Search | Wilson Center Digital Archive

Switch to Visualization

English Clear All

Related Resources

Gyeongbokgung

East Asia

South Korea

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

Japan's Itsukushima Shrine

East Asia

Japan

Dr. Syngman Rhee, 1939

Syngman Rhee Era

The Taj Mahal Shrine in Agra, India.

South Asia

India

Aerial photograph of CIA headquarters

United States. Central Intelligence Agency

-

South Korean Diplomacy in Asia, 1955-1957

Dr. Syngman Rhee, 1939

Rhee, Syngman

1875- 1965

Jan Nowak-Jeziorański broadcasting for Radio Free Europe, 3 May 1952

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty

Indian Nuclear History

George H.W. Bush and Lech Walesa

CIA Reports on the Collapse of Communism in Europe

South African Nuclear History

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

Korea (South). Embassy (Philippines)

-

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

Korea (South). Embassy (Japan)

-

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

United States. Department of State

-

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

Kim, Young Kee

-

Results:

31 - 40 of 4214

Display:

Sort By:

Documents

March 18, 1963	American Embassy Ankara Telegram 1097 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC Hare informs the Department that, in light of the Wood mission, the Turkish military would not request any changes in the text of the notes to be exchanged on the Jupiters/Polaris arrangement. It might be possible for the Turkish government to sign an “executive-type” agreement instead of taking the matter to parliament. With the U.S. willing to talk with Turkish officials and provide “reassurance,” the Wood mission “played large role in obtaining Turkish cooperation” in the details of the “missile substitution.”
March 15, 1963	Department of State Telegram 1772 to the American Embassy Rome The State Department instructs the Embassy to inform Italian authorities that if the Jupiter dismantling was to be completed within the first 25 days of April, as the Italian government requested, military officials needed to be notified accordingly. According to the Deputy CINCEUR, Italian military officials had not yet received authorization on the dismantling. The State Department hoped that Italian military personnel would be available for the operation “notwithstanding Easter holidays."
March 15, 1963	John W. Bowling, GTI [Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs] to Mr. Kitchen, G/PM [Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs], 'General Wood’s Visit to Turkey' Having accompanied General Wood on the mission to Turkey, Bowling provides Kitchen with a copy of the top secret record of the discussions with the Turkish General Staff (which remain classified). According to Bowling, Wood “accomplished his mission” by conducting the talks with “great skill and vigor”: “There will be no stalling on Jupiter removal from the Turkish military.” With the Turkish Chiefs of Staff “badly shaken up” by the implications of the Jupiter removal, Wood helped check “the slide in … morale” by addressing concerns about MAP funds, Turkish participation in Polaris targeting, the selection of a port for the Polaris visit (with Izmir preferred by Turkey), and the disposition of facilities at Cigli.
March 11, 1963	Department of State Telegram 820 to the American Embassy Ankara The Kennedy administration found it necessary to solve the problem raised by Ambassador Hare lest military assistance cuts delay or prevent action to dismantle the Turkish Jupiters. After the Wood mission left Washington, in accordance with NSC 1550 (setting requirements for foreign aid funding decisions), the State Department undid the cuts by authorizing Wood to discuss specific quantities of approved equipment that could be delivered during FY 1963 and quantities and types of equipment that could be provided during FY 1964. For the latter, equipment could be provided up to a level of $150 million (thus providing the modernization resources sought by the Turkish military), but Wood was not to mention any dollar values during the talks.
March 9, 1963	American Embassy Ankara Telegram 1063 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC Concerning levels of military aid, Hare warns that “abrupt and negative action on our part could have certainly foreseeable reaction detrimental not only to proper resolution of existing problems but also to our fundamental relationship” with Turkey.
March 9, 1963	Memorandum from NEA [Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs] Philips Talbot to G [Deputy Under State of State for Political Affairs Alexis] Johnson, 'FY 1964 MAP Levels as Basis General Wood’s Discussions in Turkey' According to Talbot, an impasse in the impending talks between General Wood and the Turkish General Staff could have damaging implications for the removal of the Jupiters and for U.S.-Turkish relations. A key issue is the level of Military Assistance Program spending for the modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces, with the Turks believing that they “need and deserve” a higher modernization rate than the U.S. had programmed. For the Turkish military, $120 million would represent a “sudden and catastrophic decline.” Citing the importance of keeping the military “in line,” Talbot cites Ambassador Hare’s argument that “it would be difficult to conceive a worse time for making a significant reduction in MAP” and urges Johnson to authorize Gen. Wood to start with a “base of least” $150 million.
March 8, 1963	American Embassy Ankara Telegram 1060 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC The Embassy reports to the State Department that the ratification of an exchange of notes by the Grand National Assembly would not prevent the U.S. from early initiation of a “technical level” approach on dismantling the Jupiters. No “unacceptable political risks” would be involved. Turkey’s participation in the presentation to the NAC meant that “we can probably take it for granted we have final answer and proceed accordingly up to point of physical removal.”
March 7, 1963	Department of State Telegram 808 to the American Embassy Ankara Following up on earlier ideas about direct talks with Turkish officials, General Robert Wood, the director of Military Assistance Programs at the Department of Defense, would be visiting Turkey for talks. This State Department message notes that in light of proposed overall cuts of foreign aid, projected military aid to Turkey would total $120 million, and U.S. officials would emphasize Washington’s “continuing long term interest” in Turkey’s military capabilities. Issues for Hare’s consideration include the “adequacy” of the proposed approach and what needed to be done to bolster Turkish “confidence and morale” and to prevent any “stalling” on the Jupiters.
March 6, 1963	Department of State Telegram 800 to the American Embassy Ankara The U.S. had hoped that an exchange of notes with Turkey on the Jupiter/Polaris arrangement would facilitate a technical level approach to the Turkish military on the “mechanics of Jupiter dismantling.” But with parliamentary approval of the notes delayed, and not likely to occur until later in the month, the U.S. needed to make an approach on dismantling so that it occurred in conjunction with the arrival of Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean. With dismantling scheduled to begin on April 15, the Department would like Hare’s advice on whether a technical approach could be made “without running unacceptable political risk.”
March 3, 1963	American Embassy Ankara Telegram 1030 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC Hare delivered McNamara’s response to Sancar’s letter to Erkin, who found it “very good, very constructive.” While reading it, Erkin observed that Sancar had been difficult, not for “reasons peculiar to him” but because there was a “general uneasiness” that “things may be happening which affect Turkey, but to which GOT is not privy.” That perception had an impact on Sancar’s “desire … for physical [Turkish] presence on Polaris.”