Officials from the US Department of State, the White House, the CIA, NSC, OSD, and JCS determine US policy toward South Korea in light of the events in Gwangju.

Botha describes that neither South Africa nor Rhodesia can count on much support from the United States.

In his National Security Council memorandum to Brzezinski, Donald Gregg notes that Kim Il Sung appears conciliatory toward the South during his conversation with Solarz. Gregg then makes recommendations on how the US and South Korea should respond.

In this lengthy transcript of discussions between Stephen Solarz and Kim Il Sung, Solarz poses questions about prospects for Korea's unification, exchanges between North and South Korea, and exchanges between North Korea and the U.S. In his response, Kim emphasizes the DPRK's views regarding the necessary preconditions for unification and increased cooperation between the two Koreas. Later, Kim Yong Nam continues to elaborate to Solarz on the North Korean perspective of unification and the role of the international community in perpetrating division.

Participants in the meeting included President Carter, Minister Vance, MP van Agt and also Min. Van der Klaauw, Zbigniew Brzezinksi, David Aaron, Tammenoms Bakker, and Merckelbach. Conversation revolves around TNF modernization and arms negotiation with the Soviet Union. Both parties discuss domestic difficulties shaping how these issues are presented and pursued.

Memorandum of conversation between Secretary Vance, National Security Advisor Brzezinski, Dutch Prime Minister Van Agt, and Minister Van der Klaauw. The conversation focuses on Dutch domestic sentiment toward TNF modernization and SALT II.