Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 'Possible Consequences of Alternative Approaches to Implementation of Ukraine’s Nuclear Policy (Analytical Report)'

Chairman of Verkhovna

Rada of Ukraine

I.S. Plushch

President of Ukraine

L.M. Kravchuk

Prime Minister of Ukraine

L.D. Kuchma

First Deputy Chairman of

the Verkhovna Rada

V.V. Durdynets

Minister of Defense

of Ukraine

K.P. Morozov

Head of SBU of Ukraine

Y.K. Marchuk

[handwritten]

Minister of Machine-building, VPK [military-industrial complex] and conversion of Ukraine

V.I. Antonov

Attached please find the analytical report about possible consequences of alternative approaches to Ukraine’s nuclear policy.

The report was prepared on the basis of analysis of a large volume of materials, primarily Western, which have been published recently and relate not only to the nuclear policy of Ukraine, but also a number of other states, the so-called “nuclear threshold states” that have already fallen under strict control regime. These materials allow to make certain forecasts about the future status of Ukraine in view of the expected consideration by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of issue of ratification of the START treaty and accession to the NPT.

Attachment: the abovementioned, on 6 pages.

Respectfully,

Minister A.M. Zlenko

[signature]

02.02.93

Possible consequences of alternative approaches to implementation of Ukraine’s

nuclear policy

(Analytical report)

Nearly half-century of the existence of nuclear weapons, work by the UN to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, the experience of states that possess it, allow us to forecast consequences of Ukraine's decision regarding the future fate of the nuclear weapons located on its territory. Today, it is already evident that the position of the world’s leading states, [as well as] the reaction by the mass media to the possibility of acquisition of nuclear status by Ukraine is extremely negative.

That is why the determination of Ukraine's position on nuclear weapons on its territory has an exceptional significance for its future.

The MFA of Ukraine has conducted a study of the possible positive and negative consequences of the following alternative approaches to nuclear weapons, located on the territory of Ukraine:

1) Ukraine as a nuclear state,

2) Ukraine as a non-nuclear state without strategic offensive weapons,

3) Ukraine as a non-nuclear state with preservation of a portion of ICBMs.

1. Ukraine as a Nuclear State

1.1. The acquisition of this status involves creation and appropriate maintenance of a nuclear missile complex, the most important components of which, at the very least, are:

- A network of special scientific and research facilities that deal with a broad range of relevant issues,

- Facilities for extraction, processing, and enrichment of uranium and plutonium,

- Facilities that manufacture nuclear warheads,

- Appropriate resources to ensure constant technical servicing and maintenance of an appropriate level of combat readiness of the nuclear arsenal,

- A nuclear test range for the verification of combat capability of nuclear weapons and their modernization.

As evidenced by the experience of the former Soviet Union and other nuclear states, the need to allocate substantial capital at the early stages of developing nuclear missile complex can considerably undermine efforts aimed at conducting social and economic reforms.

1.2. Positive consequences:

- Ukraine becomes in effect a member of the “nuclear club” and receives the status of a great power in the international community, capable of influencing political situation on the regional and global scale. Ukraine's position would have to be taken into account while solving all modern problems of international relations.

- Ukraine acquires a “strong” position in negotiations both with Western countries and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], regarding military and political problems, security issues, etc.

- Ukraine automatically becomes the third most powerful state in military-political terms.

- Ukraine gets certain internal guarantees of its national security owning to the presence of “weapons of deterrence.”

1.3. Negative consequences:

- Ukraine automatically earns a reputation of a state that does not honor its commitments.

- Ukraine automatically becomes an object of “nuclear deterrence” by Russia, United States, and other nuclear states. All sites of the strategic nuclear complex, important economic sites, and largest cities become priority military targets for nuclear weapons of other states.

- Substantial increase in a threat of a preventative nuclear attack against Ukraine, as a result of a mistaken evaluation of its possible intentions and forecasting of its behavior in a crisis situations.

- Absence of a sufficient experience in management and technical maintenance of nuclear missile complex could lead to an unauthorized use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, which would cause a retaliatory nuclear strike, or lead to a nuclear accident.

- Sharp deterioration of relations with the West in political and economic realms, which could be long-lasting and would considerably complicate domestic social and economic situation, as well as damage Ukraine’s international reputation and opportunities to conduct active foreign policy in many vital directions.

- Sharp escalation in relations with Russia, which has a considerable influence on the overall balance of power in Europe and the development of social and political situation in Ukraine, which could have unpredictable consequences.

- Emergence of a “nuclear Ukraine” could become a factor that would unite Russia and the United States, and other Western countries, in a joint anti-Ukrainian position. In such a case, we should consider as highly probable the introduction of political and economic sanctions against Ukraine, and even a full blockade, which could lead to a domestic crisis.

- The negative reaction of neighboring and other European countries would considerably narrow possibilities to conduct active regional policy in the spirit of good neighborly relations and cooperation.

