This record of a meeting with the secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Boris Ponomarev, and with the secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Konstantin Katushev, addresses the anti-Soviet course adopted by Beijing. The discussion specifically refers to relations between China and the Communist parties of Albania, Romania, Australia, France, Italy, and New Zealand. The document also assesses the situation in Anwar el-Sadat's Egypt, in Hafez al-Assad's Syria, in Iraq, and in Yemen, the main idea being that the Socialist countries should support the development of progressive Arabic states.

This East German report, issued after the Interkit meeting in Prague, addresses the domestic and foreign policies of China. It makes reference to internal conflicts destabilizing the Chinese leadership. China is said to be enhancing its military potential, especially in the area of missiles and nuclear weapons. Its aims in foreign policy are to acquire a leadership position in the so-called "Third World", to expand its relations with capitalist countries, to damage the unity of the Socialist bloc, and to obstruct the foreign relations of the Soviet Union. Considering the increase of influence of China on North Korea, Romania, and Vietnam, as well as on the Communist parties in Spain and Italy, the Socialist countries must improve their anti-Maoist propaganda efforts.

This East German report, issued after the Interkit meeting in Warsaw, addresses the situation in China under the leadership of Mao Zedong. Among the issues discussed are the ninth congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Mao's anti-Soviet foreign policy, especially China's relations with the US and West Germany. The ninth congress of the CCP is said to have stabilized Mao's position and is seen as the founding congress of a new party. Among other topics, the delegates also discuss ways to improve anti-Maoist propaganda.

Conversation with First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Sverev, describing the Vietnamese attitude toward China as becoming colder. At the same time, printing of China's anti-Soviet propaganda has become more limited and the Vietnamese appear grateful for Soviet aid. Sverev also estimates that there are over 200,000 Chinese troops stationed in North Vietnam.

Unnamed Soviet specialists claim that the USSR's aid to Vietnam is worth 1 million rubles per day. They also argue that because of the amount of aid, the Chinese propaganda claiming a lack of Soviet aid is losing ground among the population in North Vietnam, although the rumor still persists in the South.

An unnamed Soviet official explains that Chinese officers and advisors in Vietnam are discouraging the use of Soviet weapons, despite the fact that they are the most modern and effective.

Soviet Ambassador Ilya Shcherbakov informs a meeting of Socialist Ambassadors of Soviet-Vietnamese talks in Moscow. He notes that the United States realizes it does not have the international support for Vietnam that it had expected, and that the Soviet Union will continue to support Vietnam in the struggle. He argues that there is still much anti-Soviet propaganda in Vietnam, which comes from the Chinese, and points out three positions of the Chinese that he does not understand.

Siurus specifies how representatives of the Chinese embassy in Havana are spreading negative propaganda and the Soviet Union in Cuba. Trade negotiations with Poland and Cuban sugar exports to Britain are also discussed.

Pavlicek reports that Chinese representatives in Cuba have launched an anti-Soviet propaganda campaign, aimed towards all levels of the Cuban population. He mentions that many Cubans in favor of Chinese propaganda activity have expressed the opinion that China will support Cuban revolutionary activity in Latin America.

Guevara discusses Cuban economic development, Chinese anti-Soviet propaganda, a proposed PURS (United Party of the Socialist Revolution) party program, and a training program for Cubans in the Soviet Union.