work in the Subcommissions and subcommittees.

9.  The Joint Commission will consult separately with the representatives of a particular Korean democratic party and public organization of both North and South Korea from among those included in the list and by mutual agreement of the Heads of the delegations in Seoul, or in Pyongyang, as the Commission deems necessary, will consult with the representatives of a particular democratic party or public organization of both North and South Korea which has submitted its views to the Commission.

In the process of studying the suggestions of the Korean democratic parties and public organizations and the working out of their coordinated suggestions for the Commission the subcommissions and subcommittees might, by mutual agreement of the chairmen of the corresponding Subcommissions, invite to their sessions the representatives of the democratic parties and public organizations of both North and South Korea, with whom they consider it necessary to talk or to clear up some question.

10. The democratic parties and public organizations of North Korea send their representatives to Seoul with suggestions which have been worked out to submit them to the Commission. The Commission does analogous work concerning the suggestions of the democratic parties and public organizations of North Korea which have been worked out in the same procedure as for the suggestions of the democratic parties and public organizations of South Korea.

11. The coordinated suggestions worked out by the Subcommissions are passed to the Joint Commission for consideration, which examines these suggestions and gives them its preliminary approval.

12. When it considers it timely, the Commission convenes one or several joint sessions with representatives of the democratic parties and public organizations of both North as well as of South Korea and raises the questions for discussion listed in point 4 in a procedure which will be established later by the Commission.

13. The democratic parties and public organizations of both North as well as of South Korea have equal rights and opportunities for consultation with the Joint Commission.

14. After discussion at a joint session of the suggestions indicated in point 11 the Commission appoints an editorial commission which is given instructions regarding the drafting of a final text of recommendations on these questions. The texts [SIC] worked out by the editorial commission are approved by the Commission.

S. K. TSARAPKIN

Commission member from the USSR

CHARLES U. [TELER]

Commission member from the US

mb.if

Authenticated: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF

     THE SOVIET DELEGATION

COLONEL [signature] /ZYUBCHENKO/