- Termination of maintenance by Russia of nuclear warheads and liquid-fueled ICBMs, produced by Russian companies, would also significantly increase the danger from strategic offensive arms.

- Limitation of international economic, scientific and technical cooperation in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy.  Russia would cease supplies of nuclear export materials, including fuel for Ukrainian nuclear power plants, which would inevitably lead to the deepening of energy crisis. Ukraine would be forced to create its own nuclear energy cycle, which would require considerable financial and material expenses over an extensive period of time.

- Ukraine becomes a violator of the non-proliferation regime, which sets a very dangerous precedent in view of existing so-called  “threshold nuclear states” (India, Pakistan, RSA, Israel, Iraq, and others) in the context of their possible transition to open demands for membership in the “nuclear club” or even creation of the “second nuclear club.”

2. Ukraine as non-nuclear state without strategic offensive arms

2.1. Positive consequences:

- Ukraine confirms its commitment to undertaken obligations, which will receive appropriate high regard of the international community and substantially facilitate consolidation of a positive image of Ukraine on the international arena.

- The level of Ukraine's security increases substantially thanks to the disappearance of components of the nuclear missile complex, which are targets of the strategic weapons of the United States and other nuclear countries, and the threat of a first nuclear strike from them disappears.

- The threat of a nuclear catastrophe due to technological accident disappears.

- Ukraine receives an opportunity to count on considerable Western credits for the conversion of its military industry and implementation of economic reforms.

- Ukraine gets rid of the last element that links it to the Strategic Forces of the CIS and ends its participation in the so-called “joint strategic space” of the CIS, provided for by the [Belavezha] Treaty of December 8, 1991.

- Obtaining wide-ranging security guarantees from Russia and Western countries, first of all, from permanent members of the UN Security Council who have an interest in the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine.

- One of the contentious issues in the Russian-Ukrainian relations is removed, providing an opportunity to more actively defend the interests of Ukraine in the negotiations with Russia on other issues.

- Considerable material, technical, financial, and other resources, necessary for the maintenance of a nuclear missile complex, would be released and reoriented to reequip the material and technical basis of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the general pressing needs of domestic development.

2.2. Negative consequences:

- Ukraine loses, to some extent, the hard power component of global and regional influence in the international affairs and becomes equal to a Black Sea region power such as Turkey in terms of military and political potential.

- Some reduction of political interest to Ukraine on the international arena.

- Narrowing of opportunities to use the “power factor” in foreign policy in solving some issues of interest to us.

- Reduction of the level of military component of national security guarantees, which, in turn, will lead to the need to activate efforts aimed at the development of conventional arms, whose might is approximating that of the nuclear ones.

- Considering the military orientation of a significant part of the Ukrainian industry and scientific establishment, Ukraine’s achievement of a non-nuclear and neutral state would necessarily generate the need to re-organize military and scientific-industrial complexes of Ukraine.

3. Ukraine as non-nuclear state with preservation of a portion of ICBMs

3.1. Positive consequences:

- Ukraine will, as a whole, honor its commitments in acquiring the non-nuclear status, which will provide us with additional, albeit not very convincing, arguments against possible accusations of hypocrisy and rejection from the direction selected earlier.

- Ukraine remains one of the most powerful military states in Europe, inferior only to England, France, and Russia.

- Ukraine preserves a “strong” position in bilateral and multilateral negotiations on military and political problems, security issues, etc.

- Ukraine preserves some domestic guarantees of its national security, keeping the strategic “deterrent weapon.”

- The preservation of non-nuclear strategic offensive arms allows Ukraine to maintain the existing capacity for missile production, which preserves an opportunity at any time to start production and modernization of strategic offensive arms, should such need be grounded in defensive or other interests of Ukraine, and create a reliable basis for the establishment of our state as a missile exporter.

3.2. Negative consequences:

- There is high probability that Ukraine will be accused of hidden aggressiveness for keeping such armed forces which are designed not exclusively for defensive purposes.

- ICBMs without a nuclear component would remain priority military targets for the strategic nuclear forces of the United States, England, and France.

- Maintaining such missile complexes would require considerable financial expense, which would surpass their military benefits to Ukraine.

- The decrease in the credit of international trust toward Ukraine, which could find itself in “silent isolation” in the international arena.

- The strategic military potential of Ukraine could cause concern among neighboring countries, and other European countries, which would somewhat reduce our chances to conduct active regional and bilateral policy in these areas.

- Ukraine’s opportunity to receive international, including “nuclear,” guarantees of its national security would be sharply reduced.

- The Russian Armed Forces would have undoubted advantage over the Ukrainian Armed Forces in preserving their nuclear arsenals, which would provide Russia with “strong” position in negotiations on security issues and other military and political issues. If Ukraine does not receive “nuclear guarantees,” such situation could create certain disequilibrium in bilateral relations and somewhat downgrade the security level of the eastern border.

MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] of Ukraine