Denmark

The Soviet leadership discusses the state of Soviet foreign policy after the Hungarian crisis and Khrushchev’s visit to the US. Molotov criticizes Khrushchev for recklessness in foreign policy direction. Soviet inroads in the Middle East and the Third World are analyzed. The effects of the crises in Eastern Europe are placed in the context of the struggle against US imperialism.

At the end of October 1945 two NDVD employees of the “S” Department for atomic intelligence activities were sent to Denmark to establish contact and speak with Niels Bohr. They managed to meet Bohr at his institute twice, on 14 and 16 November 1945, and obtained answers to 22 questions on constructing a nuclear reactor and the atomic bomb.

Memo to Stalin discussing Beria’s efforts to obtain information from physicist Niels Bohr about development of the atomic bomb.

Stalin, Rasmussen, and Axel discuss the development of Soviet Danish relations. Topics include economic and political exchanges.

This estimate updated an estimate (NIE-4-2-64) published in 1964 of the nuclear proliferation problem. That estimate, like this one, overestimated the likelihood of an Indian bomb, while somewhat underestimating Israel’s program. This assessment followed the same pattern—predicting India would produce a weapon within a “few years” and also putting Israel in the “might” category, although treating it as a “serious contender” nonetheless. Also following a short discussion of the “snowball effect” (later known as “proliferation cascades” or “chains”) suggesting that the United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria) and Pakistan were likely to take the nuclear option should India or Israel go nuclear.