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December 22, 1962	Department of State Telegram 537 to the American Embassy Ankara Referring to the telegram on McNamara’s meetings with Andreotti and Sancar, Dean Rusk requested that Ambassadors Hare and Reinhardt to return to Washington for consultation as soon as feasible “to assist in developing plans to implement” the gradual withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles. To avoid raising suspicions, Rusk explained that their “return should not be simultaneous but should be arranged so as to permit overlap in Washington.” As the Turkish matter was more complicated, he advised Hare to return before Reinhardt. The “immediate objective will be to formulate best possible tactics to employ in relation to respective governments.” The Ambassadors could “very confidentially inform Foreign Ministers and/or Defense Ministers purpose of return, indicating they will be working on technical and military aspects of proposal in preparation for further consultation with both governments.”
December 14, 1962	Memorandum of Conversation between Robert S. McNamara, Robert S. McNamara, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Paul H. Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Ilhami Sancar, Minister of Defense Turkey, 14 December 1962 During his meeting with Turkish defense minister Sancar, McNamara raised the risks posed by, and to, the Jupiter missiles and the need to withdraw those “obsolete” missiles and replace them with Polaris SLBMs. Turkish officials would play a role in targeting the missiles at NATO military headquarters. Worried about the implications of withdrawing the Jupiters, Sancar expressed concern about the impact that removal of the missiles would have on Turkish “confidence” in the U.S., the need to avoid “moral depression” (meaning morale) among “the people or the army” and stressed that the U.S. (“the best of allies”) was leaving Turkey “to a condition of ‘aloneness.’” McNamara did not believe that substituting Polaris for Jupiters would have that impact. Both agreed on the importance of proceeding in secrecy. When Sancar observed that the late delivery of F-104G’s would adversely affect morale, McNamara said that an earlier date would be possible and suggested the possibility of announcing earlier delivery with the removal of the Jupiters. McNamara added that “time was of the essence.” The State Department later sent a telegram to the ambassadors in Italy and Turkey reporting on McNamara’s meetings with Andreotti and Sancar.
December 13, 1962	Memorandum of Conversation between Minister of Defense of Italy, Mr. Andreotti, Secretary McNamara and Assistant Secretary Nitze In a meeting with Italian Defense Minister Guilio Andreotti, McNamara had several matters to raise, but soon brought up the Jupiters and the need to “substitute something more responsive and less vulnerable to sabotage or direct attack.” When Andreotti raised the possibility of a naval deployment, McNamara agreed, suggesting assigning Polaris submarines to SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe), “with an Italian role in the targeting.” Suggesting that the U.S take the initiative on the matter, Andreotti preferred that it be settled before the spring 1963 elections.
December 13, 1962	McGeorge Bundy, 'Last Conversation with the President before NATO Meeting of December 1962' Kennedy, McNamara and Rusk moved ahead with the Jupiters matter by making plans to bring it up with Italian and Turkish defense ministers at the NATO meeting in Paris in December 1962. The goal would be to persuade them of the obsolescence of the Jupiters, the dangers that they posed during the Cuban crisis and in future crises, and the need for “better arrangements,” such as “a rearrangement of Polaris deployments.” President Kennedy continued to monitor the Jupiter missiles problem. During a meeting with Rusk a few weeks later, McNamara explained that President Kennedy, who he had seen in Palm Beach on December 27, had asked him what steps were being taken “to remove the Jupiters.” Consistent with that, McNamara favored the “earliest possible date” and asked whether a “deadline” could be set for April 1 to begin the removals.
November 9, 1962	Memorandum from William R. Tyler to the Secretary [Dean Rusk] through U. Alexis Johnson, 'Turkish and Italian IRBM's' Seymour Weiss would push back against any efforts to remove the Jupiters, but he and others realized that President Kennedy had a “keen interest” in the matter and that Secretary of Defense McNamara had ordered that action be taken (assigning his General Counsel John McNaughton to take the lead). Nevertheless Weiss and Assistant Secretary of State William Tyler presented Secretary of State Rusk with a memorandum making the case against action on the Jupiters or at least postponing their removal until a “later time.” Paralleling arguments made during the crisis by Ambassadors Hare and Reinhardt, Tyler pointed to the “symbolic and psychological importance” of the Jupiter deployments. While Tyler noted parenthetically that the Italians had “given indications of a disposition to work toward the eventual removal of the Jupiters,” the U.S. could not phase them out “without general Alliance agreement,” including Italy and Turkey’s consent, “unless we are prepared to lay ourselves open to the charge of abrogation of specific or implied agreements.” Rusk was in the know on the secret deal, but his reference to a “later time” was consistent with it and signing the memo would have placated Tyler and Weiss.
October 30, 1962	Memorandum from Seymour Weiss, Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, to Jeffrey Kitchen, 'Turkish IRBM Trade-Off' That some officials in the State Department’s European Affairs bureau were convinced that Kennedy had approved a trade of the Jupiters in Turkey puzzled State Department official Seymour Weiss, who was convinced that the higher-ups has rejected a trade. In this memo, Weiss asked a colleague, Jeffrey Kitchen, to get an “accurate reading” on the matter.
October 26, 1962	American Embassy Ankara Telegram 587 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC In an “eyes only” response to a State Department query about the Jupiters, U.S. Ambassador Raymond Hare observed that “if proper means could be found, good case could be made for removal of Jupiters from Turkey as counter for removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba.” Yet, withdrawing the missiles as part of a Cuban Missile Crisis arrangement would pose a problem that was “partly psycho-political” and “partly substantive.” With reference to the “psycho-political” problem, Hare’s explanation was framed ethnocentrically: The Turks “are proud, courageous people who do not understand concept or process of compromise.” In that context, the U.S. would lose much “if in process of Jupiter removal [the] Turks should get the impression that their interests as an ally were being traded off in order to appease an enemy.” He recommended several alternative solutions to the problem; for example, if the missiles are phased out, the U.S. could provide Turkey with a backup, such as the proposed Multilateral Force (MLF) or Polaris missiles. If Italy gave up its Jupiters, he suggests, that could help with an approach to Turkey.
October 26, 1962	American Embassy Rome Telegram 436 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC On October 26, 1962, as the Cuban Missile Crisis is unfolding, U.S. Ambassador G. Frederick Reinhardt replied to a State Department inquiry about possible Italian reactions to withdrawal of the Jupiters, stating that they “would probably be manageable,” but also recommending early consultations with the Italian government if they were to “form part of negotiated settlement.” In particular, Reinhardt suggested offsetting the withdrawal with gestures to appeal to the Italian government’s craving for status, such as (a) presenting the removal as an Italian contribution to the relaxation of East-West tensions, (b) some kind of “big power consultation” between the U.S. and Italy, coupled with assurances on “the presence of Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean,” (c) “public emphasis on Italy’s role in NATO in order to counter-balance loss of value which missiles have for Italy in calling attention to its role and position in alliance,” and (d) a promise to halt further reductions of U.S. military commitments in Italy. In short, Reinhardt saw a phase-out as a possibility but something to be “be very carefully handled.”
March 27, 1952	National Intelligence Estimate Number 27/1, 'Chinese Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to Taiwan through 1952' The CIA predicts that, as long as US support to Taiwan remains constant, the PRC cannot stage a successful attack on the island.
March 16, 1955	National Intelligence Estimate Number 100-4-55, 'Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to the Offshore Islands and Taiwan through 1955, and Communist and Non-Communist Reactions with Respect to the Defense of Taiwan' The CIA on whether the PRC has the ability to seize Taiwan and/or the offshore islands.